Senator CARAWAY. He was a citizen of Indiana, not a citizen of Illinois. Why was he contributing to a campaign in Illinois? Mr. BECK. You must remember, Senator, that

Senator CARAWAY. I thought perhaps you had some explanation. Mr. BECK. No; I have no explanation, because I can not explain the interest that men of large means take in public questions. Senator CARAWAY. Is there any evidence that he made a contribution to anybody else's campaign in any other State?

Mr. BECK. I do not know, Senator.

Turning now to the partial report of the Reed committee, it will be found that there is nothing inconsistent with the evidence already quoted. The report speaks of Mr. Insull's contributions, and gives the correct amount, and then specifies the various corporations with which he is identified; but the report does not find that the public utilities corporation, or any corporation, contributed anything what

soever.

Without troubling the committee to read it, it is enough to say that the report simply says that this money was contributed by Mr. Insull, a public utility owner; but it does not say that it was contributed by any public utility.

The same is true of the smaller contributions which were made by two other wealthy men who were identified with public utilities corporations, namely, Mr. Copley and Mr. Studebaker.

From these facts it appears that Mr. Insull voluntarily contributed from his personal resources $125,000 to the Smith campaign fund, making the contributions in three payments to Allen F. Moore, the chairman and treasurer of said fund, and that, while Mr. Smith was not ignorant that Mr. Insull had made some contribution, he did not know until after the campaign was over what contributions had been made. The gifts, which were purely voluntary, were not made upon any promise or obligation; and the only action by the Utilities Commission upon the Insull properties of which there is any evidence was to reduce their rates, and presumably their profits, by many millions. All these orders required a majority of the Utilities Commission, and all of them were subject at the instance of any interested party to an appeal in the courts of Illinois. In every instance where the question of rates is involved the officials of the municipality where the utility operated are, under the Illinois law, given notice of any hearing on the subject of rates.

One further finding of the Reed committee: The Reed committee report is fair, and no just exception can be taken to it except that it does not dwell upon some of the disclaimers to which I have referred; but, so far as it goes, it is fair in simply stating the naked fact that a man who was identified with public-utility corporations, out of his own resources, as he testified, contributed to a party movement in which he was interested.

One further finding of the Reed committee remains to be noted. It is this:

The State of Illinois has no statute restricting the amount which may be expended by any candidate, nor any law requiring the candidates or their committees to file a statement of such expenditures. The Federal corrupt practices act has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Newberry case in so far as the act applies to primary elections, and there is no duty imposed on the candidates or their committees to file with the United States Senate a statement of expenditures.

The report failed to notice the fact that there was a Federal statute of great significance in determining what conclusion you can draw from the fact that Mr. Moore, Mr. Smith's campaign manager, received from Mr. Insull, a man of many enterprises, a gift of money to promote a public purpose. As a matter of fact and I do not recall that in the debates in the Senate any reference was made to it-Congress, by a law passed on February 28, 1925, chapter 368, passed a Federal corrupt practices act.

Senator KING. What year was that?

Mr. BECK. 1925. The act commences by stating that it is to be called the Federal corrupt practices act of 1925. The reference is 43 Statutes at Large, 1070. It commences with a definition of those with whom the act is going to deal, and I want to read one or two of those definitions.

Having defined what a candidate is, and given him a distinct status, it says:

The term "political committee" includes any committee, association, or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice presidential electors

And so forth, without reading it all.

It then goes on to say:

The term "contribution" includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution.

The term "person" includes an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation

And so forth. Thereupon it starts to define what a party movement shall consist of, because it is not necessarily one of the old historic parties of America, and the act then provides:

Every political committee shall have a chairman and a treasurer. No contribution shall be accepted, and no expenditure made, by or on behalf of a political committee for the purpose of influencing an election until such chairman and treasurer have been chosen.

It then prescribes what the treasurer shall do in the matter of taking receipts and making an account of expenditures.

