Another example of lessons we have learned about the consequences of our foreign military aid program is offered by the situation in Greece. Because Greece is a member of NATO, successive U.S. administrations have subordinated virtually all our usual foreign policy interests concerning that country to the overriding question of "security." Most of the European NATO members have held Greece at arms length ever since the military coup which resulted in the abolition of the Greek Parliament. Yet the United States, far from following the example of its European allies, seems to feel that it must go on providing substantial military assistance to Greece under the heading of NATO security.

When all the arguments are stripped of verbiage it will be found that there are only two reasons for the United States to offer a military quid pro quo to the Greek regime: One is the argument that Greece could help in-transit Americans who might have to leave Middle Eastern areas on an emergency basis; the other is that our naval and air forces could use some facilities in Greece which are at best auxiliary to the major bases which we maintain in Italy. To me, it is a terrible indictment of our foreign policy process that these two slender "security" arguments should be allowed to dictate American relations with a government which has misled our executive branch about its character and its intentions. Rather than persist in examining this unpleasant subject, I would ask permission to attach to my statement an excellent editorial from the New York Times of December 30, 1970, entitled "More Tyranny for Greece."

Chairman PROXMIRE. Without objection, that editorial will be printed at the end of your statement, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. With your further indulgence, I would like to quote just the first paragraph of the editorial as follows:

By its last actions of 1970, Greece's military dictatorship has rendered even more ludicrous the claims of its apologists in Washington that it has established a 'trend toward a constitutional order.' These typical moves by Colonel Papadopoulos and his colleagues merely expose the bankruptcy of United States policy toward Greece.

One could go on enumerating the untoward results of our military assistance program overseas, highlighting such strange situations as that whereby we armed both India and Pakistan, unwittingly helped them confront each other militarily, and jeopardized our relationships with both countries only to see the Soviet Union currently supporting one and Communist China supporting the other. Such instances, however, are well known to the members of this subcommittee and I will not try their patience by emphasizing the obvious. The only reason I persisted in citing some special examples was to underline the fact that we are making very little progress in reducing the number of places where we have military, and thus political and economic, involvements. Let me stress in this last connection the point that even a military sales program alone causes us to spend money to help the country in question use the arms and equipment.

In fiscal year 1969 the number of foreign countries which the Defense Department lists as "MAP countries" amounted to 47; in fiscal year 1971 the total of countries in that category still numbers 47. If one added to the MAP countries those where we have foreign military sales programs, but not MAP, one would have a fiscal year 1971

total of 64 nations involved with the United States in one military capacity or another. It does not look as though we are getting very far away from the habits of the past.

Over and over again we have told ourselves in the last few years that we have emerged from the cold war period and need new ways of thinking about our position in the world, and therefore about our foreign and defense policies. I see little evidence, however, that we have shaken off the patterns of thought and reaction which we maintained during the so-called cold war.

During the period we in effect "militarized" our foreign policy because we adopted military methods of thinking about problems which essentially were not military in character. This is no new thought, but it does give some indication of the reason why the Pentagon has come to play the largest single role in influencing the character of our foreign relations. I believe it is largely from the military services that we have derived our great reluctance ever to give up a program or policy which we have once adopted. Just as the services keep finding new justifications for unnecessary facilities, the executive branch seems always to be seeking new justifications for our anachronistic and crippled military and economic foreign assistance pro

grams.

In response to the general outcry in this country for a new foreign policy and at least by implication a new long-range defense policywe have been given some very broad and vague guidelines which have come to be known as the Nixon doctrine. We all were genuinely glad to have the President's foreign policy message of February 1970, presented under the subtitle "A New Strategy for Peace." In the period of close to a year since that message was received, it has become increasingly clear that the new foreign policy essentially just repeated all the preexisting 40-odd commitments to the security of other nations even though this discussion was couched in terms of a slow reduction of the U.S. presence abroad. In fact, we are still waiting for an authoritative full-scale interpretation of just what the doctrine is supposed to mean.

One thing is becoming increasingly clear; namely, the Nixon doctrine will not save us any money. In one area of the world, Southeast Asia, the administration requests increased sums of military and economic assistance in order to substitute for American Forces which are slowly, too slowly, in my opinion, being withdrawn. Much of this money in effect will go to mercenaries. In another area of the world, Western Europe, the President strongly rejects any concept that Americans would pay mercenaries to do their fighting for them, and is insisting on maintaining at least the current dimensions of the American physical presence in Europe. Leaving the contradiction to one side, there can be no prospect of any great savings to be employed for domestic purposes under the heading of implementing the Nixon doctrine. Indeed, all the talk about how much better, if not cheaper, it is to employ Asian soldiers rather than American ones reminds us forcibly of the period of the early 1950's, when that was one of the main themes used in support of our "military security" programs. Let us hope that in the coming months we will be able to see and to support a better interpretation of the Nixon doctrine. The noted

columnist, Flora Lewis, in the Atlantic magazine for November 1970, has written as follows:

