could know by their own effort. Moreover, individuals as well as nations are naturally led to identical decisions on moral questions; for reason is universal and alike in all individuals, and apprehends the same law. Though on other subjects the greatest disagreement is found, yet in their views of the moral law, men show a fundamental unanimity. "Every one being who exercises right reason, judgment, and the natural desire which these direct, must and ought to agree with all other beings, who judge likewise by right reason about the same thing.”18 (d) In the fourth place, the law of nature is applicable to every state or condition under which men may live. According to the view of the Middle Ages, the law of nature, which had been the rule of life in the Garden of Eden before the Fall, had been not only supplemented, but also actually superseded, in man's corrupt state after the Fall, by "the law of nations;" and hence many institutions (e. g., slavery and war) which had been forbidden by the law of nature were permitted by the law of nations.19 Such a virtual setting aside of the law of nature for a lower standard was not acceptable to the seventeenth century writers. To be sure, they retained much of the medieval belief in a primitive "state of nature." Cumberland confused the logical priority of the law of nature with its temporal priority.20 Whichcote would derive the law of nature from a consideration of "man's constitution in the state of innocency." 21 Pufendorf, though he denied that all men had once been at the same historical period in the state of nature, held that such a primitive state frequently prevailed between certain groups of men.22 However, there never is a suggestion of the older view which regarded the law of nature as belonging to an order which had long since passed away. The older view made the law of reason, which is identical with the law of nature, inapplicable to current problems. But the writers of the seventeenth century, especially Grotius and Pufendorf, wished to use reason to remedy social abuses and political institutions. Hence they held that the law of nature is valid under all conditions of life, whether a primitive state of nature or a highly organized civil structure. In order to be moral, one must be rational. Indeed, the more intricate and complex human living becomes, the more need there is for reason as a guide. Though the law of nature may be supplemented by positive laws on points where it is itself indifferent, it can never be superseded. Contemporary social evils cannot be condoned on the ground that the law of nature, and hence of reason, reflects only an 18 Cumberland: op. cit., pp. 1, 152. Cf. Grotius: op. cit., I, 1, 12. 19 Carlyle: op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 44, 109-110; Vol. II, pp. 111-113. 20 Cumberland: op. cit., p. 2. 21 Whichcote: op. cit., Vol. III, p. 54. 22 Pufendorf: op. cit., Vol. II, 1, 5–7, ideal state of affairs in the distant past. The reforming spirit demands an application of that law to all conditions of life.23 (e) In the fifth place, the law of nature is a social principle, i. e., it directs men to act for the interests of the social group. This social character of the law of nature follows from the conception of reason, not as a law of the nature of things in general, but as a human faculty. "The law of nature is the product of human nature." 24 Since man alone has reason, he alone is that about which the law of nature is concerned. His conduct should be such as to develop his own natural powers. Whatever improves and perfects his abilities and capacities is good.25 And when human nature is examined, it is seen to be predominantly social. Man is not happy alone. "He greedily affects society, that is, community." 26 Moreover, man not only enjoys the company of his fellows, but he needs it. He cannot by himself attain much development. In the first few years of his life, he is utterly helpless, and subsists through the care of others; and even in his maturer years, he can accomplish nothing alone, but only in cooperation with his fellows. "There is nothing in the world more beneficial to mankind than men themselves."27 Thus in order to realize his own powers, man is driven to enter upon a social life. Still further, the interests of the individual and of the group do not conflict at all. "The fullest, most vigorous endeavor of each and all rational agents, in promoting the common good of the whole rational system, contributes effectually to the good of each single part in such a system: under which whole or system, the single, individual happiness of each and all of us is essentially contained." 