within Texas any classification rules different from, and minimum carload weights lower than, those applicable to shipments between Shreveport, La., and Texas points. The railroads in southern territory have been gradually adjusting many of their rates in accordance with the principles announced by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its long-and-short-haul decisions of 1914. In its decision of Dec. 31, 1915, they were ordered to readjust their rates on bituminous coal shipped from Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia fields to southeastern destinations (37 I. C. C. Repts. 652, Dec. 31, 1915). (See also Rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission, infra.) Freight and Passenger Receipts.The average receipts per ton per mile as reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission were 0.732 cents in the fiscal year 1915, as compared with 0.733 cents in the preceding year; and the average receipts per passenger per mile were 1.985 cents and 1.982 cents respectively in 1915 and 1914. The average receipts per ton per mile and per passenger per mile for the railway system as a whole during the years 1900 to 1915 were as follows: (2) Interstate v. Intrastate Rate Cases: The Shreveport Case (41 I. C. C. Repts. 83, July 7, 1916); the Missouri River-Nebraska Cases (40 ibid., 201, July 3, 1916); Traffic Bureau of the Sioux City Commercial Club v. American Express Co. et al. (39 ibid. 703, May 23, 1916); Bonners Ferry Lumber Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (38 ibid., 268, Feb. 21, 1916); Dallas Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (40 ibid., 619, June 27, 1916; 41 ibid., 552, Nov. 7, 1916); Business Men's League of St. Louis v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (41 ibid., 13, July 12, 1916).The most important decisions of the Commission during 1916 are those which will doubtless become the basis for ultimately establishing the relative scope of Federal and state control over rates. These decisions of the Commission in turn refer back to the Minnesota rate decision (A. Y. B., 1911, p. 562) and the Shreveport decision of the U. S. Supreme Court (A. Y. B., 1914, p. 341). - Rates are frequently interdependent, and this is true regardless of whether they are interstate or intrastate. Since in the past the latter were subject to the exclusive control of the states, it thus frequently happened that by establishing rates on intrastate traffic the states were virtually establishing interstate rates. Sometimes, however, the carriers refused to apply the relatively low state-made intrastate rates to their interstate traffic, with the result that interstate commerce was subjected to an unreasonable discrimination or disadvantage. Whether or not the Interstate Commerce Commission shall have superior jurisdiction in such instances is the real bone of contention in these decisions. In the Shreveport case of July 7, 1916, which is supplemental to the earlier decisions of the Commission (23 I. C. C. Repts. 31; 34 ibid., 472), the Federal Commission decided that: (1) The class rates between Shreveport, La., and points in Texas are unreasonable and unduly prejudicial to Shreveport as compared with the class rates for like distances in Texas, and that in the future they should not ex ceed the reasonable maximum class rates prescribed by the Commission. Texas are likewise unreasonable and (2) The rates on numerous commodi- | mission (1) prescribed a schedule of ties between Shreveport and points in prejudicial, and that they should not in the future exceed the reasonable maximum commodity rates between Shreveport and Texas points prescribed by the Commission. (3) The application to shipments within Texas of classification rules different from, or minimum carload weights lower than those applicable to shipments of like property between Shreveport and Texas is unduly prejudicial to Shreve port, and that the undue prejudices should be removed. maximum class rates between points in the State of Nebraska and Council Bluffs and Sioux City, Iowa; St. Joseph and Kansas City, Mo.; and Atchison, Kan.; (2) it ruled that the present relation of class rates between Council Bluffs, Sioux City, St. Joseph, Kansas City and Atchison and points in the state of Nebraska and between Omaha and other Nebraska cities and the same points in the state of Nebraska results in The carriers then proceeded to ap- undue preference to Omaha and other ply the order of the Interstate Com- Nebraska cities, and subjects the inmerce Commission to traffic within terstate shipments to undue and unTexas. They obtained an injunction reasonable prejudices and disadvanin a Federal court restraining the tages; (3) it further ruled that simTexas Commission from imposing the ilar undue and unreasonable preju penalties provided in the commission dices and discrimination result from laws of Texas and from in any way the present relation of classification preventing the