Essay appeared in 1690. But the beginning of the deistic movement dates far back into the seventeenth century. It began to be a factor in English thought when Lord Herbert of Cherbury first published his De Veritate in 1624. This early work was followed by Herbert's second important book, De Religione Gentilium, in 1663. Then Blount's writings began to appear in 1679, and a collected edition of them was edited by his pupil Gildon in 1693. Few other books 2 or pamphlets prior to 1690 have survived to indicate the exact extent to which Herbert's teachings were adopted, a fact which no doubt is at least partly due to the zeal with which heretical works in this period were deliberately destroyed. But various attacks on deism-by Stillingfleet in 1677, by Assheton in 1685, and by Prideaux in 1697—clearly indicate that other deistic writings had been put forth. Deism may not have been presented to the public in many books or lengthy treatises. It may have been disseminated only in pamphlets, in personal letters, in sermons, and in conversation. But at least the movement was a more important factor in the thought of the two generations. preceding Locke than could be inferred from its literary remains.

5

3

Locke was certainly influenced considerably by the early deists. From his reference to Lord Herbert in the Essay, it is possible to infer that he had not had his attention called to the De Veritate until after he had formed his own views. But he must have been more familiar with the currents of thought contemporary with himself. He confessedly put forth his work on The Reasonableness of Christianity as a means of mediating between the warring theological schools." Certainly his insistence on the messiahship of Jesus and the necessity for revelation was designed to offset the deistic tendency to neglect the historical origins and supernatural character of the Christian faith; it has even been conjectured that he had Blount particularly in mind. Yet he also, at the same time, wished to help the deists in denying the indispensability of a host of speculative dogmas which were being more and more questioned by educated men. In a letter to Limborch he wrote that he deliberately ventured to shock the or

2 Hobbes's writings are not here included in the list of deistic literature prior to 1690. For though he is usually classified as a deist, his position in ethics is so unique as to require separate treatment. Blount was a follower of Hobbes in political matters, and edited a volume of extracts from the Leviathan. But his other works are generally more akin to the position of Lord Herbert.

8 Even John Leland, whose book A View of the Principal Deistical Writers (1754-1756) is the earliest history of deism, mentioned only Lord Herbert, Hobbes, and Blount in the period before 1690. Gildon included in The Oracles of Reason letters signed by R. A. Richardson, Rob. Yaxly, and Au. Rogers. But if these were names of some fellow deists, they have now ceased to be anything but mere names. 4 Essay, I, 2,15.

5 It is quite possible, however, that Locke had been familiar with Herbert's De Religione Gentilium for some time. This work, being more concerned with religion than De Veritate was, would appeal more to Locke's interest. An early essay by Locke, entitled Sacerdos (King: Life of Locke, p. 186), suggests Herbert's book very strongly, and was written just about the time when Herbert's book appeared. But this conjecture is supported by no external evidence whatever, and hence cannot be relied on. 6 Works, Vol. VII, p. 188.

7 Gillett: The Moral System, p. 35.

thodox by some of his doctrines in the first part of The Reasonableness of Christianity, in order that he might render his book useful to the deists. Hence, though he felt that the deists misunderstood historic Christianity in many of their attacks, yet he sympathized with their liberal programme. His interest in theology was quite keen; and as a close observer of contemporary movements, he could hardly have failed to know much of the deistic literature. Which particular writers he was familiar with, no one can now ascertain. But the general influence of the movement on his religious and moral ideas is quite clear.

2. There is no one ethical system which can be pointed to as typically deistic. For deism was, of course, not an ethical, but a theological, movement; and men who agreed in certain theological doctrines might differ in their moral philosophy. The main purposes of Lord Herbert and the other early deists were to find a common basis on which the warring Christian sects might unite, to set aside Scripture as an infallible revelation from God, and to refute certain of the more supernaturalistic articles of the established theologies. Any discussion of ethics was almost incidental. Yet in spite of a lack of attention to strictly moral philosophy, the early deists enunciated a few principles which had important effects.

