and such controversies between such persons, as the constitution and acts of congress specifically enumerate, the former is general, and extends to all cases and judicial controversies, of every sort and description, and between all classes of persons, except only in so far as it is limited by the provisions of the federal constitution and the acts of congress relating to the jurisdiction of the national courts. The judiciary system created by the federal constitution is entirely disconnected from and independent of the judiciary of the several states. Although the courts of the two systems exist side by side in the same territory, they are as independent as if they had been respectively established by two foreign nations. Each is entitled to the uninterrupted exercise of its own powers and functions. Neither may rightfully encroach upon the province of the other. Neither can define, limit, or interfere with the constitutional jurisdiction of the other. Congress has no power to confer jurisdiction or judicial powers, under the constitution, upon the courts of a state. Neither has a state legislature any power to bestow jurisdiction, powers, or functions upon the federal courts, or to impose duties upon them under local law, or to annul their judgments or determine their jurisdiction.18 It has been made a question (but not yet decided) whether a state can grant jurisdiction to the courts of another state, or grant to another state the right to authorize her courts to act on certain matters within the first state, or to constitute a court in the first state to act upon the rights and property of the citizens of the other state therein.19 Whatever provisions may be found in the state constitution as to the jurisdiction of the courts, or as to the classes of subjects over which they shall have jurisdiction, the legislature is of course bound and limited by such provisions.20 Thus, if, under the constitution, a given court has no jurisdiction of civil proceedings which are not suits, complaints, or pleas, the legislature cannot confer upon it jurisdiction of contested election proceedings.21 Furthermore, there 18 Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175; Ex parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300; Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115. 19 See Eaton & Hamilton R. Co. v. Hunt, 20 Ind. 457. 20 In re Application of Cleveland, 51 N. J. Law, 311, 17 Atl. 772. 21 Gibson v. Templeton, 62 Tex. 555. is a very important limitation upon the power of the legislature in dealing with the courts, in this, that it is not competent to impose upon the judges, as such, any duties which are not strictly judicial in their nature. Such was the decision in regard to an early act of congress which required the judges of the circuit courts to examine and certify claims to pensions, their report to be subject to the supervision of congress or of an executive officer. This statute was resisted by the courts, and several of them filed opinions in which they refused to obey its behests, on the ground that it was an attempt to impose upon them duties not belonging to the judicial office, and also to make their judgments subject to the revision of congress or the executive department.22 But the same objections do not apply to an act of congress requiring the judges of the circuit courts to appoint supervisors of elections, since this comes within the authority given to congress by the constitution to vest the appointment of inferior officers in the courts of law.23 But if no similar power of appointment is found in the constitution of a state, it is not competent for the legislature to empower the courts to appoint election officers.2+ But since it is proper that the courts should have a voice in the selection of their own officers, it is proper to provide that in case of an undecided election for the office of clerk of the court, the court itself shall decide.25 In pursuance of the same general principle it has been held that while the courts are bound to decide the cases duly submitted to them, they are not bound to give written opinions, and the legislature has no power to compel them to do so.26 And some of the appellate courts have refused to obey statutes requiring them to prepare the syllabi to their reported decisions. As a corollary to this general proposition it also follows that the judicial powers must be confined to the courts proper, and that it is not competent for the legislature to confer powers which are essentially judicial upon persons or officers who are not recognized by the constitution or statutes as courts or judges. 22 Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; U. S. v. Todd, 13 How. 52, note; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40. 23 In re Supervisors of Election, 2 Flip. 228, Fed. Cas. No. 13,628. 24 In re Supervisors of Election, 114 Mass. 247. 25 Lewis v. State, 12 Mo. 128. 26 Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24. Thus, a statute giving to masters in chancery authority to grant writs of habeas corpus would be unconstitutional for this reason.27 And the same is true of a law authorizing clerks of courts to fix the amount of bail.28 But a statute providing for the appointment of referees is not unconstitutional on the ground of creating a diversion of judicial power from its legitimate channels, for referees are subordinate officers of the courts.29 PROCESS AND PROCEDURE. 134. Subject to the limitation that the lawful powers of the courts must not be infringed and that the vested rights of individuals must not be interfered with, the process, practice, forms, remedies, and procedure in the courts are subject to the regulation of the legislature at its own discretion. The constitution is seldom violated by any statute which has re lation merely to the form or method of conducting judicial business. Some restrictions, however, may be found in the constitutions of some of the states, and it is scarcely necessary to observe that they must be strictly heeded by the legislative body. Thus, the legislature cannot prescribe a form of process at variance with that prescribed by the state constitution; as, for instance, if the constitution directs that every summons shall run in the name of the people, a summons in the form specified by a statute, but not in the name of the people, is defective.30 So the legislature has the pow er reasonably to regulate, but not to abolish, either directly or indirectly, the use of the writ of certiorari.31 The legislature can constitutionally authorize an execution issued by a city or county court to run throughout the state. 32 And it may authorize judges of the superior courts to hold special terms at their discretion,33 or 27 Shoultz v. McPheeters, 79 Ind. 373. 28 Gregory v. State, 94 Ind. 384. 29 Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78 (Gil. 59). 80 Manville v. Battle Mountain Smelting Co., 17 Fed. 126. 81 State v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 42 N. J. Law, 118. 32 Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 292. 83 Grinad v. State, 34 Ga. 270. BL.CONST.L.-19 authorize the courts to review their own decrees in equity after the expiration of the term at which the decree was made. But a case which has been submitted for decision to a court of record is not subject to any control by the legislature.' 84 Longworth v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 690. 85 Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. Ann. 175. 85 CHAPTER XIII. LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE STATES. 135. Organization and Government of Legislature. 136. Legislative Power of States in General. 146-148. Title and Subject-Matter of Statutes. ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT OF LEGISLATURE. 135. By constitutional provisions in the several states, or by common parliamentary law, the state legislature has the power (a) To make rules for its own government and for the (b) To choose its own officers in each house. (d) To control and discipline its members, for disor- (e) To appoint committees and define their powers, and (f) To punish persons who may be guilty of con- |