A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best illustrate this principle. The common council of the city of Buffalo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for that purpose entered into contract with a hotel-keeper to provide the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority under its charter to raise and expend moneys for various specified purposes, and also "to defray the contingent and other expenses of the city." But providing an entertainment for its citizens is no part of municipal self-government, and it has never been considered, where the common law has prevailed, that the power to do so pertained to the government in any of its departments. The contract was therefore held void, as not within the province of the city government.1

contract, and approach their citizens, not as trespassers, but with the amicable prof fer of a formal receipt and the plighted faith of the city for the payment. In this they seem to me to be well justified." Judge Dillon doubts the soundness of this decision. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 371, note. The case seems to us analogous in principle to that of the destruction of buildings to stop the progress of a fire. In each case private property is destroyed to anticipate and prevent an impending public calamity. [Jones v. Richmond is overruled in Wallace v. Richmond, 94 Va. 204, 26 S. E. 586, 36 L. R. A. 554.] See post, pp. 757, 867, 868. [Village may of fer reward for arrest and conviction of incendiaries. People v. Holly, 119 Mich. 637, 78 N. W. 665, 44 L. R. A. 677, 75 Am. St. 435.]

1 Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. See also the case of New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552, which follows and approves this case. The cases differ in this only: that in the first, suit was brought to enforce the illegal contract, while in the second the city was enjoined from paying over money's which it had appropriated for the purposes of the celebration. The cases of Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. 252; Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, and Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R. I. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 648, are to the same effect. A town, it has been held, cannot lawfully be assessed to pay a reward offered by a vote of the town for the apprehension and conviction

of a person supposed to have committed murder therein. Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174. See also Hawk v. Marion County, 48 Iowa, 472; Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193, 2 N. W. 1105; 35 Am. Rep. 266; Board of Commissioners v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455, 37 Am. Rep. 174; Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush, 324. Contra, Borough of York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391; and see, People v. Holly, supra. As to the power of a municipality to bind itself by the offer of a reward, see, further, Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray, 374; Lee v. Flemingsburgh, 7 Dana, 28; Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 367, 1 N. W. 952; Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83; Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318. An officer cannot claim an offered reward for merely doing his duty. Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush, 219. See Stamp v. Cass County, 47 Mich. 330, 11 N. W. 183. Nor, under its general authority to raise money for "necessary town charges," is a town authorized to raise and expend moneys to send lobbyists to the legislature. Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250; Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341, 1 N. E. 413. Nor, under like authority, to furnish a uniform for a volunteer military company. Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502. Under power to raise money for celebration of holidays and "other public purposes," it may raise it for public concerts. Hubbard v. Taunton, 140 Mass. 467, 5 N. E. 157. Where a municipal corporation enters into a contract

The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally and judgment recovered, for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal. The board of supervisors then assumed, on behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judgments, together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused drafts to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amounts. It was held that these drafts upon the public treasury to indemnify officers for disregard of duty were altogether unwarranted and void, and that it made no difference that the officers had acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was unconstitutional. The city had no interest in the suits against the supervisors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgments and costs was not within either the express or implied powers conferred upon the board.1 It was in fact appropriating the public money for private purposes, and a tax levied therefor must consequently be invalid, on general principles controlling the right of taxation, which will be considered in another place. In an Iowa case it is said: "No instance occurs to us in which it would be competent for [a municipal corporation] to loan its credit or make its accommodation paper for the benefit of citizens, to enable them to execute private enterprises; "2 and where it cannot loan its credit to private undertakings, it is equally without power to appropriate the moneys in its treasury for such purposes, or by the conduct of its officers to subject itself to implied obligations.3

ultra vires, no implied contract arises to compensate the contractor for anything he may have done under it, notwithstanding the corporation may have reaped a benefit therefrom. McSpedon v. New York, 7 Bosw. 601; McDonald ». Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; Niles Water Works v. Mayor, 59 Mich. 311, 26 N. W. 525. Compare East St. Louis . East St. L., &c. Co., 19 Ill. App. 44; Montgomery v. Montgomery Water Works, 79 Ala. 233. [County cannot lease rooms of court-house to be used for private purposes. State v. Hart, 144 Ind. 107, 43 N. E. 7, 33 L. R. A. 118, upon lease of public buildings for private purposes, see note to this case in L. R. A]

1 Halstead v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 N. Y. 430. See a similar case in People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244. See also Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444; Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Go

shen, 11 Pick. 396; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126.

2 Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199, 224; Carter v. Dubuque, 35 Iowa, 416. See Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me. 545; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 319; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124, Am. Law Reg., Aug., 1873 with note by Judge Redfield, 11 Am. Rep. 185.

