SUIT FOR SALARY—Continued
It is held, on the facts, that it is not so required in
the instant case. Id.
Administrative Law and Procedure Om 229.
V. In the instant case, plaintiff, accused of taking lumber
from the Navy Yard, was discharged on September
18, 1952. He had been given an opportunity to
show cause why he should not be discharged but
had not done so. On separation he was notified
of his right to appeal, either directly to the Civil
Service Commission or through military channels.
He elected to appeal to the military authorities and
his separation was approved on appcal, except
that the Grievance Review Board, Civilian Person-
nel, in view of plaintiff's excellent record, rec-
ommended his restoration to duty as of a current
date. He was restored to duty August 3, 1953.
The instant suit is for pay during the period of his
separation, 320 days. Id.
United States Om 39 (11).
VI. On the showing made, on the motions for summary
judgment, where it is determined that the penalty
imposed by plaintiff's separation was a departure
from fair dealing and tolerable personnel policy,
with reference to a veteran with an excellent record,
it is held that the action of the Review Board was
arbitrary and unfair and should be set aside. Id.
Officers Emo 72 (1).
VII. Where it is found that a suspension of 30 days without
pay would have been sufficient punishment for the
offense with which plaintiff was charged, it is held
that plaintiff is entitled to recover for his wrongful
suspense for 290 days. Judgment suspended. Id.
United States C 39 (8).
VIII. Plaintiff, a veteran, brings suit to recover back pay al-
SUIT FOR SALARY_Continued
IX. Under the Regulations of the Civil Service Commission
(5 C. F. R. 22.11 (e)) the Commission has the author-
ity, within its discretion, to entertain a request from
either party to reopen an appeal, if the request is
made within a reasonable time. Id.
Officers C 72 (2).
X. In the instant case, where it is shown that an order of
restoration was received by the agency on August
26, and on September 4, plaintiff was informed by
the Commission that the agency was appealing the
decision, it is held that the request of the agency
was timely made. Id.
Officers On 72 (2).
XI. It is held, further, that the Commission, under the
applicable regulation, was fully authorized to enter-
tain the agency's request to reopen the appeal and
the Commission's subsequent final decision with-
drawing the restoration order served to eliminate
plaintiff's grounds for recovery in the Court of
Claims. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
denied. Id.
Officers Omw 72 (2).
XII. Where plaintiff, entitled to veteran's preference, sues
SUIT FOR SALARY-Continued
XV. Where plaintiff sues for salary of the position from
which he was separated, alleging that he was wrong-
fully separated from his civil service position in a
reduction in force, it is held, on all the evidence,
that no legal wrong was involved in the treatment
which plaintiff received, and of which he complains,
and he is not entitled to recover. Saxon, 408.
United States Com 39 (13).
XVI. Plaintiff in 1932 began work for the New Orleans Dis-
trict, Corps of Engineers, War Department, as
foreman of an asphalt plant. He was a temporary
employee, not under civil service. In 1933 civil
service status was accorded to the type of position
which plaintiff held. In 1946 he was made a general
foreman, Flood Control, Grade 23, a wage board
position within the classified civil service. Id.
United States Om 39 (13).
XVII. In August 1950, by reason of a faulty fuel feed system
on his unit, plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff requested
a grievance hearing, alleging gross neglect on the
part of the Chief, Operations Division. The Dis-
trict Engineer appointed a grievance board but
with instructions that plaintiff's request for disci-
plinary action was not a proper subject for the
board's consideration. Plaintiff then cancelled his
request for the hearing because of the limitations
imposed. Thereafter, plaintiff claimed that, because
of his charges, his superiors became prejudiced
against him and that his later separation was the
result of that prejudice. Upon consideration of all
the evidence and in view of all the facts and circum-
stances brought out by the testimony, it is held that
plaintiff's charge of prejudice is not sustained. Id.
United States Om 39 (13).
