Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, J. following up the provisions of secs. 1 and 2, and undoubtedly referred again to the "public, free common schools." The words "public school" are again used in sec. 4 in defining what should constitute "the public school fund of the state." When we come to examine sec. 5 of this article, we find explicit language employed showing clearly that the framers of the constitution in the use of the word "school" in that and the preceding sections had not intended to include institutions of higher learning than the free common schools. In this latter section, they were providing against the use of any of the public funds in aid of any church or sectarian or religious society, or for any religious purpose, "to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution," etc. It will be observed that the framers of the constitution had not anticipated that the word "school" included "academy, seminary, college, university and scientific institutions," and so they enumerated all these different grades of institutions and branches of learning which rank above the common schools. And it so happens that these institutions of learning ranking higher than the common school, and enumerated in sec. 5, are the specific institutions of learning to which Congress subsequently, upon the admission of the state, made sundry land grants "for educational purposes. By sec. 6 the framers of the constitution became somewhat more general and there provided that "no religious test or qualification shall ever be required of any person as a condition of admission into any public educational institution. of the state, either as a teacher or a student," etc. By the next sentence of the same section, it is provided that "no sectarian or religious tenets or doctrines shall ever be taught in the public schools, nor shall any distinction or classification of pupils be made on account of race or color." By this section they evidently intended to cover not only "the public schools" but also all "public educational institutions of the state." It will be seen that the first five sections of this article are dealing with the "public, free common schools," while Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, J. section 6 not only deals with the "public schools," but also with all "public educational institutions of the state." Section 7 takes up an entirely different subject. It provides for a state board of land commissioners, and designates the officers who shall constitute this board. This brings us to sec. 8, which reads as follows: "It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be, granted to the state by the general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum possible amount therefor: Provided, that no school lands shall be sold for less than ten (10) dollars per acre. No law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any privileges to persons who may have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the general government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such lands, shall be diminished, directly or indirectly. The legislature shall, at the earliest practicable period, provide by law that the general grants of land made by Congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective objects for which said grants of lands were made, and the legislature shall provide for the sale of said lands from time to time and for the sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the terms of said grants: Provided, that not to exceed twenty-five sections of school lands shall be sold in any one year, and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed one hundred and sixty (160) acres to any one individual, company or corporation." It will be observed that sec. 8 is general in its provisions, and has reference to "all the lands heretofore or which may hereafter be granted to the state by the general government." The power of location, protection, sale, and rental of these lands is vested in the state board of land commissioners. It will be noticed that the closing proviso of sec. Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, J. 8 is "that not to exceed twenty-five sections of school lands shall be sold in any one year, and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed one hundred and sixty acres to any one individual, company or corporation." There is nothing contained in this section or the language employed which indicates that the framers intended to use the word "school" and the words "school lands" in any different sense here than that in which they had employed the same words in the preceding sections of the same article. If they employed the word "school" in this proviso in the same sense in which they had used it in sec. 5, it is at once clear that they did not intend to include within the meaning and purview of that word "academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institutions." If used in the same sense in which it is employed in sec. 5, and,, indeed, in all the preceding sections of the same article, they clearly intended to mean only the "public, free common schools." It would therefore follow that by the words "school lands" as here employed by the framers of the constitution, they meant sections 16 and 36 which had previously been granted to the territory for the use of the common schools. This view is reinforced by the provisions of sec. 10 of the same article, wherein they were dealing specifically with the university, and it will be there noted that they did not consider that university lands were included within the term "school lands," and that while they intended to limit the number of acres of university lands that might be sold to any one person, company or corporation, they did not desire to limit the number of acres that might be sold in any one year, and so they left out the limitation as to the amount of land that might be sold in any one year, in writing section 10, but repeated the limitation as to the number of acres that might be sold to any one person. Again reverting to sec. 3, it appears that what is designated as the "public school fund of the state" is required to be "distributed among the several counties and school districts of the state in such a manner as may be prescribed by law." Now, school districts are established only for the Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, J. public common schools, and when the words "school district" are used, they at once imply the free, common schools, and no one thinks of a college, university or normal school in connection with the term "school district." The word "school" as used in other constitutions and statutory enactments has been frequently defined by the courts, and it has almost uniformly been held to refer to the public, common schools generally established throughout the United States, and usually referred to as the "common schools" of the country. (See Lichtentag v. Tax Collector, 46 La. Ann. 572, 15 So. 176; Commonwealth v. Conn. Valley St. Ry. Co., 196 Mass. 309, 82 N. E. 19; In re Townsend, 195 N. Y. 214, 88 N. E. 41, 22 L. R. A., N. S., 194; 16 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 921; Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, 616; Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen (Mass.), 500; Chegaray v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 13 N. Y. 220.) 2. It appears that in this case the notices of sale provide for a payment to be made at the date of sale and the balance to be paid in sixteen equal annual instalments. It is contended by the plaintiff that the notice of sale was not in conformity with the statute, for the reason that under the provisions of sec. 1580, Rev. Codes, "timber lands and lands chiefly valuable for timber" must be sold for "cash on the day of sale," and that under this provision a notice of sale providing for sixteen annual instalments would be invalid, while under sec. 1599, Rev. Codes, it is provided that "timber and timber lands belonging to the state of Idaho may be sold by the state board of land commissioners, at their option, upon payment of instalments of the purchase price thereof as follows: Twenty per cent of the purchase price thereof must be paid at the time of purchase, and the balance of such price in from ten to twenty equal annual instalments, with annual interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum payable in advance; the number of instalments to be fixed by the state board of land commissioners at the time of purchase." It is insisted by the plaintiff that under this latter statute the notice would be invalid, and that consequently no legal notice was ever given. It is Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, J. contended, on the other hand, by counsel who appear as amici curiae, that these lands are not "timber lands" within the meaning of either of the foregoing sections, for the reason that the timber has already been sold and disposed of, and that the state has no further timber thereon, and that the lands when stripped of the timber will be useful only, if at all, for either grazing or agriculture. We cannot accept this line of reasoning. These lands are covered with a heavy growth of saw timber, and while the timber has beensold by the state, it still stands on the land, and the state has a reversionary right in the timber itself to the extent of all that may remain standing at the expiration of twenty years from the date of the sale of the timber. Such timberas remains standing at the expiration of that date will be a part of the real estate and will pass by conveyance of the fee. This has been held so repeatedly and by courts of such high standing that we do not think it merits further discussion or consideration. See the following authorities:Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis. 52; Pease v. Gibson, 6 Me. 81; Webber v. Proctor, 89 Me. 404, 36 Atl. 631; Morgan v. Perkins, 94 Ga. 353, 21 S. E. 574; Lethonen v. Marysville Water & Power Co., 50 Wash. 359, 97 Pac. 292; Saltonstall v. Little, 90 Pa. 422, 35 Am. Rep. 683; Ford Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Cress, 132 Ky. 317, 116 S. W. 710. There is no doubt in our minds but that the lands proposed to be sold are timber lands within the meaning of both sections 1580 and 1599, Rev. Codes. Counsel seem to be in doubt as to which of these sections is applicable at the present time on the subject of sales for cash and instalments. on timber lands. There is a direct conflict between the two sections, and in that view of the case we hold that the latter section, 1599, prevails. Sec. 1580 was adopted in 1905 (1905 Sess. Laws, 131); sec. 1599 was enacted two years: later (1907 Sess. Laws, 193). It is true that both of these sections of the statute were again re-enacted and adopted at the same time in the Revised Codes at the 1909 session of the legislature. Notwithstanding that fact, we take notice. of times and conditions under which the two statutes were |