ideas, in favor of such real connections as the understanding directly observed. 85

6. One final aspect of Locke's epistemology should be mentioned. Locke distinguished between knowledge and probability. On the one hand, knowledge is certain and indubitable. It partakes of the nature of universality, and is altogether free from the bias of a personal point of view. "If an intelligent being at one end of the world, and another at the other end of the world, will consider twice two and four together, he cannot but find them to be equal." 86 Knowledge thus is absolute and final. On the other hand, probability is a hazard, a guess, a matter of faith. It is so affected by a personal factor, that anything like universality in estimating chances is impossible. It leads, therefore, to a willingness to tolerate divergent opinions on many matters of even pressing human concern.

Locke considered that knowledge itself is of three degrees. (1) Intuitive knowledge is that in which "the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other." 87 The identity of each thing with itself, the distinction between one thing and any other, many relations of our sensations, and all ultimate, abstract principles are included in this class. No proof, no intermediary connecting link or argument is necessary.88 To get all knowledge into this form would be to attain the ideal. God's knowledge is all of this type; 89 but we human beings have only a limited amount of it. (2) Demonstrative knowledge is that in which the mind perceives the connection between two ideas “by the intervention of other ideas." 90 Knowledge of this type consists of a series of steps, each of which, however, must be intuitive. (3) Sensitive knowledge is that in which the ideas derived through our senses bear witness to "the particular existence of finite beings without us." "91 This kind of knowledge does not reach "to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty." Yet Locke would include it under the eulogistic term of knowledge instead of calling it probability. He really thus broke with what his epistemological position logically calls. for, in order to keep his ontological faith in the world of external objects.

In his insistence upon the absolute certainty of knowledge, Locke showed that he shared to a certain extent the general rationalistic confidence of his age. Yet he did limit the field within which such knowledge is available. We often lack the ideas necessary for knowl

edge of a subject; and even where we have ideas, we may fail to discern the connections between them.92 Thus Locke marks a step towards the skepticism which was beginning to fall upon philosophic thought. Probability is necessary after all in order "to supply the defect of our knowledge." " We must give our assent to many propositions, even when we are not certain of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas therein brought together. Many times the probability is very great; at other times, it is quite slight.94 Yet always, in probability as in knowledge, our conclusion comes through the operation of reason upon the ideas of experience. "Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything." 95

CHAPTER II

LOCKE'S TREATMENT OF REASON AS THE ETHICAL FACULTY

1. Locke's general epistemological position pledged him to a rationalistic moral philosophy. In ethics, just as in all other branches of thought, he regarded reason as the faculty through which, and through which alone, knowledge can be obtained.

But at the outset of a discussion of his ethics it is important to note just what he did, and just what he did not, mean by reason. For though there was much in his rationalistic stand which was in verbal agreement with the prevalent view in his day, he introduced, as was seen in the last chapter, a new conception of reason. His predecessors and contemporaries referred to reason in rather a loose, eulogistic sense; he treated it more strictly and exactly as a definite kind of power. They frequently viewed it as a means whereby rational beings can evolve knowledge from within themselves; he regarded it as a means whereby rational beings can judge concerning the ideas which come to them from without. They made it competent in and of itself to obtain the ultimate truth in religion and ethics; he held it to be only latent until it is furnished with materials from experience. They were pure rationalists, pointing to reason as the sole requirement for knowledge, and thus tending to make the principles discovered by reason as innate as reason itself; he was a combination of rationalist and empiricist, not only granting the necessity for knowledge of the innate faculty of reason, but also insisting that this faculty, in order to reach valid conclusions, must operate upon ideas derived from sensation and reflection. Thus though Locke accepted the widespread confidence in reason, he completely broke with the type of rationalism current before his time, and gave a new definition of reason which profoundly modified moral theory.

In this chapter, an endeavor will be made to expound Locke's view of reason as the ethical faculty. To treat reason alone without discussing the ideas to which reason must be directed is to isolate one element of Locke's philosophy in an artificial manner; but since the next two chapters will deal with the materials whence reason discovers the moral law, such isolation is not unfair nor dangerous to a wellbalanced account of Locke's ethical theories. The significance of Locke's rationalism will become most clear by reviewing his attack upon innate ideas, his confidence in the mathematical demonstrability

of morality, and the controversies into which he ran with his contemporaries over the exact nature of the faculty by which the principles of morality are made known.

