CHAPTER 10

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE U.S. ARMY

Institutionally the Army is somewhat similar to a large corporation; it must recruit a competent workforce, operate effectively and manage its resources within a fixed set of boundaries. While carrying out my study I found that all of the problems and positive issues which were identified by Army soldiers had their foundation in one or all of four major factors which have influenced the Army. These factors are:

1. The loss of the draft;

2. Reductions in financial and personnel resources;

3. Personnel management; and

4. Public perception.

When the draft ended in 1972 the Army was required to rush rapidly into an expanded recruiting program to find the quantity of qualified personnel that it needed. This necessitated a shift in strategy towards "marketing" for manpower and a number of processes were developed. A very positive sales force was formed and put to work to find the people that the Army needed. The recruiting process was formalized year-by-year and improvements in management were provided. A nationwide advertising campaign emphasizing employment opportunities, education and benefits was founded upon sloguns such as: "Join the people who have joined the Army." In Chapter 8 and Chapter 3 the results of my analysis of recruiting and the comments of soldiers are presented. Clearly the Army has attempted to use economic stimulus and coercion to substitute for the removal of judicial pressure which existed during the draft. Reserve recruiting is directly linked to the previous draft pressure on individuals; when the draft ended the Reserve forces began to decline and have not stopped declining.

Changes are occurring in the Army due to the pressures to recruit personnel. More women are being recruited each year to offset losses in male recruiting. Lower income and minority races are contributing a larger percentage of recruits each year. The use of a volunteer recruiting process has repeated some of the inequities of the draft era (e.g., more minorities and poorer citizens are serving while the affluent majority is freed from duty). Volunteerism by its nature is not harmful but the very process of "free choice" means that many individuals who could make significant contributions to the military will never serve. Reductions in unemployment statistics among youths will further aggravate the future of Army recruiting. Major losses of personnel during their first term is also related to the absence of the draft since the present volunteer system is founded on allowing individuals the opportunity to separate from military service. No system of the scale seen today existed during the draft. Much of the pressure on the Army today begins with recruiting; without a source of "free" manpower the Army has resorted to a complex scheme for over-producing. The credibility of recruiting has been damaged by placing too much emphasis on looking at the Army as another employer; whereas, during the draft era the principle of Army recruitment was founded upon discipline, hard work and service. Most draftees had low expectations regarding military service but today's soldiers have very high expectations (based on recruiting practices) regarding military life.

Debates over discipline issues within the ranks also have their origins within the draft era. Many of today's NCO's were inducted during the draft and were subject to a firm authoritarian discipline standard. Changes in discipline authorities and procedures are perceived by NCO's and officers to be directly related to the absence of the draft.

Many of the perceptions of today's NCO's and some officers are founded on the processes of management and leadership exhibited during the draft. Appeals by soldiers to return to the use of the draft or of a national service program are made because these soldiers feel that the present volunteer system is too complex, costly and ineffective. Even junior officers and junior enlisted personnel, who never served during the draft, frequently favor a law requiring males and females to involuntarily serve in the Army. Whether a popular notion or not the removal of the draft has created a set of consequences on the Army that is limiting many personnel from fully performing their jobs. The “ghost of the draft" plagues the Army at many levels and the simple solution of reinstituting the draft has great appeal to many soldiers regardless of rank.

Damage to the Selective Service System is also perceived as a fallout from shifting to the Volunteer force. The Selective Service System is still needed as a vital tool for wartime but with the absence of a peace time draft operation many

military planners question the ability of the Selective Service System to act promptly and effectively in mobilizing during any future war. There is pressure within elements of Congress to close-out the Selective Service System as an archaic remnant of a previous era. The future of the Selective Service System is based on its ability to overcome the 1960's draft era image and find a new place as an emergency preparedness agency.

The absence of the draft has also created special problems such as the decline in population of military doctors. Despite attempts to upgrde incentives for recruiting doctors the militry physician shortage is a direct result of the end of the draft. When the era of drafted personnel closed in 1972 a second factor began to emerge; this factor was the conscious reduction in funds and personnel. The Army was too big at the close of Viet Nam; therefore, the OSD and DA began a series of reductions.

As the budgets have been pruned down each year the effects are appearing in the field in the form of less trained personnel, restructuring of units to smaller forces, and reductions in part, supplies, weapons and ammunition. Costs for personnel, procurement of material and operations are squeezing out many items of support to unit commanders. Reductions in civilian strength, reductions in training and other actions based on economic issues are affecting readiness. Reserve and National Guard readiness are also affected by funding reductions. The size of the Army force has come down each year as a result of budgetary constraints.

Proposed elimination of 20 year retirements, reductions in bonuses, elimination of recruiting incentives and many other financial cuts to the Army budget are founded upon an attempt to manage with fewer resources. Much of the personal discontent which I found in the Army has a direct relationship to financial cuts in budgets. Contrawise where adequate financial support was being provided soldiers were much more content with their jobs.

The third factor of personnel management is one of the most obtuse and often debated subjects by soldiers. Management of military personnel is more challenging in the volunteer era due to changes in society. Volunteer soldiers are more insistent upon receiving benefits and assistance. As more married soldiers enter the Army the need for social assistance programs has expanded. Also with more female soldiers present in the ranks new methods for disciplining women are being developed. Child care, maternal leave, single parent counseling and other unprecedented requirements are growing within the Army. Military leadership and methods for personnel management are being readjusted to deal with a new workforce.

The last factor of public perception is probably the most important and often the most difficult to measure and analyze. Public support to the Army is vital, yet many soldiers feel very alienated from the U.S. public. Major pressure is exerted on the Executive and Legislative branches by public groups desiring support for social programs. Soldiers are very frustrated regarding the low public interest in Army personnel needs.

