tion about important satellite activities may lead to improvements in the satellite program itself and also enhance the U.S. image in the space race. (c) Hearings.-Hearings were held on May 23 and June 6, of 1963. Hearings printed. 2. "Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government," House Report No. 198, March 22, 1965. Tenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations. (a) Summary of report.-This is an interim report on the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee's study of the Federal Government's controversial use of polygraphs. Serious questions have been raised both by public officials and private citizens regarding the reliability and propriety of the polygraph examination, including the machine, its operators, and the uses made of the information. Controversy surrounding the polygraph developed at the top levels of Government after newspaper publication of an unnamed Air Force officer's memorandum that attributed abusive tactics to staff investigators of the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, then conducting hearings on the TFX airplane. During an investigation of this news leak, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs revealed that a number of high Defense officials, including himself, had been asked to take polygraph tests as part of the investigation. The Assistant Secretary said he had refused to take such a test "as a matter of principle." Thereupon, the plans to use "lie detectors" on top Government officials were dropped before any tests could be given. In April 1963, Congressman William L. Dawson, chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, directed the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee to study the Federal Government's use of polygraphs. He acted at the request of Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher, a member of the full committee. No previous study of polygraph use in the Federal Government has ever been published by the Congress, by any agency of the executive branch, or by private researchers. Although some research had been done by Government agencies, the material was either classified for security purposes or was closely held by the agencies as internal documents. After an analysis of the available literature on the polygraph and after interviews with polygraph practitioners the subcommittee prepared a questionnaire which was sent to 58 Federal agencies. In response to the questionnaire, 19 Federal agencies reported that they used polygraphs and other so-called lie detection devices in carrying out Government business. These agencies owned a total of 512 polygraphs. Acquisition and related costs totaled nearly half a million dollars. Annual operating costs, including salaries, totaled well over $4 million. These figures do not include the costs of polygraph operations by the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, which are classified as sensitive security information. The committee concluded that there is no "lie detector," neither machine nor human. People have been deceived by a myth that a metal box in the hands of an investigator can detect truth or falsehood. The Federal Government has fostered this myth by spending millions of dollars on polygraph machines-the so-called "lie detection" devices and on salaries for hundreds of Federal investigators to give thousands of polygraph examinations. Yet research completed so far has failed to prove that polygraph interrogation actually detects lies or determines guilt or innocence. While Federal investigators testified to their great faith in the polygraph technique, they admitted there are neither statistics nor facts to prove its value. Nevertheless, the Federal Government is going ahead with plans to extend the use of polygraphs and develop more complex interrogation devices. The committee recommended that the Federal Government Initiate comprehensive research programs to determine the validity and reliability of polygraph examinations; Prohibit the use of polygraphs in all but the most serious national security and criminal cases; Improve the training and qualifications of Federal polygraph operators; Restrict the use of two-way mirrors and recording devices during polygraph examinations; Guarantee that polygraph examinations be, in fact, voluntary: Insure that refusal to take a polygraph examination will not adversely prejudice an individual's case or be made a part of an individual's records except in the most serious national security cases. The committee further recommended that the President immediately establish an interagency committee to study problems posed by the Federal Government's use of polygraphs and to work out solutions to those problems. (b) Estimated monetary and other benefits.-As a result of the subcommittee's investigation, many Federal agencies reduced sharply their use of polygraphs as "lie detectors"; and the Defense Department issued a directive controlling their use and requiring improved qualifications and training of operators. Although increased training and research will increase costs of the Federal Government's polygraph programs, the reduced use of the machines and the smaller number of operators will result in an estimated net saving of $2 million annually. (c) Hearings.-Fourteen days of hearings: April 7, 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, May 13, June 10, 11, and 12, 1964; May 25; August 17, 18, and 19, 1965, Hearings printed with classified material deleted for security reasons. 3. "Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government (Part 2)," House Report No. 2081, September 26, 1966. ThirtyNinth Report by the Committee on Government Operations. (a) Summary of report. This report on the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee's continuing study of the use of polygraphs by the Federal Government sets forth a detailed analysis of a Department of Defense directive (DOD Directive No. 5210.48, July 13, 1965) to regulate the conduct of polygraph examinations and to improve the selection, training and supervision of polygraph operations within the armed services. Regulations to implement the directive are published in the appendix of the report. The directive is responsive to earlier recommendations by the Committee on Government Operations to regulate and control the use of polygraphs in the Federal Government (House Report No. 198, 89th Congress, 1st session). The directive represents the first step taken by any Federal agency to curtail the widespread use of the so-called lie detector and although it provides for stricter controls and a stepped-up research program the committee in this report makes additional recommendations: 1. The Department of Defense polygraph directive is a good first step forward. But now a second should be taken. The Department should immediately reconsider the permissive use of the device for preemployment screening with the view of fulfilling the committee's recommendation to prohibit the use of polygraphs in all cases but those clearly involving the Nation's security. 2. Qualified physicians and psychiatrists should be included among the appropriate supervisory officials desgnated to review polygraph examination records. 