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(3) The role of the Export-Import Bank in the financing of military exports should be carefully examined by the Congress.

(4) Congress should consider making all military export credits and guarantees the subject of a simultaneous review with development loans. Both involve a charge on the resources of the recipient country and both involve the use of U.S. public funds.

(5) Congress should examine the decision-making process of the military sales program to determine whether the Arms Control Agency and Agency for International Development are meeting their responsibilities as defined by law.

(6) The United States should take the initiative in organizing regional conventional weapons "free zones"; zones that would be free of sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons-missiles, jet aircraft other than subsonic fighters, tanks, etc. Latin America, and perhaps north and sub-Saharan Africa, offer possibilities for such zones. For example, the heads of governments of the Americas meeting now scheduled for the early spring of 1967 could provide the occasion for the United States to take the lead in calling for agreements among the Latin American countries for a Latin American conventional weapons "free zone." Conceivably, the OAS could contribute to the maintenance of such a zone by the creation of an arms inspectorate comparable to the Western European Union's Agency for the Control of Armaments.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT ON THE MILITARY SALES BILL,

H.R. 15628

Mr. President. It is with both a sense of great reluctance and a feeling of guarded accomplishment that I present this bill to extend the foreign military sales program to the Senate.

My reluctance derives from the fact that I take no pride in asking my colleagues to approve the portion of this bill which contributes to the spread of conventional military hardware. On the other hand, there is a feeling of accomplishment because of the Committee's adoption of a number of significant amendments, including the prohibition on further involvement in Cambodia and a number of restrictions on the military aid and sales programs.

The basic purpose of this bill is to authorize continuation of the military credit sales program for fiscal years 1970 and 1971.

It would authorize credit sales of $300 million in military arms and equipment for each of those years and would authorize the appropriation of 250 million each year to finance the sales. The sales financed under this program are made primarily to less developed countries. Credit sales to rich countries are generally financed either through commercial channels or the Export-Import Bank.

But the credit sales program must be viewed in the context of the total picture of U.S. arms exports. The Department of Defense estimates that in the current fiscal year the United States will sell abroad a total of about $1.9 billion in arms and military equipment. Of that, $350 million will be financed under authority of the Foreign Military Sales Act. In addition to the sales volume, the United States will supply $392 million in arms through the military grant aid program and will have an additional $166 million in surplus arms and equipment-valued at one-fourth of acquisition cost-to give away. Thus, the United States will sell or give away nearly $2.5 billion in military materials this fiscal year.

I point out also that there are some $9 billion worth of surplus arms and military equipment now available for the Department of Defense to give away -even to Cambodia-without any congressional limits. And the total is mounting rapidly as U.S. forces are withdrawn from Vietnam. In addition to the excess arms, the funds available under the regular grant aid and sales program, the President may, under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act, give other nations up to $300 million of arms and equipment out of the Department of Defense's stock if he considers it vital to our national security. The sources of United States arms are many and the volume is vast. The credit sales program authorized by this bill is only the tip of the iceberg.

All of these programs add up to the fact that the United States is the world's largest producer and exporter of military equipment. And in this global context, I call attention to the grim reminder that for the period from 1964 to 1969 total military outlays around the world amounted to over $1 trillion. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this sum when measured against available economic resources "exceeds the value of all goods and services produced in the United States in the past year; it is more than two years' income for the world's developing countries in which two and one-half billion people live; and it is equal to as much money as was spent by all governments on all forms of public education and health care in the six-year period."

Few would disagree that this is a pretty sad commentary on the priorities set by governments around the world. But the future is even more bleak. Drawing on a recent United Nations study, the Christian Science Monitor graphically reported recently that "If one silver dollar coin was dropped every second, it will take 126,000 years to exhaust the amount of money that will be spent on world armaments in the next 10 years." As a practical matter there is little that the Committee can do to change the outlook for that forecast. But it did act to try to control the contribution the Pentagon planned to make toward making the prediction a reality. It made a number of substantive changes that may help to stem the flow of American weapons abroad. I would like to describe briefly the most significant actions taken.

Nothing was more indicative of the Pentagon's blatant disregard for the intent of Congress than its giving away of some $140 million in surplus military equipment to Taiwan following Congress' refusal to appropriate $54.5 million in additional military aid above the amount authorzied. As a result of this attempt to increase appropriations over the authorization level, and the Pentagon's attempt to make an end run around the Congress by using the surplus program, two amendments have been added to this bill to prevent such developments in the future.

