CHAPTER XI. EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE STATES. 120-122. State Executive Officers. 125. Powers of Governor. STATE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. 120. The executive power in each of the states and territories is lodged in a chief magistrate, who is called the "governor." 121. In most of the states, there is a second executive officer, called the "lieutenant governor," who is to succeed the governor in his office in case of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of the latter. 122. The subordinate officers of a state government, after the governor and lieutenant governor, are ordinarily as follows: (a) The secretary of state. (b) The state treasurer. (c) The state comptroller. (e) The attorney general. (f) The superintendent of public instruction. The Governor. In each of the states the chief officer of the executive department is called the "governor." In all, he is elected directly by the people. His term of office varies, in the different states, from one to four years. He is the official head of the state, and, generally speaking, is its representative in its relations with the other states and with the Union. In each of the organized territories of the United States the executive power is vested in a governor, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the senate, who holds his office for the term of four years, unless sooner removed by the appointing power.1 The Lieutenant Governor. This officer, in all the states where the office exists, is elected by the people. His functions are limited. In most of the states he acts as president of the senate and has a casting vote. He succeeds to the office of governor upon the death, impeachment, resignation, or disability of the incumbent of that office. When the duties of the office of governor devolve upon the lieutenant governor, by reason of the death or disability of the governor, he becomes permanent acting governor of the state for the remainder of the term, or until the disability of the governor is removed, and is entitled to draw the salary attached to the office of governor." Subordinate State Officers. Although there is no absolute uniformity in the state constitutions as to the officers composing the remainder of the executive department, those enumerated above are the ones most commonly provided for. In most of the states, all these officers are to be chosen by the people at a general election. But in some, certain of the executive officers are appointed by the governor, and, in a few states, some of them are chosen by the legislature. Where the constitution provides that the executive department of the state shall consist of certain enumerated officers, its purpose is to provide for such executive officers as were deemed absolutely indispensable at the time the constitution was adopted, leaving it to the legislature to create new offices when they became necessary, and to abolish the same. But the legislature has no authority to abolish any of those enumerated in the constitution. These state officers, it should be observed, occupy a position very different from that of the heads of the executive departments of the United States. They do not form a cabinet. or ministry to the governor. They are not generally chosen by him, nor are they under his direction or control. Their duties and powers are specifically marked out in the constitution, and they are not responsible for their official acts to either the governor or the legislature, but only to the people or the courts. 1 Rev. St. U. S. § 1841.. 2 State v. La Grave (Nev.) 45 Pac. 243. 8 Parks v. Commissioners (Colo. Sup.) 43 Pac. 542. INDEPENDENCE OF EXECUTIVE. 123. The governor is invested with those powers, and charged with those duties, which, under the American system, are regarded as executive in their nature, as distinguished from legislative and judicial powers and duties. 124. In the exercise of his constitutional powers, and in the discharge of his constitutional duties, he is independent of the other departments of government and free from any interference or obstruction on their part. The constitutional principle which requires that the executive department of government shall be separate from the legislative and judicial departments, and that the head of the one department shall be free and independent in the exercise of his constitutional powers from all control or interference of the others, has been fully considered in the chapter relating to the three departments of government, to which the reader is here referred. In regard to the manner of exercising those powers which the constitution specifically confides to the governor, it seems that the legis lature, while it cannot, under pretense of regulation, deprive the executive of any branch of his constitutional power, or unduly hinder him in the exercise of it, may yet make rules for his governance in many cases where his authority over the subject is not exclusive of that of the legislature, or where the constitution has not furnished the exclusive rule for the exercise of the power. While the governor may be called to account, like any other citizen, for the consequences of his private and personal acts, whether the liability therefor is civil or criminal, yet he is not answerable in the courts for any acts performed by him in his official capacity which are political in their character or involve the exercise of his judgment and discretion as governor. For example, it being made the gov 4 See pp. 13, 14, 84, supra. In English law, an ordinary action cannot be maintained against the king. But the subject may proceed by petition of right, which he may now by statute bring in any of the superior courts in which an action might have been brought if it had been a question between privateparties. This method of procedure is illustrated in the Bankers' Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1. The governor of an English colony is not exempt from being ernor's duty to issue a certificate of election to each person elected a representative in congress, the courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin the governor from issuing a certificate to an applicant for it, or to compel him to deliver a certificate to another person; for the official acts of the executive can neither be restrained nor coerced by the courts. Neither can he be compelled by the courts to appear and testify in relation to matters pertaining to the exercise of his executive functions; nor can he be constrained by attachment to disclose, in aid of an investigation before a grand jury, secrets of the business of the executive department which he does not consider it expedient to reveal. In the case cited from New Jersey it was said: "The governor cannot be examined as to his reasons for not signing the bill, nor as to his actions in any respect regarding it. But there is no reason why he should not be called upon to testify as to the time it was delivered to him. This is a bare fact that includes no action on his part. To this extent, at least, I am of opinion that he is bound to appear and testify. But I will make no order on him for that purpose. Such order ought not to be made against the executive of the state, because it might bring the executive in conflict with the judiciary. If the executive thinks he ought to testify, in compliance with the opinion of the court, he will do so without order. If he thinks it to be his official duty, in protecting the rights and dignity of his office, he will not comply even if directed by an order. And, in his case, the court would hardly entertain proceedings to compel him by adjudging him in contempt. It will be presumed the chief inagistrate intends no contempt, but that his action is in accordance with his official duty."" * sued for his debts or torts, but if judgment is given against him, his person is not liable to be taken in execution while he is on service. Hill v. Bigge, 3 Moore, P. C. 465. Bates v. Taylor, 87 Tenn. 319, 11 S. W. 266. 6 Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 433; Thompson v. Railroad Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 111. 7 The governor should not be required, by a subpoena duces tecum, to produce in court papers which have been filed with him in his executive capacity, and which are in the nature of petitions or accusations against public officers and demands for their removal. Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 23. POWERS OF GOVERNOR. 125. The powers and duties of a state governor are ordinarily as follows: (a) He is to take care that the laws of the state are faithfully executed. (b) He is to inform the legislature of the condition of the state, and to recommend such measures of legislation as he deems necessary or important. (c) He may require information from the different officers of the executive department upon subjects relating to the duties of their respective offices. (d) He has the power of appointing certain of the officers of the state, and of removing officers for cause. (e) He is commander in chief of the militia of the state. (f) He has the power to grant pardons for offenses against the state, and reprieves. (g) He has the power to convene the legislature in special session, and to adjourn them in certain cases. (h) He has the power to veto bills passed by the legislature. Appointments to Office. Although, as a rule, the governor has the power of appointing certain of the officers of the state, there is no uniformity, in the different states, as to the officers who come within the appointing power of the executive. In some states, he has a very considerable power in this respect. In others, nearly all the important officers of the state. are to be elected, leaving only inferior and subordinate offices to be filled by the governor. For example, in some few states, the judges are to be appointed by the governor, or by the governor and council. But, as a rule, the system of an elective judiciary prevails throughout the country. In some states, appointments made by the gov ernor are to be confirmed by the senate or council; and, although the power of appointment is constitutionally vested in the governor, the |