3. The whole philosophy of the deists, as of the writers on the law of nature, was quite rationalistic. Indeed if their theories of knowledge were alone to be considered, the two groups of writers might with good warrant be classified together. Lord Herbert even claimed that he published his first work with the approval of Grotius. Hence no extended comment on the rationalism of the deists is here required. The deists, like the other writers, had turned to reason for something universal and absolute, something which stood above the passions of party strife. Reason alone can win men away from the multiplicity of sects to the one true faith. The lower animals, who have to care only for their subsistence in the present, may have a suitable guide to action in their instincts; but man, who has also to anticipate future needs and to prepare for the life to come, must be ruled by reason. All the best men of all ages have followed reason. Reason leads to that which has been known always, everywhere, and by all. It alone destroys misleading prejudices. It alone serves as an adequate moral guide. And though it is "not sufficient to bring us to a perfect knowledge of all things," it is "able to furnish us with enough to make us happy.” 10

8 Letter to Limborch, Oct. 29, 1697. Works, Vol. X, pp. 63-64. Also Cf. Works, Vol. VII, p. 229, where Locke speaks of "deists and Christians" with equal deference.

• In his Autobiography, p. 93, Herbert wrote that Grotius was one of the first to read the manuscript of De Veritate, that he spoke of it with "more commendations than it is fit for me to repeat,” and that he "exhorted me earnestly to print and publish it."

10 Gildon: preface to Oracles of Reason, pp. 1-3. Cf. Herbert: Ancient Religion of the Gentiles, pp. 255-268, 299-300.

Reason meant, for the early deists, the knowledge of innate principles. This doctrine Lord Herbert stated in a cruder and more extreme form than any other important writer of the century. There are five definite articles written in the hearts of all men," which "not only we, but all mankind in general, must needs acknowledge." 12 These undeniable propositions are: "that there is one supreme God; that he ought to be worshiped; that virtue and piety are the chief parts of divine worship; that we ought to be sorry for our sins, and repent of them; and that the divine goodness doth dispense rewards. and punishments both in this life and after it." 13 Since our faculties are conformed to the nature of the world without us, these innate propositions convey certain knowledge. They are "orthodox and catholic," and are sufficient without further additions to procure eternal happiness.14 From them all particular rules for concrete moral situations can be deduced. These five propositions were repeated by other writers in substantially the same form.15 Thus they represent the type of rationalism characteristic of the early deists. of the seventeenth century.

4. The early deistic writers were the first moralists in modern times to reject entirely the Scriptural sanction in ethics. Other writers. of the seventeenth century had granted that morality could be proved by reason, but had also added that the divine revelation in Scripture would be found to be perfectly harmonious therewith.16 Thus, in spite of the admission of the right of reason to examine fundamental issues, the conclusions of reason were usually determined in advance. Reason had to operate within the limits of an external authority, and was constrained to agreement with the letter of Scripture. For every moral precept in the Bible, some justification had to be found. The difficulties into which the deists drove their more orthodox contemporaries can be seen in the replies made to the deistic position by Stillingfleet, Assheton, and Prideaux. Stillingfleet's Letter to a Deist is especially illuminating. His opponent had evidently maintained that Scripture contains things "inconsistent with the wisdom or goodness of God according to a rational persuasion." 17 He defended Scripture against this attack by three curious arguments. First, 11 Herbert: op. cit., pp. II, 356.

12 Idem, p. 3.

13 Idem, PP. 3~4.

pp. 210-222.

These five articles were more fully treated in the earlier work, De Veritate,

14 Herbert: The Ancient Religion of the Gentiles, p. 364.

15 E. g., by "A. W." in a letter to Blount, which Gildon reprinted in the Oracles of Reason, p. 197. However, later deists, writing after 1690, were unwilling to subscribe to innate truths. Wollaston, in 1724, in deference to Locke's criticism in the Essay, spoke of the acceptance of "principles that are born with us" as a superficial view, and regarded the alleged innate maxims as due to "the impressions of education." Cf. The Religion of Nature Delineated, pp. 35-36.

