(AFOSI) did not have the authority to conduct a criminal investigation unless the local authorities chose to cede their jurisdiction, which in this case they did not. The AFOSI did respond to requests from the Mesa Police Department (MPD) for assistance when asked.

Senator KENNEDY. Who were the members of AFOSI responsible for monitoring the Cavanaugh case, and how long after the AFOSI was notified of Lt. Cavanaugh's death did AFOSI contact representatives from the Mesa County Police Department and begin monitoring the Mesa Police Department's handling of the case?

Ms. HILL. The agents assigned to the AFOSI Detachment 1817, Williams AFB, AZ monitored and provided liaison with the Mesa Police Department (MPD) during their investigation of the Cavanaugh case. AFOSI Headquarters, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, was kept informed of the case by the AFOSI agents in AZ. The AFOSI at Williams AFB was notified on 11 April 1982. Personnel from Williams AFB contacted the MPD at Lt. Cavanaugh's residence at approximately 12:15 p.m. on that day.

Senator KENNEDY. Please provide copies of all communication between the AFOSI team assigned to monitor the Cavanaugh case and the Mesa Police Department, including memoranda and notes taken by AFOSI investigators.

Ms. HILL. No notes or communication between AFOŠI and MPD could be located. The case is 14 years old.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Mesa Police Department did not interview Lt. Cavanaugh's roommate and neighbors who were the last persons to see Lt. Cavanaugh alive?

Ms. HILL. There is no mention in the Mesa Police Department (MPD) report of neighbors being interviewed. There is nothing to indicate that they were or were not screened for information on the day the body was discovered. It was established that the last time anyone heard from Lt. Cavanaugh was when he called his office at 8:00 a.m. on April 9, 1982 and told his secretary he was having car trouble. Lt. Cavanaugh's roommate, Randy Tollefson, discovered the body, was at the scene, and was interviewed. Lt. Cavanaugh's other roommate, Lt. D. Glenn Annis was TDY in England at the time of the death.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Mesa Police Department did not recover or analyze the bullet fired from the weapon that killed Lt. Cavanaugh?

Ms. HILL. The fact that the spent bullet was searched for but not recovered was in the MPD report that was provided to AFOSI.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Maricopa Medical Examiner who signed the death certificate never conducted an autopsy or a complete postmortem on Lt. Cavanaugh?

MS. HILL. The AFOSI knew the Maricopa County Medical Examiner made the decision to conduct an external examination of the body on April 12, 1982. The AFOSI received the completed MPD report on May 4, 1982 and closed the file. In a position paper dated October 6, 1983, Major Owens, AFOSI stated "An autopsy on DECEASED might have added further factual information; however, the civilian authorities determined that the circumstances surrounding the death did not warrant such additional investigative effort."

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Mesa Police Department never conducted powder burn residue tests on Lt. Cavanaugh's hands, body, or clothing to determine if he fired the death weapon?

Ms. HILL. A staff summary dated October 12, 1993 prepared by Major Owens states "Local authorities had jurisdiction over the matter and feel that their investigation was adequate for determining cause of death. AFOSI believes that further investigative effort will not result in conclusions other than those already reached." Senator KENNEDY. (a) If the AFOSI investigators were aware of any of the circumstances described in the preceding question, did they encourage the Mesa Police Department to pursue these leads? (b) Since the leads never were pursued by the Mesa Police Department, did the AFOSI approach the Mesa Police Department about conducting a joint AFOSI-Mesa Police Department investigation or pursuing the leads itself, possibilities provided for in the Air Force guidelines concerning offbase death investigations? (c) If AFOSI did not approach the Mesa Police Department about initiating a joint investigation and did not pursue the leads itself, why

not?

Ms. HILL. Since the death occurred off base, the local authorities had jurisdiction, made decisions they felt were appropriate, and the AFOSI agreed that the local investigation was adequate in determining the cause and manner of death.

Senator KENNEDY. If the AFOSI investigators were not aware of any of the circumstances described in the second question, please explain why they were not, con

sidering the Air Force's guidelines requiring that "close, continuous liaison and working relationships" with local authorities be maintained throughout investigations of deaths occurring outside of military installations.

Ms. HILL. See response to previous question.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators aware of Lt. Cavanaugh's suspicions of illegal drug activity at Williams AFB and his intention to disclose this during the AF Inspector General inspection scheduled at the time of his death?

Ms. HILL. One witness claimed that 2d Lt. Cavanaugh told him that he was aware of illegal drug activity at Williams AFB and that he intended to disclose this during the AF Inspector General inspection. This allegation could not be corroborated or substantiated. There was no indication that 2d Lt. Cavanaugh was involved in any overt or covert drug activity with AFOSI or any other agency. His duties as drug and alcohol counselor did not involve him in any activity that could be tied to his death.

