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was read to the House. But when Mr J- -'s remarks, as reported by the stenographer, were made known, the entire House burst in laughter. Ideas that he never thought of, expressions that he never uttered, and words which he could not have used with any semblance of intelligence or appropriateness, were charged against him, until the brilliant young orator slunk deep into his chair, and a series of blushes spread over his face at the humiliation of having his name appended to such stuff, and his voice was not heard during the day. A truce was patched up; but the result might have been different had the stenographer's report been correct.

There is now no national bankrupt law. For several years one was in force, but did not prove satisfactory. Chancellor Kent, in his 'Commentaries on American Law' (vol. ii. p. 341), says: "The objection to a national bankrupt system consists in the difficulty of defining, to the satisfaction of every part of the country, the precise class of debtors who can, consistently with the constitutional jurisdiction of Congress over the subject, be made the objects of it; and the great expense, delay, and litigation which have been found to attend proceedings in bankruptcy; and in the still more grievous abuses and frauds which the system leads to, notwithstanding the vigilance and integrity of those to whom the administration of the law may be committed. Each state may have bankrupt and insolvent laws; but the discharge under a state law does not discharge a debt due to a citizen of another country, who has not made himself a party to a proceeding under the law. It only operates upon contracts made within the state between its own citizens or suitors, subject to state power. One state has no power to discharge debts due to citizens of another state." Mr J. L. Bishop, in

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his work on 'Insolvent Debtors, in the state of New York' (2d edition), says: "It cannot be doubted that, in the absence of a bankrupt law, or some statutory inhibition, a debtor, while he is administering his own affairs, may honestly prefer the payment of one debt to another. may indeed apply all his property to the payment of one debt, if the debt be one for which he is justly liable, and the property be no more than sufficient to pay it, without the imputation of fraud." "A debtor, after a verdict against him, and previous to the entry of a judgment thereon, may lawfully give a preference to a creditor by conveying to him real estate in satisfaction of a bonâ fide debt." "In many of the states preferential assignments are prohibited by statute, but in none has the rule at common law, as above stated, been denied." There is no doubt that creditors are, more or less, at the mercy of debtors, whose facilities for fraudulent management of their insolvent estates are great and easy. Wives may be very useful upon occasion, and are often made use of by debtors. The amount and nature and values of personal property exempt from execution, and the size and value, &c., of homesteads, vary in the different states. A judgmentcreditor may be unable to collect anything, while the judgment-debtor defies him to do his worst, and lives in comfort, while his judgment-creditor may be in the direst distress-unable to get employment, unable to get money to buy the necessaries of life. Landlords may have hard times with their tenants who fall into arrear in payment of the rent. The tenant may remove his exempt property, which may be all he owns, and then, vacating the house or farm, laugh at the landlord. What is not exempt may belong to the wife, or be said to belong to her, or to a third party,

and the landlord is helpless, unless he risks a suit for damages. Where there is doubt as to any surplus over the amount exempt from sale, the landlord or judgment-creditor is on dangerous ground. Though the tenant should pay monthly in advance, whether or not there be a written lease, he may at any time move off the premises, and laugh at the landlord; who, by the treachery of his tenant, may find himself with the house, garden, farm, &c., on his hands, and the time for letting past.

There are many mercantile agencies, protective associations, and other societies having for their object the collection and diffusion of private information regarding the financial standing, business reputation, &c., of all individuals, firms, associations, corporations, &c., or of those in a particular branch of business. Such information is given to subscribers for a term, or to a party wishing information regarding a particular individual, firm, &c., who pays a certain fee. The information furnished is confidential. Certain mercantile agencies have printed books stating the business, ratings, &c., which are issued confidentially to subscribers, to be returned when the subscription expires, or in exchange for a later edition. The correspondents of these agencies are very numerous, scattered throughout the United States and elsewhere, and the organisation has been so perfected that changes in ratings, rumours of financial embarrassments, judgments entered, &c., &c., are forwarded as occurring to headquarters, and at once communicated to regular subscribers.

