letin, Issue 7, 2nd Quarter 1995, published by the interim secret Climate Change, Convention, Geneva. For the text of the Frame see Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for A Framework C mate Change, Fifth Session, Second Part, New York, 30 April-9 Ma 12 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), R Group In, Chapter 1, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press.

13 The four models comprise the Subgroup on the Regional Dist and Benefits of Climate Change Policy Proposals. The Subgroup participating in Stanford University's Energy Modeling Forum (EM tegrated Assessment of Climate Change."

14 See Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for A Framewo Climate Change, Fifth Session, Second Part, New York, 30 April-9 15 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Report o III, Chapter 9, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press.

16 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Clim Cambridge University Press, 1994. Also see, Wigley, T., Richels, J. "Economic and Environmental Choices in the Stabilization of Concentrations," Nature, Vol. 379,18 January, 1996.

17 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),_R Group III, Chapters 9 & 10, forthcoming, Cambridge University Pr 18 See Peck, S. and Teisberg, T. "International CO2 Emissions T tables: Analysis Using CETA-M", Working Paper, 1995.

19 See Z. Yang, et. al, "The MIT Emissions Projection and P (EPPA) Model", Draft report, MIT Joint Program on the Science an Change, February 1996.

20 See Manne, A. and Richels, R. "The Berlin Mandate: the Costs 2000 Targets and Timetables", Stanford University, Stanford, CA Energy Policy, 1995.

21 See Edmonds et al.

22 See Hogan, W. and Jorgenson, D. "Productivity Trends and th ing CO2 Emissions" Energy Journal 12 No. 1, 1991.

23 For a detailed model comparison, see EMF-14.

24 These projections are intended as examples of how emissi under existing policies. They should not be interpreted as each ana guess" of future emissions.

25 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Clim Cambridge University Press, 1994.

26 See Manne, A. and Richels, R. "The Costs of Stabilizing Greer sions: A Probabilistic Analysis based on Expert Judgments," The 15(1), 1994.

27 The AOSIS proposal calls for Annex 1 countries to reduce emi 2005.

28 See notes 15 and 16.

29 There is some trade in emission rights within the OECD, hov consequence of aggregating single countries into larger regions.

an international market in carbon emission rights, global abatement costs pendent of the burden sharing scheme. This allows us to separate the difues of efficiency and equity. For the theoretical considerations underlying position, see Manne, A. "Greenhouse Gas Abatement toward Pareto ty in Integrated Assessments", in Education in a Research University, Kenneth J. Arrow, Richard W. Cottle, B. Curtis Eaves and Ingram Olkin, University Press, Stanford CA, 1996.

a more detailed discussion of the timing issue, see Wigley et al, note 16. the analysis, we use the carbon cycle model of Wigley. See Wigley, T.M. ng the Carbon Budget: the Implications for Projections of Future Carbon Dicentration Changes," Tellus, 45B, 1993.

A is a recursive rather than an intertemporal optimization model. Several ve emission paths were explored for Cases 1b and 1c. The results reported for the lowest-cost of the paths tested, and the results are not strictly comwith those from the other models.