3. All Government agencies should be placed under a uniform administrative system which will enforce maximum controls on the use of polygraphs, and which will establish regulations to prevent their proliferation and misuse. The report notes that in harmony with a prior committee recommendation, President Lyndon B. Johnson in November 1965 established a committee of representatives of all Government agencies which use polygraphs or are interested in the problems posed by their use. John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, is chairman of the interagency committee. In addition to representatives of the military and intelligence agencies which are major users of polygraphs, the interagency committee includes representatives of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology. The interagency committee's findings and recommendations are nearing final review. The Government Operations Committee report includes additional views by Representative Donald Rumsfeld and additional views by Representatives William L. Dickinson, John N. Erlenborn, Robert Dole and Jack Edwards. (b) Estimated monetary and other benefits.-Implementation of the Department of Defense directive and the impact of the subcommittee's polygraph investigations on other Federal agencies has reduced the use of polygraphs and the number of operators within the Federal Government. It was previously estimated these factors would result in an estimated net savings of $2 million annually. Adoption of the committee's recommendation to establish a uniform administrative system on the use of polygraphs along with regulations to prevent their proliferation and use will lead to further savings. (c) Hearings-Fourteen days of hearings were held, one of which was devoted exclusively to the Department of Defense directive. Dates of the hearings were: April 7, 8, 9, 10, 29, 30: May 13: June 10, 11, and 12, 1964: May 25: August 17, 18 and 19. 1965. The hearings have been printed with classified material deleted for security reasons. LEGAL AND MONETARY AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE 1. "Coin Shortage, Part 1-Preceding Treasury's Crash Coin Production Program," House Report No. 194, March 22, 1965. Sixth Report by the Committee on Government Operations. (a) Summary of report. In recent years, and particularly between 1959 and 1964, the country was faced with a serious shortage of coin for the carrying on of normal business. The report deals with the production of coin by the mint and its distribution by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System, and with the country's silver situation. Initial hearings were scheduled for June 1964, following which the Treasury announced a "crash" program of expanded coin production. The hearings demonstrated that the substantially increased coin production still was inadequate to meet the demand. In an effort to cope with growing coin demands, the mint had an engineering firm study and project coin needs but because demands for coin far outstripped its predictions, the survey proved inadequate. The report concluded: Coin needs have risen tremendously in recent years due to the growth of population and the increased coin requirements of coin operated machines, toll roads, sales taxes, and many other business activities. There was no shortage in the existence of coins; the shortage was in their availability. Since the U.S. Mint commenced operations in 1792 some 58 billion U.S. coins have been minted, about 48 billion of which were estimated to be in existence. Although enormous amounts of coins have been produced, large amounts had been withdrawn from circulation. Traditional coin collectors accounted for relatively small amounts of the withdrawals. By far the greatest portion of withdrawals was attributable to those who held coins out of circulation (a) in the expectation of profiting by the scarcity of coins or (b) to assure themselves of a constant supply of coins for their needs. Large quantities, particularly pennies, nickels, dimes, and quarters were also being withheld from circulation in "piggy banks" in private homes. Many businessmen had withheld returning their coin to banks for fear coin would be unavailable to fulfill their needs. The extensive hoarding of coin by speculators in expectation of rises in the price of coin accounted in large measure for the diminution in the supply. The melting down of coins to recover their silver content, and the export of coin also contributed to the shortage. The Bureau of the Mint produces coin and delivers it to the 12 Federal Reserve banks, 24 Federal Reserve branches, and the sales office of the Treasurer of the United States in Wash ington, D.C. The only coin delivered to the public by the Neither the Federal Reserve Board nor the Mint had any specific guidelines or any professional methods for estimating coin requirements. The inability to estimate demand was evidenced by the fact that estimates which had preceded issuance of the Kennedy half dollar had indicated that 26 million as a first run would be adequate. The early demand, however, was so great that the coin almost disappeared from circulation. The Federal Reserve Board took the position that Federal Reserve officials were not legally responsible for determing the quantity of coin to be produced; that the Reserve banks' responsibility was limited to fair distribution of available supplies; and that the Board was ready to accept responsibility for estimating needs, should the Secretary of the Treasury delegate that responsibility to the Board. The Treasury entered on a "crash" program designed to flood the country with coin, to break the shortage, and to assure an adequate supply of coin for the future. All of the steps which the Treasury took to increase coin production under its crash program could have been taken earlier. Since the mints operate most efficiently and economically on a 5-day week, two-shift basis, the crash program, requiring overtime and purchases of metal strips and blanks, was inefficient and uneconomical; however, it did substantially increase production. Estimates were that when the new Philadelphia Mint is completed, regular production of both mints initially would be 5.5 billion coins annually, and ultimately 8 billion coins annually. If demand for coin exceeds that capacity, a third mint will be needed for the continuation of production on an efficient, economical basis. Early in 1964 the Treasury practically ran out of silver dollars, by permitting them to be taken out in quantities of as many as 50,000 pieces per person per day. The dollars did not go into circulation. Instead they became collectors' items and speculators' merchandise. Recent legislation authorized coinage of 45 million silver dollars. These too might disappear from circulation unless some effective safeguards are imposed. The publication by the Mint of its monthly production by denominations had been used by coin speculators as a guide to coins which are in short supply. In order to assure that adequate supplies of U.S. coin would be available to meet all needs, the report recommended that The Treasury Department, the Bureau of the Mint, and the Federal Reserve System collaborate on a widespread program of public relations, emphasizing the temporary nature of the coin shortage; appealing to businessmen and the public to assist in relieving the shortage by depositing or exchanging for currency the coin they held in excess of normal business and personal needs; and invoking the cooperation and assistance of news media, busi |