for every house that has the responsibility of the money must have the ultimate control. That I perfectly concede. One house must have the responsibility of originating expenditure, and of originating taxation; and, therefore, to that extent it will have a controlling effect, and no doubt finance is at the root of everything. The government cannot be carried on without money. But there are many things in the administration of government besides finance. For instance, this development might occur, and might be the result of the practical experience of fifty years or a hundred years, or, perhaps, a much shorter time-that some of her Majesty's ministers controlling particularly those matters with which it is specially the function of the house of representatives to deal, should command the support of that house; but that others, administering what may be called more permanent departments, should be independent of it-that there should be, in fact, a combination of the two forms of government; and which of us is wise enough to say that our successors will not be able to improve upon anything which we have devised? Is not that possible?

of the constitution in which the federal parliament, as well as all the states, must collectively concur. A difficulty of that kind would arise in a time of great excitement. It is not like the difficulty of making a law. When you want to make a law, and you cannot all agree in making it, there is simply no law made, and you go on as before. But the government of the country must be carried on ; you cannot suspend the government of the country while you call a constitutional convention, and get the consent of all the states to the amendment. Therefore, it is necessary to provide for it in our constitution. I have referred to this matter at rather greater length than I should have desired; but it is a matter of very great importance, and it underlies the whole of our work. The relative constitution and powers of the two houses of legislature underlie the whole of what we have to do. We must remember that it is quite new to all of us. We have had no experience of its working. We are bound to put ourselves in the position of men sitting in one house or the other-of men sitting in the senate representing a small state, and feeling bound to exercise a

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I am pointing out that we are launching upon an unknown sea. We are trying to lay down two hard and fast lines, which are apparently inconsistent with one another, and insisting that nevertheless they shall both be observed. I ask, therefore, that hon. members will give their attention to this, and that in considering the forma tion, functions, and tenure of office of the executive, they will endeavour to provide against that contingency, by making such provision that whatever the wisdom of our successors shall find to be best it may be possible for them to do without the extremely inconvenient method of a revision

cised; or as men supported by a large majority in the house of representatives, and wishing to exercise the authority that men in that position feel they ought to exercise. We ought to put ourselves in each of these positions and imagine what arguments we should be likely to use under such circumstances. I do not propose to move any amendment to the resolutions now before us. I apprehend that it is desirable, for the present, that the discussion should be somewhat general, although I hope that, before the resolutions are finally put from the chair, we shall have an opportunity, either in Committee of the Whole or in some other way, as by taking the resolutions seriatim, to propose any amendments

that hon. gentlemen may think desirable, in order to render them acceptable.

The PRESIDENT: Before the hon. member concludes, I desire to say that it is my intention, on the floor of the House, to move that the Convention resolve itself into Committee of the Whole to consider the resolutions in detail.

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I have very few words more to say. I trust I have made my arguments clear to hon. gentlemen, whether I am right or wrong. I am perfectly open to conviction, but entertaining these views with a greater or less degree of confidence, and entertaining, at any rate, the idea that they are very important matters for consideration, I thought it my duty to bring them forward for the consideration of the Convention at this early stage, because they certainly ought to be fully considered. I shall only indicate in what respect I think these resolutions may be modified, not with a desire to alter the practical result at which the President

aims in the resolutions that he has submitted-not as indicating a desire that the federation should not in practice work upon those lines, because I entirely concur with them, and hope that the Convention will concur with them-but because I desire that the machine may be made one that will work, and of which its framers will not be ashamed. I have indicated that I think the 2nd and 3rd resolutions might be transposed, the coming into operation of the 2nd necessarily following upon practical effect being given to the principle laid down in the 3rd resolution. With respect to defining the powers of the legislature, I would respectfully suggest to the Convention that we should consider whether it would not be better to declare that the house of representatives should have the sole power of originating the imposition of taxation. and the appropriation of revenue, leaving to the senate representing the states

the power of veto, which they, I believe, will claim upon every matter of legislation. Mr. GILLIES: But not amendment ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Power of veto-that is, amendment by omission, veto in part. That is what I mean. HON. MEMBERS: No, no!

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Veto in part, because the system of tacking is absolutely inconsistent with the theory of equal authority.

Mr. GILLIES: Does the hon. member mean that the senate could take one part and leave out the other?