The first, dealing with the excess property issue, restricts the Department of Defense's authority by imposing a $35 million ceiling on the amount of surplus military arms or equipment that may be given away in any fiscal year. A portion of the original cost of any surplus material given away above that amount would be deducted from the funds available for grant military aid.

The second, relating to appropriations, simply states that any appropriation above the amount authorized cannot be used and that any appropriation for which there is not an authorization cannot be expended. This amendment writes into law the principle, supported by the Senate in two votes last year, that the appropriation of funds which are not authorized is bad practice and, if carried to extremes, could seriously undermine the authority of all legislative committees. In addition to these two amendments, the bill contains provisions which require: (1) that recipients of military grant aid, including surplus equipment, pay in their local currency 50 percent of the value of the grants, the funds to be used to meet U.S. obligations in the country and to finance educational and cultural exchange programs; (2) that the United States not approve requests by foreign countries to transfer military equipment, supplied under the grant or sales program, to any country to which the United States would not supply the arms directly; (3) that the President be given explicit control over successive transfers of military equipment supplied under Government-financed programs; and (4) that sales or grants of the International Fighter aircraft, except for those given to Vietnam or sold through commercial channels, be authorized under the regular military grant aid or sales programs.

Mr. President, the fact that the Committee felt compelled to adopt these restrictions serves only to emphasize the failure of policies which have resulted in making the United States the world's leading arms merchant. This policy, which places such great reliance on arms as a means of solving problems of human and national relationships evidences a type of national illness.

It is the kind of illness that has spread deceptively and insidiously for many years and now permeates our entire body politic.

It is an illness that blinds both policy makers and public to our nation's basic traditions and values to produce a kind of "Doublespeak" where lives are saved by sending more men into combat; villages are destroyed in order to save them; and risks for peace are taken by buying more weapons of destruction.

It is the kind of illness that has drawn us into Vietnam; that has nurtured our adventure in Laos; and that has brought us to the brink of a far wider war throughout Indo-China.

In short, it is the kind of illness that prostitutes and distorts. It is the kind of illness that must be cured if we are to ever achieve peace abroad or at home. The Church-Cooper-Aiken-Mansfield amendment, to prevent any further United States involvement in Cambodia, is a small, but important step in the recovery process.

Last year, by a vote of 70 to 16, the Senate adopted the national commitments resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that "a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment." By its action of April 1970 in initiating hostilities within the territory of Cambodia without the consent or even the prior knowledge of Congress or any of its committees, the Executive Branch has shown disregard not only for the national commitments resolution but for the constitutional principles in which that resolution is rooted. In the wake of recent events, there is reason to reassert, with renewed conviction, a statement made in the Foreign Relations Committee's report of April 16, 1969, on the national commitments resolution:

"Our country has come far toward the concentration in its national executive of unchecked power over foreign relations, particularly over the disposition and use of the Armed Forces. So far has this process advanced that, in the committee's view, it is no longer accurate to characterize our Government, in matters of foreign relations, as one of separated powers checked and balanced against each other."

The notion that the authority to commit the United States to war is an Executive prerogative, or even a divided or uncertain one, is one which has grown up only in recent decades. It is the result primarily of a series of emergencies or alleged emergencies which have enhanced Executive power, fostered

attitudes of urgency and anxiety, and given rise to a general disregard for constitutional procedure.

In fact, there was neither uncertainty nor ambiguity on the part of the framers of the Constitution as to their determination to vest the war power exclusively in the Congress. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Madison in 1789:

"We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."

As to the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, Alexander Hamilton, an advocate of strong executive power, wrote in Federalist No. 69:

"The President is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy, while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies-all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature."

The present Administration's view of the President's power as Commanderin-Chief is almost the polar opposite of Hamilton's. In its comments of March 10, 1969, on the then pending National Commitments Resolution, the Department of State made the following assertion:

"As Commander in Chief, the President has the sole authority to command our Armed Forces, whether they are within or outside the United States. And, although reasonable men may differ as to the circumstances in which he should do so, the President has the constitutional power to send U.S. military forces abroad without specific congressional approval."