application within ratings and exceptions, the Nebraska Texas of the rates and classification state classification applying within rules prescribed by the Interstate that state, and the Western classifiCommerce Commission. While the cation applying to interstate shipcase was before the Interstate Comments; and (4) it ordered the carmerce Commission, the Texas Com- riers to "cease and desist from the mission had agreed to advance the rates on certain commodities 10 per cent. Being dissatisfied, however, with the order of the Federal Commission, the Texas Commission, on Aug. 28, issued an order cancelling these advanced rates. Thereupon the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order directing the Texas railroads to show cause why they should not put into effect the commodity rates cancelled by the Texas Commission. In October, 1916, a lengthy informal conference of the various parties concerned in the Shreveport dispute was conducted before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The conference was called in answer to various requests that the newly filed tariffs of the railroads should be suspended. At the present writing final action has not been taken. The attorneygeneral of Texas has also filed a suit in the state court against 34 railroads that were not parties to the injunction proceedings mentioned above, asking for an injunction to restrain them from putting into effect the new tariffs that were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the Missouri River-Nebraska cases the Interstate Commerce Com undue preferences and the undue and unreasonable prejudices and disadvantages found to exist." When the railroads took action to remove the undue discrimination against interstate shipments by increasing their intrastate rates within the state of Nebraska, the Nebraska Commission obtained an injunction from the Supreme Court of the state restraining the railroads from putting into effect the new tariffs which they had prepared subsequent to the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the South Dakota express-rate case the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed certain express rates and ordered the companies to remove the undue discrimination resulting from lower rates charged within South Dakota. The attorneygeneral and the Railroad Commission of South Dakota thereupon obtained an injunction forbidding the express companies to charge rates on shipments within the state of South Dakota other than those prescribed by the state Commission. The American and Wells, Fargo Express Companies also obtained injunctions from Federal courts forbidding the state authorities to interfere with them in putting into effect the rates pre scribed by the Interstate Commerce | As the result of its rulings in the Commission. Business Men's League of St. Louis v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al., decided July 12, 1916, the Interstate Commerce Commission, as far as this case applies, has practically eliminated the Illinois twocent fare law. It decided that the passenger fares between St. Louis, Keokuk and Illinois points are unreasonable in so far as they exceed 2.4 cents per mile plus a reasonable bridge toll. The Commission, however, simultaneously ruled that these interstate fares are unjustly discriminatory against St. Louis and Keokuk and in favor of East St. Louis, Chi In the Bonners Ferry Lumber Co. case it was shown that the rates on lumber in carloads from Bonners Ferry, Idaho, to various points in Montana were unjustly discriminatory as compared with rates from Libby and Eureka, Mont., to the same destinations in Montana. The Commission therefore declared the rates on the interstate shipments to be unreasonable, and they prescribed reasonable and non-discriminatory rates for the future, leaving with the carriers the determination of the question of how the discrimination as between interstate and intrastate ship-cago and other Illinois points, bements is to be removed. The Dallas Chamber of Commerce decision was less directly concerned with the main question at issue, but the evidence submitted in it was made part of the record in the Shreveport case. The Commission found certain carload commodity rates from St. Louis and points in northeast Texas to be unreasonable to the extent of five cents per 100 lb., and ruled that the rates from Kansas City to the same points are unreasonable to the extent that they are not as much as five cents per 100 lb. less than the rates contemporaneously maintained from St. Louis. One of the effects of this decision is futher to reduce the size of Texas common-point territory. The railroads had formerly constituted Dallas-Fort Worth as a separate rate group. The Commission believed that the present record shows that a like exception should be made in rates from St. Louis and Kansas City to northeast Texas. As to traffic from St. Louis and Kansas City to points in northeast Texas, those points are at a