his mind and applied for OCS in 1988. He was making plans for the future when he left the marines in 1994.

23. Why say that Kirk didn't have friends? Kirk had many friends from school that he remained in contact with. He had hoped to go to Ames for a reunion he had organized in May. He had to give that up when transferred. He talked about friends at Camp Lejeune and sent us pictures. He didn't mention Dr. Landry until the week he died.

24. Why did they make a point about the missing adult magazines, but fail to mention his gun, scuba and skydiving magazines which were more important to him. He had renewed his Playboy subscription that week.

25. Why didn't we find anything in Kirk's papers on the purchase of the H&K MP5? Paid for but not received. He had dreamed of owning a weapon like that since he was 8 years old and lived in Ethiopia.

26. Why didn't Norman Chandler, retired USMC, contact us about the H&K MP5 when he knew that Kirk was dead? Kirk had purchased the pistol from him and had suppressors ordered at the time he died.

The Onslow County Sheriff's Department did not conduct a homicide investigation so there is no evidence of another person. They made up a scenario after they realized Kirk was shot twice and didn't check to see if it was plausible. Who opened Kirk's car door on Monday (2-17-92) after Major Stroff saw the car and before Mrs. Wager went to the range? Why were the keys in the ignition and the flashlight in the car? Major Watts assured us that he would conduct a separate investigation and urged us to stay home for Kirk's funeral. He did not and later stated that we knew that some of Kirk's property would be destroyed if we didn't come immediately. He did not. When I visited Camp Lejeune in March 1992, Kirk's fellow officers told me that he had been murdered and that they would look for his killer.

I might have believed an accident if he had not been shot between the eyes. He would not have had two weapons loaded and wouldn't have had the Mini 14 on the ground.

On May 13 and 14, 1993, I met with the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (Case Number 103-89-3). Congressman Fred Grandy's aide, Charles Robbins, accompanied me. The result was a report published in March 1994 that stated that the NIS found no evidence to support a suicide conclusion. Sadly it also, contained errors.

In June 1994 I returned to Capitol Hill to meet with the UNTIL WE HAVE ANSWERS group, Senator Tom Harkin and Senator Charles Grassley, both of Iowa. Both Iowa senators have been supportive for the last 3 years.

"No one", who knew Kirk believes that he shot himself, accidentally or deliberately. To lose Kirk is sad enough. The lack of integrity of the investigating officers compounds our loss. Kirk's father is a marine who believed in Semper Fi. Does he have to lose that too?

I am enclosing the letter I wrote after receiving the JAGMAN report because it lists errors that were never corrected. A list of information on Kirk will give you an understanding of him. Kirk was a "gung ho" marine who was there for others. How can we do less for him? Kirk's family, friends, neighbors, teachers and fellow officers stand behind me as I look for answers. I am not alone!

With your help we can reduce the number of families that will be made to suffer this kind of loss.

[Additional information is retained in committee files.]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY Edward and MARIE WANKE, PARENTS OF PFC PATRICK

A. WANKE, USA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on Personnel: It is with heavy heart that we felt compelled to review all that has happened to us since our son's death over 5 years ago, while serving his country in the Persian Gulf War. It is sad and unfortunate that serious problems exist so that these hearings even have to be held, but it would be an even greater tragedy if we did not speak out for changes in how military deaths are handled, to put a greater emphasis on honesty and thoroughness, accuracy and credibility, responsibility and accountability, and cooperation with the family. Our family is healing and we seek no publicity-only justice (we value our privacy), but we want to share our story with you to do our part to help correct and change the process so that no other family in the future will have to face and endure what we have had to handle. These victims were real people, our sons and daughters, who we value more than our own lives. Now, we, the families, have become the second victims. No matter what the circumstances of any sol

dier's death, they and their families deserve the most thorough and accurate investigation possible!

Our family has had to deal with three major blows: First, we had to deal with the fact that our beloved son was dead. Next, we had to deal with the fact that his death was being determined a suicide. Third, we had to deal with how the military in which he served mishandled so many aspects of his death. Our testimony consists of two parts: our own case, and then positive constructive suggestions for change. Our son, PFC Patrick A. Wanke, was found dead in his vehicle about dawn on 24 March 1991, in AsSamawah, Iraq, from a gunshot wound to his forehead on the day of his unit's return to Saudi Arabia for redeployment back to the States after serving 194 days in the Persian Gulf, from September 11, 1990, to March 24, 1991. He was allowed to depart alone at about 2100 hours the evening before to return to his unit, and he never arrived. He was unaccounted for, in enemy territory, before the permanent ceasefire, for almost 9 hours, with the estimated time of his death as being between 0200 and 0300 hours on 24 March 1991.

