SAME-NATURE OF THE LITIGATION. 34. To induce the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute, the question must arise in the course of an actual and bona fide litigation. The judicial tribunals will decline to exercise this high office unless it becomes necessary in order to determine the rights of parties in a real and antagonistic controversy. "It never was thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act." 15 SAME-PARTIES INTERESTED. 35. A statute will not be declared unconstitutional on the application of a mere volunteer or person whose rights it does not specially affect. "It is a rule, and a very wholesome rule, that no one can take advantage of the unconstitutionality of an act who has no interest in and is not affected by it." 16 For instance, the objection that a state statute impairs the obligation of contracts cannot be urged against it in a proceeding to which the only parties who have any contract rights to be affected by it, if any such exist, have not been made parties. It is only when some person attempts to resist the operation of an act claimed by him to impair the obligation of a contract, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce it void as to him, his property, or his rights, that the objection of unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained.17 So, again, white persons will not be heard to object that an act under which a tax has been levied is unconstitutional because the property of colored persons is made subject to the tax, while they are neither allowed 15 Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 12 Sup. Ct. 400. 16 State v. Snow, 3 R. I. 64; Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 96; State v. Becker, 3 S. D. 29, 51 N. W. 1018. 17 People v. Brooklyn, F. & C. I. Ry. Co., 89 N. Y. 75; Moore v. City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 726. to vote on the question of taxation nor to participate in the benefits for which the tax is levied.18 Persons may also become estopped from denying the constitutionality of a statute, by participating in the procurement of its passage, by acquiescing in it after its passage, or by accepting benefits under it, although it may be invalid as to all other persons.19 And an individual has no right to complain that a law is unconstitutional after he has endeavored to take the benefit of it to the injury of others.20 But taxpayers, citizens of the state, may maintain a bill quia timet to restrain the executive officers of the state from funding the public debt under an act which is unconstitutional and void. 21 SAME-NECESSITY OF DECISION. 36. The question of constitutionality will not be decided unless it is imperatively necessary to the right disposition of the case. Courts are not eager to annul acts of the legislature. A becoming respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government will make them loath to adjudicate the grave question of the constitutional validity of a statute, and they will not do so when the matters or questions presented by the record do not require it.22 The decision of a case will be rested on grounds which do not involve a determination as to the validity of the statute, if there be any such in the case. It is only when the question of the power of the legislature under the limitations of the constitution is the very gist and marrow of the case that the courts will give their judgment on this point. And if a judgment on the question of constitutionality was not necessary to the determination of the particular case, it will usually be regarded as obiter dictum and not as concluding the question. As a corollary to the foregoing rule, it may be stated that the courts will ordinarily refuse to decide upon the constitutionality of 18 Norman v. Boaz, 85 Ky. 557, 4 S. W. 316. 19 Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.) 230. 20 Hansford v. Barbour, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 515. 21 Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 121. 22 Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Hopson v. Murphy, 1 Tex. 314. a statute except when the decision is necessary to the final disposition of the case. That is, they will not allow the question to be raised, or will not determine it, upon preliminary, provisional, or collateral proceedings, such as motions for a preliminary injunction, motions to strike out pleadings, hearings concerning costs, or the like. 23 SAME-CONSTRUCTION. 37. Unconstitutionality will be avoided, if possible, by putting such a construction on the statute as will make it conform to the constitution. The courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it the force of law, if this can be done without extravagance. They may disregard the natural and usual import of the words used, if it is possible to adopt another construction, sustaining the statute, which shall not be strained or fantastic. In so doing, they construe the act in accordance with the presumed intention of the legislature. For the law-making body is always presumed to have acted within the scope of its powers.24 SAME-EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. 38. Courts will be influenced, but not bound, by a long and uniform construction of a statute, with respect to its constitutionality, by the other branches of the government. While the courts are to determine for themselves all questions of constitutionality which come properly before them, yet it is proper and usual for them to show much respect to the decisions of the executive and legislative departments, made for their own guidance, upon the same questions, especially when such decisions have been acquiesced in and acted upon for a long period of time.25 28 Deering v. Railroad Co., 31 Me. 172; Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583. 24 Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich. 484; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376; Roosevelt v. Godard, 52 Barb. 533; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433; Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 5 Sup. Ct. 125. 25 Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299. SAME-PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY. 39. Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. Legislators, as well as judges, are bound to obey and support the constitution, and it is to be understood that they have weighed the constitutional validity of every act they pass. Hence the presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a statute; every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute, not against it; and the courts will not adjudge it invalid unless its violation of the constitution is, in their judgment, clear, complete, and unmistakable.20 SAME REFERENCE TO JOURNALS OF LEGISLATURE. 40. The journals of the legislature may be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the act was passed in due form; but no evidence will be received to contradict the journals. A statute may be unconstitutional for lack of compliance with the forms prescribed by the constitution in the process of its enactment. If it is shown to the court that the legislature has neglected or violated its duty in any of these particulars, the act must be pronounced invalid. And for this purpose, the court may go behind the enrolled or printed bill and examine the journals of the two houses. But the act will not be adjudged void unless the journals. affirmatively show a lack of compliance with such forms.27 26 Tonnage Tax Cases, 62 Pa. St. 286; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Stewart v. Supervisors of Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9. 27 Prescott v. Illinois Canal, 19 Ill. 324; Common Council of Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787. Compare Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401. And see infra, p. 296. SAME-MOTIVES OF LEGISLATURE. 41. The motives of the legislature, in passing a particular measure, cannot be inquired into, nor can it be shown that it was procured by fraud or bribery. The constitutionality of a statute is a bare question of legislative power, and any inquiry as to the motives operating on the minds of the legislators, in voting for the measure, is entirely incompetent. The validity of a statute does not in the least depend on the considerations which induced the legislature to enact it. Evidence to establish fraud, bribery, or corruption against the members of the legislature, as a ground for setting aside the statute, is not admissible. The courts are not made guardians of the morals of the legis lators, nor are they at liberty to impute to them any improper motives. 28 Nor can it be shown that deception or suppression of the truth was practiced upon the legislature to induce the passage of the act. Thus, an inquiry as to whether a land grant was obtained by a railroad company by false representations to the legislature would indirectly interfere with the power of the legislature to enact such laws as it may deem best for the general good. The courts will therefore presume (whatever may be averred to the contrary) that no general statute is ever passed either for want of information upon the part of the legislature or because it was misled by the false representations of interested parties.29 SAME-POLICY OF LEGISLATION. 42. A statute cannot be declared void on considerations going merely to its policy or propriety. The courts have nothing whatever to do with the policy, expediency, wisdom, or propriety of acts of the legislature. Such matters 28 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502; State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S. W. 364; Parker v. State, 132 Ind. 419, 31 N. E. 1114; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 121; Jewell v. Weed, 18 Minn. 272 (Gil. 247). 29 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & S. Ry. Co., 39 Fed. 143. And see Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 651, 27 Pac. 1089. |