subject may be helpful, also in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature with reference to the act that is being construed. The Workmen's Compensation Act was first passed in this state in 1911 (Laws of 1911, p. 314). The provisions for hearing before the arbitrator were somewhat similar to those of the act as it now stands. That law provided that the third arbitrator should be appointed by the county or circuit court of the county where the injury occurred, and also provided in section 10 that the report of the arbitrator should be reviewed in the court that made the appointment by filing within 20 days after the finding of the arbitrator, a petition asking for a review in said court and filing a good sufficient bond approved by the court. There was no provision in the statute at that time with reference to reviewing the finding of the county or circuit court in that regard. The act was amended in 1913, providing for the industrial board substantiaily as in the present act, and further providing that the Supreme Court should have the power to review the questions of law involved in any such descision if application for such review by this court was made by the aggrieved party with 30 days after the decision or after the filing of a correct statement of facts or a stenographic report with the industrial board. Laws of 1913, par. f, p. 349. This court held that this provision for a review directly by this court of the decision of the Industrial board was unconstitutional (Courter v. Simpson Construction Co., 264 Ill. 488, 106 N. E. 350), and that the only way to review the decision of the industrial board in court was by the common-law writ of certiorari. At the next session of the Legislature this provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act was amended so as to provide that the circuit court of the county where the parties defendant in a proceeding of this kind were found could review by writ of certiorari the finding of the industrial board, and also to provide that the judgment or decree of the circuit court could only be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of error upon the certificate of the trial court that the case was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, or, if the trial court certified that it was not one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, in its discretion could order the writ of error to issue. Laws of 1915, p. 410. This amended act also provided that a copy of the decision of the industrial board could be entered in the circuit court of the county in which the accident occurred by either of the parties on 15 days notice to the other parties as to the making of such application for an entry of judgment. The amended act of 1915 also provided that within 18 month after the agreement or award had been decided upon, as stated therein, such award or agreement might be reviewed by the industrial board, at the request of either employer or employee, on the ground that the disability of the employee had recurred, increased, diminished, or ended, 15 days' notice being given as to the hearing on this review. There are several other provisions of this amended act indicating that the Legislature intended to have a final decision in the matter of the award quickly disposed of. The act was again amended at the last session of the Legislature, providing that, if the trial court refused to certify that the cause was one proper to be heard by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in term time, or one of the judges of that court in vacation, could order the writ to issue for the review of the proceedings of the circuit court. Both the amendment of 1915 and the amendment of 1917 provided that the review in the circuit court by a writ of certiorari or by chancery proceedings must be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the board of arbitration. Having in mind the history of the legislation in this state on this subject, the various provisions that have been made for the speedy disposition the hearing in the lower court, and the attempt of the Legislature by the act of 1913 to obviate a hearing by intervening courts, and requiring any review to be made directly by the Supreme Court within 30 days from the rendering of the decision, and the various provisions now found in the amended act with reference to the speedy disposition of the hearing, both before and after review, it seems most unreasonable to believe that the Legislature intended the whole matter could be held in abeyance during the three years in which the statute provides that a common-law writ of error may be issued out of this court to review the judgment of the trial court. Such an intention would render uncertain the final disposition of the case until after the three years had expired. If the Legislature had ever had its attention called to this question it surely could not have allowed three years for such review in view of the other provisions in the act, which show clearly that it intended to have a speedy disposition of the proceedings, so that the injured person-or, if he was dead, his beneficiaries-could have quick relief under the provisions of the act. As this court has said in a recent decision, the act was passed for the purpose of speedily disposing of claims for injuries with as little expense as possible. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 III. 136, 118 N. E. 483. Section 100 of the present Practice Act provides that appeals cannot be taken from the decisions of trial courts to the Supreme Court more than 20 days after the date of the entry of the judgment, and that not more than 50 days may intervene between the date of the entering of such order and the term of this court to which the appeal is taken. While the Workmen's Compensation Act calls this proceeding to review a "writ of error," yet it is not a common-law writ of error, because it can only be issued on the order of the trial judge or the Supreme Court or one of the judges thereof, and it is therefore not a matter of right, but a matter of discretion of the court or judge, and is practically an appeal allowed in the discretion of the court or judge rather than a common-law writ of error. The conclusion reached in this opinion, it seems to me, leads to an unreasonable conclusion as to the enforcement of this law in making the decision of the trial court subject to the common-law writ of error. When great inconvenience or absurd consequences will result from a particular construction of a statute, that construction should be avoided unless the meaning of the Legislature be so plain and manifest that avoidance is impossible. Considering all the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act together, it seems to me that it was the plain intention of the Legislature that there should be a speedy, final disposition of all claims for injuries coming within those provisions. It is as reasonable from the letter of the statute to hold that section 100 of the Practice Act should apply as to the time in which a statutory writ of error should be sued out as it is to hold that section 117, as to common-law writs of error, applies to this statutory writ of error. To construe section 100 as applying here is in full harmony with all the other provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and carries out, beyond question, the spirit and purpose of that act. That being so, it would seem that it should be held that this writ of error should have been sued out and brought to the February term, 1918, of this court, and not having been brought until the April term-long after the 50 days expired from the entry of the former judgment-that this court is without jurisdication to review the proceedings under the statutory writ. APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA. ENTERPRISE FENCE & FOUNDRY CO. บ. MAJORS. (No. 10286.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -SUBMISSION TO OPERATION. An insured employee seeking compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act must submit to an operation which will cure him, when so advised by his attending physician, when not attended with danger to life or health or extraordinary suffering, and he cannot obtain compensation for a permanent impairment resulting from such refusal. (For other cases see Master and Servent, Dec. Did. § 385[11].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S SUBMISSION TO QPERATION. COMPENSATION In a proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for a permanent injury to a hand, claimant's refusal to allow amputation of his finger was not unreasonable or willful misconduct prejudicing additional compensation, where his physician stated that the finger could be saved. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 380.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S INCREASE OF AWARD. COMPENSATION— Where compensation for loss of an employee's finger has been awarded by the Industrial Board as provided for by Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1918, §§ 8020, 8021, the award may be modified and increased upon a showing that the employee's use of hand because of infection had been permanently impaired. (For other cases, see Master and Servant Dec. Dig. § 419.) Appeal from Industrial Board. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Edward Majors, opposed by the Enterprise Fence & Foundry Company, employer. From an award of compensation, the employer appeals. Affirmed. Orbison & Olive, of Indianapolis for appellant. IBACH, J. Appellee was injured on March 6, 1917, while in the employ of appellant, which injury consisted of a "twist and laceration of the index finger of the right hand." Appellant had actual knowledge of the injury when it was received, made its report of the same at that time, and filed it with the Industrial Board on March 14, 1917. On the 30th of March the parties agreed on the compensation which should be paid appellee, which was $6.81 a week during his total disability not to exceed 500 weeks, and the necessary and reasonable surgical, medical, and hospital expenses occasioned by the injury during the first 30 days thereafter. This agreement was approved by the board on April 2, 1917. On the 19th of April appellee's * Decision rendered, Nov. 26, 1918. 121 N. W. Rep. 6. injured finger was amputated at the middle joint. At that time the parties entered into a supplemental agreement pursuant to sections 8020, 8021, Burns' Supp. 1918, wherein appellant agreed to pay appellee for a period of 15 weeks the sum of $6.81 each week, which was 55 per cent. of his average weekly wage. This agreement was likewise filed with the Industrial Board, and approved by it April 26, 1917. Appellant has fully paid the compensation provided for in such supplemental agreement. On September 10, 1917, appellee filed petition with the Industrial Board which he terms his "Application for Adjustment," and in which he asks for a review of the agreed reward of April 19, 1917. The material averments of his petition are that as a result of his injury the second and ring fingers of his right hand, were left stiff and permanently injured. This petition was subsequently heard by the full board, and an award made granting to appellee 222 weeks' compensation at the rate of $6.81 per week to be paid in cash in a lump sum. It is from this award that appellant appeals and contends: (1) That the Industrial Board had no legal power to make appellee an additional award after the agreement of April 19, 