"Air Force and Navy flying units are generally at higher levels of readiness. For example, on average, the Air National Guard flying units are rated C-2 ("substantially ready"), with 43 percent of the units rated C-1 ("fully ready").

"Other Reporting Systems.-The training ratings produced by the Army's Reserve Evaluation System (RES), which was described above, have not been systematically correlated with training C-ratings. But Army personnel indicated that RES ratings are often lower than those portrayed by the C-system. Thus, RES may paint a slightly gloomier-but more accurate-picture of Army reserve training readiness than the C-ratings.

"The Reserve Evaluation System also provides other indicators of Army reserve readiness that are worrisome. According to RES, in 1976:

"Personnel turbulence was high (33 percent losses, 29 percent gains);

"36 percent of the enlisted reservists were not working in the jobs for which they were trained;

"25 percent of reserves were not present for annual training with their units, though of that number 10 percent received training in schools or with other units, and another 7 percent were awaiting entry into boot camp;

"Training areas and weapons qualifications ranges for weekend training were often inadequate;

"Only 46 percent of the crews qualified on their weapons during active training; and

"There were serious deficiencies in nuclear/chemical/biological equipment and capability.

"Exercises.-Exercises present another view of the ability of the reserves to fight effectively, as well as information on how quickly they could mobilize. Several important types of reserve exercises were examined: mobilization exercises, graded combat exercises, and training exercises conducted with the active forces. The picture that emerges tends to support a pessimistic view of reserve readiness among ground units."7

These findings were supported by my field inspections and in discussions with Army Reserve Headquarters personnel and Army National Guard personnel.

Mobilization of Reserve forces was evaluated by the Army during 8 November to 9 December 1976 under MOBEX-76 at Ft. Hood, Ft. Drum, Ft. Lewis, Camp Roberts, Ft. Benning and Ft. McCoy. The Army National Guard furnished 275 units, the USAR 315 units and 31 TAGS and 18 ARCOM's were involved. The ground rules for MOBEX-76 included a deliberate full mobilization test with no warning time and strong emphasis on early "round out units." No units were actually moved and roughly one-fourth of the Reserve Component units were involved. A "no-fault" process was used to insure that units accurately reported their problems as well as

successes.

The MOBEX-76 test showed that Reserve units lack adequate planning for POE and overseas processing of personnel. Many units have readiness deficiencies that will require extended training for the unit and filler personnel. In some cases it was not judged possible to bring Reserve units and forward deployed units to authorized wartime levels in required time. One major area was the high losses of Reserve personnel who were excused from deployment due to critical skills deferments and potential physical disqualification. Critical skill deferments exist for policemen, firemen, doctors and others who are considered essential for national and civil defense needs. The CBO and MOBEX-76 reports documented a host of other problems. There is a major shortage of support in Automated Data Processing, lack of secure communications and a shortage of trucks and railroad cars to transport heavy equipment. Also the Wartime Chain of Command in the U.S. was overloaded. Also identified was a shortage of highly specialized skills (doctors, aviators, etc.) in the Reserve Components. A major shortage exists in the IRR and MOBEX-76 documented the inability of the IRR to provide the necessary manpower to adequately man the Reserves.

Overall MOBEX-76 uncovered many problems. The Army is now trying to correct these deficiencies and retest mobilization under MOBEX-78. Unfortunately MOBEX-76 did not include the actual deployment of equipment which may unleash a complete set of additional problems.

In my discussions with DA planners, Reserve units and National Guard units the lack of deployment planning was obvious. Most Reserve commanders and personnel stated that they felt that much more needs to be done to strengthen deployment planning and training for deployment.

Mobilization within the Reserves can be strengthened by:

'See footnote 4, p. 158.

1. Finding a positive method to recruit additional personnel into the Reserves and provide incentives to retain current personnel.

2. Continue providing Reserves with modern equipment.

3. Establish a higher priority for mobilization station support units.

4. Man and equip the D to D-60 units at deployable levels (ALO 1 or 2).

5. Increase deployment training.

6. Define mobilization exemption policies.

7. Establish intra-conus movement system.

In order for the Reserve mobilization to be strengthened the Army should be provided with additional financial and personnel resources to meet these objectives. It is apparent from an analysis of Reserve readiness and mobilization that much more needs to be done. Either the Reserve forces must be given more support through additional recruiting and incentives coupled with additional material resources or a major decline in strength may occur by 1980. Since U.S. Army force strength is founded on a "total force" of active duty and Reserves this force will grow weaker.

