gets back and until he and the President and Mr. Rabin meet, principally because if I went any farther at this stage I wouldn't even be Deputy Secretary very much longer. Senator GRASSLEY. I can appreciate that maybe for details, but would it be OK for somebody at your level to say, you know Mr. EAGLEBURGER. The atmosphere is better. There is no question about it. The atmosphere on this question is better. Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no other questions. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Senator DeConcini. Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me participate in this hearing. I am very concerned about a couple of things. CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA Regarding the former Yugoslavia, I am not sure who can answer this question. Mr. Secretary, I will start with you. Our policy there is to accept a proportion of these refugees that are fleeing, estimated to be as many as 2 million so far, is that correct? Ambassador, or whoever can answer that? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Senator, currently our assumption is that the people that are fleeing within the former Yugoslavia and outside of the former Yugoslavia are people who ultimately want to return to their homes. So the emphasis of our approach is to try to work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which is primarily responsible for Yugoslavia, to work out some kind of a framework under which they can be protected in their refuge and under which ultimately they can return. Senator DECONCINI. On the contrary, Ambassador, if some want to come to the United States, is that an available option? Mr. McNary, are you interviewing any of them who seek political asylum or any kind of status here? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. As I understand it—Mr. McNary can correct me-we have not had an overwhelming number of requests for political asylum from Yugoslavs yet. That may come, and that is why our efforts are at the moment trying to make sure they are protected in the countries-accepted and protected in the countries that they are fleeing to. Senator DECONCINI. Are you satisfied at all, Ambassador Zimmerman, that they are being protected? The stories I hear from the foreign minister and even the President of Bosnia-Hercegovina, it is awful what is happening. They are being put on train cars and shipped to the borders by the Serbians, with no sanitary facilities, no food or water. Do you believe that that is happening, and what do we do about it? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I think it is happening. I think we are watching a very brutal policy of forced expulsion from their homes under the most execrable of conditions, and this is being perpetrated by the Serbian authorities in Bosnia. What we are trying to do in the light of this is encourage countries nearby to take people who want to flee Senator DECONCINI. On a temporary basis? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. On a temporary basis. Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. That is right. In fact, Ms. Ogata has called a conference next Wednesday in Geneva to deal with precisely this problem, and we are very active in helping her with this. ADMISSION OF REFUGEES FROM YUGOSLAVIA Senator DECONCINI. Now, if somebody from Bosnia-Hercegovina wanted to make an application to come to this country as a political refugee or for political asylum, where would they do that, Mr. McNary, or do you know? Mr. McNARY. Well, they do it-we don't participate in selection of refugees. We get those applications from the State Department or UNHCR. Senator DECONCINI. So they make it with the State Department. Where would they make that, Ambassador Zimmerman? I mean, realistically, where would somebody from Sarajevo who feels they want to make an application to come to this country-where would they physically go do that? Do you have any idea? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, they would make it wherever they are, I assume. Senator DECONCINI. So if they are in Zagreb, they could go and make it there? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. They could make it there. Senator DECONCINI. And are any making such applications? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, we are getting applications. We don't have a resettlement program for Yugoslavs because the potential problem is so enormous that taking in a few hundred or a few thousand wouldn't even begin to scratch it. Senator DECONCINI. Yes, I agree. Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. That is why we are operating on the assumption of protection for them outside. I am not saying that we can do very much to protect them from being put in box cars, but once they get to a place where there are U.N. people, where there are Red Cross people, then we can help them. Senator DECONCINI. Once they get to a place where you can help them through U.N. auspices, does the State Department interview some of them? Do you know? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I don't think we do. Senator DECONCINI. Does INS interview some of them? Do you know, Commissioner? Mr. McNARY. I am sorry? Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I don't think either INS or the State Department Mr. MCNARY. NO. Senator DECONCINI. Is nobody on the ground there from our Government talking to them about their plight, that you know of? I am not saying that critically; I am just inquiring. Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. No. They are in the hands of the U.N. organizations, which we support with money and counsel. Senator DECONCINI. I understand, I understand. Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Senator, let me add one thing. I understand that State and Justice are now consulting on the possibility of temporary protected status for some people from the former Yugoslavia, and if that goes forward, then we would be able to provide, I don't know how many, but some opportunity for them, under the TPS Program, to come to the United States for a period of time, at least. Senator DECONCINI. That is under consideration? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir. Senator DECONCINI. Thank you. When will that be Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I don't know. I will check on that when I get back and we will see if we can't speed it up. Senator DECONCINI. Would you be so kind as to let the committee know, and me, in particular, since I am not a member of the subcommittee? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir. HAITIAN REFUGEES Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Eagleburger, what is the rationale for the President's May 24 Executive order dealing with the return of Haitians without any interview by INS? I am told the answer is that they are not on U.S. territory, so therefore they are not entitled to an interview. Is that all there is to it? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. No, sir. Senator DECONCINI. Had they gotten to Guantanamo or had they gotten to Key Biscayne, then they would be entitled to an interview? