that the CO was aware of the hazing incident by virtue of his presence and comment in the machinery room. Yet, he took no immediate action. He failed to exercise any degree of control over the hazing investigation, even though it was miserably mismanaged. CDR Boulden was the Captain of that ship. The crew members were under his watch. Dennis' death is by far the most tragic outcome under his watch. However, many other crew members lives and careers were irrevocably damaged under his watch prior to Dennis' death and continue to be even after Dennis' death as a result of his watch. Although, CDR Boulden proved, without a doubt, that he was unable to accept the responsibilities of a CO as a Commander, he was rewarded by being promoted to the rank of Captain and appointed to a position at Submarine Squadron One Headquarters in January 1996 where he is the second in command after CAPT Miller. (exh 10 & 17).

• The Executive Officer, LCDR Harris was central to this tragic event. He was inexperienced in his position. He allowed himself to be manipulated by the COB and intimidated by his superiors. Under his guidance, the investigation quickly degenerated into a malicious persecution of the victim in an effort to prove himself as an effective leader. Although he espoused integrity, he exhibited his lack of that quality when he demonstrated his willingness to increasingly subject Dennis to stress and pressure, with no regard to the consequences other than the effects on his own career. He locked down the boat, (fast cruise) knowing that this was against regulations, and against the advice of LT Hunt. The usual career path for an XO is promotion to being the Commanding Officer of a submarine. Again, this is a telling thought. For his punishment, LCDR Harris was given a non punitive letter of caution for initiating the “fast cruise".

• Captain Miller showed his leadership style to be that of an intimidator. When the overwhelmed XO approached him for advice and guidance, Captain Miller responded with his "Gutless Wonders" comment. Both the XO and the COB had a very clear understanding of the intent of this comment. Yet, when later questioned about it, this "leader" denied that it had been directed at the XÔ. Captain Miller showed his disregard for Dennis' welfare when he summarily dismissed any possibility of transfer even if Dennis was in fear of retribution. CAPT Miller was aware of, and in fact asked XO Harris if the whole crew was onboard (secured liberty). CAPT Miller was aware of Dennis' concerns. CAPT Miller's message to ADM Barr included the following statement, "The MMFN appears to be concerned with the possible repercussions from crew members if he identifies anyone, so he is not budging." For jeopardizing our son's life and approving an illegal fast cruise, CAPT Miller's punishment was a non punitive letter of caution for allowing the "fast cruise." CAPT Miller also was the convening authority in the conduction of our son's JAGMAN death investigation. (exh 54).

• LT Salansky actively took part in the consultations and decisions during the hazing investigation. Having had time to consult with his superior, CAPT Miller, when questioned about the "Gutless Wonders" comment, Salansky supported CAPT Miller's contention that it was not directed at the XO. Both CAPT Miller and LT Salansky had time to coordinate their response to the question concerning CAPT Miller's comment. They were questioned about Miller's comment after we presented it as one of our concerns at the 01/05/96 FOCAB meeting, and our questions and concerns had been forwarded to Hawaii. For his part in the decision making process of the hazing investigation which resulted in our son's death, LT Salansky, who reports to CAPT Miller, was assigned as the investigating officer and entrusted with conducting an objective and comprehensive JAGMAN investigation into our son's death. LT Salansky has been transferred to Japan. • ADM Barr expressed an absolute need to identify the hazers without offering any consideration for the welfare of the victim. Based on that direction, the actions of his subordinates had disastrous consequences. ADM Barr addressed all the C.O.'s, X.O.'s and COB'S on October 20, 1995. He made it clear that the Los Angeles' actions in dealing with the initial situation were all reasonable. Most likely, Barr said this because his "inconclusive is not good enough" remark, without the benefit of constructive direction and concern for the victim's welfare exacerbated a bad situation. His comment generated pressure which was multiplied as it was passed down the chain of command. His endorsement of the JAGMAN Investigative Report reflected his preconceived bias. He failed to present an objective review of the facts. In the end he expressed that he would use what he learned to prevent future tragedies. We would like to know what did ADM Barr

learn? What did he do to implement policies and procedures that will help to prevent future tragedies? How could ADM Barr honestly believe that people acted appropriately? How could he conduct a meeting with Commanding Officers, Executive Officers and Chiefs of Boats, a day and a half after our son's death, and tell them that the Los Angeles' actions were reasonable? How could he make that statement when the investigations were just beginning? God help the next sailor in a situation such as our son's, if all of those C.O.'s, X.O.'s and Chiefs left that meeting believing what ADM Barr told them. Within months of our son's death, RADM Barr retired. Most assuredly at a full pension.

• It seems quite clear that Chief Macatantan was well aware of the tacking-on of Dennis' Dolphins as he entered the machinery room. His feeble attempt to explain away his comments reflect a cowardly attempt to protect his own career. Chief Macatantan was given a non punitive letter of caution.

