Mr. KING. If this power be not given to the national Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Although this scheme of erecting the General Government on the authority of the State legislatures has been fatal to the Federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen still foster the dangerous ideas.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed that the States might make false returns, and then make no provisions for new elections.

Mr. Sherman did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State legislatures. The motion of Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge did not prevail. The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State." On the motion of Mr. Read, the word "their" was struck out, and "regulations in such cases" inserted, in place of "provisions concerning them"-the clause then reading, "but regulations, in each of the foregoing cases, may, at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the United States." This was meant to give the national Legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether. Article VI, section 1, as thus amended, was agreed to nem. con. (199).

FRIDAY, August 10, 1787.

[On the question of agreeing to section 2, Article VI, the ayes were 3, the noes 7. The debate is here omitted.]

[Section 3 of Article VI was amended and agreed to. The debate is here omitted.]

Sections 4 and 5 of Article VI were then agreed to nem. con.

Mr. Madison observed that the right of expulsion (Article VI, section 6) was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum, and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved that "with the concurrence of two-thirds" might be inserted between "may" and "expel."

Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason approved the idea.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. This power may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men, from factious motives, may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.

Mr. Carroll thought that the concurrence of two-thirds, at least, ought to be required.

On the question requiring two-thirds in cases of expelling a member, 10 States were in the affirmative; Pennsylvania, divided.

Article VI, section 6, as thus amended, was then agreed to nem. con. (202).

[Section 7 of Article VI was amended and agreed to. The debate is here omitted.]

SATURDAY, August 11, 1787. [Section 8 of Article VI was amended and agreed to. The debate is here omitted.]

TUESDAY, August 14, 1787.

In convention.-Article VI, section 9, was taken up. Mr. Pinckney argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was degrading to them, and the more improper as their election into the legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might be supposed to

contain the fittest men. He hoped to see that body become a school of public ministers, a nursery of statesmen. That it was impolitic, because the legislature would cease to be a magnet to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone the section, in order to take up the following proposition, viz:

"The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States for which they, or any others for their benefit, receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind; and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively."

General Mifflin seconded the motion.

Colonel Mason ironically proposed to strike out the whole section, as a more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which might not otherwise thrive so well in the American soil; for completing that aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some among us; and for inviting into the legislative service those generous and benevolent characters who will do justice to each other's merit by carving out offices and rewards for it. In the present state of American morals and manners, few friends, it may be thought, will be lost to the plan by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary and depraved ambition.

Mr. MERCER. It is a first principle in political science that whenever the rights of property are secured an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective governments also necessarily become aristocratic, because the rulers, being few, can and will draw emoluments for themselves from the many. The governments of America will become aristocracies. They are so already. The public measures are calculated for the benefit of the governors, not of the people. The people are dissatisfied, and complain. They change their rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of emolument to the rulers of another. The people gain nothing by it but an addition of instability and uncertainty to their other evils. Governments can only be maintained by force or influence. The executive has not force; deprive him of influence by rendering the members of the legislature ineligible to executive offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority. The aristocratic part will not even let him in for a share of the plunder. The legislature must and will be composed of wealth and abilities, and the people will be governed by a junto. The executive ought to have a council, being members of both Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be between the aristocracy and the people. He wished it to be between the aristocracy and the executive. Nothing else can protect the people aginst those speculating legislatures which are now plundering them throughout the United States.

Mr. Gerry read a resolution of the legislature of Massachusetts, passed before the act of Congress recommending the convention, in which her deputies were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the fifth article of the Confederation, nor to agree, in any case, to give to the members of Congress a capacity to hold offices under the Government. This, he said, was repealed, in consequence of the act of Congress, with which the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified manner. The sense of the State, however, was still He could not think, with Mr. Pinckney, that the disqualification was degrading. Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to ministers and ambassadors, few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many that they ought to be discontinued on our part, that none may be sent among us, and that source of influence shut up. If the Senate were to appoint ambassadors, as seemed to be intended,

they will multiply embassies for their own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are once appointed, the House of Representatives will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of the measures or not. If men will not serve in the legislature without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best citizens are actuated by such mercenary views, we had better choose a single despot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According to the idea of one gentleman (Mr. Mercer), our Government, it seems, is to be a government of plunder. In that case, it certainly would be prudent to have but one, rather than many, to be employed in it. We cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this system. It will be examined on all sides, and with a very suspicious eye. The people who have been so lately in arms against Great Britain for their liberties will not easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing, at present, under our governments, but imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to the people. The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention to the opportunities afforded by the new system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands, it is as complete an aristocracy as ever was framed. If great powers should be given to the Senate, we shall be governed in reality by a junto, as has been apprehended. He remarked that it would be very differently constituted from Congress. In the first place, there would be but two deputies from each State; in Congress there may be seven, and are generally five. In the second place, they are chosen for six years; those of Congress annually. In the third place, they are not subject to recall; those of Congress are. And, finally, in Congress nine States are necessary for all great purposes; here eight persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to render the members of the House of Representatives, as well as of the Senate, ineligible, not only during, but for one year after the expiration of, their terms. If it should be thought that this will injure the legislature, by keeping out of it men of abilities, who are willing to serve in other offices, it may be required, as a qualification for other offices, that the candidate shall have served a certain time in the legislature.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. Exclude the officers of the Army and Navy, and you form a band having a different interest from, and opposed to, the civil power. You stimulate them to despise and reproach those talking lords who dare not face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your troops shall have laid down their arms, and, though the civil authority be "intrenched in parchment to the teeth," they will cut their way to it. He was against rendering the members of the legislature ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible again, after having vacated their seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people choose to give them their confidence? There can be little danger of corrup tion, either among the people or the legislatures, who are to be the electors. If they say, We see their merits, we honor the men, we choose to renew our confidence in them, have they not a right to give them a preference, and can they be properly abridged of it?