Whether or not our son took his own life has not been proven as presently described by the CID ROI, dated February 4, 1992, or by any of its supplements, with all of its inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and omissions.

The most significant and upsetting problem (or "material deficiency") in our son's case has yet to be reconciled by the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and it is a very obvious one. If the report of the military's medical examination on our son is true (and we have every right to expect it should be), it is very evident that the caliber of the projectile on which was removed from our son's skull several days after his death is not the same caliber of the projectile which all their testing was conducted on, and it is not the same caliber as his assigned weapon carried (which the CID ROI says was used in his death!) This means it is impossible for our son to have taken his own life as the CID ROI describes. The projectile which was examined showed that “individual characteristics are present for comparison purposes" (CID ROI Exhibit 15), yet it "could not be identified or eliminated as having been fired through Exhibit 6”, (CID ROI Exhibit 17), which was supposed to be the assigned weapon of our son. The weapon, which was at the scene, was never fingerprinted for either his prints or that of another person! Furthermore, all of the reports passed through many levels of review, all the way up to the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG); and to our knowledge, this discrepancy was never noticed-at least no one made any mention of it or made any attempt to correct it! Either this was a complete oversight by ALL of these professionally-trained people, or else it was quietly ignored by ALL of them. (Although our son died more than 5 years ago, this discrepancy was not discovered by us until fall of 1994 as we were preparing to request the DODIG to review our son's case under Section 1185. We had received the autopsy report and the CID reports 8 months apart, and we naively never compared the two reports.) The final report was coordinated, in person, and was reviewed on 27 Jan 92 by officers from the following offices: Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Criminal Law, and Trial Counsel!

From the very beginning, the events following our son's death were flawed by many mistakes:

1. Our Casualty Assistant Officer was given a non-existent house number, alarming some of our neighbors as he tried to find our house in the dark on Sunday night to notify us of our son's death.

2. We had not been prepared for the fact that our son's death could possibly have been a suicide! The first word of that came, not through the military, but through the media, heard early Thursday morning by our son's 79-year-old grandmother over our local radio station. Our Privacy Rights had been violated when a news reporter from near the base was able to obtain that information from an unidentified woman in the Department of Defense on Wednesday evening, and she sent it out over the airwaves and newswires the following day. Official word did not reach us until Thursday night. The whole world heard the devastating news before we were informed, and we have never received an apology for how this was handled! (To our knowledge, the Public Affairs office at the base never did put out an official press release about our son's death.)

3. When contacted by our local newspaper for confirmation of the Associated Press news story, the Public Affairs officer at the base was quoted as saying that our son was found dead in his tent. We believed that for 7 weeks until we were contacted by the military for an interview.

4. At that time, the special agent told us that our son had died in his vehicle. 5. He also told us that our son had sold some of his possessions at a price far below their value, thus anticipating to commit suicide. One of the items was his camera. We told the agent that those items had been sold because our son had ordered new ones to replace them. In fact, we gave him a copy of our son's check

(which had been returned to us when the order could not be filled) to prove their theory incorrect. The check was dated just hours before our son died! (Anyway, it is our understanding that a person gives his possessions away, not sells them!) Although the CID ROI, in its Psychological Autopsy makes mention that our son had sold his camera, there is no mention of the check or other information we presented to the agent in the section of the CID ROI where he describes his visit with us! As a result, facts were knowingly omitted-allowing false information assumed by the military to become a part of the CID ROI! (The check was for $350!)

6. That same special agent sat at our kitchen table with his papers in front of him and falsely told us that the direction of our son's wound was from under his chin. Since we had viewed our son's body and had authorized our own autopsy, we knew that what he was telling us was not true! About 5 days later, he corrected himself; but by then, from everything that had happened so far, our trust in anything that the military did or said was greatly diminished! We requested that this man be removed from the case!

7. It was at this time (8 weeks after our son's death) that we were contacted by our son's battalion commander. We arranged a visit to the base where we tape recorded, with his permission, our visit with him and our son's captain. Since then, six of the men who were stationed with our son have contradicted some of what we were told by these two officers, and the 3rd Supplemental Report of the CID ROI is also contradictory of some of their statements. These are issues which the DAIG did not resolve, and which are now in the hands of the DODIG. They refer to the events of that fateful night.

Our son's case involves more than cause and manner of death. In our son's case, the circumstances going on with our son's unit on the night of his death is vitally important, since we feel that his death is related to the failure of his unit to follow several established policies for the area they were in!