Then follows section 305, giving far more in detail the duties of the treasurer of the committee; but as, for a reason presently disclosed, they have no immediate application, I forbear to read them. When it comes to what the act applies to, I beg your attention to the following language. It is referring to a Federal corrupt practices act in the matter of elections, and the section says:

The term "election" includes a general or special election, and, in the case of a Resident Commissioner from the Philippine Islands, an election by the Philippine Legislature, but does not include a primary election or convention of a political party.

Whether that was done in deference to the Newberry decision, which had held there could be no valid legislation in respect to primaries, at least prior to the seventeenth amendment, or whether it was because of the historic policy of this country under all parties, except in grave intermittent crises of our national life, namely, to leave the regulation of elections and the details thereof to the States, I do not pretend to say; but the fact is, therefore, that at the time

Colonel Smith opened this campaign and arranged with Mr. Moore that he should attend to what might be called the executive management while he went through the populous State of Illinois and tried to reach two and a half million of qualified voters, these great facts appear:

First, that there was no law whatever of the State of Illinois that forbade Mr. Insull, out of his personal pocket, to give money to a political cause in any sum whatever.

Secondly, that the Congress of the United States had specifically provided that it did not legislate with respect to primaries or political conventions, and that the act which I have quoted could only refer to the general election.

Third, and most important-because I do say, with great respect, that if Colonel Smith is disqualified and denied his seat it will not be upon tangible facts, but upon innuendo from facts-it is very important to remember that at the time he made this arrangement with Colonel Moore, the law of the land, the Federal law, had recognized a party movement as a distinct entity, having a legal status as such, requiring every political committee to have a chairman and a treasurer, prescribing the duties of the treasurer, and making him responsible directly to the people for the proper collection and the proper disbursement of moneys in connection with elections.

Mr. Doyle suggests and I am very glad he does--that when the Willis resolution was passed in the Newberry case-which, of course, was nothing more than a declaration of the then existing sentiment of the Senate, because it could have no force of law, being but a statement of the opinions of the Senate as then constituted as to whether or not more than $25,000 could be properly spent in a senatorial election that resolution, having no legal force as a statute, was prior to this act of Congress, which, passed under the Constitution, is the supreme law of the land, and which, therefore, did say that in respect to primary elections the Federal Government had and could have no possible concern, and disclaimed it by the emphatic exception to which I have referred.

The point I was coming to, however, was this. I know that it is easy in newspaper offices-I do not say that invidiously, but they work under terrific pressure from hour to hour, and can not give that calm and sober consideration to any public question that a judicial body such as the court or this committee can give—it is easy for newspaper offices to say:

Oh, well, if Mr. Insull is connected with a public utility corporation, and he gives money, that is the money of the public utility corporation. If he gives it to Mr. Moore, that is given to Mr. Smith.

As a matter of fact, when you are passing upon so grave a matter as denying the right of Illinois to have its own choice in the United States Senate, you must not determine a question upon innuendos or without recognizing the existing status under statutes of men who occupy any relation to the activities of a campaign.

The treasurer was a legal officer, responsible as such; and when, therefore, money was given to Mr. Moore by Mr. Insulla perfectly proper gift on the part of Mr. Insull, certainly forbidden by no lawwhen it was given, whether proper or improper, it was not a gift to Mr. Smith, even though Mr. Smith was the beneficiary of the political

movement.

If you were to follow any other reasoning it would lead you to consequences which would shock the pride of any American; because can it be that a contribution, say, of Judge Gary to the treasurer of the Republican National Committee, or of Mr. Baruch to the treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, for the purpose of educating the people as to the issues of a presidential campaign, is a gift to the man who subsequently becomes President? It is not a gift to him at all.

Senator CARAWAY. May I ask you a question right there, please? I do not want to interrupt you.

Mr. BECK. Certainly.

Senator CARAWAY. You are contending that the Federal act had nothing to do with primaries. Then Mr. Moore would not be a treasurer or sustain any official relation to the campaign under the provisions of that act; would he?

Mr. BECK. You are quite right, Senator. I quote the act, not because it has any application to a primary election you are quite right-but only to show that under the law the status of a party movement and the status of the treasurer of that movement as distinct from the candidate were recognized by the law. It is not that the law is a binding obligation, but it shows the judgment of Congress that there is a distinction between the treasurer of a party fund and the candidate of that party, because they are not the same person, and a gift to a cause is in no respect a gift to a man who in some immediate sense is to be regarded as the beneficiary of that cause.