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Suppose a majority of the house of representatives proposed to spend £1,000,000 or £2,000,000, raised from customs, or perhaps by loan, to establish an arsenal or to establish a very large federal force, and the majority of the states disapproved of it, they ought to be allowed to disapprove of it, whether it was brought in as a separate bill or included as an item of appropriation; that is, I wish that the power of veto should be a real one.

An HON. MEMBER: Would that be veto of the whole?

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I only wish to make my meaning clear. I know that that power is exercised in some of the colonies of Australia at present, not that I believe in its being done under our present Constitution. I have had the pleasure, or rather the experience, of a fight with the Legislative Council of our own colony when it attempted to omit an item in the estimates, but it became law all the same and during the same session. I do not in the least depart from that; but I am pointing out that we are trying a new experiment; that the states will claim the power of veto, and when we are considering the matter de novo, as we now are not dealing with one homogeneous community such as we have to deal with in our present

colonies, where the Upper House really is, under any constitution yet devised, weaker in practice than the other House, so that the principle works very wellwhen we are considering a thoroughly new system, it does not follow that it would be best to adopt the same system which we have followed up to the present time under quite different conditions. With regard to the imposition of taxation, I would not allow the senate to originate taxation, but I would allow them to veto-to refuse to accept taxation.

An HoN. MEMBER: Would the hon. member allow them to do so in detail?

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: To veto in detail. For instance, suppose the house of representatives proposed to impose a land-tax, and, I will say, an income-tax together in one bill, why should not the senate, representing the states, have the power of dealing with each proposal? A land-tax might be in one state or in several states a most just and proper thing, while in other states it might be most unfair and improper. So with an income-tax. It might be very fair, it might be easily collected, convenient, and desirable with respect to one state, while it might be absolutely impossible with respect to another. Why should not the senate have the power of veto? Why should not the senate have the power of saying, "We will have the one, but not the other"? Both houses would have to concur in the omission. I maintain that the more hon. members think of this subject the more they will see the necessity, if we are to have two houses, one representing the states and the other the people, of allowing the house representing the states the power of veto in detail as well as in the whole, instead of following what is really an artificial growth of comparatively recent years in our own system of two houses in a single homogeneous state.

Mr. GILLIES: That would be a law for one province and not for another!

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I am sorry that the hon. member misapprehends me. I have not indicated that in any way. All that I have endeavoured to convey is that a law which might commend it self to the majority of the house of representatives as suitable to the states they represented, might be entirely unsuitable to all the other states, and those states, therefore, should have the right of refusing to make such a general law.

Mr. GILLIES: That is exactly what I said!

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: With respect to the executive, the suggestions that I would offer would go in this direction: Instead of providing that the ministers shall sit in Parliament we should say that they may sit in Parliament. I have doubts myself whether we might not also say that their term of office should depend upon their retaining the confidence of the legislature; but it should be provided that they may, not that they must, sit in Parliament. If we do that and do no more, we shall have gone as far as it was ever thought necessary to go in the United Kingdom, as far as was thought necessary to go by the gentlemen who sat in this hall many years ago, and who framed the Constitution which has been the mother of all the Australian constitutions, and which has certainly stood the test of time. They left that Constitution open to further development. It has had further development, and it will have much more development. I ask hon. gentlemen in considering this question to be careful to frame the Constitution in such a manner that, whatever developments the necessities of the times may require, it will be possible to adopt them without the trouble of anything like a deadlock, or the interruption of the executive government of the country. I have been much longer than I intended in addressing the Convention, but I have endeavoured to express my mind as briefly as I could. However, the subject is a large one and must be

dealt with fully, and I hope hon. gentlemen will pardon me if I have intruded too long upon their time.

Mr. FYSH: As an exemplification of what I hope will be the great principle which must be established before the work of this Convention shall be closed-the principle that the colonies, at any rate in connection with our senatorial work, shall be equal-I rise now to continue the debate upon the resolution which you have submitted. I make no excuse other than the one which I have offered, except this: that I am aware that in the case of a number of gentlemen who have travelled from all parts of Australasia, and who largely represent the executives of their various colonies, they are here not so much at their own personal inconvenience as at the inconvenience of the executives which they represent. A goodly number of the ministers of the Crown of all our colonies are now assembled in Sydney-some 600 and some 1,200 miles away from their seats of government-and practically some of the executive work of our colonies is at a standstill while we are present here. It is, therefore, almost an absolute necessity that a goodly number of the members of governments must find their way back, at an earlier period than that at which this Convention can close, to their executive duties in their own particular localities. Under these circumstances, I think it is of the utmost importance that there shall not be one day's delay in proceeding with the important business which we have before us. Therefore, although I was desirous to await somewhat the issue of this debate, to endeavour, perhaps, to gather some inspiration from what might be said by various. speakers who have for a longer period ruled over destinies somewhat greater than those which I have had the pleasure of presiding over in the smaller colony of Tasmania; yet, when I think that we stand in the hall which is memorable by reason

