of making a collection, then it interferes with the obligation of such contracts, and, as to them, is invalid.62 For instance, a statute providing that the proceeds of life-insurance policies shall not be liable for the debts of the decedent would be void as to debts already contracted.63 The "betterment acts," allowing to defendants in ejectment the present value of improvements made by them upon the land in good faith, deducting the amount reasonably due for use and occupation, do not impair the obligation of contracts.64 But a statute which undertakes to make a lien for seed grain superior to the lien of a mortgage executed before the statute was enacted is repugnant to this clause of the constitution, and therefore void.65 A statute providing that property shall not be sold on execution or foreclosure of a mortgage, unless it will bring one-half or two-thirds of the value put upon it by appraisers, is invalid in respect to contracts made before its passage which could have been enforced, by the law at the time they were made, by a judgment and the seizure and sale of property to satisfy it. For such a law, though professing to act only on the remedy, really withdraws from the creditor the effective means of enforcing it upon the basis of which he may be supposed to have made the contract." A statute giving the right to redeem from mortgage foreclosure sales, or from sales on execution or other judicial process, where no such right before existed, or where such right was expressly waived, or extending the time allowed therefor, cannot constitutionally apply to existing mortgage contracts or to sales made before its passage."7 But a statute which reduces the rate of interest which redemptioners from mortgage foreclosure sales are required 62 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 295, 35 N. W. 513; Willard v. Sturm (Iowa) 65 N. W. 847; Dunn v. Stevens (Minn.) 64 N. W. 924; Patton v. City of Asheville, 109 N. C. 685, 14 S. E. 92; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. St. 46. 63 Rice v. Smith, 72 Miss. 42, 16 South. 417; In re Heilbron's Estate, 14 Wash. 536, 45 Pac. 153. 64 Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Fed. 519. 65 Yeatman v. Foster Co., 2 N. D. 421, 51 N. W. 721. 66 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Gantly's Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 67 Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042; Watkins v. Glenn, to pay to 8 per cent. is not a violation of the obligation of a contract as to a mortgagee whose mortgage was executed at a time when redemptioners were required to pay 10 per cent. interest. The reason is that such a statute does not diminish the duty of the mortgagor to pay what he agreed to pay, nor shorten the period of payment, nor affect any remedy which the mortgagee had, by existing law, for the enforcement of his contract." 68 The legislature cannot constitutionally deprive municipal corporations of the power of taxation, in such a manner or to such an extent as to leave them without the means of raising money for the payment of existing debts, which were contracted at a time when they possessed the power to levy taxes and on the faith of the continuance of such power. To do so would be to impair the obligation of the contracts out of which the debts arose, by abolishing the means of their enforcement.69 Thus, when municipal bonds are taken by the holders on the faith of a promise to levy an annual tax to pay the interest on them, this constitutes a part of the contract; and the municipality cannot lawfully be deprived of the power to levy such taxes." 70 55 Kan. 417, 40 Pac. 316; Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 South. 97; State v. Fylpaa, 3 S. D. 586, 54 N. W. 599. 68 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 2 Sup. Ct. 236; Robertson v. Van Cleave, 129 Ind. 217, 26 N. E. 899. 69 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; In re Copenhaver, 54 Fed. 660; McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C. 34, 23 S. E. 99. 70 Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 6 Sup. Ct. 398. BL.CONST.L.-40 CHAPTER XXII. RETROACTIVE LAWS. 285. Validity of Retroactive Statutes. 286. Retroactive Effect Avoided by Construction. 288. Statutes Curing Administrative Action. 289. Curing Defective Judicial Proceedings. VALIDITY OF RETROACTIVE STATUTES. 285. Retroactive laws are not unconstitutional, unless they are in the nature of ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, or unless they impair the obligation of contracts, or divest vested rights, or unless they are specifically forbidden by the constitution of the particular state. A retroactive (or retrospective) law is one which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts or transactions occurring before it came into effect, or rights already accrued, and which imparts to them characteristics, or ascribes to them effects, which were not inherent in their nature in the contemplation of the law as it stood at the time of their occurrence. Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws are both included in this class. A bill of attainder or an ex post facto law is always retroactive; but not all retroactive laws are bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. The latter terms, as we have already seen, relate only to the imposition of pains or penalties or the conduct of criminal Again, all laws which impair the obligations of contracts are retroactive. For if they related only to future contracts, they could not be said to have this effect, because contracts are made with reference to existing laws. Laws which have the effect of divesting vested rights are also of this character; for the phrase "vested right" implies something settled or accrued in the past, on which the new statute is to operate. There are also numerous classes of retroactive laws which are constitutionally objectionable for the reason that they exceed the powers of the legislature or invade the province of one of the other departments of the government. But unless the law in question belongs to one of the classes mentioned above, or is open to some one of the objections described, the mere fact that it is retroactive in its operation will not suffice to justify the courts in declaring it unconstitutional, unless all laws of that character are prohibited by the constitution of the state. No such prohibition is found in the federal constitution. If a state statute does not impair the obligation of contracts or partake of the nature of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law, its retrospective character does not make it inconsistent with the national constitution.1 But in the constitutions of some few of the states, we find a specific prohibition against retroactive legislation, eo nomine. RETROACTIVE EFFECT AVOIDED BY CONSTRUCTION. 286. A statute will be construed to operate in futuro only (that is, it will not be given a retroactive effect by construction), unless the legislature has so explicitly expressed its intention to make the act retrospective that there is no place for a reasonable doubt on the subject.2 The reason for this rule is the general tendency to regard retroactive laws as dangerous to liberty and private rights, on account of their liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. "Retrospective laws being in their nature odious, it ought never to be presumed the legislature intended to pass them, where the words will admit of any other meaning." And where the law is clearly and explicitly retrospective, it will still be subjected, in this respect, to a rigid interpretation, so that its retrospective features may not be further extended than is absolutely required by the language of the act.* 1 Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380. 2 Auffmordt v. Rasin, 102 U. S. 620. 3 Underwood v. Lilly, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 97, 101. Thames Manuf'g Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550. CURATIVE STATUTES. 287. The legislature may retrospectively validate transactions between private persons, which would otherwise fail to have the effect which the parties intended to give them, either in consequence of a want of capacity, or of a failure to observe formalities which the law imposed and which it might dispense with. It is first to be noticed that the object of curative and confirmatory acts is to give effect to the intention of the parties, to enable them to carry into effect some transaction which they have designed and attempted, but which fails of its expected legal consequences only by reason of some statutory disability or some irregularity in their action. Hence it would not be competent, by an act of this kind, to make the transaction carry a legal effect which the parties did not contemplate, e. g., to turn an attempted mortgage into a deed absolute. In the next place, statutes of this kind are intended to do justice, and they cannot be objected to by the party whose invalid contract or conveyance they validate. Such a party cannot claim that he has a vested right to insist upon the ineffectualness of the contract or conveyance. On the contrary, the law recognizes an equity in the other party to the transaction, and it is to this that the curative act gives effect. But retrospective curative statutes cannot be allowed to operate to the detriment of the intervening rights of third persons. Thus if, after the execution of an invalid contract or conveyance, the person who made it deals with a third person, in good faith, in respect to the same subject matter, the rights thus acquired by such third person cannot be cut out by the validation of the prior contract or conveyance." The invalidity of the transaction may arise from the want of authority or capacity in the person who attempted to transfer rights to another. And this may be of two kinds, natural or legal. it is of the former sort, the legislature cannot supply the lack of Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292 (Gil. 199). |