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have been instrumental in having unfounded charges of unfair labor practices made against employers. It has been our experience that they accept as true every statement made by the employee and as untrue or doubtful every statement made by the employer. Let me give you two examples with which I am personally familiar.

A case of unfair labor practice was filed against the Southern Pine Electric Cooperative of Brewton, Ala., a branch of the Rural Electrification Administration, serving the counties of Escambia, Conecuh, and Monroe in the State of Alabama. This cooperative has a meritrating system and pay-rate schedules. Pay increases are made at regular intervals. Such raises, if any, are based on the employee's merit rating. At one period, certain of the linemen employed by this cooperative did not merit raises and some others did not merit as much as they thought they should have received. These linemen protested to the manager. The manager explained his reasons for his action. The employees became bitter and threatened to resign if the raises desired were not granted. The manager stated that he acted in accordance with rules and regulations. Thereupon several of the employees resigned, effective in 2 weeks. The manager accepted their resignations and upon advice of counsel gave them 2 weeks' pay and replaced them.

The resigned employees went to Pensacola, Fla., made application to join the union, and then filed unfair-labor-practice charges against the employer cooperative.

An examiner came to Brewton to investigate and an official of the employer related the facts to the examiner. The assistant manager related that the resigned employees had threatened to do physical violence to the manager. A complaint was filed, and upon the trial of this charge the evidence of the REA cooperative was disregarded and the evidence of the resigned employees accepted as true. The cooperative was ordered by the trial examiner to reemploy the resigned employees and to pay back wages. This was appealed and is now pending before the Board.

Another case is that of an economic strike called against the company for which I work, T. R. Miller Mill Co., of Brewton, Ala., in March of 1952, when the company and the union were unable to agree on a checkoff provision. The strike started as a continuous union meeting. The said meeting closed several departments in our operation, but we gave employment to all who reported for work. The union meeting continued from day to day, and more and more of our employees returned to work. Some of our departments were operating, but not with full crews. Then they called a regular strike. Picket lines were thrown up around our several departments.

We then gave notice that we would give permanent employment to anyone applying for positions then open. Threats were made by the strikers against the management and against loyal employees. Homes of some of the loyal employees were bombed. Mass picket lines were placed on the tracks of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad leading into our plant. Threats were made against the train crews. A Federal-court injunction was granted to the railroad company to prevent the mass picketing of its tracks and threats against its employees.

We were negotiating almost continuously, meeting for negotiation at each request of the union, State mediator, and Federal mediator.

Charges of unfair labor practices were made against us that we would not negotiate with the union in good faith. From time to time the charges were amended as the examiner proceeded with his investigation. Finally, after a number of visits from the field examiner, he advised us that the charge of refusal to bargain had no merit. Following this, the union withdrew that charge.

Then another charge was filed against us charging the discriminatory discharge of one of our office girls. She was in the personnel department, and knew everything that was going on, who was being hired, and what was happening. That was investigated by the same field examiner, who reported to us that it, too, had no merit; but to date it hasn't been dismissed by the regional director nor has it been withdrawn by the union. Of course, the withdrawal of charges by the union are usually accomplished on the recommendation of the regional directors, but the regional director can and should, if the case has no merit, dismiss it without reference to the union.

This was then followed by another charge of discriminatory refusal to rehire the strikers and to discharge those whom we had employed after the strike began to replace the strikers. The case is still pending, although no complaint has yet been issued. We have been advised that in all possibility the complaint will be issued regardless of the fact that the Supreme Court has said that replaced economic strikers have no right to reemployment.

We had at all times told the union that we would not discharge our new employees; that striking employees whose places had not been filled could return to their jobs at any time, and that replaced striking employees would be given any open job they were capable of filling. In fact, we instructed all our hiring supervisors to hire every returning striker who applied for a job if there was an opening he was capable of filling.

The strike was called off on these terms, and then the field examiner returned for another examination and told us that he had been instructed by his superiors to inform us that, if we would discharge our replacement employees and reinstate all replaced strikers and give them back pay, the unfair labor charges against us would be dismissed. Otherwise, a complaint would be issued and the trial had before a trial examiner. And he further stated that, although we should in the end be successful in defending ourselves against the charges made against us, the costs would be so great the effort would not be worth the cost.

In many cases the southern-pine-lumber industry is the only or principal industry in a community. Consequently, when there is a labor dispute which ends in a strike, the entire community is affected. The company for which I work has been operating for over 80 years. The employees-common laborers, skilled workmen, foremen, managers, and owners-have lived in and near Brewton for generations. They have attended the same schools and churches, played together and worked together. They have always had a friendly and cordial relationship.

But, when the strike was called in March of last year and the picket lines thrown up, the union leaders sent to Brewton to call and manage the strike were able to instill in some of our striking employees, and worst of all in members of their families, a persecution complex so strong that it will be difficult ever to restore our once harmonious relationship.