of great difficulties overcome, by spirits with whom I hope we are somewhat kindred-one of whose portraits looks down upon us at the present time—which portrait reminds us of the difficulties. which, apparently, may embarrass the discussion of these resolutions, difficulties many of which have been described to us by the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith -when I remember what has been done by the men of old, who framed our present constitutions, which we have been working under for thirty-five or forty years, I am disposed to believe that, embarrassed though we may be by the conflicting opinionsI will not say conflicting interests, for when Australia is spoken of we are no longer to have conflicting interests-we shall be able to get over the difficulties arising from those conflicting opinions which may be expressed in this chamber with respect to these various resolutions. I do not propose to follow the line of argument adopted by the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith. There will be opportunities of doing so, as you, sir, have told us, in Committee. And if you had not announced that it was your purpose to move that the resolutions be considered in Committee of the Whole, I should have deemed it my duty to have reminded hon. members that subjects so important, so diverse, could not possibly be dealt with by a body sitting as we now are; but that every word of each resolution would have to be weighed and debated. That cannot possibly be done unless the House finds its way into Committee of the Whole. For these reasons I purpose to address myself only to general principles, to what I deem to be the essential portions of these resolutions, treating the matter as if I were asking for or supporting the second reading of a bill, when we debate principles only, and not details. Although a measure may be 100 or 200 paragraphs in length, whatever may be the diverse opinions of hon. members

when we go into Committee, it is only with the great principles of the bill which we are supposed to deal when discussing its second reading. Therefore, for my purpose, I may limit my observations to what I regard as the essential portions of the work of this Convention. I feel sure that those essential portions are discovered in the three great points of commercial union, of defence, and what I ought to have taken first-that is, what is known in America as the sovereignty of the states. I doubt whether the general public has any particular interest at the present moment in the method in which you will frame your executive, and in the mode in which your duties will be discharged. But I believe the interest which is now concentrated around this Convention throughout the whole of the Australasian colonies, centres around those three questions which I have named, and it is with respect to those that the great masses of the people are more concerned than they are with any other. They are more concerned, firstly, as to what portion of the rights which they have been enjoy ing for nearly forty years past it shall be proposed by this Convention to surrender. I am glad that the term "surrender" has been used in the first resolution. It should be indicative to all those whom we represent throughout Australasia, that this Convention is unlikely to try their patience, to try their spirit of justice, in asking them to surrender any rights which they consider to be of vital importance to their local autonomies, that it is unlikely to ask them to surrender any rights which will not be more fittingly discharged by the greater executive of the dominion parliament. If, therefore, we are to explain in connection with these resolutions what we mean by surrender, I would limit my explanation to a very few words. I say that it will be absolutely unnecessary to ask the people of these colonies to surrender to the do

minion parliament anything which can best be legislated for locally-anything which cannot be best legislated for by a central executive. Now, these may be far embracing words, but every man who runs may read in connection with an opinion of this kind, because he himself will be able as well as any of us to detect what it is that is best discharged locally. He will know that, with respect to the great future progress of his country, it must be by his voice that the extension of railways and of roads must be continued. He must know that it must be by his will and consent that possibly the education of the people shall be provided; and he must know that, in connection with the various developments of his own province, there can be no interference by an executive which will sit 1,000 miles away, and which cannot, except in regard to some individual members thereof, have so close an identity with the work in which he is engaged, or such a knowledge of the necessities which surround the country in which he is living, as those who represent him in the local parliaments. I believe, therefore, that we may limit our explanation of the term "surrender" to these very few words, and that the people may at once feel sure that this Convention is unlikely to ask them to give up any important right; but that its purpose will be to continue in all its harmony, in all its prestige, the position of the local parliaments, and that the dominion parliament, the great executive of the higher national sphere at which we are to arrive, will not in any way detract from it. But they will continue, most likely, under the Constitution under which they live, to have the right of appointing their own representatives to their own local parliaments, and, possibly, to have also in connection therewith their Upper Chamber; and certainly in all matters their voice will be paramount. Under these circumstances, I deem it that our duty in connection