The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled JudgementDIANE Publishing, 2002 - 97 pages The author argues that American policymakers must take an approach based on "principled judgment" when deciding on the use of force. The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Throughout American history, debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives like regional security and stopping humanitarian disasters in regions with few tangible U.S. interests. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies. |
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Page v
... Cold War. Force conservers emphasize future threats and conventional challenges, while proponents of the liberal use of force consider a wider range of national interests and accept greater risk regarding future challenges ...
... Cold War. Force conservers emphasize future threats and conventional challenges, while proponents of the liberal use of force consider a wider range of national interests and accept greater risk regarding future challenges ...
Page 1
... Cold War, the United States has not settled on a basic disposition towards the use of force. A debate continues between two main camps, force proponents and force conservers, defined by diverging views on the costs, risks, and ...
... Cold War, the United States has not settled on a basic disposition towards the use of force. A debate continues between two main camps, force proponents and force conservers, defined by diverging views on the costs, risks, and ...
Page 10
... Cold War. Since the Cold War, there are more serious problems with using the vital national interest construct as a guide to policy. One is that the task of distinguishing vital from less-than-vital interests has become even more ...
... Cold War. Since the Cold War, there are more serious problems with using the vital national interest construct as a guide to policy. One is that the task of distinguishing vital from less-than-vital interests has become even more ...
Page 20
... Cold War humanitarian interventions. Similarly, the timing of President Clinton's Desert Fox campaign and the missile attacks on Afghani and Sudanese targets may have been diversions from domestic problems.37 One could further point to ...
... Cold War humanitarian interventions. Similarly, the timing of President Clinton's Desert Fox campaign and the missile attacks on Afghani and Sudanese targets may have been diversions from domestic problems.37 One could further point to ...
Page 22
... Cold War. This phenomenon of capabilities driving policy and determining interests may explain why the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations declined to intervene massively in Indochina, for example, whereas the Johnson administration ...
... Cold War. This phenomenon of capabilities driving policy and determining interests may explain why the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations declined to intervene massively in Indochina, for example, whereas the Johnson administration ...
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Common terms and phrases
achieve action administration's Albright Anthony Lake argued attack Bosnia Bush administration Caspar Weinberger casualties challenges Civil-Military clear Clinton administration Cold Cold War commit conflict crises debate decisions Defense Caspar deterrence diplomacy domestic early Eliot Cohen ethnic cleansing fight force conservers Foreign Affairs future George grand strategy guidelines Gulf Haass Humanitarian Intervention important Interventionism issues John Hillen John Lewis Gaddis Kissinger Korea Kosovo Kull last resort leadership limited force major military force military power mission national power National Security necessary overwhelming force peace operations percent policymakers political goals political objectives Post-Cold potential Powell Doctrine Powell-Bush Argument President principled judgment problem public support Report require response role Ronald Steel Secretary of Defense security environment September 11 Shultz Somalia stakes Strategic Studies Institute strict criteria terrorism terrorist threats Turmoil and Triumph U.N. Peacekeeping U.S. Army U.S. forces U.S. interests U.S. military United victory Vietnam vital interests Weinberger Doctrine York
Popular passages
Page 85 - Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: WW Norton, 1969), p.
Page 32 - Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost?
Page 33 - Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes.
Page 36 - Similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them. The relative importance of an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital.
Page 19 - If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.
Page 48 - To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States.
Page 56 - Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
Page 48 - Plainly, this attack did not amount to a casus belli against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan.
Page 35 - Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.57 He further argued that whenever possible the United States should lead international coalitions and contribute to them "in a manner commensurate with our wealth . . . and strength.
Page 50 - States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.