AMBASSADOR AT LARGE WASHINGTON DC 20520-6333 August 14, 1992 Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing with regard to the use of the 1,000 FY 1992 refugee admissions numbers which are unallocated to any particular region. As you are aware, these numbers have been set aside for use when the allocated admissions ceiling for a particular region proves insufficient. With the end of the fiscal year approaching, it is clear that a shortage of admissions numbers exists in only one region South Asia. We expect to come close to but not exceed established ceilings for other areas. - - the Near East/ The situation of Iraqi refugees particularly in Turkey and Saudi Arabia has been the cause of some concern. In order to respond to UNHCR's request that the United States provide resettlement opportunities for some of these refugees, during the past several months, the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have focused considerable resources on admissions processing in these locations. Thanks to the response of the voluntary agency community in promptly providing sponsorship assurances, we would be able to admit more of these refugees this year with additional admissions numbers from the unallocated reserve. I hope that you will not object to our plan to expedite the resettlement in the United States of as many of these deserving refugees as possible. Consequently, we propose to utilize the 1,000 "unallocated reserve" to augment the Near East/South Asia regional ceiling to a new level of 7,000 admissions. After analyzing relevant refugee budgets, it has been determined that the admission of these additional 1,000 refugees can be effected within existing resources. In order to complete travel and other arrangements, we hope to inform the relevant The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, United States Senate. -2 overseas posts of the availability of these 1,000 numbers by August 24. Therefore, it would be most helpful if you could let me know prior to that date if you have any objection to the use of the unallocated reserve in this manner. Thank you for your consideration of this matter. a pleasant summer recess. I wish you Sincerely, Lafontant- Mankarivin Jewel Lafontant-Mankarious DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON August 6, 1992 Dear Senator Kennedy: During my July 23 appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee I promised that I would provide you with a comprehensive statement of the administration's policy with respect to Haitian refugees. The enclosed document traces the genesis of our policy toward Haitian boat people, reiterates our emphasis on saving lives, and notes the effectiveness of the President's May 24 Executive Order. I hope this statement can be made part of the hearing record. Enclosure. The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, United States Senate. Sincerely, Marry Lawrence S. Eagleburger Haiti Policy Since the first wave of Haitians attempted to reach Miami by boat in 1980, successive Administrations have sought to enforce U.S. immigration laws while protecting the lives of migrants, most of whose boats are overcrowded, unseaworthy and lack navigation and safety equipment. To address these problems effectively, President Reagan, in coordination with Haitian authorities, issued in September 1981 the Executive Order known as the Alien Migrant Interdiction Operation (AMIO). Under AMIO, U.S. Coast Guard cutters intercepted migrant vessels en route to Miami rather than permitting them to prolong a perilous voyage. To ensure that no Haitian fleeing persecution was returned to Haiti, immigration officials screened interdicted Haitians on board the cutters to determine if any had credible claims to political asylum. Those who demonstrated a credible fear of persecution were brought to the U.S. to pursue their asylum claims. Those who did not were returned to Haiti. From 1981 until September 1991, the Coast Guard intercepted over 23,000 migrants under AMIO. Of those, INS paroled into the U.S. only 24 individuals for asylum processing; the others were determined to be leaving Haiti for reasons other than persecution, most in search of better economic opportunities. While understandable given Haiti's acute poverty, such motives do not under our law entitle migrants to enter the United States as refugees or asylees. For ten years AMIO proved an effective way to prevent death at sea, to protect Haitians with legitimate claims to political asylum, and to deter illegal migration to the U.S. After the September 30, 1991 coup d'etat which ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide, departures of migrant boats (which had occurred sporadically during Aristide's administration) ceased for four weeks. On October 28 the first post-coup boat, with 19 persons aboard, was intercepted by the Coast Guard. Within a matter of days interceptions began to increase rapidly. Initially, interdiction and screening continued under AMIO as before. Repatriations, however, were suspended while the Department of State assessed changed conditions in Haiti. Meanwhile, the number of Haitian migrants quickly outstripped the capacity of our cutters. On After careful deliberation, the Administration decided to resume repatriation of those screened out by the INS. November 19, after only two cutters had returned migrants to Port au Prince, the Haitian Refugee Center filed suit challenging the INS screening procedure for the interdiction program. The court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring further repatriation. Coast Guard cutters, unable to return those individuals not paroled into the U.S., quickly became overcrowded and unhealthful. In order to relieve the cutters, a temporary pre-screening facility was established at Guantanamo Naval Base in late November. On With the restraining order barring the Government from repatriating screened-out migrants, the migrant population at Guantanamo quickly grew, reaching 6788 by January 22. January 31, 1992 the Supreme Court issued a stay permitting the Administration to resume repatriations. Nevertheless, repatriation of screened out migrants did not keep pace with the number of migrants the Coast Guard continued to intercept on the high seas. During the month of April, Guantanamo's refugee population increased by approximately 600 per week. In addition, offsetting the deterrent effect of eventual repatriation, it was evident that our cutters and temporary facilities in Guantanamo in themselves had become a magnet for Haitians. Assured of being picked up by a cutter once outside Haitian waters, migrants began paying up to $2,500 for a spot on overcrowded, unseaworthy craft. Once picked up, Haitians received temporary shelter, meals and medical treatment and had, on average, a one in three chance of being screened into the U.S. By late May the exodus reached unmanageable levels, with interceptions approaching 1,000 per day. Guantanamo reached its capacity of 12,500 occupants and we could no longer safely house and process additional individuals there especially with the hurricane season approaching or on board our cutters. Intense diplomatic efforts to locate another processing facility in the region proved unsuccessful. - - the Overwhelmed by the sheer number of Haitian migrants U.S. had, since October 28, rescued over 34,000 Haitians at sea and unable to gain regional or international assistance in setting up additional processing facilities, the President issued a new Executive Order on May 24 directing that cutters repatriate migrants directly to Haiti without screening. With this decision, the Administration sought to end the magnet effect of our cutters and facilities in Guantanamo. The decision produced the intended result. Since June 5, only two boats, with fewer than 400 migrants, have been intercepted. Meanwhile, in February, the Administration had set up refugee processing within Haiti so that those with legitimate claims to refugee status could apply for admission to the U.S. without risking their lives at sea. Only nationals of three other countries Cuba, Vietnam and the former Soviet Union this opportunity to apply for refugee status in their own countries. - have In taking this decision, careful consideration was given to our legal obligations for the treatment of refugees. It has long been the position of the U.S. Government that the |