Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir. Mr. ROGERS. What does the Bureau of Narcotics do then? Why are they involved overseas at all? Mr. ROSSIDES. They work with the foreign governments on eliminating the sources. And they also work on the smuggling cases that they initiate that we have not already initiated. They work on this. This is part of the overlap we are working out. In the past it was an atrocious relationship. Mr. ROGERS. But you think it is beginning to work? Your agreements have not yet been finalized? Mr. ROSSIDES. Under the new Cabinet committee directive we are working on it. Mr. ROGERS. How many men do you have now working on enforcement, Bureau of Customs? I notice you talked about increases? Mr. ROSSIDES. I will submit the figures for the record with the authorization. We will have close to 4,000 inspectors. They are not all in straight enforcement but they are in this total effort that we make as far as customs goes. That inspector today is more conscious of drugs than anything else. (The following information was received for the record:) NUMBER OF MEN WORKING ON ENFORCEMENT (BUREAU OF CUSTOMS) Customs enforcement personnel presently total 5,097 out of an authorized number of 5,453. Mr. ROGERS. You did have, when this started out, what, 300 and some? Mr. ROSSIDES. We started with maybe 3,000 inspectors at the beginning of this administration. With agents we started with 350 and now we have 980, a significant and substantial increase. We have increased customs patrol officers up to maybe 600. That was a major deficit. There is no substitute for manpower. The customs bureau had not had an increase in manpower for 40 years, back to the midtwenties. No periodic increases. Mr. ROGERS. So you have 980 that are actually enforcement people? Mr. ROSSIDES. Nine hundred and eighty agents authorized on board. Mr. CARTER. That is three times the number approximately that we had at the beginning of this administration. Mr. ROSSIDES. Correct, sir. Mr. ROGERS. I think the President has done a good job in this and. of course, the problem has grown significantly within this period of time, hasn't it? Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, when you say grown, it has become one of the things, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ROGERS. You don't think the drug problem has grown within the last 3 to 5 years? Mr. ROSSIDES. Three to 5 years. What I am saying is that in December of 1968 before the national debate, the national discussion, all the facts and figures had not been brought out. The Congress and the President initiated this. It has been all to the good. You could hardly have had a proper discussion in December of 1968. Now you can and this is fine. We are discovering things we had not discovered before and a lot of statistics we did not have before. Mr. ROGERS. I agree. What I am saying is we have increased manpower and you have increased some interception now. That has gone up considerably. Mr. ROSSIDES. And education and research. Mr. ROGERS. What I am concerned with is how does what we are doing now compare to solving the problem? I don't see any great reduction in the number of drug users according to statistics. For instance the U.S. district attorney in New York said the recent seizures there, commendable as they are Mr. ROSSIDES. I would like to tell you off the record what I think about his statement. Mr. ROGERS. He said it did not even affect the presence of heroin in New York. Mr. ROSSIDES. He is wrong. He does not know. I disagree with his statement, and the statement reported in the press was stronger than was his interview with Mr. Rozell. This is some of the myth that gets perpetuated. He is asked a quick question. "Well, it does not show a ripple," or some comment like that. He does not know. He does not know all the facts. For him or anyone else to say that 1,000 pounds of pure heroin has not had an effect, they do not know what they are talking about. So all I am saying is that is a disservice to the men and women of the customs service, and it is a disservice to the Congress and others who have worked hard on this. He does not have an overall view on that. My point is that there may have been a supply. There may have been an inventory. It may be that less are using it and more using something else. In the District of Columbia the reports from the police department is that the addicts are getting cheated because when they buy the bag there is less heroin in there. The reports we have are that the percentage of heroin in the stuff seized is less. So we are making an impact and these off-the-cuff comments, frankly, annoy me. Mr. ROGERS. I wanted to get your reaction on it because this concerns me, too. We are making all this effort, tripling our manpower and yet the District Attorney, who is involved probably in the most heavily drug-infested area says it has not made a ripple. This causes us concern. Now, are you familiar with the report of the customs advisor, I am not sure how to pronounce his name, Kovoriac, dated February 8? Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir. Mr. ROGERS. Let me quote a statement here. On January 9, 1968, a report entitled “Treatment of Professional Smugglers” was submitted by Mr. J. F. O'Neil, Advisor at Tan Son Nhut Airport in Vietnam. This outlined shortcomings of personnel at the airport and their reluctance to stop the flow of goods into Vietnam. This is their customs people. We were advising trying to improve it. The operation on January 9, 1971, three years later, has deteriorated to the point to where Customs are for all practical purposes totally ineffective and have no control whatsoever over the goods that arrive at Saigon's International Airport. He goes on to say that the situation exists in spite of advisory teams' efforts to build an effective customs operation in the area : During the past three years innumerable suggestions and reports have been made and meetings held with the Chief of the passenger terminal, Director of Customs, Vice Minister of Finance, Minister of Finance. These gentlemen, with 66-841 O 72 pt. 4-9 out exception listen with extreme politeness, agree a bad situation does exist and that something must be done, but after three years of these meetings and countless directives being issued at all levels the Customs operation at the airport has not only not improved, but it has reached a point to where the Customs' personnel of Vietnam are little more than lackeys to the smugglers mentioned in the above report. The same people that were operating three years ago are still in business and more powerful than ever. The sole function of Customs at the airport seems to be to assist these smugglers to bring in their contraband without hindrance and the advisors at the airport are not looked upon as advisors but as policemen. What comment do you have on this? Mr. ROSSIDES. Are you reading from the New York Times report? Mr. ROGERS. I don't know where it came from. This is excerpted from the report. Mr. ROSSIDES. Correct. Mr. ROGERS. I got the impression everything was rosy from your report. Mr. ROSSIDES. Oh, no, no, no. Not only not rosy but I say that at least we are making the effort in the Far East that we had not thought of before. Part of the reasons Mr. ROGERS. 1968 is 3 years. Mr. ROSSIDES (continuing). We concentrated on Turkey, that was the major source. How we moved in there and part of it has beenand I am proud of the fact--it has been the customs that was sounding the alarm. It was the team that was there under our agreement. They were sounding the alarm and the bell on smuggling and blackmarketing and so on. I happened to be there before this report leaked, but I was not involved in any leak. I met with the Embassy. We had taken action before February. In the fall of last year, the President moved in on this. I am pleased to say that they have made changes. I don't want to get into discussions. Mr. Gross may want to make future comment. The customs chief was put out by the Government of Vietnam, Ambassador Bunker got into this and Ambassador Burger, who has the Irregular Practices Committee at the Embassy. He is a top man. Burger is a tough cookie and he has done a tremendous job in my judgment regarding corruption and smuggling in drugs. They went right to the Government. The Government did act. I don't say more should not be done. Mr. ROGERS. When did they act? Mr. ROSSIDES. Within 2 or 3 months after that report was in the paper they removed the chief of customs. They moved a few other people. Tan San Nuit is now in much better shape. Mr. ROGERS. What about International Airport? Mr. ROSSIDES. That is the one. Tan Son Nhut International Airport. There is a problem with other situations. They have a long way to go but there has been improvement. When I say "rosy," I am saying at least half the battle is to know what the problem is. Mr. ROGERS. Now, as I understand it, it would be BNDD that would carry on the negotiations with the Government and not you? Mr. ROSSIDES. No. The Ambassador is responsible and he will do it. Mr. ROGERS. I want to get clear in my mind this function. As I understood, you said that BNDD is the lead agency? Mr. ROGERS. I presume this is enforcement. Mr. ROSSIDES. This is Customs to Customs. They don't have dealings with our fellow Customs Service. Mr. ROGERS. So they would not get into that at all. Mr. ROSSIDES. That is our role. The customs services of the world have been neglected and yet the substances have to go across the border. BNDD will deal with the national police of Vietnam, Thailand and so on. Mr. ROGERS. You would deal Mr. ROSSIDES. With the customs. And Mr. Gross can report to you further on some of the programs that are being developed by the State Department on a team basis. Mr. ROGERS. What improvements have been made since February of 1971? If you could furnish that to us? We have just been there and it was not very encouraging. Mr. ROSSIDES. We will do the best we can. (The following information was received for the record :) IMPROVEMENTS OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS AT TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT Customs controls at Tan Son Nhut