• The note that was attributed to Dennis indicates that the Engineering Department Enlisted Assistant (EDEA), Senior Chief Schildgen was aware that Dennis' Dolphins were tacked-on, but did not report it. We are not aware of any action taken against Senior Chief Schildgin.

• It has been strongly indicated that Chief Daue, who was the chief of Dennis' division, participated in the tacking-on of Dennis' dolphins. On the night of Dennis' death, Dennis told Chief Daue that Senior Chief Norris had threatened him with physical harm. Chief Daue took no action to report the incident. Chief Daue had an obligation to take immediate actions to protect Dennis and to report what Dennis had told him concerning Senior Chief Norris' threat. We are not aware of any action taken against Chief Daue.

• There were chiefs who either participated in the hazing or were aware of it. They remained silent as Dennis bore the brunt of the command's wrath during the hazing investigation. The chiefs and the U.S.S. Los Angeles long tolerated the COB's misconduct. They exhibited their lack of courage and principle by their unwillingness to take a stand in opposition to his illegal conduct.

There is no indication that the commissioned officers aboard the U.S.S. Los Angeles undertook any action to actively involve themselves in a way to bring a level of common sense sanity to the situation.

Where were all of the chiefs and commissioned officers during the many occasions of misconduct by the COB? Only Dennis, when he stood up for Regnary, showed a willingness to take a stand for decency. Unfortunately, Dennis had neither the power nor authority to implement positive change. Dennis tried to bring about positive change with his presentation to the CO, who did not take the crew's complaints seriously, and did nothing.

• TM1 Fagen and MM3 Hoofard immediately admitted to tapping Dennis' Dolphins on in a congratulatory manner. They were each given a non punitive letter of caution. This is the only case where the actions are appropriate.

To our knowledge, the crew members that tacked-on Dennis' Dolphins and did not come forward during the hazing investigation, have never been identified.

It should be noted that non punitive letters amount to being handed a letter and told don't do this again. The person receiving the letter has the option of tearing it up as soon as they walk out the door. Neither a notation stating that a non punitive letter was issued nor the non punitive letter itself is entered into personnel files.

On numerous occasions we have written to Naval leaders. We have brought to their attention the obvious deficiencies in the investigative process. We have offered very specific questions to which we are entitled to receive answers. Most of our letters are not even acknowledged. We have not received direct answers to our direct questions.

Hazing, when in the form of traditionally acceptable, or condoned rights of initiation, presents certain aspects that should be addressed. We have related to you that when young recruits are being recruited, various rites of initiation are explained to them as events to be expected in order to achieve acceptance by their peers. During recruit training and submarine school, senior enlisted personnel frequently share their experiences of being the recipient of various initiation rites. These rites are glorified by these people as initiations which are necessary to gain

acceptance. At this same time as these hazing practices are being glorified, recruits are taught about loyalty to their shipmates.

It is appropriate that the Navy stand in official opposition to hazing. Various policy statements have been issued to inform the Navy's leaders of its position. However, we have seen nothing that provides guidelines for leaders to follow when investigating an alleged hazing incident. Particularly, the appropriate treatment of victims should be clearly stated.

Victims should be treated as victims. Victims should be immediately removed from a potentially threatening environment, especially when fear of retribution is claimed. Separation from a potentially threatening environment should be handled in a protective manner, not a punitive manner. Victims should not be subjected to intimidation, threats, punishment and persecution. Victims should not be made to believe that they are responsible for the incident or the ramifications of a failed investigation. Victims of any prohibited activity, whether in the form of sexual harassment, racial discrimination, assault, or hazing, whether considered cooperative or not, should never be revictimized in the interest of investigating the original offense. It must be recognized that victims are frequently "uncooperative" toward participation in investigations. It should be understood that uncooperativeness by a victim does not justify persecution of the victim.

Immediately, when the boat's leaders felt that Dennis was an uncooperative witness to the hazing incident, he should have been afforded his rights. He should have been subjected to appropriate administrative action and proper punishment for his offense. This matter should have been properly disposed of at Captain's Mast on Monday morning along with the charge for disobeying the order to submit to a medical examination. They could then have pursued the investigation without further persecution of Dennis. Instead, the leaders chose to persecute him and subject him to continued psychological pressures, including continual threats of punishment which exceeded its authority. He was effectively punished without the benefit of due process. An objective review of the facts can only lead a reasonable person to conclude that the planning and implementation of the actions taken, during the hazing investigation, were inept, malicious, and exhibited such disregard toward Dennis' welfare as to directly influence his death.

