Bell et al. vs. Bruen. The distinction between the case of a person whose name is on the bill, and that of one who is no party to it, is recognised and approved by Chitty in Treatise on Bills, 324-441, referring to Warrington vs. Furbor, 8 East. 342; Phillips vs. Astling, 2 Taunt. 206; Swinyard vs. Bowes, 5 Maule & Selw. 62; Holbraw vs. Wilkins, 1 Barn. & Cres. 10; Van Wert vs. Woolley, 3 Barn. & Cres. 439; in the American cases of Foote & Bowler vs. Brown, 2 McLean Rep. 369; Lewis vs. Brewster, ib. 21; Bushnell vs. Church, 15 Conn. 406; Oxford Bank vs. Haynes, 8 Pick. 423; Reynolds et al. vs. Douglass et al., 12 Peters, 497; and by Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, vol. 3, pp. 123–124. In the case of Lewis vs. Brewster, 2 McLean's C. C. R. 21, it was also decided that as notice of default was essential to fix the responsibility of the guarantor, it must be specially averred in a declaration against him. Construction of Guarantee. Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to ascertain its meaning. Consideration necessary to support it. BELL & GRANT, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, US. MATTHIAS BRUEN.* MR. JUSTICE CATRON delivered the opinion of the Court. The original action was founded upon a guarantee given by Matthias Bruen to Bell and Grant, in favor of Wm. H. Thorn, by the following letter: New York, 23d April, 1831. MESSRS. BELL & GRANT, London.-DEAR SIRS: Our mutual friend, Mr. Wm. H. Thorn, has informed me that he has a credit for £2000, given by you in his favor with Messrs. Archias & Co., to give facilities to his business at Marseilles. In expressing my obligations to you for the continuation of your friendship to this gentleman, I take occasion to state, that you may consider this, as well as any and every other credit you may open in his favor, as being under my guarantee. I am, dear sirs, your friend and servant, M. BRUEN. To this letter the following answer was given by Bell & Grant: London, 14th June, 1831. MATTHIAS BRUEN, Esq., New York.-We are in the receipt of * 1 How. Rep. 169. Bell et al. vs. Bruen. your favor of the 23d April, guaranteeing the credit opened on behalf of Mr. Wm. H. Thorn with Messrs. Archias & Co., of Marseilles, for £2000, for the purpose of facilitating his business with that place; and moreover, desiring us to consider as under your guarantee, also, all credits existing, or that we may hereafter open for said friend, of which we take due note. And we trust that Mr. Thorn, as well as your good self, will have every reason to be satisfied with the confidence which we feel a pleasure in assigning to both of you. The declaration contains four counts: 1. That the plaintiffs, on the 31st of March, 1836, were requested by Thorn to open a credit in his favor, authorizing the firm of La Cave & Echicopar, of Cadiz, to draw on the plaintiffs to the extent of £2500. That on the 22d November, 1836, La C. & E. drew for £385: which was advanced on the 12th February, 1837, by the plaintiffs, according to Thorn's request. 2. That on the 10th of October, 1834, at the request of Thorn a credit was opened in his favor, authorizing R. Anderson & Co., of Gibraltar, to draw for £4000. On the 16th December, 1834, Anderson & Co. drew for £318 12s. 6d. which plaintiffs paid, 19th March, 1837. 3. That on the 15th of August, 1836, the plaintiffs opened a credit in favor of Thorn, authorizing Amac, Zipcey & Co., of Smyrna, to draw for £3500. Of this sum, the house at Smyrna drew £1640: which plaintiffs paid, 8th April, 1837. 4. That on the 8th March, 1837, plaintiffs opened a credit to Thorn himself, for £3500, for which amount he drew bills; and which were paid, 17th June, 1837. Much other correspondence and evidence was given to the jury, that need not at present be referred to; but which appears in the statement of the case made out by the reporter, and presented to us. The evidence being closed, the defendant prayed the Circuit Court to instruct the jury, as matter of law, that the letter of guarantee, of April 23d, 1831, was confined to credits to be opened to the house of Archias & Co., or other houses with whom Thorn might deal at Marseilles; and therefore the plaintiffs could not recover from the defendant, the advances made. upon the bills of exchange given in evidence: being for the sums paid, as stated in the four counts of the declaration. Bell et al. vs. Bruen. Thereupon the Court did decide, as matter of law, "that by the true construction of the said letter of guarantee, of April 23d, 1831, the same only embraced credits which should be opened for account of Wm. H. Thorn to the house of Archias & Co., of Marseilles; and that the evidence of the other matters in this behalf proved, did not give the said letter of guarantee a more enlarged application. And therefore, that the jury ought to find a verdict for the defendant." The jury found accordingly: and it is this instruction of the Court alone, that we are called upon to examine, and revise. Does the letter of guarantee extend to, and cover the debts of Wm. H. Thorn sued for? is the question. It was an engagement to be executed in England, and must be construed and have effect, according to the laws of that country. Bank of the United States vs. Daniel, 12 Peters, 54, 55. But it is necessary to remark that the law governing the agreement is the same in this country and in England: had it been made between merchants of different States of this Union, and intended to be executed at home, the same rules of construction would be adopted; and the same adjudications would apply. It is insisted for the plaintiffs, that the Circuit Court erred in determining the question absolutely as a question of law, upon the construction of the letter: that it also erred in declaring the other circumstances