[The Committee requested and received the following statements concerning the Service Suicide Prevention Programs for the record:] PREPARED STatement SubmITTED BY LT. GEN. THEODORE G. STROUP, JR., USA, DEPUTY CHIEF of Staff for PERSONNEL, UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the men and women of the United States Army, I thank you for the opportunity to submit my record testimony to the subcommittee. Soldiers and their families are the Army's most important asset. As an institution, the Army has a moral and ethical obligation to care and provide for them. It is an obligation we take seriously and exercise great care in fulfilling. Suicide prevention must be the business of every leader, supervisor, soldier, and civilian employee in the Army.

During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Army experienced an increase in the number of its soldiers committing suicide. This increase coincided with an increase in the American public at large. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, working with the Offices of the Surgeon General and Chief of Chaplains, developed an extensive Suicide Prevention Program and began fielding it in 1985. Since that time, modifications have occurred as experiences from the field dictated and lessons were learned. However, the primary thrust of the program has remained unchanged, which is to emphasize moral leadership, based upon three principles: 1) Most suicides are preventable. 2) Leadership is key. 3) Leaders need training to become sensitive to indicators of depression and danger signals, as well as the referral process available to help troubled soldiers and family members discover alternatives to suicide.

THE ARMY SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAM

The Army requires the establishment of a coordinated suicide prevention program at every installation or community and separate activity. To assist commanders and leaders, the Army developed and issued three references that provide useful information, procedures and guidelines:

(1) Army Regulation, 600-63, Army Health Promotion, Chapter 5, Suicide Prevention and Psychological Autopsy-This chapter sets guidelines for establishing the Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP). This reference addresses active duty soldiers, family members, and civilians.

(2) Department of the Army Pamphlet, 600-24, Suicide Prevention and Psychological Autopsy-This pamphlet establishes the functions of the Suicide Prevention Task Force (SPTF), explains the procedures for suicide risk identification, and for conducting a psychological autopsy. The primary purpose is to reconstruct and understand the circumstances, lifestyle, and state of mind of a suicide victim at the time of death.

(3) Department of the Army Pamphlet, 600-70, United States Army, Guide to the Prevention of Suicide and Self-Destructive Behavior-This pamphlet explains the problem of suicide, causes, facts versus myths, signs and symptoms and intervention strategies.

The overall responsibility for providing guidance and monitoring the suicide prevention mission at each installation rests with the installation commander. One of the commander's key tools for suicide prevention is the establishment of an organized Suicide Prevention Task Force (SPTF). The SPTF is normally chaired by the Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA). Other members may include the Installation or Division Chaplain, mental health officer, provost marshal, division surgeon, public affairs officer, civilian personnel officer, and representative

commanders. The task force meets periodically or at the discretion of the task force presiding officer.

The Suicide Prevention Task Force coordinates suicide prevention activities of the command, interested agencies and persons. It develops awareness training and appropriate forums for training. The SPTF recommends command policy guidance regarding training and operational issues to assure soldiers and their leaders have sufficient opportunity for quality family life. The TF is aware of local suicide publicity and develops public awareness articles for publication. Coordination with civilian support agencies is necessary to provide an effective community liaison. In the event of a suicide, the task force reviews the results of the psychological autopsy for possible causes and trends and makes preventive recommendations to the commander. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be sensitive to the potential for suicides and ensure their subordinates take prompt action to refer soldiers for appropriate assistance when early warning signs become evident. To assist commanders and leaders in identifying at-risk individuals and their behaviors, the following information has been compiled from psychological autopsies.

SUICIDE PROFILES AND RATES

While suicides occur in all ages, races, and gender, the typical soldier committing suicide is a young white male with a rank of staff sergeant or below. If the suicide victim is an officer, he is typically a lieutenant or captain. On examination, soldiers who commit suicide have poor relationships with significant others. They find the situation to be hopeless and feel helpless to do anything to change their circumstances. This combination of hopelessness and helplessness is the critical motivation that results in suicide. Most often, the suicide occurs immediately following an argument with a wife or girlfriend. Often, alcohol is consumed just prior to the event. Frequently it turns out the soldier was experiencing severe financial difficulties and this was affecting his relationship with his wife or girlfriend. Firearms comprise the most common method soldiers use in taking their own lives.

The Army's suicide rate is less than what we find in society's equivalent at-risk age population (20-34 years old). The suicide rate for this at-risk age population, nationwide, is in the range of 22-25 per 100,000. The Army's annual suicide rate will probably be in the range of 13-15 per 100,000 for calendar year 1996. The current point projection, based on data collected through August, is 13.5 per 100,000. By comparison, the Army rate for calendar year 1995 was 14.2 per 100,000; in 1994 it was 14.5 per 100,000. The chart below graphically depicts our overall downward trend since 1993.

It is our belief that the Army's Suicide Prevention Program is a key factor in this lower suicide rate.