This result is more detrimental to the comunity than the economic loss caused by the strike. It is to prevent many uncalled-for, illegal, and unjustifiable strikers that the principles of the Taft-Hartley Act should be retained and fairly administered. No; the Taft-Hartley Act did not prevent the strike at Brewton, but it would have had the striking employees and the union leaders known that the law would have been fairly administered.

The Taft-Hartley Act was designed, and I think well designed, to bring industrial peace. Unfortunately, in our section it has not been administered with that purpose in mind. The maladministration which we have experienced in my part of the country has had the opposite effect, and where we formerly had peace we now have friction, distrust, suspicion, and conflict.

Gentlemen, we would not presume to recommend broad changes in the Taft-Hartley Act on the sole basis of the two cases I have described but on the basis of my personal experience and the experience of our whole industry in this problem.

I have made some recommendations which are contained in the statement which I would like to file with you at this time. Senator IVES. Without objection, that will be done.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

1. We are opposed to eliminating the present statutory prohibition against economic strikers who have been permanently replaced from voting in subsequent National Labor Relations Board elections. An employee who goes out on an economic strike and is replaced has no right to return to his job, and until he is reemployed he should not be allowed to vote in such elections. Of course, if for any reason the striker is entitled to reinstatement, he should be allowed to vote. 2. We oppose removal of the present penalty against individuals who strike during the 60-day waiting period prior to the expiration or modification of a contract.

3. We favor requiring employers to make the anti-Communist affidavit. Every employer should welcome the opportunity to make such an affidavit.

4. We are opposed to the elimination of the so-called mandatory injunctions against secondary boycott.

5. We favor an amendment permitting employers to discharge, and unions to demand discharge of, persons thought to be members of the Communist Party.

6. We favor creation of an Advisory Committee on Procedure and Practice to advise on rules of procedure and practice, so as to improve the Board's proceedings.

7. We favor enlarging the National Labor Relations Board to include seven members.

.8. We favor establishing a new, independent agency of Government to be known as the Administrator of the National Labor Relations Act, with powers generally similar to those now vested in the General Counsel of the Board.

9. We oppose allowing the National Labor Relations Board to force the General Counsel to prosecute unfair-labor-practice charges even where the General Counsel is convinced that there is no basis for prosecution.

10. We oppose eliminating the present provision preventing representation elections oftener than once a year.

11. We oppose extending the statute of limitations on unfair labor charges from 6 months to 1 year.

12. We oppose making all collective-bargaining contracts subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.

13. We oppose eliminating the use of injunctions to prevent national emergency strikes.

14. We oppose the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration, using a permanent panel of arbitrators set up in the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

15. We favor extending the free speech protection to representation cases just as it now applies to unfair labor practice charges.

16. We favor restoring jurisdiction in the States to regulate or qualify the right of employees to strike or picket.

Mr. MCMILLAN. With us today we have another Southern Pine representative, Mr. John G. Curren, an industrial relations consultant from New Orleans.

Senator IVES. Just a minute and we will see if there are any questions.

I ask to be excused at this time because I have another engagement. Mr. MCMILLAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Curren appeared before the House Committee on Education and Labor on March 20, 1953, and filed with that committee a formal statement in addition to giving testimony and replies to questions directed to him. Mr. Curren has prepared a formal statement for presentation to this committee and is prepared to answer any questions the committee may desire to put to him. I would therefore like to ask the permission of the committee to file as a part of my statement Mr. Curren's formal statement.

Senator PURTELL. Without objection it is so ordered. (The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF JOHN G. CURREN IN BEHALF OF THE SOUTHERN PINE INDUSTRY COMMITTEE

My name is John G. Curren. I am an industrial relations consultant from New Orleans, La., and am presenting this statement in behalf of the Southern Pine Industry Committee and at the request of the National Lumber Manufacturers Association. The Southern Pine Industry Committee represents manufacturers located throughout the broad region from Virginia to Texas. In connection with my work as a labor relations consultant, I personally act for a number of southern pine manufacturers in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Alabama, handling their collective bargaining, grievances, and other matters normally coming under the Labor Management Relations or Taft-Hartley Act. Drawing upon my years of first-hand knowledge as to the application of Federal labor relations law, I would like to give you to the best of my knowledge and ability the benefit of that experience before the National Labor Relations Board-under the Wagner Act and also under the Taft-Hartley Act. I say "first-hand knowledge" because my chief contact with, and my observations of, the National Labor Relations Board has been with its regional offices and officials in the field. That is where the public has its major relations with the Board and the application of the Taft-Hartley Act.

As you know, under the old Wagner Act no restrictions were placed on organized labor. It was left free to do anything. The victim of the law was the employer, even when the union was the wrongdoer. There have been occasions when the victim was the general public.

