CHAPTER I

EARLY WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATURE

1. The tradition which seems to have had the most outstanding effect upon Locke's ethical philosophy was that which based morality upon "the law of nature." This tradition was very old and widespread. It sprang from the teachings of the Roman stoics, dominated the thought of the medieval scholastics, and then found striking expression in several of the greatest moralists of the seventeenth century. Locke probably was not acquainted with the stoics except as their ideas were embodied in Cicero, whom he often quoted;1 and he surely had slight contact with any of the scholastics. But he was familiar with some of those writers of the seventeenth century who, after the disintegrating and chaotic moral effect of Protestant sectarianism, revived the conception of the law of nature as a unifying and catholic principle. Among these writers there were two on the continent who stand out prominently, the Dutch jurist Grotius and the German jurist Pufendorf. Both of these men Locke knew quite well and admired greatly, even recommending their works as an indispensable part of the education of a gentleman.2 In England itself the writers who discussed the law of nature were quite numerous. In the last decade of the sixteenth century there had appeared the work of Richard Hooker, who not only antedated but prepared the way for Grotius. Locke was fond of quoting his words, usually adopting the current designation of him as "the judicious Hooker."3 Then throughout the second half of the seventeenth century a group of less notable writers appeared. Culverwel and Cumberland used the law of nature as the basis of their replies to Hobbes. There is no direct evidence to indicate whether or not Locke was acquainted with their treatises. Yet it was an intimate friend of Locke, Tyrrell, who in 1692 published an abridgment of Cumberland's work. Also both Culverwel and Cumberland, as intellectual leaders, had many followers among the clergy, who popularized their ideas and made their fundamental principle a common possession of most educated men. Benjamin Whichcote,

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1 Some Thoughts concerning Education, §§ 184-186, 188-189. Also King: Life of Locke, pp. 5, 45, 130. Works, Vol. III, pp. 271-272. Vol. X, p. 306. Essay II, 28, 11.

* Some Thoughts concerning Education, § 186. King: op. cit., p. 5. Also Works, Vol. III, p. 272; Vol. X, p. 308.

3 Of Civil Government, §§ 5, 15, 60, 61, 74, 90, 91, 94, III, 134, 135, 136. Works, Vol. III, p. 272; Vol. X, p. 308.

• E. g., Samuel Parker: Demonstration of the Law of Nature and of the Christian Religion, 1681. Also the works of John Wilkins (†1672), Henry More (†1687), and John Tillotson (†1694).

for example, who is said to have been Locke's favorite preacher,5 spoke much of the law of nature, as his Discourses, printed long after his death, disclose. Locke recommended the sermons of Whichcote, Barrow, and Tillotson as "masterpieces." Thus there is no doubt that Locke was very familiar with this whole tradition in moral and political philosophy.

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2. The term "the law of nature" on which morality was made to rest did not of course have the same meaning in the many discussions devoted to it through the centuries by its various adherents. But in those writers of the seventeenth century who have just been mentioned, it had come to have a fairly consistent signification. At least there were certain points of general agreement which were characteristic of the period before Locke.

(a) In the first place, the law of nature was said to be identical with the law of reason. This identification had been a traditional one through many centuries. But in the Middle Ages it had meant several different things. Sometimes the law of nature was a sort of impersonal cosmic force, regulating the ordered relations of all things, animate and inanimate alike; and the law of reason was identified with it because, according to the tradition of Greek philosophy, order of any kind is witness to the existence of reason. At other times the law of nature was a law common to all living beings (inanimate objects were here excluded); and the law of reason was identified with it because that with which nature had endowed all life was supposed to be noble and worthy of eulogy." In the former case reason became an attribute of the universe in general; in the latter case it became -a kind of animal instinct. But in the writers of the seventeenth century reason is that faculty of the human mind which sets man off, not only from inanimate nature, but also from the lower animals,it is that divine faculty which man is supposed to share with God. Hence when the law of nature and the law of reason are identified, reason is proclaimed to be that which has been designed by nature and by God to be man's moral guide. Those creatures who do not possess the faculty of reason cannot comprehend what law means, and hence are not to be held responsible for obedience to any law: they are completely outside the realm of moral distinctions. Man, however, is endowed with reason; hence he can comprehend what law means, and especially can know that law which flows from the nature of his own being. "The law of nature is that law which is intrinsical and essential to a rational creature." It is "the dictate

5 Fraser's edition of Locke's Essay, Vol. I, p. xxiv.

• Works, Vol. X, p. 306.

7 Carlyle: A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Vol. I, pp. 37-40; Vol. II, pp. 30, 103-104.

• Culverwel: Of the Light of Nature, p. 57.