Merchants and others combine to act as self-protectors, and naturally listen to all rumours. Business could not be conducted in the way it is if those conducting it had not the information these agencies supply. The amount of espionage

into other people's affairs is very great. Injustice and black-mailing do of course sometimes occur; but the first-class agencies have, through experience, learned to sift thoroughly information received; and it would injure their business standing were they to be parties to black-mailing tricks. Even the learned professions are subjected to the ratings of selfconstituted judges. The publishers of one Directory, according to a circular sent to lawyers in 1887, claim to give "careful and accurate ratings for legal ability, worth, reliability, &c., &c., &c., of over 60,000 lawyers in the United States and Canada, and to be to the legal profession what Dun's and Bradstreet's books are to the merchants." There are five grades for legal ability, five for reliability, and nine for financial worth - the highest rating being "over $100,000," the lowest, "no financial worth " and eight abbreviations, indicating special lines of practice. The price of the volume is $10, and the number published biennially is limited to actual subscriptions at the date of printing. The subscriber is requested to give in the order to the publishers such rating as he deems himself entitled to, which will enable the publishers to compare his views with the report they have of him; and when the discrepancy is wide, they will make farther investigation, thus avoiding the danger of doing him injustice. The order also provides: "And it is understood and agreed that a private key will be supplied to the undersigned, separate from the Directory, which the undersigned agree to treat confidentially, and use for own private use only, and not divulge its meaning to any one else, and to make no copy of it; and for any violation of this agreement to be answerable for all damages resulting either to the publishers or to any

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attorney rated in said Directory; | ed for cause in all the other states and to forfeit both key and Directory. No key will be furnished unless this agreement is signed."

The marriage and divorce laws in operation in the several states are very complicated, each having its own system independent of all others. In a number of states, marriage between first cousins is forbidden, and even declared incestuous and void in some of them. In many states, marriages between whites and persons of negro descent are prohibited and punishable. In Arizona and North Carolina, marriages between whites and Indians are prohibited; and in Arizona, those between whites and Chinese also. In New Jersey and Ohio, males under twenty-one years and females under eighteen years require the consent of parents or guardians to the marriage. A marriage between a male of fourteen and a female over twelve years of age is in Massachusetts legal, even without the consent of parents. The age of legal consent varies in the several states. In Maryland, only an ordained minister can tie a legal marriage. In New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and Dakota, marriage licences are not required, while in all the other states and territories they are necessary. Civil marriages are contracted in terms of special laws of the state or territory. In Missouri, parties who cohabit and represent themselves as husband and wife are presumed to be married; and where parties of the age of legal consent agree in express terms with each other to be husband and wife and cohabit, there is a valid marriage. In California, marriage is declared to be a civil contract, and consent, followed by cohabitation, &c., is all that is necessary.

In South Carolina there are no divorce laws.

Absolute or full divorces are grant

and territories. The length of residence in the state or territory before the action for divorce can be brought varies, and may be ninety days, six months, and one, two, or three years, as the case may be. Adultery is a cause for divorce everywhere except in South Carolina. In New York, an absolute divorce is granted only on the ground of adultery. Wilful desertion for one year in certain states and territories, for two years in others, for three years in still others, and for five years in Virginia, is cause for divorce. In all the states and territories except eleven, “habitual drunkenness " is a cause for divorce; and so, "imprisonment for felony" or "conviction of felony," in all except eleven. So, "cruel and abusive treatment," 'intolerable cruelty," "extreme cruelty," or "inhuman treatment," in all except eleven; so, failure to provide for one, two, or three years, as the case may be, in six states, for no time specified in four other states; "great neglect of duty," in Kansas; wilful neglect for three years, in Delaware; so, fraud and fraudulent contract, in six; so, absence without being heard of, in New Hampshire; absence for two years, in Tennessee; seven years, in Connecticut and Vermont; absence without reasonable cause for one year, in Missouri; separation for five years, in Kentucky; voluntary separation for five years, in Wisconsin; so, ungovernable temper, in Kentucky; "habitual indulgence in violent and ungovernable temper," in Florida; "such indignities as make life intolerable," in Missouri and Wyoming; "indignities as render life burdensome," in Oregon and Pennsylvania; so, "husband notoriously immoral before marriage, unknown to wife," in West Virginia; 'fugitive from justice," in Virginia gross misbehaviour or wickedness,'

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in Rhode Island; 66 attempt on life," in Illinois; "refusal of wife to move into the state," in Tennessee; 66 tal incapacity at time of marriage," in Georgia; "three years with any religious society that believes the marriage relation unlawful," in Massachusetts; "joining any religious sect that believes marriage unlawful, and refusing to cohabit six months, in New Hampshire; "parties cannot live in peace and union," in Utah; "settled aversion which tends to permanently destroy all peace and happiness," in Kentucky. The concurrent verdict of two juries at different terms of the court, is in Georgia necessary to the granting of an absolute divorce.