The real problems of Asia are not military but political, social, economic. Arms and alliances, as Vietnam has shown, cannot solve these problems. It is still possible for the Nixon Doctrine to be transformed into a policy of support for Asian countries which are trying to come to terms with China. These countries need an American policy which will safeguard their own efforts to develop, rather than a policy of countercoalition designed principally to reduce the cost of conflict for America.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the entire article by Miss Lewis, entitled "The Nixon Doctrine," be appended to my statement.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Without objection, that article will be printed at the end of your statement, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In conclusion, I would like to suggest to this subcommittee the likelihood that the largest single barrier we confront in exploring ways to streamline and to improve our posture and our programs overseas is an attitude of mind. I remember well that former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in summing up his time in office, kept citing one main accomplishment: that is, the fact that nuclear war did not destroy the world during his tenure of the post. That strikes me as a highly revealing insight into his general attitude toward the foreign relations of this country. If we are going to conduct ourselves every day and on every occasion as if some kind of nuclear sword of Damocles imminently threatens us, then I believe we will always elect to place a narrow definition of military security above any other consideration. I would submit that the term, "security," while comprehending military activities, embraces a far larger complex of factors and a much larger vision of the future. That vision would encompass some hope for cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, for example, rather than such great reliance upon military equipment spread around the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, Senator Fulbright, for a brilliant statement and an excellent contribution to our hearings this morning. (The editorial and article referred to for the record by Senator Fulbright in his statement follow:)

[From the New York Times, Dec. 30, 1970]

MORE TYRANNY FOR GREECE

By its last actions of 1970, Greece's military dictatorship has rendered even more ludicrous the claims of its apologists in Washington that it has established a "trend toward a constitutional order." These typical moves by Colonel Papadopoulos and his colleagues merely expose the bankruptcy of United States policy toward Greece.

"As far as the question ofthe regime and the Constitution are concerned, there will be no change in the coming year," said Premier Papadopoulos in a year-end policy statement. He left no doubt that this meant perpetuation of martial law with special military tribunals and the suspension of basic freedoms.

This declaration was received in pained silence by the State Department, whose spokesman had detected the "trend" toward constitutional order as a justification for resumption of major military aid to the junta in September. It made a poor prophet of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rodger Davies, who predicted to a Senate committee in June that the junta would implement its Constitution "by the end of this calendar year."

With fanfare, the junta announced on Christmas Eve that it had released 305 political prisoners. It neglected to mention that right through the Christmas

period it persisted with a new series of arrests, including a former judge, three former members of Parliament, prominent lawyers and several women. These arrests brought the number of persons detained for political reasons in December alone to about ninety.

The junta also ignored until it was too late an extraordinary request by three United States Senators that it grant a temporary safe passage to enable a respected, self-exiled Greek journalist, Elias Demetracopoulos, to go to his dying father. The request was forwarded through Ambassador Henry J. Tasca in Athens, who proved as ineffectual in this compassionate matter as in other dealings with the colonels.

The Athens regime finishes 1970 in greater international disrepute and isolation than ever before in its 44 months of power. It has renounced the agreement which gave the International Red Cross access to its political prisoners. It is out of the Council of Europe; its agreement with a critical European Common Market has been shelved indefinitely and it was blasted by an International Labor Organization commission for suppressing 250 trade unions without cause. All this adds up to tragedy for the Greek people but it also reflects discredit on an American Government that still pretends to take junta promises seriously and evidently sees no peril in its lonely support for oppression and tyranny.

[From the Atlantic Magazine, November 1970]

THE NIXON DOCTRINE

(By Flora Lewis)

From Singapore to Tokyo, America's shifting Asian policy is the key to every stateman's plans. No one doubts that change has begun. In that sense, the Nixon Doctrine is no longer just words; it is the emerging shape of reality. But on a long tour of Asia, I found no responsible figure, official or unofficial, who claimed with any confidence that he divined the essential meaning of America's new policy. In that sense, the Nixon Doctrine is a hazy shadow, unsettling, uncertain; it is welcome to some, unnerving to others, unclear to all. So long as that is so, it is a shaky base for efforts to build a new stability in a region of tremorous conflict.

GET US OUT

Some outlines, or rather directions of momentum, have been recognized by everyone involved. First, there is the undoubted American desire to get American men out of direct combat and exposure to enemy fire, not only in Vietnam. Even at MACV, U.S. military headquarters in Vietnam, the chief briefing officer now says heartily, "The name of the game is to get us out of here." It is noticeable, though, that instead of dwelling on advances and the imminence of great success, as they used to, briefing officers now tend to emphasize military difficulties and dangers. They are real, of course. But observers who know MACV well can't help suspecting that at least part of this new ploy is to discourage the kind of optimism which might lead credulous congressmen to say, "That's great, but if we're doing so well, why can't we get out faster?" Generals are careful these days not to show too much light filtering into the tunnel.