28 Thus the law of nature. becomes identified with that which furthers the common good. The moral is the social. “This is a fundamental law of nature, that every man ought, as much as in him lies, to preserve and promote society: that is, the welfare of mankind.”29 Whatever is necessary for the continued existence of society, or will advance the interests of that society, is good. Similarly whatever harms the group, or destroys confidence in social life, is evil. In their common participation in the common good, men best obey the law of nature. 3. There have thus been reviewed five points on which the writers of the seventeenth century agreed in their interpretation of the law of nature. The law of nature is the dictate of reason, more ultimate than any positive enactment, universally present to rational beings, 23 Cumberland: op. cit., p. ix. Pufendorf: op. cit., I, 2, 16, 3, 9; II, 1, 8. 24 Grotius: op. cit,, p. vii. 25 Cumberland: op. cit., p. 250. 26 Grotius: op. cit. p. iii. 27 Pufendorf: op. cit., I, 3, 3. Cƒ. II, 1, o. Also Hooker: op. cit., I, 10, 28 Cumberland: op. cit., p. xxvi. Cf. also p. 9. 1. 29 Pufendorf: op. cit., I, 3, 9. Cƒ. I, 2, 16. Also Grotius: op. cit., I, I, morally binding under all conditions of life, and leading inevitably to a thoroughly social ideal. Beyond these specified points, however, there was little agreement. How does reason discover the law of nature? What are the data with which reason must operate to reach its conclusions? Just what is reason anyhow? To these questions the advocates of the principle of natural law gave no definite answer. Grotius and Pufendorf are mainly occupied with political problems; Culverwel is rhetorical rather than scientific; Cumberland is as confused as he is verbose. All alike seem to have failed to appreciate the necessity of a frank consideration of epistemological questions. A rationalistic ethics requires a theory of knowledge. And their theories of knowledge are only implicit and incidental,-indeed are often different on successive pages of the same work. But since Locke later realized the importance for morals of a careful epistemological foundation, the epistemological suggestions of these earlier writers must here be examined. (a) One way in which the law of nature may be discovered is from the universal consent of nations. As has been shown above, the law of nature is universally known wherever reason prevails. Hence to establish particular moral rules, one needs only to show their common acceptance. If nations widely separated from each other in time and space are nevertheless found to hold the same moral principles, such unanimity is too striking to be accidental,-it must be the effect of a universally operating cause. Such a universally operating cause could be found nowhere except in the voice of reason. As the same kind of seed bears the same kind of fruit in many different soils, so the same rational faculty leads to the same law of nature in many diverse civilizations.30 However, if universal agreement by all nations is not found, agreement "by the most civilized” is adequate.31 Grotius, in making this last admission, seems to have been unaware to what extent he was betraying his whole case. (b) The proof of the law of nature from its universal acceptance hardly touches the real epistemological difficulties. For why do the various nations agree? How does each nation, or how does each man in each nation, reach the same conclusion? Even if the conclusions reached are the same, the process of discovery is not yet revealed. Moreover, if the agreement of only the most civilized nations, or of the most rational men, is to be sought, how are the relative civilizations and degrees of rationality to be judged? To meet such difficulties, another suggestion is offered. Hooker had contented himself merely by insisting that "the main principles 30 Culverwel: op. cit., p. 109. Cf. Grotius: op. cit., II, 20, 45. Also Hooker: op. cit., I, 8, dorf rejected this argument, probably under the influence of Hobbes, a1 Grotius: op. cit., I, 1, 12, 2–9. Pufen of reason are in themselves apparent." When these principles are proposed, "the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof." 32 With this idea of the law of nature as an axiom of reason, Grotius and Pufendorf agreed. But the English writers of the second half of the seventeenth century wanted something more definite. They held that there are certain fundamental principles impressed on every human mind, from which reason can develop the law of nature. Thus they added a rather crude theory of innate ideas to the accepted rationalistic position. "There are stamped and printed upon the being of man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of Reason, thus, by warming and brooding upon these first and oval principles of her own laying, it being itself quickened with a heavenly vigor, does thus hatch the law of nature." 