did not allow of an application of the guarantee to the transactions in question: such other circumstances, being admitted, their effect on the extent and application of the guarantee was for the jury; and by deciding on their effect as matter of law, they were withdrawn from the jury. The letter of Bruen was an agreement to pay the debt of another on his making default by the statute of frauds (29 Chs. 2), such agreement must be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged; it cannot be added to by verbal evidence, nor by written either, if not signed by the guarantor, unless the written evidence is, by a reference in the letter, adopted as part of it. But as the statute does not prescribe the form of a binding agreement, it is sufficient that the natural parts of it appear either expressed, or clearly to be implied: and correspondence and other evidence may be used to ascertain the true import and application of the agreement; by the aid of which extrinsic evidence, the proper construction may be made. Such is the Bell et al. vs. Bruen. doctrine of this Court, as will be seen by reference to the cases of Drummond vs. Prestman, 12 Wheat.; Douglass vs. Reynolds, 7 Peters; Lee vs. Dick, 10 Peters. In the present instance, the question having arisen, and construction been called for, the matters referred to in the letter of the defendant were considered (as circumstances attending the transaction), to aid the Court in arriving at a proper understanding of the engagement: so soon as it was understood, its construction belonged to the Court, and was "matter of law" within the general rule applicable to all written instruments. It rested with the Court to decide, whether the guarantee extended to, and covered the credits set forth in the declaration; and was the common case of asking the Court to instruct the jury, that the plaintiff had not proved enough to entitle him to recover, admitting all his evidence to be true. In England the same end is attained by moving for a nonsuit. For the defendant it is contended: That the letter of April 21, 1831, is a contract preceded by a recital, and that the engagement extends no further than the recital. The recital introduces in direct terms, or by reference, the entire arrangement made between plaintiffs and Thorn, by the letters of the 23d of February, 1831, and March 22, 1331; and the words "this credit" in the defendant's letter of 23d April, 1831, mean the first £2,000; and the words "and any and every other credit," mean the subsequent credits to be opened under the same arrangement. The general rule is well settled in controversies arising on the construction of bonds, with conditions for the performance of duties, preceded by recitals; that where the undertaking is general it shall be restrained, and its obligatory force limited. within the recitals. The leading case is Arlington vs. Merricke, 2 Saund. R. 403. It has been followed by many others: Liverpool Waterwork Co. vs. Harpley (6 East, 507); Wardens, &c. vs. Bostock (2 Bos. and P. 175); Leadly vs. Evans (2 Bingh. R. 32); Pepin vs. Cooper (2 Barn. and A. 431), are some of the principal cases affirming the rule. Where a mercantile guarantee is preceded by a recital definite in its terms, and to which the general words obviously refer, the same rule applies, of limiting the liability within the terms of the recital, in restraint of the general words. We find the courts constantly referring to the cases arising on bonds with Bell et al. vs. Bruen. conditions for the rule of construction, and applying it to commercial guarantees; the most approved text writers on this subject do the same: does the engagement before us fall within the rule? It recites: "Our mutual friend, William H. Thorn, has informed me that he has a credit for two thousand pounds, given by you in his favor with Messrs. Archias and Co., to give facilities to his business at Marseilles." The agreement is: "I take occasion to state, that you may consider this, as well as any and every other credit you may open in his favor, as being under my guarantee." We are of opinion that the engagement should be construed as if it read—“ You may consider this credit with Archias and Co. as being under my guarantee, as well as any and every other credit you may open in favor of William H. Thorn with any and every other person, as also being under my guarantee." And that therefore the first branch of the undertaking has reference to the recital, and that the latter part is independent of it. To hold otherwise would reject the general words-"as well as any and every other credit "-as unmeaning and useless, the agreement having the same effect by the construction claimed for the defendant, if these words were struck out, as if they are left in it. The general words, it is insisted, related to the character of the credit opened with Archias and Co., because it was an open and continuing credit for £2000. That this appears by the letters of Thorn to Bell and Grant, and to Archias and Co., which are sufficiently referred to in the recital of the letter to make them part thereof, and to extend it to the continuing credit with Archias and Co. That the two letters of Thorn were sufficiently referred to, and could be read to establish the nature of the credit; and that it was open, we have no doubt; but their adoption was just as certain without the general words, as with them. The special reference to the recital, adopting it as explained by the letters, leaves the general words still without meaning unless the guarantee extends beyond the credit opened with Archias and Co. To make a proper application of the general words, it becomes necessary to lay down a definite rule of construction applicable. to them; as the authorities are in conflict, and to say the least, |