The law varies in the different states as to the right of both or either of the divorced parties marrying again. In four states there are no restrictions; in one, the defendant must wait two years and obtain permission from the court; in one, the decree of the court may restrain the guilty party from remarrying; in one, the parties cannot remarry until after two years, except by permission of the court; in one, the defendant cannot remarry during the plaintiff's lifetime, unless the decree is modified, or proof that five years have elapsed, and that the plaintiff has married again, and defendant's conduct has been uniformly good. Marriage in violation of this is punishable as bigamous, even though the plaintiff had married again.

As a

rule, each state refuses to recognise as valid a divorce against one of its citizens by the court of another state, unless both parties to the suit were subject at the time to the jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce. In Kansas, a divorce obtained in another state which forbids the defendant to remarry, is ground for the defendant to obtain a divorce in Kansas; so if a divorce has been

obtained in New York, and the plaintiff becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in Kansas, where the defendant is a citizen, a divorce obtained in Kansas by the defendant in the New York proceedings would have to be recognised in New York, and this defendant could not be punished for remarrying in New York. Polygamy and polyandry are permitted in New York in certain cases. Thus, after five years' desertion by either party, the party deserted, if without knowledge that the party deserting is alive, may marry again; and this second marriage is valid, even though the party deserting returns. The second marriage may be declared void, but only from the date of the decree by a court of competent jurisdiction upon proper petition; but if no such petition is made, and all parties are satisfied, one husband may live in lawful wedlock with two or more wives, and one wife with two or more husbands. The children would inherit, and both wives would be entitled to dower. (The writer is indebted to the 'New York World Almanac' for 1887 for the greater part of the above synopsis.)

It has been said that there are 28,000 divorces granted annually in the United States-one to every sixteen marriages. In an article on

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'Marriage and Divorce," appearing in the North American Review' for July 1884, the Hon. ex-Justice Noah Davis of the New York Bench said: "In considering the subject of divorce, the interests of society are first and paramount; those of individuals are subordinate and secondary. . . . Our present systems are barbarous and degrading. They have led to a large increase of divorces in proportion to marriages. In some states the ratio has advanced from, say, one in thirtyfive to one in ten; in some to one in six, and in some cities the proportion

is even greater. It is safe to say, says one writer, that divorces have doubled in proportion to marriages in most of the Northern States, attributable to the difference of statutes and modes of procedure, the percentages of increase being largest in states furnishing the readiest facilities as to grounds of divorce, and the ease and cheapness of obtaining decrees.

It is possible, under our present laws, that a husband and wife may rise from their lawful bed in the morning bound by the bonds of matrimony to each other, and each lie down at night of the same day the lawfully wedded husband or wife of another party.

But if this can be done by willing parties, what cannot be done by fraudulent ones? . . . But the greatest evil in this country grows out of the differing laws of the several states touching the grounds and effect of divorce.

It is a monstrous truth

that a person can quit the state of his residence, and, leaving his wife and children behind, in a brief time obtain, in the courts of another state, a decree of divorce entirely valid in that state, but absolutely void in the courts of other states. His remarriage is lawful there; it is felony elsewhere, and his guilt or innocence depends upon which side of an imaginary state line he happens to stand. This would be less important if the status of his wife and children, past, present, and future, were not to be seriously affected by the decree. Let me illustrate.

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again acquires new estates; but, tiring of his second wife, he deserts her and goes to California, where in a brief space he is again divorced, and then marries again, forming a new family, and acquiring new real and personal estates. In a few years his fickle taste changes again, and he returns to New York, where he finds his first wife has obtained a valid divorce for his adulterous marriage in Indiana, which sets her free, and forbids his marrying again during her lifetime. He then slips into an eastern state, takes a residence, acquires real property there, and after a period gets judicially freed from his California bonds. He returns to New York, takes some new affinity, crosses the New Jersey line, and in an hour is back in New York, enjoying so much of his estate as the courts have not adjudged to his first wife, and gives new children to the world. At length his Master takes him. dies intestate. Now, what is the legal status and the condition of the various citizens he has given to our common country? and what can the states of their birth or domicile do for them?

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"A few words will show how difficult and important these questions are. The first wife's children are doubtless legitimate, and heirs to his estate everywhere. The Indiana wife's children are legitimate there, but probably illegitimate everywhere else. The California children are legitimate there and in New York (that marriage having taken place after the first wife had obtained her divorce), but illegitimate in Indiana and elsewhere; while the second crop of New Yorkers are legitimate in the Eastern States and New York, and illegitimate in Indiana and California. There is real and personal property in each of these states. There are four widows, each entitled to dower and distribution somewhere and to

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