33 The first principles of knowledge, therefore, do not need to be discovered or invented: they are given. They do not need to be criticized or questioned; for what is innate is also indubitably true. nature. This doctrine of characters imprinted on the mind of man was not stated by any of the writers on the law of nature in as crude a fashion as it had been by Lord Herbert.34 Indeed it was at times almost entirely contradicted. Culverwel ridiculed the supposition that a child in the cradle is aware of any first principles. Rather the self-evident and indubitable principles are consciously present only when the faculty of reason develops.35 And he even anticipated Locke's epistemology when he asserted that reason, "the pinnacle of certainty," is but “fantastical and poetical" unless its operations are based in sense-experience.36 Cumberland also insisted that he did not intend to base his argument on "innate ideas," which, though they may possibly be born with us, are not acceptable to most philosophers. Rather he wished to begin "with those principles which are discovered and understood upon the evidences of sense and daily experience." 37 Likewise, Pufendorf denied that new-born babes have "plain and distinct notions concerning what is to be done or avoided." 38 Yet the procedure of all of these moralists belies their concessions to empiricism. No use is made of the data of sense experience, and the principles of reason are developed in a purely a priori fashion. Pufendorf immediately added to the passage last quoted that reason 32 Hooker: op. cit., I. 8, 5. 33 Culverwel: op. cit., p. 81. Cf. Cumberland: op. cit., pp. 284–285. Also Whichcote: op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 22, 122–123. 34 Cf. below, Book I,Chapter II, § 3. 35 Culverwel: op. cit., pp. 126-128. 36 Culverwel: op. cit., p. 202. 37 Cumberland: op. cit., p. xvi. 38 Pufendorf: op. cit., I, 3, 12. is so able to apprehend with plain and clear evidence the law of nature that that law comes to be regarded as equivalent to a connate principle. Certainly it so came to be regarded by these seventeenth century upholders of natural law. The bulk of their work rests on the naïve acceptance of those innate impressions which at moments of epistemological frankness they somewhat repudiated. If the law of nature is derived by reason from indelible imprints on the mind, the task of the moralist is simple. He has only to gather and note down his own clear notions.39 Whatever he cannot conceive to have been determined by personal prejudice will be a "natural precept." But the outcome of this moral philosophy reveals the weakness of the position. There are only two possible alternatives open, either of which is futile. One alternative is to remain in the realm of vague generalities, defending natural law in general, extolling the power of reason, without specifying any particular concrete maxims. This alternative is the one of which the seventeenth century was most often guilty. The other alternative is to attempt definite statements concerning actual problems, at the cost of becoming dogmatic. When morals are spun out of one's inner endowments, every one can frame his own system for himself. A great deal of contradiction is likely to result, and there will be no means of settling any dispute. Culverwel mentions three of his "first and indelible principles":40 "We must seek good and avoid evil," "We must seek happiness," and "Do not do to others what you do not wish to have done to yourself." But he does not tell what things are good and what are evil; he does not define happiness; and he mentions no way of confuting one who, like Hobbes, is bent solely on selfish aims. Whichcote, typical of most Christian preachers, simply fits the traditional ethics of the church into his barren philosophical scheme. "Humility, patience, meekness, and such like virtues favor nature, whereas passion, pride, and envy do waste and destroy nature."41 But such a verdict is convincing only to one who has already accepted the Christian standpoint. Consequently, the bare principle of natural law is in itself so lacking in content as to be useless, and the epistemology on which it rests is so tied up with rank dogmatism as to be quite unconvincing. 4. Grotius and Pufendorf, and even Hooker to some extent, were interested in political affairs, and attempted to construct a philosophy of the state. Certain of their views are important because of their relation to Locke's Treatises of Government. (a) The need for a powerful social organization was recognized. Not only is it true, as has already been shown in discussing the law 89 Cf. Culverwel: op. cit. p. 83. 40 Culverwel: op. cit., pp. 81-82. 41 Whichcote: op. cit. Vol. III, p. 53. |