Second, the understanding has spread that Americans want not only to get out of the front line of Asian wars; we want to be altogether more reticent. Unlike well-bred children, we would like to be heard but not seen.

Third, it is taken at last as self-evident that there are limits on the men, money, and attention which the United States is willing to provide Asia, and that those limits lie somewhere below the current levels.

And finally, the thought is percolating into the consciousness of all who make decisions that the United States no longer automatically considers every Asian dispute a matter of its vital national interest. But of course, each capital considers its own troubles to be of the special sort which Washington cannot afford to watch indifferently. Vietnamese who oppose the Thieu government whisper bitterly that it is America's fault that Saigon does not govern better. They cannot yet come to grips with the idea that the United States may soon consider the governance of South Vietnam, for better or for worse, to be of no direct concern.

These are the vague, but accepted, main points of the Nixon Doctrine. But what are the new limits of American involvement to be, and how fast must they be reached? What is the new American understanding of how much is committed by a commitment? How far out of Asia does the United States mean to pull? How much does the United States care what happens in Asia in the 70s, and what will it leave as tangible proof, as it has maintained NATO in Europe?

Does the phrase "Asians helping Asians," or, as critics put it, “Asians fighting Asians," mean that the United States will provide everything but the front-line manpower, or that it will step back and help hold the ring, or that it will become a mere spectator?

These are the Asian questions. Nobody pretends to be sure of answers, and it isn't only because there is much static in the voice of America. Certainly, President Nixon adds to the confusion when, after announcing his new doctrine in Guam, he flies to Bangkok and immediately proclaims no change of any kind in our commitment to Thailand; when Nixon orders troops into Cambodia, orders them out again as the war gets going in earnest, announces that survival of Lon Nol's regime is not Washington's affair, and urgently hustles every friendly Asian government to rush to Lon Nol's aid; when Secretary of State Rogers says on tour that the United States is going to keep its troops in Asia, while Secretary of Defense Laird is saying that withdrawal will start this year in Korea whether Seoul likes it or not. Vice President Agnew's whirlwind trip momentarily soothed some ruffled feathers, a new role for Spiro the Blunt, but he left a trail of contradictions. He told Koreans the withdrawal of 20,000 Americans was only "the first step" to removal of them all, which the White House promptly disclaimed. Then he went on to promise extensive financial help to upgrade Korean forces, when both the Defense Department and the Congress were talking only of sharp cuts in the military budget. It must have been strange for the Koreans, who aren't ignorant of the U.S. system, to hear the presiding officer of the Senate tell them not to pay attention to the amendment forbidding the United States to pay bigger allowances to Koreans and Thias in Vietnam than to American troops because the Senate's vote "doesn't count."

Cambodia heard him say the United States "will do everything we can to help the Lon Nol government," and then overheard him explain to Americans that he meant only that a Communist victory there might slow troop withdrawals from Vietnam. He told Thailand to forget the arguments among Americans because the United States is going to keep up its big military subsidies. Seldom has the oriental conviction that nothing a public figure says should be taken at face value been so strikingly confirmed.

Still, every government indulges in inconsistency, and one so huge as the United States dealing with such a tangle as Asia can be expected to zig and zag on its course. The deeper difficulty is that the premises, or, to sustain the metaphor, the compass readings on which the course is based, do not reconcile with the landmarks on the horizon.

LULL AND RUN?

Assuming that the aim of the Nixon Doctrine is to promote stability in non-Communist Asia by getting Asians to do more for themselves mutually and lean on America less, it parallels American policy in Europe from the Marshall Plan onward. In his sweeping article on "Asia After Vietnam" in Foreign Affairs of October, 1967, Nixon called for "a concert of Asian strengths as a counterforce to China" similar to the "Atlantic community within which a ravaged Europe was rebuilt and the westward advance of the Soviets contained." There were inconsistencies in Europe, too, but the thread of policy was clear to encourage Western Europeans to develop their own strength so as to form with the United States a joint barrier to Communist expansion, and eventually a sufficiently solid base from which to negotiate peaceful terms with Moscow. (West Germany's new treaty with the Soviet Union is the logical fruit of Dean Acheson's reliance on "containment" and "negotiation from strength" a generation ago.)

Some people doubt that a parallel to America's long-range commitment to Europe is the correct assumption about evolving U.S. policy in Asia. In several Asian capitals, top officials wondered aloud whether Nixon were not secretly