in the state, and could not be sold at the place of destination, either in the original packages or other form, except as the laws of the state might prescribe; and that the police power of the state, so exercised, did not infringe on the power delegated to congress to regulate interstate commerce. But in 1890, a similar question came again before the United States supreme court, in the case of Leisy v. Hardin,134 and then the License Cases were overruled. It was held that, inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the states to do so, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall remain free and untrammeled; that restrictions upon the sale of articles imported from one state into another, so long as they continue to be objects of interstate commerce, are unlawful invasions of the exclusive power of congress; and that, in consequence of these rules, the prohibitory liquor law of Iowa, in so far as it forbade the sale of liquors imported from another state, by the importer thereof, in the original and unbroken packages of their importation, was unconstitutional and void. The effects of this decision, so far as concerns the particular case of intoxicating liquors, were counteracted by the act of congress passed the same year, and commonly called the Wilson Law." 135 But still the rule in Leisy v. Hardin remains as an authority for the proposition that, whether or not congress has legislated upon any particular branch, department, or subject. of interstate commerce, it is not within the lawful power of the states to lay any burden or restriction thereon directly and materially affecting either the transportation or the sale of the same, and the allegation of the police power is no justification for an unwarranted interference with the exclusive domain of the national government in this regard. Unreasonable Laws and Unjust Discriminations. Police regulations must not be unreasonable, nor must they make unjust discriminations against individuals or classes. For example, 184 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681. This is the case called the "Original Package Decision." 135 Upon this statute and its constitutional validity, see In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865. 137 an ordinance of the city of San Francisco set apart a certain district or portion of the city for the Chinese quarter, required all Chinamen to remove into such quarter, and required them there. after to confine their residences and business establishments to such quarter, under heavy penalties. It was held that this was void. It was not a valid exercise of the police power of the state or city, because it operated as an unjust and oppressive discrimination against the Chinese, and did not profess to make any distinction between those individuals who might be dangerous or noxious to the safety or health of the city and those who were not thus objectionable.130 Again, an ordinance which professed to regulate the establishment of laundries in wooden buildings, but which in effect gave to a board of supervisors an arbitrary and uncontrollable power to allow or prohibit the use of such buildings for that purpose, at their mere pleasure, and as concerned both persons and places, and which was in fact so enforced as to discriminate unjustly against the Chinese, was held void.13 And so, while a city undoubtedly has the right to regulate the use of its streets, with a view to securing the peace and comfort of its inhabitants, yet its ordinances must be general and impartial, and applicable to all alike. And hence an ordinance which is aimed especially at the "Salvation Army," and designed to prevent their parading in the streets, by giving to the mayor arbitrary power to grant or refuse permission for such processions, operates as an unreasonable and unjust discrimination, and is not valid.181 The same decision was made in regard to an ordinance which prohibited the erection of any steam engine within the limits of the city unless by permission of the mayor and council, and then subject to their power to revoke the permit.139 The legis lature of New York passed a statute making it a misdemeanor to manufacture cigars, in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants (which included only New York and Brooklyn) in any tenement house occupied by more than three families, except on the first floor of houses in which there was a store for the sale of cigars and tobacco. This was held unconstitutional, for reasons similar to those which de136 In re Lee Sing, 43 Fed. 359. 137 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064. 138 State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104. 140 termined the cases already mentioned." To take one more illus. tration, a city ordinance required a railroad company to keep a flagman stationed at a particular street crossing. But the court considered, under all the circumstances of the case, that the danger to the public at this particular crossing was not sufficient to authorize the municipality to put the railroad to that trouble and expense, but could be sufficiently averted by other and simpler means. It was therefore held that the ordinance was unreasonable, and for that reason void.14 141 Province of the Courts. "Generally it is for the legislature to determine what laws and regulations are needed to protect the public health and secure the public comfort and safety, and while its measures are calculated, intended, convenient, and appropriate to accomplish these ends, the exercise of its discretion is not subject to review by the courts. But they must have some relation to these ends. Under the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and private property cannot be arbitrarily invaded, and the determination of the legislature is not final or conclusive. If it passes an act ostensibly for the public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the property of a citizen, or interferes with his personal liberty, then it is for the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it really relates to and is convenient and appropriate to promote the public health. It matters not that the legislature may, in the title to the act, or in its body, declare that it is intended for the improvement of the public health. Such a declaration does not conclude the courts, and they must yet determine the fact declared and enforce the supreme law." "The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those ob 99 142 140 In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98. 141 Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37. 142 In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98. jects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution." 148 Federal Revenue System and State Police Power. A license granted by the United States, under the internal revenue laws, to carry on any species of business (as, that of a liquor dealer) in a particular state named, although it has been granted in consideration of a fee paid, does not give the licensee power to carry on the business in violation of the state laws forbidding such business to be conducted within its limits; nor does it relieve the holder from the necessity of taking out any license required by the laws of the state, if that is the system therein prevailing.1 144 148 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273. See, also, Ex parte Hodges, 87 Cal. 162, 25 Pac. 277. 144 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; McGuire v. Massachusetts, 3 Wall. 387. CHAPTER XV. THE POWER OF TAXATION. 156-157. General Considerations. 158. Independence of Federal and State Governments. 159. Limitations Imposed by Federal Constitution. 160-161. Limitations Imposed by State Constitutions. 162-163. Purposes of Taxation. 164-165. Equality and Uniformity in Taxation. 166. Taxation and Representation. 167. Taxation under the Police Power. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 156. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty and belongs as a matter of right to every independent state or government, and it is as extensive as the range of subjects over which the power of that government extends. 157. Taxes are ratable burdens or charges imposed by the legislative power upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes. Taxes are a ratable portion of the produce of the property and laber of the individual citizens, taken by the nation or the state, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, for the support of government, for the administration of the laws, and as the means for continuing in operation the various legitimate functions of the state.1 "The power of taxing the people and their property," says Chief Justice Marshall, "is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constituents. That is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 1 Black, Tax Titles, § 2. |