The lack of appropriate punitive actions in this case leads us to believe that the Navy's policy against hazing is more for public relations and political considerations than it is out of concern for the welfare of its sailors, since the actions of the command were far more damaging than the initial hazing. Dennis did not die as a result of the hazing. He died as a result of the commands' actions to “investigate” the hazing.

It is quite clear that it has been the Navy's intention to take as little action as possible in response to this tragedy. The COB's misconduct was only minimally addressed after crew members repeated their experiences to NCIS agents. Non punitive letters were only issued as token actions 4 months after Dennis' death, and only as we pressed these issues.

Suicide prevention is included in the Navy's leadership training programs. Leaders are instructed to watch for and alleviate signs of pressure and stress. They are instructed to render help and assistance when they observe that a shipmate is under unusual pressure and stress. The leaders involved in this tragedy ignored their training and intentionally created an environment to maximize stress and pressure upon Dennis. The actions of these leaders, and others, exhibited a consciousness and intent to exert maximum pressure and stress upon Dennis. They showed no concern for Dennis. Their concerns were purely selfish. For this they should be held accountable.

The abuses of the COB had gone unchecked for an extended period of time. Dennis was forced into a situation that was intolerable and promised to get worse. With the leaders unwillingness to exercise any common sense there could be no satisfactory conclusion for Dennis. The command immediately placed Dennis in a situation where he was boxed in by the command and the crew. He was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. There was no indication that any effort would have ever been made to relieve Dennis of any of the pressure and stress that he was subjected to. In fact, there is every indication that it would continue to escalate. If in fact Dennis took his own life, Dennis threw himself on the grenade to protect his fellow ship

mates.

We have seen no positive actions taken to prevent future deaths. We have seen no punishments issued to those whose actions reflected incompetency and malicious conduct. Non punitive letters, transfers, retirements and promotions fail to reflect the seriousness of the events which took place, and which were directly associated with poor leadership.

Since Dennis' death we have become aware of many crew members who have left the US.S. Los Angeles. Many have expressed their disgust concerning the manner in which the command mishandled its hazing investigation, and they are bitter about Dennis' death. The retention rate of the U.S.S. Los Angeles has suffered as a result of this incident. We understand that the Navy considers a ship's retention rate to be a factor by which it measures the effectiveness of its leaders. The recent exodus from the U.S.S. Los Angeles should be of concern to you.

There are many sincere and honorable Naval Personnel. We feel confident that these good people represent the rule rather than the exception. To allow those leaders whose actions, and in many instances inactions, exhibited their disregard for the welfare of Dennis for their own selfish personal reasons to go unpunished, is an insult to all of the quality leaders and sailors in the Navy. The refusal of the Navy's highest leaders to act appropriately and decisively, tarnishes the image of the Navy as an organization, and continues to place the lives of sailors in jeopardy. In conclusion, it is our belief that:

The Navy should immediately implement procedures and guidelines in conjunction with its "Zero Tolerance Policy on Hazing" to ensure that victims of hazing incidents are treated as victims, and not revictimized in its efforts to enforce its policy when violations occur. As we write this letter, we are sure that somewhere, a sailor is having his Dolphins tacked on, or is being subjected to some other form of hazing, and runs the risk of being revictimized and losing his life. Dennis' death should not be in vain.

The Navy should enforce appropriate punishment against all of the leaders who exhibited disregard for Dennis' welfare during its hazing investigation, and who committed and/or tolerated illegal actions which created the environment which resulted in Dennis' death. Now, more than 10 months after Dennis death, the Navy has taken no appropriate actions.

JAGMAN Investigations are biased in that they are structured to protect the command. NCIS Investigations are not thorough in that they are conducted in a manner to conclude suicide, ignoring other factors.

The structure of investigations whereby elements are segregated under separate investigative authority, precludes objective and comprehensive presentation of all contributing factors to the death. All facts should be disclosed so that appropriate steps may be taken to prevent reoccurrence of such events. Authority and responsibility for such investigations should be assigned to an agency independent of the military such as the Department of Justice.

The NCIS family liaison services are substantially ineffective. The NCIS family liaison serves the NCIS, not the families. Only one meeting is permitted during which the family is presented with the investigation status. Our meeting was 3 weeks after our son's death. Information provided to the family is presented in a way to give the feeling that it is done as a favor to the family. When the family has follow-up questions, the majority of the time, the answer provided is, it will be in the final report. In our case, the final report was not mailed to us until 9 months after our son's death. During the extended period of time between the service member's death and the release of the final report, there should be at least two NCIS agents' meetings with the family. During the initial meeting, the family is still in shock. An additional meeting could be productive for all concerned. The reviewer of this report needs to be aware that every piece of information that we received from the NCIS prior to the release of the final report, took a great deal of correspondence and effort on out part. If the reviewer intends to review the NCIS or Navy's correspondence, our correspondence should be reviewed also.

