Engaged in Agriculture - Exemption. (See also the title EXEMPTION LAWS.)-The Tennessee statutes exempt in the hands of the head of family "engaged in agriculture" certain property. One who owned within a town a lot of ground of one acre, and was engaged in the business of butchering, working as a day laborer, and cultivating his garden for the support of his family, claimed the exemption. He was held not to be an agriculturist in the sense of the exemption laws, the court saying: "The word 'agriculture,' as used in these exemption laws, has its peculiar legal sense, and relates to the vocation. It is true that two or more vocations may be combined, but we are not accustomed to think of an artisan, a merchant, or a lawyer, who, living within a crowded town or city and following his avocation, happens to cultivate a little patch of earth in vegetables for his table, as an agriculturist, even in its most general sense. If he produced them on any extended scale for market, or for man and beast' in the sense of husbandry, then he might be regarded as an agriculturist in the sense of the law." Simons v. Lovell, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 510.

But in Springer v. Lewis, 22 Pa. St. 193, the exemption was held to extend to a person engaged in several occupations. The court said: "A person is actually engaged in the science of agriculture' when he derives the support of himself and family, in whole or in part, from the tillage and cultivation of fields. He must cultivate something more than a garden, though it may be much less than a farm. If the area cultivated can be called a field, it is agriculture, as well in contemplation of law as in the etymology of the word. And if this condition be fulfilled, the uniting of any other business, not inconsistent with the pursuit of agriculture, does not take away the protection of the act. The keeping tavern and boarding-house, and the working at his trade as a tailor in the intervals of the seasons for farming, did not divest Lewis of the benefits which the statute was intended to secure to him."

Cultivated Lands.—“ An agricultural holding, I take it, refers only to land cultivated for profit in some way, and not the natural grass land." Morley v. Jones, 32 S. J. 630.

1. Webster's Dictionary, quoted in Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. Dak. 374.

The terms "aid and relief," imply want, need, or necessity on the part of the applicant. Russell v. Providence, 7 R. I. 574.

Absconding Debtor-Advice.-Simply advising a debtor to run away, though the advice be given to delay, hinder, or defraud his creditors, is not equivalent to "aiding and assisting," and will not sustain an action under the statute against the fraudulent removing of debtors. "Most persons are willing to give advice; some do it officiously; but if called on to give aid or assistance, the subject is looked at in a different point of view. Ad

Aid or

vice costs nothing; it is but words. assistance is the doing of some act whereby the party is enabled, or it is made easier for him, to do the principal act, or effect some primary purpose." Pearson, J., in Wiley v. McRee, 2 Jones (N. Car.) 349.

But going with the debtor to the station and returning with his horse renders the party liable under the statute, where he knew of the fraudulent intent. Moss v. Peoples, 6 Jones (N. Car.) 142, citing Godsey v. Bason, 8 Ired. (N. Car.) 260; Wiley v. McRee, 2 Jones (N. Car.) 349; Moore v. Rogers, 3 Jones (N. Car.) 90.

Aid or Comfort.-The words "aid or comfort" used in the Act of March 12, 1863 (12) Stat. 820), allowing any person claiming to be the owner of property captured by the United States during the rebellion to bring suit therefor in the Court of Claims, on proof that "he has never given aid or comfort to the present rebellion," have the same meaning as they have in the clause of the constitution defining treason (art. 3, § 3). Young v. U. S., 97 U. S. 39.

See also U. S. v. Greathouse, 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 464; and the titles ADHERE, vol. 1, p. 633; TREASON.

Provisions against Furnishing Aid to Sectarian Schools. (See also the titles RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; SCHOOLS.)-The constitutions of a number of the states provide that no money or property of the state shall be appropriated to aid any sectarian school, society, etc. It has been held that this prohibition applies to all appropriations to such schools, whether made as a donation or in payment for services rendered the state by such schools. Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. Dak. 366. And in Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School, 125 Ill. 540, it is said: "It cannot be said that a contribution is no aid to an institution, because such contribution is made in return for services or work done. A school is aided by the patronage of its pupils, even if they do pay for their tuition." It was contended in that case, that as these institutions furnish tuition, clothing, care, etc., in return for the money received by them, and as they earn what they receive and are not the recipients of any gift or donation, nothing was paid in aid of or to help to support or sustain them. This contention was not allowed. And to the same effect is Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. Dak. 376. Compare Millard v. Board of Education, 121 Ill. 297, commented upon in Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School, 125. Ill. 540.

Public Works.-See also the title MUNICIPAL AID.

The legislature of Nebraska, by several acts, authorized any county or city in the State to issue bonds to aid in the construction of any railroad or work of internal improvement. Such bonds were issued to pay for work constructed by the county itself. On an application

for an injunction to restrain the collection of certain taxes levied for the payment of the interest due on said bonds, on the ground that they were illegal and void, the bonds were declared valid and the injunction refused, the court saying: "It is evident that the word aid, as used in this connection by the legislature, has a much broader meaning than that contended for by the plaintiff's counsel, and is not necessarily restricted to works of internal improvement in which the county has no interest. *** The word aid, as used, evidently means that the county may contribute toward the cost of the improvement by issuing its bonds, a portion of the fund necessary to make the improvement to be contributed in some other manner, as by grant from the state, donations, by two counties bordering on the river uniting in the enterprise, etc., but does not necessarily repel the conclusion that the county may construct the desired improvement for the benefit of the public." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Colfax County, 4 Neb. 450, 3 Cent. L. J. 287.