Senator GEORGE. But, Mr. Beck, while the Federal corrupt practices act does differentiate between the treasurer of a political party and the candidate of that party, the whole act undertakes to hold responsible the candidate of the party himself; does it not? Mr. BECK. I think not, sir; no.

Senator GEORGE. Is there not any burden placed on him if his committee does take more money than the act permits?

Mr. BECK. The Federal corrupt practices act requires the candidate, as of course every Senator knows, to file a statement of his expenses, etc., with the Secretary of the Senate. The treasurer is obliged to make certain reports. I have forgottn what page that was.

Mr. DOYLE. Page 1070.

Senator GEORGE. The point I am making is this. Is the candidate who is successful in the final election held responsible for whatever may have been disclosed to have taken place with the treasurer, that is, so far as the sum of money expended is concerned?

Mr. BECK. Oh, no; of course not.

Senator GEORGE. Well, while the act deals with the treasurer as an individual, it also has to do with the candidate, the man who claims the office.

Mr. BECK. The point to which I am addressing myself is simply this: I take it that every member of the committee will agree that if Mr. Smith had not been chairman of the public utilities commission you would never consider denying him his seat by reason of Mr. Insull's contribution. Therefore, the whole point of the one tangible objection against Mr. Smith is that, being in a position as to which he had a vote with respect to the rates of public utility corporations, it was quite improper for him to receive money from public utilities. Therefore it is a matter of importance to determine that that which

a man gets and puts into his own pocket is one thing; that which is given to a political movement of which he is the avowed public spokesman, and, I grant, the practical beneficiary, is quite another thing when you are considering questions of disqualification.

You may say, Senator, that as a matter of propriety it would have been better not to have received this money.

Senator GEORGE. No; I was not talking about it from that standpoint, Mr. Beck. You were invoking the Federal act, as I understand your argument, for the purpose of showing that what the treasurer received was one thing, and that the treasurer, the official of the committee, was separate and distinct, under the scheme of the Federal law, from the candidate himself. Of course I grant you that the law has no application to primaries, and I understood you to take that position.

Mr. BECK. Oh, the law is explicit.

Senator GEORGE. Yes; I understand that.

Mr. BECK. The question is this, Senator: What this committee is to pass upon, and what the Senate presumably will ultimately pass upon, is whether there is anything in the facts of this case disclosing such moral turpitude as to justify the Senate in nullifying not only Mr. Smith's individual right to his seat, but the right of the State of Illinois to choose Mr. Smith.

Of course, I am not conceding that moral turpitude is any qualification or disqualification within the Constitution. I am going to come to that presently, and I hope to throw some light upon the question. Senator GEORGE. I did not understand you; I was simply missing the whole force of your argument as to this Federal act. Of course the treasurer of the political party is himself responsible for his own statements, and of course a burden is put upon him in the law; but ultimately the candidate who is the candidate of that political party is also held responsible under that very act. That is all I

asked you.

Mr. BECK. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. That is what I understand.

Senator SMITH. Just one minute. Senator George, the point you are making is that if this treasurer, clothed with official power and recognized as such under the statute, receives contributions in such a manner as that they are in violation of the law, then the candidate himself is

Senator GEORGE. Is finally affected by it.

Senator SMITH (continuing). Is affected, because just in proportion as this is corrupt, his own right to claim the seat is vitiated to the extent of the corruption practiced by the treasurer?

Senator GEORGE. That is my understanding of the law, and I was asking Mr. Beck if that were not true.

Senator KING. As I understand your position, Senator Georgesee if I understand it—it is this, that this law is something akin to the British statute. There, as I understand the law, if a contribution is made to the committee which has charge of the candidate's campaign, he is responsible and chargeable with the contribution. Knowledge is imputed to him of all the contributions made and of all the expenditures, though he may have no knowledge whatever of them, constructive or actual. If it shall be held that there was too