active duty manpower to support the increased Reserve missions, and to ensure that Reserve assets are available to carry out those missions short of total mobilization. Would you expand on those issues and tell us what additional active duty support is required and what must be done to increase the availability of Reserve assets short of total mobilization? ANSWER: One of my concerns is that adequate full-time support personnel and resources come with any additional missions assigned to the Naval Reserve. But before that even becomes a consideration, any shift from Active Duty Forces to the Reserve must be accompanied by (1) reduction in Navy's peacetime commitments (this is essential to maintain present perstempo), and (2) absolute assurance that Reserve personnel and units will be accessible through involuntary recall under 10 USC 673b to respond to operational missions which cannot be satisfied by reduced peacetime forces. FUNDING FOR PERSIAN GULF OPERATIONS QUESTION: I understand that the Naval Reserve has made a considerable contribution to the Navy's operations in the Persian Gulf, including five Naval Reserve minesweepers and two guided missile frigates. During a recent hearing on the FY 1990 and 1991 Navy O&M request, we were told that it did not include funding for Persian Gulf operations above the pre-" tanker war" levels. Is this the same for the Naval Reserve request and, if so, how will you support operations in the Persian Gulf if they actually continue into FY 1990 and beyond? ANSWER: Funding for operation of Naval Reserve ships while in the Persian Gulf is through the Operation & Maintenance, Navy not Operations & Maintenance, Naval Reserve appropriation. This funding policy is predicated on the fact that these ships are conducting an "active", rather than "Reserve" mission; and therefore use of Reserve funding would be inappropriate. DRUG INTERDICTION QUESTION: Do you feel it would be possible for the Naval Reserve to increase its drug interdiction efforts in the coming years without interfering with its other missions? ANSWER: Yes, in certain mission areas. For instance, we could use a Reserve squadron over an extended period of time on drug operations in the Caribbean area where we have access to the ASW range, rotating crews between drug missions and readiness training. The extent of this contribution would depend upon the availability of the Reservists. To be most effective, ensure crew integrity and the right mix of skills, Reserve personnel should be accessed by involuntary recall. Any significant Reserve participation as part of normal drills and periods of active duty for training would result in a degradation of mobilization training and be less effective. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION QUESTION: The Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve have succeeded in establishing a policy of "horizontal integration" for the modernization of equipment as a "mirror image" of similar programs in the active forces. How well is this policy working out in practice and do you have any concerns about the ability to continue "horizontal integration" in a period of austere defense budgets. Upgrades ANSWER: The policy of "horizontal integration" for the Naval Reserve continues to have strong support within Navy. This is true of the proposed modernization of the FFG-7 class frigates in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) which will all receive the AN/SQQ-89 ASW Combat System upgrade. This is also true for introduction of new aircraft in the Naval Air Reserve. and modernization of other NRF ships and squadrons are scheduled. We are, of course, concerned with cuts in the defense budget which may impact on the ability to continue "horizontal integration." The Naval Reserve fully participates in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) budgeting process. working closely with the warfare resource sponsors within Navy to monitor how best to utilize limited funding to continue "mirror imaging" of Naval Reserve Forces. We are optimistic that our resource sponsors will continue to see that maintaining a strong and viable Naval Reserve is particularly beneficial during periods of austere defense budgets. COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE QUESTION: For a number of years this subcommittee has been concerned about the capability of Naval Reserve Combat Search and Rescue Squadrons to perform their missions. What has been done to improve this capability and what more needs to be done? ANSWER: New HH-60H helicopters have been procured to replace the old HH-3A helicopters currently used for this mission. Deliveries to our first Helicopter Combat Support (Special) Squadron start this summer (July - Aug 89) and the second squadron will be commissioned October 89 and receive this new helicopter next winter (Jan - Feb 90). The HH-60H represents a quantum leap in mission performance over the HH-3A. Funding has not been available to fully outfit these helicopters with some of the war fighting and survivability items that would enhance mission performance. Approximately $8.4M would provide 18 helicopters with Global Positioning System (GPS), AAR-47 Plume detector, AVR-2 Laser Warning system, ALE-47 Flare/Chaff dispenser, ARS-6 Downed Aviator Locating System and fuel boost pumps. While these equipment acquisitions have enhanced the Combat Search and Rescue function, the feasibility of placing the entire mission area in the Naval Reserve remains an unanswered question. There are many mission areas where it would be both practical and cost effective to be in the Reserve but Navy is reluctant to do that because there is no absolute assurance that Reservists will be accessible if needed in crisis situations short of full mobilization. REGULAR DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL RESERVE FORCE SHIPS QUESTION: Why couldn't the Naval Reserve use volunteer Reservists to support regular deployment of NRF ships? ANSWER: We have used some volunteer Reservists in the Persian Gulf including the deployment of two NRF frigates. We had 10 volunteers for every billet required aboard the frigates. However, through voluntary recall, we were unable to match the individual volunteers with the specific rate/rating 98-274-89-35 requirements. Unless we use involuntary recall under Title 10 USC 673b, and call up the SELRES crew that has been trained to operate and fight with their ship, there is no guarantee we will get the specific rate and rating required. In addition, participation by Reservists on a voluntary basis could create a contentious relationship with civilian employers. READINESS CENTERS QUESTION: I understand that about forty Naval Reserve Centers have been designated as "Readiness Centers". Why was this done and how does this initiative contribute to Naval Reserve Readiness? ANSWER: Forty Naval/Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Centers were selected for designation as "Readiness Centers" (REDCENs) as one part of the Surface Program to