had been occupied by an enemy came again under the former sovereignty. The doctrine was applied in various directions in municipal law. In international law it was considered as applicable to territory which had for a time been in the power of the enemy as well as to persons. It is now held that sovereignty does not pass to the military occupant, but that its exercise is for the time suspended. Acts of the occupant which are legitimate under the rules of international law of war are valid when the occupancy is at an end. The occupant may carry on the ordinary administrative functions, and his acts are as valid as those of the sovereign. The occupant has right to the use of the ordinary revenue under the law. Receipts which the occupant gives for services rendered or taxes paid are valid. If the occupant has performed acts which are not legal under the law of military occupation, these acts are invalid. If he has sold the public domain, he has gone beyond his legitimate authority, and the title will not hold against the state when it is restored to power. The occupant would have a right to the income from the public domain during his occupancy. If private property is seized and sold, the title is not valid, when the occupant is driven out, retires, or when peace is restored, because the confiscation of private property is forbidden under the laws of war. Such property reverts to the original owners, when the authority of the legitimate sovereign is restored, and the purchaser has no redress. The analogy to the old idea of postliminium is by some writers not considered sufficiently close to warrant the use of the word, and they maintain that it obscures the meaning of rules which are in themselves simple and based on the fact that military occupation suspends the operation of sovereignty, but does not establish a new sovereignty, which may act without regard to previously existing rights, or in disregard of the laws of war.22 22 Bonfils, Droit Int. No. 1710; 3 Nys, Droit Int. 738; Ullmann, Volkerrecht, § 169. AMNESTY. 171. Clauses are frequently included in treaties of peace by which immunity is granted for offenses in nature of the violation of the rules of war. Amnesty is a kind of act of oblivion. Even if such a clause is not included in the treaty, it is generally understood that acts in the line of hostilities will not be penalized. Amnesty does not give immunity for ordinary crimes which have no direct connection with the war; i. e., foraging might be allowed in time of war for war purposes, but similar action might be liable to penalty if not for war purposes. Unless specially incorporated in the treaty, treason against the state would not be included in a general amnesty. Amnesty does not give any relief from penalty already suffered, whether in person or property.23 During and after the Civil War in the United States, several proclamations of amnesty were issued. The earlier proclamations did not confer amnesty upon all, but made exception of certain classes. The proclamation of December 25, 1868, was general in its nature; President Johnson saying that "I, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution, and in the name of the sovereign people of the United States, do hereby proclaim and declare, unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or rebellion a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States or of adhering to their enemies during the late Civil War, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof." 24 23 United States v. Dunnington, 146 U. S. 338, 13 Sup. Ct. 79, 36 L. Ed. 996. 24 6 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, p. 708. |