Same-Donations-In State v. Babcock, 19 Neb. 230, it was held that the word aid might include donations. The court said: "Objection is made that the power to vote bonds is to aid in the construction of railroads or other works of internal improvement. This question was very fully considered in U. P. R. R. v. Commissioners of Colfax Co., 4 Neb. 450. The evident object of the statute was to enable a county or city to avail itself of some proffered benefit of the character named in the statute by aiding or assisting the enterprise. From the nature of the case no narrow technical construction can or should be placed upon the word. In U. P. R. R. v. Commissioners, supra, it was contended with great force that it was to be restricted to donations alone; but this court refused to give it such a narrow construction, but held that the statute applied where the funds were to be expended in a work of internal improvement constructed by the county. It may include donations and also works of internal improvement constructed by the municipality in part from bonds voted to aid the enterprise. This was the evident intention of the legislature, and the statute

should be so construed as to carry such intent into effect."

The

Aid and Comfort.-Where a testator stated that he desired to render some aid and comfort to his sister in her decline of life, it was held that these words indicated that the provision he made in her favor was to take effect at once, and not, as contended by the executors, that it was not to take effect until ten years after the death of the testator. The court said: "There is nothing in the will to warrant the notion of the executors, that the provision for the plaintiff did not commence until ten years after the death of the testator. It would be preposterous to suppose it, when this legacy, in the nature of an annuity, was given, as the will recites, with the view of rendering some aid and comfort' to the plaintiff, in her decline of years;' the chance being that ten years would outlast her. will, speaking from the death of the testator (Houghton . Franklin, 1 Sim. & Stu. 392), directs the executors and trustees to pay over to the plaintiff the dividends, interest, or income of the investment, semi-annually during her natural life.' These words, in conformity too with the spirit and purpose of the bequest, require that the payment should commence at the expiration of a half year from the death of the testator. And the cases of Gibson v. Bott, 7 Ves. 96, 97, and Eyre v. Golding, 5 Binn. 474, 475, distinguishing between the gift of the principal sum for life, without more, and a direction like this to trustees, to pay to one, annually or semi-annually for life, the interest or income of that sum, as well as the above case of Houghton v. Franklin, support us in this construction." Trott v. Wheaton, 5 R. I. 353. 1. Escape. (See also the title ESCAPE.)-The design of the act was to prohibit the conveying to prisoners in confinement any substantial, tangible thing which might be used or handled by them in facilitating or effecting their escape; but conveying information to a prisoner by which he is led to expect aid or release, or conveying to him any substance which could in itself be in nowise useful or of advantage to him in making his escape, does not come within the prohibition. Hughes v. State, 6 Ark. 131.

Volume II.

1. Reg. v. Young, 8 C. & P. 644, 34 E. C. L. 564; State v. Tally (Ala. 1894), 15 So. Rep. 722; Hill v. State, 28 Ga. 608; Williams v. State, 47 Ind. 568; Adams v. State, 65 Ind. 574; State v. Farr, 33 Iowa 553; Mulligan v. Com., 84 Ky. 229; State v. Ellis, 12 La. Ann. 390; State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 396; Warden v. State, 24 Ohio St. 146.

A Principal in the Second Degree is one who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to be done. 4 Bl. Com. 34.

A person may be a principal in an offense in two degrees. A principal in the first degree is he or she who is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime. A principal in the second degree is he or she who is present, aiding and abetting the act to be done. Georgia Code, § 4305; Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347. Aid and Abet.-The words "aid and abet," in legal phrase, are pretty much synonyms of each other, as they comprehend all the assistance rendered by acts or words of encouragement or support, or presence, actual or constructive, to render assistance, should it become necessary. No particular acts are necessary. Per Stone, C. J., in Raiford v. State, 59 Ala. 106.

Abetting [in a crime], I understand to mean giving some assistance." Per Bramwell, B., in Reg. v. Taylor, 2 Cent. L. J. 458. In the Criminal Code of Iowa, the word

"abet," in relation to the commission of a crime, indicates the act of an accessory before the fact, while the word "aid" indicates the act of an accessory after the fact. State v. Empey, 79 Iowa 460.

The terms "aid and abet, though not present," as used in the Michigan Comp. Laws, 6065, are employed in an enlarged sense, including all which go to constitute an accessory before the fact at common law. Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 71.

Where a statute defines an offense, and provides that every person who "aids or abets" in the violation of the statute shall be punished, one who procures and counsels the act to be done may be indicted under the statute, for such acts are included within the term "abet." U. S. v. French, 57 Fed. Rep. 382.