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of right reason, showing the moral malignity, or the moral necessity that there is in any act, by either the repugnancy, or congruity, it hath to rational nature itself."9 No man can deny the indubitable and self-evident character of the law of nature, without at once ceasing to be rational and descending to the level of the brutes. "Every man of a mature age, and entire sense, has so much natural light in him, as that, with necessary care and due consideration, he may comprehend at least those general precepts and principles which are requisite in order to pass our lives here honestly and quietly."10 The more theologically inclined writers, to be sure, were quick to add that it was yielding to temptation and committing sin which made men unable thereafter to discern the law of nature." But all alike agreed wherever reason was present, there would be an immediate apprehension of the law of nature, which is the moral law.12

(b) Secondly, the law of nature is immutable. Its immutability is a necessary correlate of its rationality; for reason issues, not in changing whims, but in fixed decrees. Morality does not rest on anything transient; it cannot vary from one generation to another; it has nothing relative about it; rather it is forever the same, at all places and at all times. Consequently, the moral law cannot depend upon any enactment, human or divine. It is not a statutory affair. It follows from the nature of reason, not from any will. No man, however much a king, can create right and wrong. The law of nature stands as the eternal standard behind all monarchs and all codes, setting forth "propositions of unchangeable truth and certainty" which "lay obligations upon all outward acts of behaviour, even in a state of nature, prior and antecedent to all laws of human imposition whatsoever, and are clearly distinct from every consideration of all such compacts and agreements as constitute civil government." 13 Even God himself cannot by arbitrary fiat alter the basis of moral law. For the law of reason is the criterion by conformity to which God's will is judged to be good.14

There is involved in this insistence on the priority of the law of nature to all human and divine wills no denial that morality lies in obedience to God's commands.15 God's will is true and righteous altogether,—i. e., it is in joyful harmony with the law of nature.

• Grotius: Concerning the Rights of War and Peace, I, I, 10, Cf. also p. xiv.

10 Pufendorf: The Whole Duty of Man, according to the Law of Nature, I, 1, 4.

11 Whichcote: Works, Vol. I, p. 131; Vol. II, p. 64. Also, Cf. Vol. I, pp. 132, 140, 199.

12 Hooker, though he would assent to the statements of the men who came after him, employed a slightly different terminology. He preferred to use the term "law of nature," more as science today uses "natural law," for the laws according to which inanimate objects operate. Yet he recognized the law of reason as the injunctions which man realizes himself morally bound to obey. Cf. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, I, 3, 1–4, 6, 1–5, 8, 9.

13 Cumberland: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Laws of Nature, pp. 2-3.

14 Grotius: op. cit. 11, 1o. Cf. also Whichcote: op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 252–253; Vol. III, p. 128.

15 Grotius: op. cit., I, 1, 11. Culverwel: op. cit., p. 79. Cumberland: op. cit., p. 28.

All the philosophers of the seventeenth century granted that God as the creator of the world and the giver of reason to mankind is responsible for man's rational and moral nature and his consequent subjection to law. But God acted as he did, not arbitrarily, but from the necessity imposed on him by reason. Therefore, the ultimate source of moral distinctions is that reason which God himself is not free to disobey. And though in the beginning he alone existed and alone possessed reason, yet the law of nature was determined by the nature of reason simply as reason, and not as the reason of God. The law would continue now to be binding on all rational beings even if God ceased to exist. The priority of reason to will is what makes the law of nature supreme above God as well as above earthly rulers. Nevertheless the divine law is identical with the law of nature, so that the religious man will always find added incentive for doing right in the fact that he is thus obeying God.

The writers on the law of nature who have been mentioned differ on one point. Though they all agree that reason declares the law ofnature, they do not agree whether reason also makes it binding on

Grotius and Cumberland, as thorough rationalists, implicitly assume that as soon as a principle is proved reasonable, man is morally bound to obey it. But Culverwel and Pufendorf are not so intellectualistic in their psychology. Every complete law consists of two parts, precept and sanction. And though reason can declare the law of nature, it cannot create the obligation to obey. The law of nature becomes binding on man only when it is commanded by God. "That the same [i. e., the law of nature] may obtain the force of laws, it must necessarily be presupposed that there is a God who governs all things by his providence, and that he has enjoined us mortals to observe these dictates of our reason as laws." 16 Hence, however independent of God's will the existence of the law may be, its controlling force arises by God's positive injunction.17

(c) Thirdly, the law of nature is universal. Its universality follows as a corollary from its rationality and immutability. Since that which reason lays down is always the same, all rational beings will know the one fixed moral law. We find the civil codes of all nations more or less approximating each other in their essential features; for underlying them all, as the common standard to which they tend to conform, is the law of nature. Even where the divine will is revealed in some form of positive law (as in the Mosaic code or the Gospel), such revelation is only a reaffirmation, needed because of men's sinful conduct or careless thinking, of that law of nature which all rational beings

16 Pufendorf op. cit., I, 3, 10. Cf. I, 2, 7. Also Culverwel: op. cit. p. 75.

17 The question of future rewards and punishments is likely to arise here, and tends to give a hedonistic flavor to the moral law. Cf. Culverwel: op. cit., p. 54. Cumberland: op. cit., pp. xvii, 28. Hooker, I, 9, 1.