In determining whether the subject-matter is within the legitimate authority of the town, one of the tests is to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred in relation to a subject specially placed by law in other hands. . . . It is a decisive test against the validity of all grants of money by towns for objects liable to that objection, but it does not settle questions arising upon expenditures for objects not specially provided for. In

The powers conferred upon the municipal governments must also be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial limits embraced within the municipality; (a) and the fact that these powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exercise except within those limits. A general power "to purchase, hold, and convey estate, real and personal, for the public use" of the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corporate limits for that purpose. Without some special provision they cannot, as of course, possess any control or rights over lands lying outside; 2 and the taxes they levy of their own authority and the moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.3

But the question is a very different one how far the legislature of the State may authorize the corporation to extend its action to objects outside the city limits, and to engage in enterprises of a public nature which may be expected to benefit the citizens of the municipality in common with the people of the State at large, and also in some special and peculiar manner, but which nevertheless are not under the control of the corporation, and are so far aside from the ordinary purposes of local governments that assistance by the municipality in such enterprises would not be warranted under any general grant of power for municipal

such cases the question still will recur, whether the expenditure was within the jurisdiction of the town. It may be safely assumed that, if the subject of the expenditure be in furtherance of some duty enjoined by statute, or in exoneration of the citizens of the town from a liability to a common burden, a contract made in reference to it will be valid and binding upon the town." Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485, 487. See Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20. It is no objection to the validity of an act which authorizes an expenditure for a town-hall that rooms to be rented for stores are contained in it. White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 578.

1 Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64. It is competent for a municipal corporation to purchase land outside to supply itself with water. Newman v. Ashe, 9 Bax. 380. Or to provide drainage. Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474, 24 Am. Rep. 601. See Rochester v. Rush, 80 N. Y. 302; Houghton v. Huron Copper M. Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N. W. 820.

And see

2 Per Kent, Chancellor, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320. Bullock . Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171; Weaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. 8. 564; North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. 288; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465; Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474. A city may be authorized to take land outside for a park. Matter of Application of Mayor, 99 N. Y. 569. [But neither the legislature of the home state nor that of a sister state can authorize the city to construct and control a highway in the sister state. Becker v. La Crosse, 99 Wis. 414, 75 N. W. 84, 40 L. R. A. 829, 67 Am. St. 874.]

& In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396. the action of a town appropriating money in aid of the construction of a county road was held void and no protection to the officers who had expended it. See also Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465. A town cannot lay a tax for the benefit of a cemetery which it does not control. Luques v. Dresden, 77 Me. 186.

(a) [State v. Eason, 114 N. C. 787, 19 S. E. 88, 41 Am. St. 811, 23 L. R. A. 520, and note upon boundary of municipality upon navigable stream.]

government. For a few years past the sessions of the legislative bodies of the several States have been prolific in legislation which has resulted in flooding the country with municipal securities issued in aid of works of public improvement, to be owned, controlled, and operated by private parties, or by corporations. created for the purpose; the works themselves being designed for the convenience of the people of the State at large, but being nevertheless supposed to be specially beneficial to certain localities because running near or through them, and therefore justifying, it is supposed, the imposition of a special burden by taxation upon such localities to aid in their construction.1 We have elsewhere 2 referred to cases in which it has been held that the legislature may constitutionally authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to the stock of railroad companies, or to loan them their credit, and to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or other securities issued as loans, where a peculiar benefit to the municipality was anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in these cases, if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows such municipalities to impose burdens upon their citizens to construct local streets or roads, and they can only be defended on the ground that "the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected with the [municipality] and its interests as to conduce obviously and in a special manner to their prosperity and advancement." 8 But

1 In Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held competent for the legislature to authorize a town to raise money by taxation for a State agricultural college, to be located therein. The case, however, we think, stands on different reasons from those where aid has been voted by municipalities to public improvements. See it explained in Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94. And see similar cases referred to, post, p. 332, note.

2 Ante, pp. 166-168.

8 Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526. See Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37. It seems not inappropriate to remark in this place that the three authors who have treated so ably of municipal constitutional law (Mr. Sedgwick, Stat. & Const. Law, 464), of railway law (Judge Redfield), and of municipal corporations (Judge Dillon), have all united in condemning this legislation as unsound and unwarranted by the principles of constitutional law. See the views of the two

writers last named in note to the case of People v. Township Board of Salem, 9 Am. Law Reg. 487. And Judge Dillon well remarks in his Treatise on Municipal Corporations (§ 104) that, "regarded in the light of its effects, there is little hesitation in affirming that this invention to aid private enterprises has proved itself baneful in the last degree."

If we trace the beginning of this legislation, we shall find it originating at a time when there had been little occasion to consider with care the limitations to the functions of municipal government, because as yet those functions had been employed with general caution and prudence, and no disposition had been manifested to stretch their powers to make them embrace matters not usually recognized as properly and legitimately falling within them, or to make use of the municipal machinery to further private ends. Nor did the earliest decisions attract much attention, for they referred to matters somewhat local, and the spirit of

there are authorities which dispute their soundness, and it cannot be denied that this specie of legislation has been exceedingly