Casualty Assistance Personnel, have been courteous and polite. They have been effective in their help with certain bureaucratic matters. When we met with the FOCAB on January 5, 1996, we were impressed by their appearance of genuine interest and sincerity. They seemed to agree that significant corrective measures were needed. They were instrumental in helping to obtain some of the hazing investigation materials that were excluded from the JAGMAN Investigation Report after we brought it to the attention of RADM Gunn. However, 8 months after the January 5, 1996 meeting, we have not received answers to many of our questions that we presented prior to, during and after that meeting. Nor have we seen corrective measures taken.

A truly effective family liaison service that is independent of military organizations, with the authority to obtain answers for families is needed.

All investigation documents relating to the circumstances which resulted in Dennis' death and/or acquired during the investigation into Dennis' death and diverted elsewhere (Norris investigation, internal JAG reports of the leaders, etc.) should be included in Dennis' death investigation report.

The Navy should provide us, Dennis' parents, with direct answers to our direct questions' concerning the circumstances that led to and resulted in Dennis' death, and to the questions that it may be necessary for us to submit, upon receipt of the final endorsement to the JAGMAN report.

It is not possible to place finite value on a human life. If however, the Navy cannot see the value in a human life simply because it is a human life, then it should look at the expenses involved when a life is lost. Substantial sums are invested into the training of sailors. With Dennis' death, the investment in his training was lost. Expenses incurred after his death, as a result of his death, must be substantial. Additionally, many of Dennis' shipmates have refused reenlistment as a result of this tragedy, and some are emotionally scarred and unable to return to sea duty. The investment made in all of these people has been lost at great expense to the taxpayers. For this reason, we ask that you request that the General Accounting Office conduct an investigation into the effects of indiscriminant enforcement of the "zero tolerance policy on hazing" without procedures and guidelines to accompany it.

Dennis was a son who provided us with great love, joy and pride. He had strong feelings for decency, honor and loyalty. Dennis had grown up to become the young man that we hoped he would be. Dennis' shipmates consistently described him as a hard worker and well liked by all. He was described as the best junior sailor on the boat. His former XO, CDR Woolston, described Dennis as the first person he would choose if he were picking a crew, and described Dennis as a candidate for the "seaman to admiral" program.

Dennis' life should not have ended at the age of 21 under the circumstances and in the manner that it did. If Dennis had broken a rule, he should have been promptly and appropriately been punished. Instead, the leaders in command, chose to persecute him to his death. For the way he was treated by those who were entrusted with the responsibility of serving as his leaders, the Navy owes a formal apology to Dennis!

Thank you for allowing us to present this testimony. We hope that you will bring about changes that will prevent needless deaths in the future, and see that justice is served.

[Additional information is retained in committee files.]

ADDITIONAL Prepared StateMENT OF DENNIS B. O'BRIEN, Sr. and Mary L.

O'BRIEN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, we submit this letter, with attachments, to be appended to our testimony concerning the circumstances and investigations surrounding the death of our son MMFN (ŠS) Dennis Bradley O'Brien, Jr., USN, which we provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee, for the hearing held September 12, 1996.

On page 23 of our original testimony, we referenced an order that was issued over the U.S.S. Los Angeles public address system, as our son was bleeding to death, requesting an ambulance, but not 911. Since our original testimony was prepared, we received a letter dated August 28, 1996, from RADM S. Todd Fisher in which he explained the Navy's policy on this subject. We were relieved to receive his reassurance concerning the Navy's priorities concerning emergency medical care. However, the point of our testimony remains unchanged. Numerous crew members had a clear understanding of the intent of the COB (chief of the boat) MMCS Michael Norris' order not to call 911. For this reason, we believe that unfavorable publicity rather than our son's medical condition was of greater concern to the COB when he issued the order. (exh 1A).

Statements made by Mr. Nedrow of the NCIS were in direct opposition to what we experienced. Although we pointed out a number of deficiencies of the NCIS investigation, we did not discuss the issue of psychological autopsy which seemed to be of interest to you.

Although Mr. Nedrow's exact statement is a matter of record, our recollection of the message of his statement was as follows:

Mr. Nedrow indicated that the decision to perform psychological autopsies is made by the medical examiner. According to our recollection, Mr. Nedrow further stated that psychological autopsies are performed in a percentage of cases that approximate less than half of all cases.

Mr. Nedrow's statement seems to contradict what we were told by NCIS special agents Mike Monroe and Cathy Clements. At a meeting in our home, on November 10, 1995, they told us that psychological autopsies were routine in suicide cases. They stated that family members and Dennis' friends would be interviewed. They requested that we provide them those names. We immediately objected to the psychological autopsy without such studies also being performed on those individuals