1

2. In dealing with Locke's general epistemological views, only a passing reference was made to his rejection of innate ideas. Certainly there is good precedent for minimizing the first book of the Essay in which this denial of innate ideas appears. Locke himself barely mentioned this book in the abstract of the Essay 1 which he contributed in 1688 to Le Clerc's Bibliothèque Universelle; and Wynne, who with Locke's approval published in 1696 an abridgment of the Essay for use at the universities, omitted reference to the first book altogether. Yet what is trivial in sketching Locke's contribution to epistemological theory, becomes more important in dealing with his ethics. For anyone who rejected innate ideas would have to find a new basis for moral philosophy and give a new interpretation to the customary view of conscience. Hence Locke's attack on "innate practical principles" deserves careful consideration.

It is a most interesting fact that the conservatives and radicals among Locke's contemporaries resorted to very similar means of defense for their opposed theories. Both parties, orthodox and heretical, appealed to innate impressions as proof of the truth of their divergent claims. The conservative point of view is rather typically represented in John Edwards who made several scurrilous assaults upon Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity. He maintained that “these natural impressions in all men's minds are the foundation of religion and the standard of truth as well as of morality;" 2 and he deplored Locke's denial of the innate character of commonly accepted speculative principles because that denial led to a slighting of Christian principles too. The radical point of view is found most adequately in the writings of the deists, who, as was shown above, followed Lord Herbert in his reliance on innate truths. The only material difference in the appeal which conservatives and radicals alike made to innate truths was over the question of whose minds contained the infallible impressions. The conservatives always emphasized the wide differences between themselves and the unbelieving mass of men; the radicals always emphasized the common elements in the faith and practise. of all mankind. Consequently, the conservatives found assurance of truth in the innate ideas of those only who were competent to judge (thus gaining warrant to set up extravagant claims for their own sect and to exclude all who differed from them); the radicals, however, appealed to the innate ideas of all men everywhere, reading their own favorite articles into all other faiths and all other civilizations, and

1 This abstract is reprinted in King: Life of Locke, pp. 365 ff.

2 The Socinian Creed, p. 122.

3

thus venturing to use even their opponents as part of the defense for their own positions. A rather mediating point of view is seen in those moderate liberals like Grotius and the other writers on natural law, who appealed to the common consent of all, and yet acknowledged that in the minds of many men the innate impressions were partly or wholly effaced. But conservatives, moderates, and radicals, however much they differed as to the number of minds in which they claimed that reliable impressions might be found, at least agreed in supposing those impressions to be innate.

4

Locke drew the only logical conclusion which could be drawn from these rival appeals to innate impressions by the most divergent schools of thought, namely, that all the claims were alike a matter of futile dogmatism. The belief in innate truths served only as an idle excuse for rigorous thinking; "it eased the lazy from the pains of search." 3 The advocates of innate ideas he considered as guilty of giving way to "enthusiasm" which beclouded their calm judgment. The chapter on enthusiasm towards the end of the fourth book of the Essay was not inserted until the fourth edition; but the dangers of enthusiasm had been noted by Locke much earlier, as entries in his journal in 1682 show. The imaginations of men's fancy "are apt to disturb and depress the rational power of the mind," and lead them to entertain a proposition "with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant." 5 Locke maintained that no form of enthusiasm is more dangerous than resorting to alleged innate ideas in lieu of genuine proof, and in opposition to that current type of enthusiasm he based his views on as careful an empirical examination of anthropological data as was possible in his day. During his early travels on the continent, he observed a great many divergences of belief and custom; and he had a keen interest in the reports of those who took long journeys to the less familiar parts of the globe, as his constant references to "savages" in the first book of the Essay show. It was probably as a result of these studies, which in method were quite a scientific advance over the procedure of other seventeenth-century writers, that Locke discarded the claims of both radicals and conservatives in their appeal to innate ideas.

7

6

Locke first took up the argument of the radicals that there are certain universally accepted truths. To this argument he replied that "there are no practical principles wherein all men agree." & He felt that the strength of the appeals to innate moral ideas was due to the fact

3 Essay, I, 3, 25,

4 King: Life of Locke, pp. 126–128.

5 Essay, IV, 19, 1.

6 Cf. King: Op. cit., pp. 46-86, 109–120, 160-168.

"8

"Cf. also Locke's letter to Thomas Cudworth, asking for information about native customs in foreign parts. Bourne: Life of Locke, Vol. I, p. 474.

8 Essay, I, 2, 27.