16 Cf. Tillotson, John Howe, Edward Fowler, etc. Even Hobbes, though probably only as a matter of discreet policy, endeavored to find sanction for his views in quotations from the Bible. 17 Stillingfleet: A Letter to a Deist, p. 106.

some seemingly immoral provisions are justified on the ground that they have prophetical value. "May not God make use of one vice, whose evil is notorious, to represent another by, whose evil they are more hardly convinced of?" 18 Secondly, some concessions are made to human weakness. "God doth not always require that from men. which is best pleasing to himself,"19 but is willing to accept a lower standard. Thirdly, Scripture makes some recommendations concerning even wrong customs. God does not mean to permit an evil but he does insist on regulating the evil if the evil is going to be done.20 On one of these three grounds any passage of Scripture can be made. acceptable. Thus the more orthodox theologians would say of the whole Bible what Prideaux concludes of the New Testament: "It is so far from having any such flaw therein, that it is the perfectest law of righteousness which was ever yet given unto mankind, and both in commanding of good, as well as in forbidding of evil, vastly exceeds all others that went before it, and prescribes much more to our practise in both, than the wisest and highest moralist was ever able without it to reach in speculation.” 21

With such a Scriptural tradition the deists entirely broke. For them there was no external authority. Reason was given free play. The need vanished of a casuistry which had to go through violent contortions in order to reconcile a supposedly divine command with a developing conscience. The vehemence of the protests against their assaults on the Bible reveals to what extremes the deists must have gone. Perhaps in no respect have the deists as much significance for the history of ethical theory as in their definite rejection of Scripture as a guide in morals.

5. The early deists believed quite frankly in a primitive state of nature. In spite of their theological radicalism, they here remained within the Christian tradition. Since God endowed all men alike with reason and certain fixed innate principles of unquestionable truth, all men naturally began with a clear knowledge on religious and moral questions. Hence before the present corruption of men's minds, there was an earlier period when wisdom and righteousness prevailed. At this fortunate era, "there was no worship of God but in a rational way," and virtue and piety were everywhere taught and practised.22 Thus instead of a doctrine of the total depravity of man, the deists went to the other extreme, holding to the natural goodness of man's untutored nature.

18 Idem., p. 130.

19 Idem., p. 112.

20 Idem., D. 106.

21 Prideaux: A Letter to the Deists, p. 59.

22 Blount: Great is Diana of the Ephesians, p. 3. Cf. also the same view in the later work of Toland: Christianity not Mysterious, p. xiii.

The deists consequently had to give an explanation of the origin of error and of evil. The golden age was destroyed by the inordinate ambitions of a few schemers. Certain crafty, intriguing princes imposed superstitious inventions on the common people, in order to procure greater credit and esteem for themselves. Then false prophets and scheming priests introduced vain ceremonies, spread erroneous doctrines, and inculcated immoral practises, in order to establish their own greedy power over their fellows. "The primitive institution of idolatry received its birth from princes, at whose charge it was afterwards educated by ecclesiastics; the one made the idol, and the other ordained the worship of it."23 Lord Herbert endeavored in his De Religione Gentilium to trace the historical steps by which the original purity of the one true religion was followed by the degradation of many false religions.

Yet however corrupted man has become, he still possesses the saving power of reason. Through all the perversions of faith and practise among the heathen, the five innate articles of true religion continued to be held. These fundamental propositions "never were or ever can be concealed from any age or country." 24 Hence in reason lies the possibility of a genuine reformation both in religion and in morals. The natural goodness of man's primitive make-up has never been lost, and is available as a basis for any new effort to establish a high standard of moral living.

6. At no point is the ethical work of the deists more inadequate than in their explanation of the relation of man's duty to God's will. Coming to ethics from the theological standpoint, they unfortunately tended to make ethics a mere appendix to their theological system. The belief in innate principles impressed on the human mind by God so bound morals and theology together that ethics did not gain emancipation from doctrinal ties. The very denial that God can be properly worshiped by sacrifices and ceremonies led to an emphasis on obedience to God's moral commands. Nowhere did the deists explicitly make the nature of goodness dependent upon God's arbitrary fiat. But they did insist upon the intimate connection of man's duty with the divine will. They seem to have resolved the moral life into a matter of imitating the divine perfections. Sometimes morality is placed in an almost mystic allegiance to God. "All vice and wickedness is but a denial and disowning of God to be the supreme, infinite good." He who gives way to lust makes matter more important than God; he who feels envy puts some created thing ahead of God; he who seeks revenge is attacking what God has made.25 Many of such pas

23 Blount: op. cit., p. 7. Cf. Blount: Anima Mundi, p. 13. Also Herbert: Ancient Religion of the Gentiles, pp. 3, 12-254, 270-296.

24 Herbert: op. cit., p. 354.

"Blount: The Oracles of Reason, pp. 88-89, 95.