Serious manpower shortfalls are continuing in certain Reserve Component units and in the individual ready reserve (IRR). The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that the decline in Reserve Coponent forces may have a severe impact on the overall readiness of the forces." "

The Adjudants General of the individual States met in May 1977 and uniformly agreed that either the draft or some form of national service should be instated to enlist manpower for the military, especially the Reserves. While this only addresses a fraction of the total mobilization issue it is evident that the manpower shortage within the Reserves continues to be a major problem.

The ability of the U.S. Army Reserve to carry out its wartime mobilization and readiness of its units needs much more improvement. The Congress and the DOD share in the burden for failing to take the initiative in fiscal year 1978. With the conference committee issues pending to decide the fiscal year 1979 budget the question of the Army's future lies again at the wellspring of OSD and the Congress. Soldiers in the United States and Germany field have expressed low confidence in their readiness, either due to a lack training or due to shortages in personnel and equipment. Congress and OSD can do much more to offset the decline in readiness by providing increased support to U.S. Army initiatives.

United States Military Posture for fiscal year 1978, General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHAPTER 6

RESERVE FORCES

One area within the Army where there is an undisputed problem is the continuing shortfall of personnel to man the National Guard and Reserve units. Thousands of pages of written materials submitted to the Congress, published in newspapers and documented in studies clearly show that since the removal of the draft of the Reserves have had a steady decline in strength. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee each year documents the steady decline of manpower within the Reserve and National Guard.

During the House and Senate hearings in fiscal year 1977 the Army stated that the mobilization requirement for the Reserves was 276,000; the manning level requirement was 260,000 but actual strength was 192,000 at the close of fiscal year 1977T. A projected upswing in strength was made and it was planned that the drill strengths would be: Fiscal year 1977-205,000; fiscal year 1978–219,000; fiscal year 1979-225,000; fiscal year 1980-230,000; fiscal year 1981-235,000; and fiscal year 1982-240,000. However the actual end strength in fiscal year 1978 of the U.S. Army Reserves dipped to a level of 185,000 personnel, well short of the planned 205,000 goal and 91,000 short of wartime authorized level for fiscal year 1977 of 276,000 (see Table 6-1).

TABLE 6-1-USAR STRENGTH, PAID DRILL STRENGTH PER FISCAL YEAR UPDATED FEB. 2, 1978

3-September 1977 paid drill strength is 189,420 which equates to 68.6 percent of wartime requirements. 4-USAR TPU strength has gone up by 3,284 personnel in the last 2 months (July-186,136 to September-189,420). 5 USAR TPU preliminary strength for October 1977 is 190,198.

Fiscal year 1978 authorization, S. 1210, Part 4, Manpower and Personnel, March 14, 22, 29, April 4, 1977. Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, first session.

The Army National Guard has suffered and equal decline as shown on Figure 6-1. The National Guard wartime level is 428,000 with an actual paid strength of 354,7000 personnel. Major attempts to revise recruiting and increase retention were made during fiscal year 1977 by the National Guard and the Reserves. But as Figure 6-2 shows the overall losses have exceeded gains for the past five years. Lack of pressure to enlist caused by the draft has changed the entire recruiting picture within the Reserves and National Guard. Waiting lists existed in 1970 with more people applying than could be enlisted, but this began to decline in 1972 and the composition of personnel within the National Guard has changed as shown on Table 6-2. The number of accessions has declined and the ratio of mental categories has shifted down, especially among Mental Category I and II personnel. Each year of recruiting is yielding more Category III personnel. High school graduates have plummeted from 93 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1977. Like the active Army the National Guard is trying to recruit more high school seniors. However the non-highschool enlistee constituted 55.6 percent of fiscal year 1977 accessions compared to 42.2 percent in fiscal year 1976. One positive indicator was the reduction of Mental Category IV personnel from 17.9 percent accessions in fiscal year 1976 to 14.9 percent in fiscal year 1977.