Under the Wagner Act, unions could do as they pleased and the NorrisLaGuardia Act said nobody could stop them even if a particular strike affected the public health and safety of the United States. In 1947 Congress was tired of seeing the welfare of the Nation put in jeopardy and determined to protect us in such national emergencies by authorizing the President, whenever, in his opinion, a threatened or actual strike or lockout would imperial the public health and safety, to appoint a board of inquiry and upon findings of such board to instruct the Attorney General to petition for an injunction to restrain such strike or lockout for a total period of 80 days. A great many people have overlooked the reasons and purpose for this 80-day injunction. It is divided into two main sections. The first section is designed to guarantee a real effort on the part of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to settle this particular dispute. During the first 60 days the Conciliation Service is expected to devote its major efforts to bring about a settlement. The last 20 days of the 80-day period is devoted to the preparation by the National Labor Relations Board for holding an election by secret ballot on the acceptance or rejection of the last offer of settlement made by the employer-this election must be held during the first 15 days of the remaining 20 days. During the last 5 days the result of the election is reported to the Attorney General and from him passed on to the President. If the offer is accepted, then, of course, the case is ended. If the offer is rejected, the result of the vote is passed on by the President with a firm

recommendation to the Congress of the United States as to what he would like to see done.

During the first 5 years of the Taft-Hartley Act the emergency powers of the President have been used 8 times-in the telephone, coal, maritime, copper, and packing house industries. In every case the dispute was settled during the first 60 days. There has never been a single case where it was necessary for the National Labor Relations Board to hold an election. We in the South believe that these emergency powers of the President should be protected.

The Taft-Hartley Act, however, placed certain responsibilities upon organized labor. Unfortunately, we in the lumber industry have been disappointed to find that the agency administering that law seems determined to find ways of evading enforcement of those responsibilities. Our feeling in the South is that the National Labor Relations Board is still trying to administer the Taft-Hartley Act by Wagner Act principles. We are not happy over it. The employer is still the victim.

Let me cite some specific examples of the unwillingness of the Board to administer the law on a fair, equitable basis-or with an even hand. And in referring to the Board, I not only refer to the Beard in Washington which is officially responsible, but more particularly to the staff at policy-making leveles both in the Washington and regional offices.

The first instance I have in mind where the Board goes beyond the principles of the Taft-Hartley Act is where it invades through its regional offices the actual collective-bargaining processes between the employer and the union. In one case with which I am familiar and where unfair labor practice charges had been filed against the company alleging refusal to bargain in good faith, two of the Board's representatives went to the location of the employer; convened an immediate meeting of bargaining representatives of the company and the union; held the meeting in session until 3 o'clock in the morning on 2 consecutive days; and, in effect, finally brought about an agreement which certainly the company would not under fair collective bargaining have signed. My point is that this is an instance where a representative of the National Labor Relations Board uses the prestige and influence of his official position to invade the jurisdiction of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. In this particular instance, two commissioners of conciliation had already met with the company and the union-but retired in order to prevent further confusion when the Board injected itself into the matter. This was a clear violation of that provision of the Taft-Hartley Act which prohibits the Board or its agents from undertaking the duties of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (sec. 4 (a)).

Another case I am familiar with is related to the Board's desires to speed up processing of cases. We appreciate that desire. But there are altogether too many cases on the books which the Board has held open and done nothing about for a year of more. In May of 1950 a charge was filed against an Arkansas company. A complaint by the Board was not finally issued until about 8 months ago and then the hearing was indefinitely postponed notwithstanding there appeared to be little or no merit to the case.

In another case this time in Tennessee-a charge was filed late in 1950 charging the company with having refused to bargain with the union. An admitted economic strike had taken place earlier in the year. All the strikers had been replaced and the company had carried on business in its normal manner for 6 months or more when the strike was called off. The strikers returned and applied for their jobs, but only those who had applied earlier when there were job vacancies were rehired. In January of 1952, almost 2 years later, a complaint was filed based on the old charge of refusal to bargain except that nothing was said in the complaint about refusal to bargain. The sole new charge was that the company had discriminatorily refused to hire back the replaced economic strikers. Their reinstatement was sought with 2 years' back pay. This was not only contrary to the concept of prompt action but was in violation of the provision of Taft-Hartley concerning the 6 months' limitation and the necessity for a complaint, following at least to some reasonable degree the alleged unfair labor practice set out in the charge.

Now, one proposed amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act which apparently is receiving some consideration is the proposal that economic strikers who have been replaced should be allowed to vote in an election following the strike and their replacement. As the law now reads, the economic strikers not entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to vote. An economic striker can lose his right to vote in two ways: (1) by losing his place to a permanent replacement, or (2) by conducting himself on the picket line in such a fashion that the employer is justified in refusing to take him back. The Supreme Court laid down

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