Public sentiment will not change significantly unless all the relevant facts about defense are presented. Yet the absence of public support is the very basis upon which budget cuts and personnel reductions are founded. Also lost in the shuffle of public opinion is the total issue of national security. Soldiers know the facts regarding their military preparedness, yet many top level general officers feel prohibited from providing a free flow of information. The Army's future lies with the political will and consensus from the public; currently the public is becoming more apathetic. Much more needs to be done in providing the public with accurate, timely information regarding the Army.

Soldiers favor an opportunity to come forward and testify about the current problems in the Army. Open hearings to promote a free exchange of ideas might help the public and Congress to better understand the plight of U.S. Army soldiers.

CHAPTER 11

SPECIFIC ISSUES

This chapter of the report deals with those specific issues which I think underlie all of the major comments from soldiers. The following text includes my analysis and evaluation of a series of complex issues that are creating a strain on the Army; therefore, it is a very debatable section of the report. The topics which follow should be further debated by the Executive Branch and in the Congress in a systematic manner since all of these issues are interconnected. The status of today's Army and the future course of the Army are dependent upon resolving a series of questions such as:

1. What is the actual threat to U.S. national security?

2. Is the Army just another employer of a military fighting machine?

3. What impact is the changing personnel composition of the Army having on the Army's ability to perform its mission?

4. What are the options for the future?

At first review these questions may appear to be unrelated; however, they are closely linked. The use of a small Active Army supported by a strong Reserve Component was the underlying strategy of disbanding the draft and beginning a Volunteer force. Any potential threat to U.S. interests which require Army forces influences the size of the total Army. Since the Army has recruited personnel on the basis of employment, benefits, and education the mission of the Army has become diluted by a shift from military issues to social concerns.

The Soviet threat in Europe continues to grow as the Soviets reequip their forces with increasing numbers of modern tanks, weapons and aircraft. At the same time the U.S. Army has declined in strength and the composition of the U.S. Army has come to include more women, more married soldiers and an increasing population of minorities. All of these trends will affect the future course of the Army. Soldiers in the U.S. Army are concerned about all of these issues and during my discussions with Army personnel it became clear to me that many U.S. Army soldiers are uncertain of their future. "What has become of the threat to national security?” is a common question asked in all discussion groups and at all levels of rank within the Army.

Soldiers are deeply disappointed in the continuing decline in Reserve force strength, shortages in equipment and a seemingly apathetic public posture regarding Soviet force expansion. Many soldiers in Europe tended to rate Soviet forces as superior in terms of equipment and numerical advantage. Forces stationed in the United States are concerned about training harder to be ready to go into battle against a potential enemy who is perceived to be capable, well equipped and numerically superior. Even in the Reserves and National Guard the question of military preparedness dominates other issues. There is profound concern by Reserve commanders about the continuing decline in force strength within the Reserves and many Reservists wonder why more financial resources are not being provided to "beef up" the Reserves. The question of assisting Reserve forces is crucial since the Army adopted a total force policy which includes Reserves as a key part of the Active Army.

There is a serious tone of skepticism present in the Army today regarding U.S. policies in national defense. European soldiers are especially skeptical about public interest in national defense. The major question posed by soldiers is, "How big and how capable an Army does the public want to have?" Many soldiers feel that the budget dictates force strength rather than allowing a military assessment of the probable threat to dictate force structure. The question of what type of an Army we need is also influenced by public opinion. Many soldiers feel that too much emphasis is being placed on presenting the Army as just another employer.

Is the Army another employer or is it a special organization (e.g., a fighting machine)? In holding discussions with soldiers one consistent theme was present among junior enlisted personnel-they expected the Army to be a place of employment. Recruiting processes provided the new soldier with the expectation that he would be entitled to working conditions comparable to those found in the public sector. Disappointment over unfulfilled "promises" (mostly verbal) are rampant within the junior enlisted ranks. Whether this disappointment has its foundations from "selective reading," which the Army claims to be the source of false promises, or from the intent by recruiters to accentuate the positive, is debatable. What is not debatable is the fact that hundreds of the soldiers who I interviewed consider that their expectations were not and are not being met by the Army.

I evaluated the motivations of Army soldiers by using a General Accounting Office questionnaire 12 that had been used to evaluate the satisfaction of soldiers with their recruiting, training and job assignments. The GAO study concluded that much more work needed to be performed to improve the managment of military personnel. Since the GAO study had been conducted 2 years ago I decided to test applicants to see if any favorable trends had developed. While visiting military bases in the United States I passed out questionnaires to 126 soldiers in the E-1 to E-4 pay grade level. Samples were made at 5 military bases involving 126 respondents, compared to the GAO study which sampled 205 respondents at one military base. Care should be taken in using this data since the statistical confidence level is quite small but the trends are useful to evaluate management issues.

The average age of respondents to our survey was 21 years as compared to the GAO survey of 18.7 years in age. Fifty percent of the personnel who we surveyed were of the E-4 rank and 98 percent were in their first enlistment. Figure 11-1 presents the age profile for the Beard survey compared to the GAO data.

The Army has made a concerted effort to enlist more high school graduates each year since 1972 and the success of this approach is reflected in Figure 11-2.

12 Problems Resulting from Management Practices in Recruiting, Training and Using NonHigh School Graduates and Category IV Personnel, GAO Report FPCD-76-24, January 12, 1976.

Since the Beard Survey was taken on a random basis, including combat and combat support units, the Army appears to be succeeding in obtaining more high school graduates. Unit commanders were very favorable in their evaluation of soldiers who are high school graduates. However the induction of more high school graduates has also increased the motivational criteria at enlistment as shown on Figure 11-3.