and the knowledge of civil government which distinguish them from every other people. Here have been the seats of modern civilization, the nurseries of public spirit, and the centers of constitutional liberty. They are the opposites of those systems which collect all power at a common center, to be wielded by a common will, and to effect a given purpose; which absorb all political authority, exercise all its functions, distribute all its patronage, repress the public activity, stifle the public voice, and crush out the public liberty." And in another case we read: "This right of self-gov ernment lies at the foundation of our institutions, and cannot be disturbed or interfered with, even in respect to the smallest of the divisions into which the state is divided for governmental purposes, without weakening the entire foundation; and hence it is a right not only to be carefully guarded by every department of the government, but every infraction or evasion of it to be promptly met and condemned, especially by the courts, when such acts become the subject of judicial investigation."

This important principle finds its most pure and perfect expression in the town meeting of New England, which is a legal assembly of the qualified voters of a town, held at stated intervals or on call, for the purpose of electing town officers, and of discussing and deciding on questions relating to the public business, property, and expenses of the town. Although such pure democracy does not prevail throughout our country, yet it is in pursuance of the same general principle that municipal corporations are established in all the states, and invested with rights and powers of government subordinate to the general authority of the state, but exclusive within their sphere. And it is in reality but an extension of this principle that the government of the United States should be intrusted with only such powers and rights as concern the welfare of the whole country, while the individual states are left to the uncontrolled regulation of their internal affairs. The principle of local government being thus firmly implanted in our political system, it rests with the legislative authority of each state to apply and adjust it to the varying needs of its own people. That authority must determine what municipal corporations shall be created 1 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, 561. 2 People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50, 57.

and what shall be their powers and the limit of their jurisdiction, according to its view of the requirements of the different sections and districts of the state, and their capacity and need of local gov ernment.

In some of the states, the right of local government is guarded by constitutional provisions forbidding the legislature to make any private or special laws "regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties." In others, it is considered as one of the rights inherent in the people at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and reserved to the people by that instrument except as modified by the grant of authority to the legislature. Thus the supreme court of Indiana, speaking of a statute which attempted to create a fire department for a city, but making it entirely independent of the selection, regulation, or control of the municipal authorities, observes: "We hold that the right to provide and maintain a fire department in a town or city is one of the rights which are vested in the people of municipalities, and to be exercised by them, and is not subject to legislative interference, except in so far as they may prescribe rules to aid the people of the municipality in the exercise of such right; that such right is an element of local self-government, which was vested in the people of the municipalities at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and was not parted with by it; that so much of the statute under consideration as relates to the management and control of the fire departments of cities is unconstitutional and void."

NATURE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

182. Municipal corporations are administrative agencies established for the local government of towns, cities, counties, or other particular districts.

183. The special powers conferred on them are not vested rights as against the state, nor are they in the nature

. State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274. And see City of Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267. In the case of State v. Williams (Conn.) 35 Atl. 24, will be found an interesting discussion of the nature of local selfgovernment and of how far the legislature is bound to recognize and provide for it.

of contracts, but, being wholly political, they exist only during the will of the legislature. Such powers may at any time be changed, modified, repealed, or destroyed by the legislature, saving only the vested rights of individuals.

A municipal corporation is a public corporation created by the government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legislation; it is an incorporation of persons, inhabitants of a particular place or connected with a particular district, enabling them to conduct its local civil government.* The more usual kinds of municipal or quasi municipal corporations in this country are cities, towns, townships, boroughs, villages, parishes, counties, school districts, poor districts, and road districts.

The charter of a municipal corporation is not a contract, within the meaning of that clause of the federal constitution which forbids the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Hence it follows that such charters may be altered, amended, or repealed by the legislature at its own discretion, without any violation of that clause, provided only that private vested rights are not infringed by the action which it may take in regard to the charter." And municipal corporations, being creatures of legislation, have no constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, and such trial may be denied to them.® They are liable to have their public powers, rights, and duties modified or abolished at any time by the legislature. They are allowed to hold privileges or property only for public purposes. Hence, generally, the doings between them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than compact. And one legislature cannot impose restrictions on the powers of a municipal corporation which a future legislature cannot modify or abrogate, except where a vested right or the obligation of a contract might be thereby divested or impaired.

4 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169, 180.

Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 86, 92; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; Paterson v. Society, 24 N. J. Law, 385; Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427.

• Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374.

7 Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511, 534. 8 State v. Pilsbury, 31 La. Ann. 1.

POWER TO CREATE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

184. The power to distribute the administrative functions of government, and from time to time to change their distribution, belongs exclusively to the legislature, and this includes the power

(a) To incorporate cities and other municipal corporations.9

(b) To establish, modify, or change their territorial boundaries.

(c) To classify the cities of the state according to population or some other reasonable principle of division.

Creation of Municipalities.

The creation of municipal corporations is generally accomplished either by a special grant of a charter, or (where this is forbidden by the state constitution, as is now generally the case) by the enactment of a general law under which such corporations may be organized whenever the particular district possesses the requisite population and complies with the other conditions of the act. When the constitution empowers the legislature to establish but one system of town and county government, to be as nearly uniform as practicable, absolute uniformity is not required.10

Boundaries.

As it is for the legislature to determine whether municipal corporations shall be established, and how the subordinate functions. of government shall be apportioned to them, so also it is within its power, unless restrained by the constitution, to decide what shall be the territorial boundaries of a city, county, or other such corpo ration, and after having established the boundaries it may, in its discretion, modify or change them, subject only to the proviso that private vested rights must not be injured by the alterations. Thus, the legislature may annex or authorize the annexation of territory contiguous to the limits of an incorporated town or city, without

• Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54; Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 1. 10 Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590, 14 N. W. 833.

the consent of the persons residing either in the corporation or the annexed territory." But if the legislature should prescribe that such territory should not be annexed to the municipality unless a majority of the persons living therein should assent thereto, this would not be an unlawful delegation of legislative power, but a concession to the parties to be affected of the privilege of accepting or rejecting a charter.12 Statutes fixing the boundaries of counties, and dividing such counties into towns, and providing for town or ganizations, are held to be properly within the sphere of the pow ers of the legislature, even though not expressly specified in the constitution.18 And an act of the legislature fixing the county seat is not unconstitutional because it was passed without any consultation with the people of the county and without giving them an opportunity to petition the legislature; nor because two places were named in the act, and the choice between them left to the popular vote.14

Classification.

It is now a common practice to divide the cities of a state into sev eral classes, according to their population, giving to those of each class a certain range of powers or privileges, or a form of government, different from those accorded to the other classes, the object being to adapt the municipal government and powers to the varying conditions and needs of the different populations. Laws making such a classification are not open to the objection that they are local or special. "A law applying to a certain class of cities, fixed by previous legislation, into which other municipal corporations may enter, and from which they may pass into other classes, by increase of population, is not special but general, since the grade of any par ticular city is not designated by the act, but depends upon its growth in population, as it may, by such growth, pass from one grade or class into another." 15 And it is no constitutional objection

11 Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 S. W. 742; Stilz v. City of Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53.

12 Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 S. W. 742.

13 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Langlade Co., 56 Wis. 614, 14 N. W. 844. 14 Ex parte Hill, 40 Ala. 121.

15 State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 108, 5 N. E. 228; Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 294, 40 N. W. 482; People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436,