Mr. Williamson introduced his opposition to the motion by referring to the question concerning "money bills." That clause, he said, was dead. Its ghost, he was afraid, would, notwithstanding, haunt us. It had been a matter of conscience with him to insist on it as long as there was hope of retaining it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection with

reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was said on the other side was that the restriction was not convenient. We have now got a house of lords which is to originate money bills. To avoid another inconvenience, we are to have a whole legislature at liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad as the Constitution has been made by expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning money bills, he did not wish to make it worse by expunging the present section. He had scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the legislature of North Carolina which could not be traced up to office-hunting.

Mr. SHERMAN. The Constitution should lay as few temptations as possible in the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the country grows more populous, and as the means of education are more diffused.

Mr. PINCKNEY. No State has rendered the members of the legislature ineligible to offices. In South Carolina the judges are eligible into the legislature. It cannot be supposed, then, that the motion will be offensive to the people. If the State constitutions should be revised, he believed, restrictions of this sort would be rather diminished than multiplied.

Mr. Wilson could not approve of the section as it stood, and could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the people. He considered himself as acting and responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked himself the serious question, what he should say to his constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrificed his own judgment in a case where they authorized him to exercise it. Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort, "Did you suppose the people of Pennsylvania had not good sense enough to receive a good government?" Under this impression, he should certainly follow his own judgment, which disapproved of the section. He would remark, in addition to the objections urged against it, that, as one branch of the Legislature was to be appointed by the legislatures of the States, the other by the people of the States-as both are to be paid by the States, and to be appointable to State offices-nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the national Legislature but to render its members ineligible to national offices, and by that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the Government, and to render it useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to offices of dignity and trust an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withhold from it the prospect of those rewards which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the State of Pennsylvania, which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the legislature ineligible to offices of Government.

Mr. Ellsworth did not think the mere postponement of the reward would be any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious minds will serve two years, or seven years, in the legislature, for the sake of qualifying themselves for other offices. This he thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services of the ablest men in the legislature; although, whilst members, they should be ineligible to public offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate only within the legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged.

Mr. Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the appointment of this convention? The corruption and mutability of the legislative councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able, in our private capacities, to support and enforce it; nor will the best part of our citi zens exert themselves for the purpose. It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the United States. It is the men whom it will bring into the government, and interest in maintaining it, that are to govern thein. The paper will only mark out the mode and the form. Men are the substance, and must do the business. All government must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France, but 200,000 janizaries of power, that govern that kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence, then, must be substituted; and he would ask whether this could be done if the members of the legislature should be ineligible to offices of state; whether such a disqualification would not determine all the most influential men to stay at home, and prefer appointments within their respective States. Mr. Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by Mr. Ellsworth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members must either go a second time into the legislature, and disqualify themselves, or say to their constituents, "We served you before only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and, having answered this purpose, we do not choose to be again elected."

Mr. Gouverneur Morris put the case of a war, and the citizen most capable of conducting it happening to be a member of the legislature. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or even in the course, of the late contest for our liber

ties?

On the question for postponing, in order to take up Mr. Pinckney's motion, it was lost.

New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, ay, 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 5; Georgia, divided.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to insert, after "office," "except offices in the Army or Navy; but, in that case, their offices shall be vacated."

Mr. Broome seconds him.

Mr. Randolph had been, and should continue, uniformly opposed to the striking out of the clause, as opening a door for influence and corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him but those which related to the case of war, and a coexisting incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Mr. Butler and Mr. Pinckney urged a general postponement of Ar ticle VI, section 9, till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of state to be chosen out of that body. A general postponement was agreed to nem con. (207). [Section 10 of Article VI was amended and agreed to. The debate is here omitted.]

SATURDAY, September 1, 1787.

In convention. Mr. Brearly, from the committee of eleven, to which were referred yesterday the postponed part of the Constitution, and parts of reports not acted upon, made the following partial report: "That in lieu of Article VI, section 9, the words following be inP. Mis. 67-II