Upgrade Readiness (SPUR), package of several initiatives designed to correct Surface Reserve discrepancies reported in a 1983 Navy Inspector General report. SPUR was approved for phased implementation by the Secretary of the Navy in 1988. REDCENS are designed to provide training in specific training areas of concentration to Reservists assigned locally as well as on an exportable basis to Reservists at other activities. REDCENS not only augment traditional active duty for training and use of fleet training activities but also provide flexibility for providing new initiatives such as interactive video and civilian augmented training. Without additional resources, REDCENs are cost effective approach to achieving better local weekend training for Reservists throughout the country. Through this method of improved training it is expected that overall individual training qualification levels will improve. Readiness Center resource requirements are defined in detail by Area Navy Training Plans. These plans specify the aggregate individual Selected Reserve training requirements for the geographic area, and, from this, all support requirements such as classrooms, instructors, curriculum, formal school seats, and laboratory space/equipment can be identified. Although only eight REDCENS have been officially established at this time, many elements of SPUR have been implemented and the overall trend in Surface Reserve readiness training is upward and will continue as the remaining REDCENs are established over the next four years. FULL TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL QUESTION: I understand that the Naval Reserve is programmed to increase in full time support personnel end strength from almost 22,000 to a little over 24,000 by FY 1992. This seems like a pretty significant growth in support personnel in a period of level defense budgets accompanied by little growth in the size of the Selected Reserve. Why is this increase necessary and what would happen if Congress authorized only part of this growth? ANSWER: Most of the growth in FTS occurs after FY 1991. Between the end of FY 1989 and FY 1991, FTS end strength increases by 1574 to 23, 565, and another 2,258 by the end of FY 1992 to 25,823. Only the increase from FY 1989 through FY 1991 can be defined in budget detail at this time. Although they are termed "support", most of the increase in FTS is required to fill operational billets aboard additional ships being transferred to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). 1989 and the end of FY 1991, the NRF will receive 12 frigates and 2 amphibious ships. In response to your committee's direction in previous years, Navy mans the active portion of NRF ships' crews with a high proportion of TAR personnel, relying on USN personnel only when TARS are not available in sufficient numbers or where TAR ratings do not exist. This policy, combined with the fact that a high proportion of an NRF crew must be active duty (TAR or USN) in order to conduct minimal ship operations, results in higher FTS growth relative to Selected Reservist growth than is required in other Reserve programs. In addition to the FTS growth for ship crews, there is an accompanying increase in FTS support of maintenance activities at Reserve homeports. This is required because the reduced active manning of NRF ships causes some ship's work to be delegated to shore maintenance activities. Finally, some of the growth between FY 1989 and FY 1991 is associated with the continuing conversion of existing NRF ship billets from USN to TAR that is made possible as the TAR rating structure is expanded. Thus, the requested growth includes manning not only for new NRF ships, but also for ships that joined the inventory in prior years, as Navy adjusts the manning mix to the desired goal. Since the requested growth primarily relates to hardware coming to the Naval Reserve, failure to realize that growth will result in either Reserve ships that are not capable of conducting operations, or delay of planned transfers. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT QUESTION: In recent years, we have heard a lot about the Total Force concept and why it is a vital element in our overall national security posture. How well has the Total Force concept been implemented by the Navy and Marine Corps and what more needs to be done to bring it to total fruition? ANSWER: The Total Force is no longer a concept, reality. Changes and accomplishments include: o The Naval Reserve has grown by 50% in eight o New missions have been placed in the Naval o Modern equipment that is compatible with the o The Naval Reserve is now a capable and ready Whether the Total Force is effective is, and will remain, QUESTIONS: Has there been more meaningful Reserve involvement in the Department of the Navy decision making and budget process? ANSWER: The Naval Reserve has participated fully and meaningfully in the Navy programming and budgeting decision making processes. The Deputy Director of Naval Reserve and the Director of Naval Reserve are assigned to the Program Development Review Committee and Program Review Committee, respectively, through which Navy programs for both the regular and Reserve components are developed. These are flag-level decision-making bodies, as is the CNO Executive Board, or CEB, forum in which we also participate whenever Reserve issues are under consideration. Through these formal coordination, review and decision-making bodies, the Naval Reserve is afforded a full opportunity to participate in program development. The same is true in the budgeting arena in which the Commander, Naval Reserve Force, as a major claimant within the Navy, is a full and active participant in the development and execution of budgets for support of the Naval Reserve. As a result of the above, the Naval Reserve has had the fullest opportunity for continued meaningful involvement in the Department of the Navy decision making and budget process. SHIP REPAIR AND AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE QUESTION: The subcommittee has been somewhat concerned about the steady growth in the Navy and Marine Corps depot maintenance backlogs in recent years and the fact that they are projected to continue to grow in FY 1990 and 1991. Has the growth in these backlogs created any significant problems for the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve readiness or in their ability to fulfill their missions? There is no backlog in the ships maintenance program. Executable aircraft depot maintenance backlogs for the Naval Reserve were first projected to begin in FY 1989. Executable backlog for FY 1990 is currently projected at $31.6 million and $43.1 million in FY 1991. The impact of this backlog is that aircraft will not be available for readiness training while awaiting rework or receipt of modifications necessary to make the aircraft compatable with the active inventory. The backlog will likely result in some deterioration of readiness training, and is a matter of vital importance. |