Airport have been markedly tightened up. Known smugglers have been excluded from the Customs areas, and large quantities of commercial merchandise are no longer passed through the passenger terminal without collection of import duties. The United States Customs Advisory Team working through the Embassy was finally successful in having GVN Customs enforce the joint Finance-Economy Decree of December 4, 1970, which requires that import licenses for all commercial merchandise be obtained prior to the fact of importation. Previously such shipments were being licensed after arrival at Tan Son Nhut, sanctioning their purchase through illegal financial transactions. A shakeup of SVN Customs in May 1971, reflecting Embassy representations, brought about the removal of the Director General of Customs and the transfer of several other corrupt GVN Customs officials. As a result, goods detained and cases established at Tan Son Nhut showed a marked increase due principally to the efforts of the Customs advisors and the new and capable Airport Terminal Chief and Airport Fraud Repression Chief, both of whom received Customs training in the U. S. At this time Tan Son Nhut is no longer believed to be a major entry point for commercial or narcotics smuggling. Although the situation is greatly improved, problems still remain, and they will continue to receive attention. Mr. ROGERS. When this committee visited Vietnam we were not encouraged about what they said about the smuggling. Mr. ROSSIDES. All I am saying, I am encouraged in that the problem was recognized. Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Burger acted. The Government acted just at the beginning. At least we are finished with the beginning. Mr. CARTER. Certainly I think that the agreement you made with Turkey was, or the administration made with Turkey, was quite tremendous. I believe it will be fruitful. You have accomplished much in this area. Again last year I believe you interdicted seven times as much drug coming into the United States or as much as had been interdicted in the past 7 years, is that correct? Mr. ROSSIDES. That is correct. Mr. CARTER. And in the international field, international commu nity, you have done more work and received more cooperation in the past 22 years than in the past 25 in our history, is that correct? Mr. ROSSIDES. This is my judgment, sir. That more has been accomplished. Mr. CARTER. You have also increased your IRS agents, too, is that not correct? Mr. ROSSIDES. That is correct. Mr. CARTER. So that you can get on these dealers? Mr. ROSSIDES. For the first time we initiated this program. Mr. CARTER. Really it has been a great program, hasn't it, and personally I think you are doing a wonderful job. You made a great presentation here. This shows that the administration is going forward and advancing wonderfully in its fight against drugs. Now, the sad thing about Vietnam is actually that the agents there are Vietnamese and under Vietnamese control, is that not correct? Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, they are their own agents; yes, sir. Mr. CARTER. Just as their army there is under the control of South Vietnam. Most people do not realize that but we don't make military moves without approval of Thieu and his people. Mr. ROSSIDES. Correct. Mr. CARTER. And we are phasing that out. In 1968 we had how many people in there? Mr. ROSSIDES. In January of 1970 we had 542,000, we reduced that over 60 percent. As of December 1 there will be 182,000. Mr. CARTER. We feel combat people will be removed and that so far as the military is concerned this drug problem will vanish. At least we hope so. I think you made a wonderful presentation. I want to thank you. Mr. KYROS. One more question, in light of the testimony this morning. When I think of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the work that you are doing, I wonder why you do not take your drug activities and combine them under the Special Action Office. Give me a reason for not doing that, please. Mr. ROSSIDES. Let me give at least a couple of reasons, Congressman. You know the administration's position that the bill regarding the Special Action Office excludes law enforcement. I would only say that I obviously support that position but I want to say that nothing could be worse than to try to put law enforcement in that office for a number of reasons. Not so much that a doctor is heading it now. He does not have to be a doctor to head it. Law enforcement is a straight line operation. The last thing we need to do and the last thing we need to think about is national police forces operated from the White House. This administration is unalterably opposed to it. I personally think it would be a disaster. It is that bad. I know there is a concern and urgency. Proper coordination is being worked out. So you have some bumbling here and there, you have some problems, but you work them out. We now have the mechanism of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control but the last thing Congress would want is the concept that someone in the White House has some direct-line |