Encourage, Aid, or Abet.-The words "encourage, aid, or abet," mean or imply that the will of a person has contributed to the act committed by another, and fully and accurately describe an accessory before the fact if such person is too far away to aid in the felonious act, or a principal in it if near enough to aid. True v. Com., 90 Ky. 651; Omer v. Com., 95 Ky. 360.

sent

Aid and Consent.-The words "aid and conin the commission of an offense, used in a statute wherein the offense is not called a felony, include all thus aiding and consenting,

1. Aider and Abettor Convicted-Principal Acquitted. Thus, the aider and abettor may be convicted, although the person charged as principal in the first degree is acquitted. Rex

. Taylor, 1 Leach C. C. 360; Reg. v. Wallis, I Salk. 334; Rex v. Towle, Russ. & Ry. 314; State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 312; State v. Whitt, 113 N. Car. 716; Searles v. State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 331.

In Reg. v. Wallis, 1 Salk. 334, A was indicted for murder, and B and C as persons present aiding and abetting A. A was acquitted. It was held that B and C might be convicted. Lord Holt said: "Though the indictment be against the prisoner for aiding, assisting, and abetting A, who was acquitted, yet the indictment and trial of this prisoner is well enough, for who actually did the murder is not material; the matter is that a murder was committed, and the other is but a circumstance, and all are principals in this case; therefore, if a murder be proved, it is well enough."

Where it was claimed by the prosecution that the defendant, who was indicted for murder, had agreed with one F that they would make the deceased retract a statement which he had made, or, if he failed to so retract, would inflict serious bodily injury upon him or kill him, and that the deceased was afterwards killed by F, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the guilt of F, and then to connect the defendant with that guilt by showing an agreement and conspiracy and presence, or that, by his presence, the defendant aided and abetted F in the killing; and evidence of the flight of F, after having inflicted the fatal injury upon the deceased, was held admissible to prove his guilt so as to warrant a conviction against the defendant. McIntyre v. State (Texas Crim. App. 1895), 33 S. W. Rep. 347.

Effect of Principal's Guilt or Innocence.-One charged as principal in the first degree, if properly indicted himself, cannot take advantage of defective averments, if any, against those indicted as principals in the second degree. State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 391.

The record of the acquittal of the principal in the first degree is not admissible in favor of one tried as principal in the second degree. State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32.

But in Georgia it has been held that one cannot be convicted as a principal in the second degree, where there is no evidence of the guilt of the principal in the first degree. Jones v. State, 64 Ga. 697.

And in that state the record of the conviction of the principal in the first degree may be introduced on the trial of the principal in the second degree, and is conclusive evidence of the conviction of the former, and prima facie evidence of his guilt. Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2; Coxwell v. State, 66 Ga. 309.

2. See the title ACCESSORIES AND THE LIKE, I ENCYC. PL. AND PR., p. 66, for the rules regulating the trials of accessories. See also the title ACCESSORY in the present work, vol. 1, pp. 263–264.

One against whom there is evidence that he was present, aiding and abetting, should be indicted as a principal, and not as an accessory before the fact. State v. Maxent, 10 La. Ann. 743.

Order of Trial.-The aider and abettor may be arraigned and tried before the principal in the first degree has been found guilty. 2 Hale P. C. 223; 1 Chitty Crim. L. 256, 259; Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194; Williams v. State, 69 Ga. II.

Indictment as against Principal in the First Degree. An aider and abettor may be indicted as a principal in the first degree, and the indictment will be sustained by proof that he was present, aiding and abetting.

Alabama.-Griffith v. State, 90 Ala. 583. Florida.-Albritton v. State, 32 Fla. 358. Georgia.-Hill v. State, 28 Ga. 604; Leonard v. State, 77 Ga. 764; Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347.

Illinois.-Smith v. People, 74 Ill. 144. Indiana.-Doan v. State, 26 Ind. 495; Williams v. State, 47 Ind. 568.

Iowa.-State v. Pugsley, 75 Iowa 742; State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa 268.

Kansas.-State v. Shenkle, 36 Kan. 43. Louisiana.-State v. Littell, 45 La. Ann. - Com. v. Chapman, II

656.

Massachusetts. Cush. (Mass.) 422.

Michigan.-Strang v. People, 24 Mich. r. Missouri.-State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 391; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32; State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. III.

Ohio.-Warden v. State, 24 Ohio St. 143; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178, 41 Am. Rep. 496.

Oregon.-State v. Kirk, 10 Oregon 505. See also vol. 1, title ACCESSORY, p. 263.

In Georgia, however, if one is indicted as the principal in the first degree, a verdict against him as guilty in the second degree is not warranted, and cannot be sustained. Washington v. State, 36 Ga. 222; Shaw v. State, 40 Ga. 120; Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347.

In Kentucky, where two are indicted as principals in the first degree, one may be convicted as charged, and the other as aider and abettor. Thompson v. Com., 1 Metc. (Ky.) 13; Young v. Com., 8 Bush (Ky.) 366.

But where one is indicted alone as the actual perpetrator of the crime, he cannot be convicted upon proof that he was an aider and abettor. Mulligan v. Com., 84 Ky. 229.

Indictment as Aider and Abettor.-One indicted as principal in the second degree may be convicted on proof that he actually committed the crime. State v. Littell, 45 La.