Without going into a lot of detail about our complicated case, we will briefly highlight some of the problems we have regarding our son's death and the reports thereof. Keep in mind that the reason for investigations and reports is to truly and accurately record for all time an event as it occurred. The USACIDC Crime Records Center will keep our son's case on file for 40 years!

A. Testing:

1. To repeat, the projectile removed from our son's skull does not appear to be the same as that which his weapon contained, nor the same one on which all tests were conducted.

2. The weapon was never tested for fingerprints (either his or others), blood, hair, and tissue, which we understand are standard ballistic tests to prove or disprove suspicions beyond a shadow of a doubt. We have no indication that a blood stain pattern analysis was done.

3. Gunshot residue testing for powder burns on the hands of our son was not done until more than 72 hours after his death, well after the established time limits. There was mishandling of procedures involving the protective covering put on to protect our son's head and hands which had been removed somewhere between the scene of death and Dover AFB.

4. The angle of the wound is not consistent with his position and the angle of the weapon as shown on a video re-creation of our son behind the wheel of his vehicle put together by the base. We had asked to see a like vehicle and a like weapon. They did the video instead, much to our disappointment. They selected a man taller and a man shorter than our son to re-enact the video. Was there no one on base who was our son's height?

B. Problems with the Medical Examiner's Report, Case Flow Sheet, etc., include: 1. Our son's dental records which were used to help identify him had been incorrectly identified or reversed.

2. Our son's identifying unit was listed incorrectly on two important documents: on the Medical Examination Report and on the Certificate of Death (Overseas). They show that our son's unit was Co. I, 187th Inf. It should have been Co. D, 187th Inf.

3. The Medical Examination Report indicates that our son was clean-shaven, when in fact, he had a mustache which is clearly visible on the autopsy photographs.

4. Instead of a regular autopsy, there was only an “external examination/inspection" performed on our son, the projectile located on X-ray, and removed through the entrance wound.

5. That military "external examination/inspection" made no mention of bruises and discoloration on our son's body which were found by our medical examiner and a private investigator who viewed the autopsy photographs.

C. The Psychological Autopsy is part of the Commander's Inquiry AR 15-6 Report:

1. The psychological autopsy contained many untruths and a picture of a person we did not know. It was completed so hastily that much very important information was missing! The division psychologist who prepared this autopsy stated-"This report is submitted without the following essential sources of information: 1) Physical autopsy report. 2) CID investigation report. 3) Interview with PFC Wanke's immediate family.” (Exhibit Q, Page 6). When we questioned him as to why all these "essential sources of information” were missing, he told us that he had been instructed to complete the Psychological Autopsy within a week! Had we been interviewed at that time, there was so much that we could have set straight!

2. Statements by the division psychologist indicating that information was not available' was written at least ten (10) times in his report. At that time, no effort was made to obtain that unavailable information. Consequently, the report was considered complete and conclusions were drawn by both the division psychologist and the AR 15-6 investigator based on completely false information. The answers to the things we were questioned about by the special agent 7 weeks after our son's death never did make it into any of the reports.

3. Their second hypothesis as to why our son took his own life-that he may have been ashamed of how he had treated his family is completely ridiculous! We could have proven that by showing them all the written and taped letters to us, the photographs he took, and the gifts he sent. He told us of his love for his family, his fears of the war, and his hopes and plans for when he returned. He missed home, his family and friends, his dog, and his car. A taped letter he did just days before he died tells how anxious he was to come home. We were proud and continue to be proud of how he surpassed any expectations we might have had in this regard. They never should have had the right to print such “crap” into a permanent record without verification or denial by the family!

4. When a supplement to the psychological autopsy was done well over a year later and several months after the conclusion of the investigation, much good and positive information and corrections which were provided by us was never used; they were omitted as though they were never given!

D. The Commanders Inquiry/AR 15-6 Investigation Report is an exhibit in the CID ROI:

1. We feel that the investigating officer failed to fully comply with the responsibility of his appointment orders asking him to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of our son. The fact that our son was unaccounted for, for at least 8 hours, was never addressed.

2. Lacking are statements from the two men who we believe may have known our son the best.

3. Exhibit P contains sketches of the scene and a statement which is dated more than 72 hours after that officer "assessed the shooting." The sketches were not verified by anyone else and we are challenging the accuracy of those death scene sketches based on statements from others saying those sketches are incorrect. However, since the sketches do not affect the cause and manner of death, they (the military) have refused to do anything about them. We feel the sketches affect the credibility of the report; and we feel that if the sketches are important enough to be part of this report in the first place, they are important enough to be correct! This is especially important because two rolls of film taken at the scene were "inadvertently lost".