disadvantage as compared with Shreveport, a competing locality, by reason of the shorter distance to Shreveport, and the competitive conditions at that point, but that natural disadvantage ought not to be unduly increased by an artificial rate adjustment. The dispute as to the relative authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the various state commissions has not been confined to freight rates and classifications and express rates; it has been extended also to the making of passenger fares. cause the fares charged within the state are limited by the two-cent fare law. The Commission therefore required the carriers to remove the discrimination between interstate and intrastate fares where found to be unjust. These decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission have brought the entire contention as to relative state and Federal jurisdiction to a head. It is likely that the question will ultimately need to be settled before the Supreme Court of the United States. (3) National Society of Record Associations et al. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R. Co. et al. (40 I. C. C. Repts. 347, June 29, 1916); Eastern Live Stock Case (36 ibid., 675, Dec. 2, 1915). In the Eastern Live Stock case the Commission authorized an increase in many rates on live stock, fresh meats, and carload minima within the Central Freight Association territory, and on shipments from Central Freight Association territory to points in Trunk Line and New England territories. In the other case mentioned it found numerous classifications, rates and shipping rules applicable to the shipment of less than carload lots of live stock to be unreasonable and discriminatory. It prescribed reasonable minimum live-stock weights, standard or basic values and excess-value rate increases, and reasonable rates on small stock in crates. It also declared unlawful the requirements of the carriers that shippers' attendants shall accompany shipments. The line-haul rate covers the customary movement of cars over industry tracks incident to the receipt and delivery of carload freight at convenient points on those tracks for loading or unloading without regard to the size or complexity of the industry, and the points at which the cars are to be placed by the carrier for that purpose without additional charge are to be determined by general the usage. . . . [But] line-haul rate covers only one placement of a car upon an industry track for loading or unloadmade for each additional placement of a car for that purpose, as also for the movement of cars from place to place within the plant during the processes of (4) New England Milk Case (40) I. C. C. Repts. 699, July 11, 1916).The Commission found the so-called New England or leased-car system of milk transportation to be unlawful. Instead it prescribed a scale of rates on a per-can basis for less than carload shipments made in passenger, mixed milk and passenger, and freighttrain services; also rates lower by 25 per cent. for milk shipped in freighting, and an additional charge should be cars on freight trains; and carload rates, not more than 872 per cent. of the less than carload scale rates, for carload shipments made from one consignor to one consignee and from one point of origin to one destination, the cars to be iced by the shipper of the milk. (5) Iron Ore Rate Cases (41 I. C. C. Repts. (181, July 10, 1916).-The Commission decided that the existing rate groups of lake ports and ironore destinations, and the existing rate relationships of the destination groups are unreasonable. Instead it prescribed a revised grouping of ports and destinations; revised rate relationships, and a scale of maximum iron-ore rates. The result of these changes points to increased rates in some instances and decreased rates in others. The Commission also required the carriers to establish separate charges for storing ore on their docks, for various other dock services performed by them, and for switching and other services on private industrial tracks; it prescribed maximum rates for dock services, and suggested a charge on the engine-hour basis for the switching and other services performed by the railroads on private industrial tracks. (6) Car Spotting Charges (34 I. C. C. Repts. 609, July 6, 1915). The Commission decided that the tariffs proposing a "spotting charge" for placing cars for loading or unloading at points on the tracks of the industrial concerns named in the tariffs that were filed are not justified, because the proposed spotting charge was in many cases applied to services covered by the line-haul rate, and because the collection of the special spotting charge in some instances and not in others would result in unjust discrimination. The Commission held that: manufacture. (7) Second Industrial Railway Case (37 I. C. C. Repts. 497, Dec. 23, 1915; 37 ibid. 491, 567, Jan. 3, 1916; 41 ibid., 46, 69, July 6, 1916).