PREVENTION STRATEGIES

As stated in DA Pam 600-24, the strategy and supporting elements of suicide prevention are based on the premise that suicide prevention will be accomplished by leaders through command policy and action. The key to the prevention of suicide is positive leadership and deep concern by supervisors of military personnel and civilian employees who are at increased risk of suicide.

Once identified as being at increased risk, personnel are referred to appropriate helping agencies such as the Community Mental Health Service (CMHS) or emergency room of the medical treatment facility. Civilians will be encouraged to seek assistance from the appropriate civilian agency.

While effective commander and leader involvement is necessary for the program to be successful, commanders and leaders must understand how to identify individuals at risk and recognize potential warning signs. This understanding is developed through a continuous education process.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Leader training in suicide prevention is required by Army regulation. Commanders must take the lead in this effort for the program to be successful. Suicide prevention programs must be integrated at every level. To this end, formal training in suicide prevention and suicide risk identification is presented at all levels of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCÓES) and officer leadership courses. To ensure our methods and information are current, we update our training support packages. The 2-hour block of instruction on the Army Suicide Prevention Program is currently being reviewed at the United States Army Medical Department Center and School at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In addition to the training received at our schools, annual training is required at unit level at all Army activities.

Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants work together in Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) and are trained in suicide prevention and risk identification. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains coordinates suicide prevention activities with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Office of the Surgeon General. Providing "education aware

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ness training" is a function for chaplains at battalion staff level and up. UMT suicide awareness training addresses Army leaders, soldiers, and family members.

The Chief of Chaplains annually sponsors 2 week-long training conferences at The Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. This internationally recognized psychiatric hospital is at the forefront of suicide prevention and intervention training. The training is comprised of two tracks. The basic track trains Suicide Prevention. The advanced track trains Family Intervention following a suicide. The Army assists other services in suicide prevention and awareness. By invitation from the Chief of Chaplains, selected individuals from the Air Force and Navy, as well as Army Reserve and National Guard are invited to attend this Army-sponsored training program each time it is offered. Most unit chaplains are trained in providing suicide prevention and awareness training for both soldiers and family members.

When properly trained, commanders and leaders are better equipped to handle crisis situations and direct the soldier to assistance.

INTERVENTION ACTIONS

Caring leaders and peers who are aware of suicide risk factors can assure early identification and intervention for persons experiencing crisis. Early involvement is a critical factor in prevention. Leaders, both military and civilian, are in the best position to identify persons at risk. Intervention includes listening, referring the individual to a support agency, or if need be, physically taking the individual to a mental health professional or chaplain. The primary mission of the chaplain UMT (unit ministry team) is education and awareness. UMT personnel refer any suicidal individual to the medical treatment facility (MTF) or the Community Mental Health Service (CMHS). Law enforcement and medical personnel are summoned to the scene if an individual declines assistance.

The permanent prevention of suicide for an individual at risk depends upon treatment of the underlying disorder (such as depression), and the alteration of conditions that produced the current crisis. Effective treatment depends on the availability of mental health professionals who are properly trained for the population they

serve.

CONCLUSION

The Army makes suicide prevention the business of all its leaders, supervisors, soldiers and civilian employees. We continue to make coordinated efforts at every Army installation and separate activity. Even though the Army suicide rate is lower than that of the equivalent civilian at-risk population, we must remain ever vigilant as we care for our most important asset, our soldiers and their families.

PREPARED Statement SubmitTED BY LT. GEN. (Dr.) Edgar R. ANDERSON, JR., USAF, SURGEON GENERAL, United States AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the status and goals of the Air Force Medical Service suicide prevention program. We recognize the crucial nature of educating and assisting our members to better cope in these increasingly stressful times. The Air Force has long been proactive in the prevention of suicide among our members. Traditionally, the Air Force's suicide risk reduction programs have been developed and administered through our major commands. This has allowed each major command to address or emphasize the specific issues faced by their own personnel. These programs may target not only members, but commanders, supervisors and first sergeants. We feel these programs have been very successful, but as long as one Air Force member takes his own life, there is work to be done. Therefore, we are committed to achieving our goals for a new, integrated program with functional communities across the Air Force.

In June 1996, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff directed that an integrated product team (IPT) review suicide in the Air Force and make recommendations. Major General (Dr.) Charles H. Roadman, II, Commander, Air Force Medical Operations Agency, was appointed to lead the IPT. This team has included the work of more than 75 people representing the Air Force functional communities who provide social services to the Air Force. These include first sergeants and staff from the personnel, chaplain, legal, safety, medical, security police, and services organizations. All major commands participated with their own cross-functional groups, as did the Air Reserve Component. The Epidemiology Division from the Air Force's Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks AFB, Texas, was instrumental. Additionally, we had extremely helpful consultation from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Walter Reed Army