Like a number of its predecessors, the present Administration is basing its claim to war powers on either a greatly inflated concept of the President's authority as Commander in Chief, or on some vague doctrine of inherent powers of the Presidency, or both. Another possibility is that the matter simply has not been given much thought.

Whatever the explanation may be, the fact remains that the Executive is conducting a constitutionally unauthorized, Presidential war in Indochina. The commitment without the consent or knowledge of Congress of thousands of American soldiers to fight in Cambodia-a country which has formally renounced the offer of protection extended to it as a protocol state under the SEATO Treaty, and to which, therefore, we are under no binding obligation whateverevidences a conviction by the Executive that it is at liberty to ignore the national commitments resolution and to take over both the war and treaty powers of the Congress when Congressional authority in these areas becomes inconvenient.

It is noteworthy that, in his address to the Nation of April 30 explaining his decision to send American troops to Cambodia, the President did not think it necessary to explain what he believed to be the legal ground on which he was acting, other than to refer to his powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Equally noteworthy was the President's repeated assertion in his press conference of May 8 that he and he alone-as Commander in Chief was responsible for the conduct of the war and the safety of our troops. This sweeping assertion of the President's authority as Commander in Chief amounts to the repudiation of those provisions of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which empower the Congress not only to "declare war" but to "raise and support armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," and "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." It is true, of course, that the present Administration's attitude in this area hardly differs from that of its predecessors except that preceding Administrations took no special pride, as the present Administration does, in adherence to a "strict construction" of the Constitution.

The Senate's adoption of the Church-Cooper-Aiken-Mansfield amendment will be a significant step toward restoring the health of our Constitutional system of checks and balances. Both its purpose and language are simple and straightforward. Its purpose is simply to prevent involvement by the United States in a wider war in Asia by insuring that our forces are withdrawn from Cambodia

and that the United States does not end up fighting a war in behalf of Cambodia. I will not go into the several points of the amendment since the sponsors of it will discuss its details in their presentations.

Mr. President, I believe that, with the amendments adopted by the Committee, this is a good bill and I hope that the Senate will approve the Committee's recommendations.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Let me also quote the following passage from the committee report on H.R. 15628:

Although the credit authority approved by the Congress in the Foreign Military Sales Act in the following year is an improvement over the open-ended revolving fund previously used, it is still questionable if a government-sponsored sales program, to poor countries, of this magnitude serves the national interest. The committee will give more detailed study to this subject in connection with the review next year of our foreign aid policy.

It is no secret that the Foreign Relations Committee over the last few years has found increasingly that the ponderous existing legislation relating to foreign military assistance contains all sorts of blanket authorizations which can be used by the President with little or no congressional supervision or control. More and more it becomes apparent that the basic Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, even as frequently amended, is an outmoded, cumbersome vehicle which reflects the views of the Pentagon far more than those of the Congress. The administration should soon be sending up to the Hill its recommendations for an entirely new foreign assistance program and we shall have a chance to put to work the lessons we have learned since 1961 when we deal with that legislative request.

What are those lessons? Time does not permit more than a few examples to indicate the kinds of problems which have been illuminated for us in our inquiries over the past 2 years. In any case, there is more than adequate information contained in the already mentioned hearings and report of the Subcommittee cn Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad.

I have a particular interest in citing the situation with respect to U.S. military assistance to Spain-some $625 million through fiscal year 1969. As the Economist of London for December 19 puts it boldly: "Spain is again a police state."

The main reason why we have had such a close relationship with that country and have spent so much money there for close to two decades has been the military requirement for base facilities, beginning with the 1953 agreement. In turn, one reason given for overcoming the American public's reluctance to deal with a Fascist regime was that the United States could not plan on continuing its base operations in Morocco. Now, we have found that certain communications facilities at Rota, in Spain, which were expanded in 1963 to take up the slack from Morocco, were continued in operation even after the United States was permitted to keep operating from its Moroccan facilities. At this point let me quote directly from the final report of the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Foreign Relations Committee:

In March 1969 when the Subcommittee staff visited Rota, questions were asked about duplication with communication facilities in Morocco. The staff was reassured that both facilities were needed, with the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet cited as a key reason. One year later, however, in March 1970, when the staff visited communications facilities in Morocco, they were told that the comparable facilities in Spain had been taken off the air.

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