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. No, no. Senator, this is more complicated than that. The rationale for the President's decision and Executive order in May was that we-it is not the issue that you raise. It was purely and simply a fact that Guantanamo was full, that these boats were coming out and sinking and people were drowning at sea. They were overloaded. The people that ran those boats were charging, per head, to move these people, and obviously overloaded the boats. They were sinking, and the President decided that it would-and the Guantanamo operation was full. It was a magnet to draw these people out. The decision was, in fact, that we would return these people to Haiti immediately, but that they then could go to the United States Embassy, or indeed we could send out writers to them to be interviewed if they decided that they wanted still to apply to come to the United States. And, in fact, the interviewing process within Haiti has been going forward for some period of time since then, and it was not the issue of where they were or whether they would be interviewed. It was simply a question of stopping the outflow at that particular time. Senator DECONCINI. Was it impractical or impossible to interview them in the course of a several hour trip before they were returned to try to interview some of them instead of putting them back on the ground? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. As I understand it, the answer is fundamentally yes. You would have had the point was to stop these boats as soon as we could, return the people to Haiti, and let them be interviewed in the Embassy. Senator DECONCINI. So there are 100 a day coming to the Embassy, I am told—a minimum of 100 a day. We don't have the personnel to handle them, I am told. Am I correct? The Embassy, or wherever they go for an application, is right next to a military establishment, a headquarters or something that is very intimidating. Isn't there anything else we can do for these people? It seems to me the Haitians are the forgotten refugees. I don't want to leave any inference here of impropriety on anybody's part, but it looks like hell that the Haitians are shunted off and we make no effort. If we do make any effort, I don't know of any, to try to find some procedure at least within Haiti, Port-Au-Prince, that they could go to with a little bit more sensitivity about the problems they are under, because we all know what the problems are. Can you address that, Mr. Secretary? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I would be glad to briefly, and then I think Ambassador Zimmerman wants to say some more. But, Senator, we have investigated 2,500 cases from the Embassy of people who have been returned, repatriated. We have found no case of persecution once they were repatriated. As I understand it, in fact, the number of people available in our Embassy in Port-Au-Prince to handle these things is adequate. If it isn't, I will be glad to be corrected. In fact, in terms of the numbers that have been interviewed in the Embassy, we have granted, I think, authority to come to the United States something like one-third of them. I don't believe myself that-in fact, it may look bad, but, again, the fundamental point was too many people were in danger of drowning. The magnet effect of Guantanamo or of bringing them to the United States was simply going to indicate that more would come out, and we felt that this was the best way to deal with it. Senator DECONCINI. Well, Mr. Secretary, my time is out. I could go on because I could argue with you a little bit about going and interviewing them. I wonder if anybody is working with the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service or some of the internationals. I sure hope they are. My time is out. If I could have a personal privilege, Mr. Chairman, just to ask Mr. McNary if he has a policy of not returning phone calls. I made a call to you Friday on a particular case. To your defense, you were out of town. When I called Secretary Eagleburger yesterday, he happened to be there. He took my call and called me back, and I am most grateful because I know you are a very busy man. Since Friday, I have not heard from your office on an immigration case. Are we not able Mr. McNARY. No, sir. I return your calls, and I returned this one. Senator DECONCINI. OK, very good. Mr. McNARY. So there is a misunderstanding. If you call me, you will get a call back. Senator DECONCINI. I left the name of the case and I can't seem to get any information from your office. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Chairman, may I just offer-I would like to send you in writing a little more on this Haitian issue just to try to establish our case on it. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] Senator DECONCINI. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to extend my time here. Senator KENNEDY. That is fine. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND FIRST ASYLUM I just have a very brief final two areas, but one of them is related to what Senator DeConcini raised. As I understand it, Mr. Secretary, you attended the Geneva conference on Indochina refugees in June 1989. You were under instructions from the President to oppose forced repatriation of Vietnamese boat people, and the State Department strongly protested each time Hong Kong forced people back. Last month when more Vietnamese were forced back, the administration was silent and we didn't hear a strong protest from the administration, and in recent weeks when Yemen turned back Somalis, when Austria sealed its border with Slovenia, and Bangladesh decided the Burmese should be sent back, we were quiet. So hasn't the administration abdicated its essential leadership for the protection of refugees? Won't millions of refugees suffer because of the tragic precedent of Haiti? Now, as I understand it, the State Department has weighed in on both sides of the question of whether international refugee obligations are extraterritorial. In 1981, the State Department's legal adviser said it was extraterritorial and the refugee protocol obligated the United States to screen Haitians before returning them. In the current Haitian litigation, the current legal adviser said it was not. I mean, is this any way to develop a rational, coherent refugee policy? Mr. EAGLEBURGER. With regard to the last point, Mr. Chairman, I will have to get back to you with something. I don't know the difference that you have identified between the advice of legal advisers. I will get back to you on that. I think there is a substantial difference between the Vietnamese case and the Haitian case, for instance, and we have not agreed to forcible repatriation of the Vietnamese and we have made it clear to the Hong Kong and United Kingdom authorities that that was our position, including in this most recent case. I don't know whether anything was said publicly, but the British and the Hong Kong authorities are under no doubt as to our position with regard to the Vietnamese case. The distinctions, I think, are fairly substantial, one of which is there is a regional comprehensive program in which a number of countries have agreed in the Vietnamese case to participate. We tried very hard in the Haitian case to get regional cooperation on receiving refugees and got nowhere. We put a few people into Venezuela and a few into Honduras, and when they discovered that they were in Venezuela and Honduras and were not going to the United States, two-thirds of them asked to be returned to Haiti. I really do think there is a distinction between the two. |