1917, which agreement was fully executed by the parties in settlement of his claim and in all respects in conformity with the rules of the board more than seven days after the accident and duly approved by the board, and that there was no change of condition so far as the extent of the injury was concerned subsequent to the execution of such agreement. (2) That appellee cannot recover compensation for a permanent injury to his hand when said permanent injury was due to his refusal to permit the attending surgeon to perform a surgical operation not of itself dangerous or attended with extraordinary suffering which if it had been performed when it was advised, would have prevented infection and saved the permanent impairment now complained of. [1] We will first dispose of apellant's second contention. The law seems to be well settled that an injured employee seeking compensation must submit to an operation which will cure him when so advised by his attending physician, when not attended with danger to life or health or extraordinary suffering, and, if as a result of such refusal on his part he suffers a permanent impairment, the employer will not be required to compensate him for the resulting permanent impairment. 1 Honnold, W. C. 525; Jend. s v. Detroit Steel Products Co., 178 Mich 265, 144 N. W. 563, L. R. A. 1 16A, 381, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 476. There is evidence in this case, and the Industrial Board found: "That at the time of the injury the attending surgeon employed by appellant t first advised the amputation of appellee's index finger. That appellee remonstrated and insisted that the finger should be saved if possible, and, in response to the objection of appellee, the attending physician advised that he had saved fingers as badly injured as that of appellee, and it was agreed to make an effort to save the finger. The finger was not amputated at that time, but was treated for some period in an endeavor to save it. That infection developed which involved practically the whole of plaintiff's right hand, and made necessary the amputation of the index finger, which was amputated at the middle joint. *** That the infection developed because of the delay in the amputation. That the plaintiff's refusal to accept the amputation at the time of the injury was made in good faith with a view of saving the finger if possible. That his refusal was not willful, stubborn, or without reason.' [2] It would therefore seem to follow that appellee's insistence that Kis finger be saved if possible, when taken with the statement made by the surgeon, was not such unreasonable or willful misconduct as would prejudice the allowance of additional compensation. We are satisfied that the further contention of appellee has been determined by this court. In re Stone, 117 N. E. 669. In that case it it said: "Where the Industrial Board has approved an agreement under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it still has jurisdiction of the subject-mat ter, even if the agreement was intended as a compromise settlement of all compensation, and may consider all disputes with reference to compensation to be paid at any time before the case is finally disposed of,” In this connection, the Industrial Board has found, in addition to what we have already set out: "That on the 19th day of April, 1917, plaintiff and defendant entered into a supplemental compensation agreement providing for the payment of 15 weeks' compensation at the rate of $6.81 per week for the loss of the index finger of the right hand at the middle joint; that pursuant to said agreement the defendant had paid to plaintiff 15 weeks' compensation at the rate of $6.81 per week; that, because of the amputation of the index finger at the middle joint, the adhesion of tendons, and permanent stiffness especially in the middle and second fingers of the right hand, the natural use and function of the whole said hand has been permanently impaired." [3] It is clear, we think, that by the supplemental agreement appellant intended to and did pay for the loss of appellee's index finger as provided for by said sections 8020, 8021, Burns' Supp. 1918. Nothing was allowed or paid for permanent or temporary partial disability thereafter, if any resulted to appellee's hand and other fingers. The evidence shows and the finding is that appellee's second and ring fingers were "left stiff" owing to an infection, consequently a partial permanent injury resulted to such fingers, and no such injury was contemplated or considered in the agreed award of April 19, 1917. Such award was doubtless considered sufficient for the injuries as they then existed, but a change in such condition and an increase in appellee's disability were properly considered by the Industrtial Board upon the petition filed by appellee, and there is no dispute in this appeal that appellee's petition was timely and properly filed. Under at the evidence, we are satisfied that the Industrial Board was justified in reaching the conclusion that appellee's second and ring fingers had become in part permanently impaired after the agreed award, and it was warranted in granting the award which is here appealed from. Award affirmed. APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA. DIVISION NO. 2. BACHMAN ບ. WATERMAN. (No. 9959.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION— "PLACE OF WORK." Where it is necessary that an employee travel the public streets in doing the work he was hired to do, his place of work includes such public streets as he is required to traverse while doing the work. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375 [1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Place to Work.) * Decision rendered, Nov. 26, 1918. 121 N. E. Rep. 8. |