4. The First Sergeant gave false and incorrect information in this report (saying that the illumination that night was 60 percent, based on the 'guess' of a fellow officer and he signed his name to it as fact. According to a light data chart mailed to us by the battalion commander, the maximum illumination possible that night was only 45 percent!

5. So, in reality, conclusions were drawn by the investigating officer of this report, in part, based on incorrect sketches, wrong information supplied by one of the officers (the illumination), the false and incomplete information contained in the psychological autopsy, and lacking statements from two of the soldiers who may have known our son better than the others giving statements.

6. The military failed to follow through on the recommendation of the investigating officer that "a supplemental report be done when formal autopsy is complete." This was never done. Had that physical autopsy been carefully read and the projectile discrepancy been discovered, what a difference there would have been in the conclusions drawn in this report.

7. We point out the following inconsistencies: errors on dates, distances, vehicle problems, radio in the vehicle, where our son was to travel that night, the written description of the crime scene, drawing of the scene, and the photographs, for some examples.

E. The CID Report of Investigation is the official report regarding our son's death:

1. Because the above mentioned reports (the Physical Autopsy, the Psychological Autopsy, and the Commander's Inquiry/AR 15-6 Report) are all a part of the CID ROI and because they all contain many errors, the CID ROI is also flawed.

2. Two rolls of 35mm film exposed at the death scene and containing aerial photos of that scene were "inadvertently lost".

3. Some of our son's writings, held as evidence, were withheld from us due to the fact that they fell under "copyright laws and works of authorship". Finally, after we were able to identify them from copies which we had had in our possession for at least 9 months, they were released to us.

4. Many of our son's personal effects were not returned to us. Some were mentioned in this report; others we knew he had in his possession. Papers we saw in his case file at the base which had nothing to do with his death were never returned to us, and they now appear to be lost or destroyed. Some were taken from the mail room at the base and destroyed instead of being returned for a refund of the cost. Some of his possessions were burned for sanitary reasons, but there is no record of just what they are. (What about the legality and propriety of taking personal possessions and papers, not receipting for them, never returning them when they were not useful to the case, and possibly destroying them?

5. We had been told that the CID ROI would contain only fact and that most of the things that we had inquired about would not be included in that report. So we were very surprised to find that it contained statements from some of the men which were their own opinion and speculation, not fact. They were opinions which were unfounded and unsupported, were without basis and could not be proven. They were speculation and had no bearing on cause and manner of death. Yet statements we made and evidence we presented, we were told, would not be included because they had no bearing on cause and manner of death! We should have had equal input, because we did have factual and provable information!

F. The 3rd Supplemental Report to the CID ROI was an interview with the two investigators on the scene as they recalled their actions 2 years earlier:

1. This report completely contradicted statements we have on tape which were made by our son's captain during our visit to the base in June 1991, regarding whether the unit knew that our son was on his way; and it contracted statements made by the battalion commander about the safe environment they were in. The DAIG refused to reconcile what the unit knew or didn't know by interviewing the proper soldiers. We believe the unit must hold some responsibility for our son's death!

2. We had been given an indication of some of the people who would be interviewed for this 3rd Supplemental Report. Then suddenly, after the statements of the two investigators were received, the case was closed with those people never being contacted!

3. They also tried to locate the two missing rolls of film. The agent on-the-scene said he had turned the films over to the evidence custodian. Several days later, when he asked about the films, the evidence custodian had no recollection of having received the films. The Agent Activity Summary described what was done with all the evidence except for the films! There is some inconsistency between what we were told and what we read in the CID ROI 3rd Supplemental Report about whether there was a local processor in the area. We feel that those films, which we are told included aerial views of the scene, are important and would have answered the question of the incorrect sketches of the scene. A photo is indisputable and is worth a thousand words!

G. Miscellaneous

1. When we requested the nine Polaroid photos which are mentioned in the AR 15-6 Report, we were only sent three photos! After weeks of trying to locate the other six photos, we finally had our congressman's office make contact with the base. Ironically, the following day, the six lost photos were located in the back of the file where they had been all the time! They also discovered a second file in our son's case, which file had been "misfiled in the evidence room", and they were not aware that it existed. Why two files?

2. The Agent's Activity Summary which we have in our hands refers to a notation under date of 16 Dec 93 that "4th Supl reviewed..." We requested that 4th supplemental report under the Freedom of Information Act. We were informed that this was an "administrative error" in that report and that there were only three supplemental reports.

3. The USACIDC Crime Records Center was inconsistent in what was releasable and not releasable under the FOIA. We received identical reports, one had the names redacted and the other did not. Other information which had been denied to us at one time was received by us as part of another report.