—The famous industrial railway case mentioned in previous issues of the YEAR Book (1915, p. 544) was continued during the year. In a number of decisions the Commission specifically applied the principles that it had laid down in the original decisions. decided whether or not, in particular instances, the industrial railways are common carriers, and whether or not they are entitled to divisions or switching allowances, and if so, the maximum amount to which they are entitled. It (8) Special Reports to the Senate. —On Oct. 11, 1915, the Commission made its report (36 I. C. C. Repts. 429) on the conditions affecting the production, transportation and marketing of crude petroleum which had been requested in the Senate resolution of Sept. 28, 1914. This report contains detailed data regarding (1) the control of pipe-line companies, and (2) the discontinuance of the running and purchase of petroleum in 1914 and the reasons therefor. On April 11, 1916, the Commission made its report to the Senate concerning the relation between carriers by rail and carriers by water. The report was made in answer to a resolution dated May 16, 1914. It contains detailed data as to the ownership and control of vessel properties by rail carriers. It indicates that on June 30, 1914, the railroads of the United States controlled, directly or indirectly, a total of 1,098 vessels having a total gross tonnage of 2,941,941 tons. LEADING COURT DECISIONS The following are the principal court decisions affecting railroads since the last issue of the YEAR BOOK: (1) St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas (240 U. S. 518, April 3, 1916).—In this decision the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to compel railway companies to conduct switching operations across public crossings in cities of the first and second classes with a switching crew of not less than one engineer, a fireman, a foreman and three helpers. It decided further that a full-crew statute of this kind is not unconstitutional even though it contains an exemption in favor of railways less than 100 miles in length. (2) Seaboard Air Line v. Railroad Commission of Georgia (240 U. S. 324, Feb. 21, 1916).-The U. S. Supreme Court ruled that it is within the power of a state, acting through a commission, to require crossing or intersecting railways entering the same point to make and maintain track connections for the interchange of traffic if the established facts show a public necessity, and if due regard is given to the advantages which will result on the one side and to the necessary expenses that will be incurred on the other. (3) J. D. O'Keefe, receiver of the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico R. R. Co. v. United States and Interstate Commerce Commission (240 U. S. 294, Feb. 21, 1916).—The U. S. Supreme Court upheld the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe the maximum allowance out of the joint rates which trunk lines may make to tap lines which are owned by persons who own the timber and lumber mills which they principally serve, even though no joint rate was fixed either by the Commission or by the carriers and they had not been afforded an opportunity to agree in respect to the division. Special note is made of the additional power in this regard that was conferred upon the Commission by the Mann-Elkins Act of June 8, 1910. It further decided that a trunk line has no constitutional right to build up its business by paying tap lines bonuses or rebates which have been forbidden by Congress for considerations affecting the welfare of the public. (4) Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. United States (234 Fed. 682, May 12, 1916).-This decision by the Federal district court, commonly known as the "Lake lines divorce decision," was the result of the section in the Panama Canal Act requiring the railroads to dispose of their steamship properties unless the Interstate Commerce Commission, under certain conditions, permitted them to continue such ownership. In May, 1915, the Commission had, in accordance with Section 5 of this Act, refused to authorize a large number of railroads to continue the ownership of their Great Lakes lines. All of the railroads, except the Lehigh Valley, thereupon disposed of their Lake lines. The Lehigh Valley, however, contended that the Commission had acted beyond its legal authority and took the matter to the Federal courts. Its purpose was to compel the Interstate Commerce Commission to permit the Lehigh Valley Railroad to continue its ownership of Great Lakes steamship properties. The Federal Court, however, upheld the action that had been taken by the Commission. It held that the Commission having found the existence of competition, no question might be raised by the court as to whether the Commission's judgment in that regard was correct or incorrect. It also held that the order of the Commission was a negative order in that it had not ordered something to be done, but had merely refused to take certain action. It ruled that |