XVIII. Further, it is held that plaintiff's separation in 1951,
in a reduction in force, was justified by all the facts
and circumstances of the case, as shown by the
evidence. Id.
United States Om 39 (13).
XIX. Further, it is held that in effecting plaintiff's separation
all procedural requirements were met and oppor-
tunity for appeal was accorded. There is no basis
for concluding that his separation was arbitrary,
capricious or actuated by malice. Id.
Officers om 72 (1).
SUIT FOR SALARY-Continued
XX. Where plaintiff, a Civil Service employee, between
September 9, 1947, and May 24, 1952, was employed
as a correctional officer at the Federal Reformatory
for Women, Alderson, West Virginia, sues for night
differential and overtime pay for overtime duty, it
is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover under the
provisions of the Federal Employees Pay Act of
1945, as amended. Farley, 776.
United States Om 39 (4).
XXI. The Federal Employees Pay Act (5 U. S. C. 911, 912,
921) requires the payment of overtime, in addition
to basic compensation, for all hours of employment
officially ordered or approved in excess of 40 hours
per week, and provides, further, for 10 percent
additional in excess of the basic rate of compensation
when the overtime work is performed between 6
p. m. and 6 a. m. Id.
United States Own 39 (4).
XXII. In the instant case, each correctional officer, such as
the plaintiff, was required to work regularly five
days each week, eight hours per day, a total of 40
hours per week. In addition each officer was re-
quired to remain on duty two nights one week and
three nights the alternate week. No compensation
was paid for this overnight service, which amounted
to an average of 43 hours for each 2-week period.
It is held that this night work was a duty assignment
and was in excess of the 40-hour regular weekly per-
formance of duty, for which overtime the plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Id.
United States Com 39 (4).
XXIII. While simple conditions of employment, such as wear-
ing of a uniform or badge, may properly be made
without incurring an obligation for extra compensa-
tion, it is held that an agreement to work overtime
without pay cannot be enforced contrary to the
clear provisions of the statute limitng the work-
week to 40 hours and providing overtime pay for
extra duty. Id.
United States 39 (4).
SURPLUS PROPERTY.
See Transportation of Freight I, II, III, IV, V.
TANKER “BLUE SUNOCO”.
See Report To Congress I, II, III.
TAXES.
INCOME Tax.
I. (1) Plaintiff, during the taxable years i944, 1945, 1946,
and 1947, filed his individual income tax returns on
the cash receipts and disbursement beses of account-
ing. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue made a
deficiency assessment for each of these years, using
the increase in net worth computation method.
The Commissioner collected the deficiency for each
year, together with penalty and interest, and
plaintiff in turn filed a timely claim for refund. It
is held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
deficiency, penalty and interest collected for the
fiscal year 1944, with interest as provided by law.
Jacobs, 1.
Internal Revenue Om 1288.
II. (2) Under the applicable statutes, the Commissioner
is permitted to use another method of ascertaining
the taxpayer's taxable income where the method
used by the taxpayer in his return does not clearly
reflect his income. It is held that in the circum-
stances of the instant case the Commissioner's use
of the net worth method was proper. Id.
Internal Revenue Con 1288.
III. (3) The determine tion of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is prima facie correct unless arbitrary,
capricious or excessive, and the burden is upon the
taxpayer to show that the tax assessed is not due.
Id.
Internal Revenue me 1307.
IV. (4) In the years 1945, 1946, and 1947 the net worth
computation is approved where the taxpayer did
not show that the increase of his net worth from
his furniture business, returns on his investments
and market transactions in that period was not due
to unreported income. Id.
Internal Revenue Cms 1288.
V. (5) For the fiscal year ending October 31, 1944, it is
held that the Commissioner did not prove that the
taxpayer had understated his income by more than
25 percent. When the Commissioner made his
assessments for that year the normal 3-year statute
of limitations had expired and the Commissioner
was relying on the 5-year statute of limitations
where the taxpayer has understated his income by
more than 25 percent. In such case the burden of
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