brought about by declaring that the spectacles on his nose were a fetish that would cure people of their evil ways. He does not see that the sudden tearing-down of native faith and institutions uproots the moral system connected with them, and causes great masses to degenerate who have not the advantage of his personal example. He admits that the Mpongwe, among whom he has been working, are "hurrying to extinction," but he blames this on the coast trader and administrator, who in turn blame the missionary, the fact being that each of them is to be blamed for not co-operating.

It is disappointing, and much to be regretted, that missionaries have not profited more from the criticisms of their work by modern scholars, and that they should not have shown more of a disposition to follow the trend of modern religious thought in the direction of greater emphasis upon service.

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

JEROME DOWD

The New History. Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook. By JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. 266.

Of this collection of eight essays, all but one have previously been printed, although not precisely as they appear here. Six present Professor Robinson's conception of the modern point of view in history, and two are contributions to historical knowledge. Professor Robinson's first contention is that the selection of historical facts in books intended for the public has previously rested on a wrong basis. He would have history shake off everything not vitally connected with present-day life, and devote itself to furnishing a background for the problems of the common man. In the second place he would have history brought into closer touch with other sciences-anthropology, political economy, psychology, sociology, etc. He points out how much history hás already gained from the natural sciences, and urges the advantage of closer alliance. Thirdly, he recurs constantly to the idea that the period of whose history we have a record is but a moment in the whole course of human development, that the pace of world-progress is growing constantly more rapid, that it is time to co-operate to direct and control this progress, and that it is the main function of history to furnish a sense of direction.

Professor Robinson's style is brilliant and interesting. He is not, however, a convincing controversialist, owing to his habit of setting up a

man of straw to overthrow instead of dealing with facts as they are. Actually the gulf between modern historical production and what Professor Robinson wishes is not so great as he represents it. If he had been content simply to express the modern point of view instead of presenting it as new and in violent contrast with the work of his contemporaries, his major views could scarcely have failed of very general acceptance. In other words, his views are on the whole more sound than new, though the majority of his own profession would probably claim that some of those that are new are not altogether sound. No one, however, would deny that his historical essays on the "Fall of Rome" and the "Principles of 1789" exhibit a thorough mastery of the most advanced historical method, and are contributions to an understanding of their respective fields.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

CARL RUSSELL FISH

Assistance publique et charité privee. Par MAURICE BEAUFRETON. With a foreword by FERDINAND DREYFUS. In "Encyclopédie internationale d'assistance, prévoyance, hygiène sociale et démographie." Paris: Giard & Brière, 1911. Pp. xii+394.

Fr. 4.

The problem of the relations of public relief and private charity is the theme of M. Beaufreton's volume. The first chapter deals with the present crisis of private charity in France and the running fire of criticism to which it has been subjected. He concludes that the crisis is one of transformation, charity is becoming an art and a science. The next two chapters deal with the rôle of public relief and private beneficence. The problem of the relations between public relief and private beneficence is then discussed at length. Although in practice each form of aid has its own proper domain, the question of reciprocal co-operation' is important because individuals seeking relief go from one to the other. The question of the pre-eminence of official relief over private charity is disputed. Without doubt society has the obligation of helping the indigent but it does not necessarily follow that the social power ought to execute this social obligation. If the need is relieved by private initiative, for example, the social obligation is discharged and the state has not interfered directly. So that far from substituting official aid entirely in the place of private aid, public relief should interfere when

private charity proves itself insufficient to cope with the situation. The intervention of public power has always been indispensable to success. It is a question of making history explain the change; it is not a question of principle. This discussion of principles is followed by a study of the conditions of the relations of the two forms of relief, and the control of official and private aid. The study of these conditions is elucidated by tabulations. M. Beaufreton has performed the service of giving us a clear exposition of the fundamental problems concerned in the relations of these two forms of relief.

SMITH COLLEGE NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

F. STUART CHAPIN

Psicologia Sociale. Di GUALTIERO SARFATTI. Torino: S. Lattes & C., 1911. Pp. 87. L. 1.50.

This small volume is devoted primarily to defining the scope and limits of social psychology. The author makes careful distinctions between the social mind and the collective mind, and between social psychology and collective psychology. He regards collective psychology as the science which deals with the phenomena of crowds, individuals temporarily united in space. Social psychology, he maintains, should concern itself with the psychic phenomena of historical social groups. Differentiation of collective psychology from social psychology has been properly insisted upon by other Italian writers, as, for instance, Groppale and Vadala-Papale, but is not evident in the writings of Le Bon and Sighele.

After distinguishing social psychology from collective psychology and specifying its particular field, the book treats briefly of the formation, the evolution, and the manifestations of the social mind. It does well all that it attempts to do.

VALPARAISO, IND.

I. W. HOWERTH

Causes and Effects in American History. The Story of the Origin and Development of the Nation. By EDWIN W. MORSE. New York: Scribner, 1912. Pp. xxvi+302. $1.25 net.

The professed purpose of this brief volume, as indicated in its title, is very commendable and it is to be hoped that someone will yet write of

the main currents of American history from the standpoint of the causes and effects of the movements. The present work is a pleasing though rather superficial narrative, such as students of American history in the public schools might use for supplementary reading with profit. For a more causal and analytical treatment of the subject we must still turn to the more extended works of McMaster and Rhodes and to the writings of the economic and industrial historians.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

L. L. BERNARD

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Ueber Gesetzmässigkeiten in der Geschichte ("historische Gesetze”).— "Historical laws" are uniformities in special areas of social experience. The arguments against the possibilities of law in history are the universal evidence of freedom and originality in the individual; the large and necessary share of chance in human events; and the infinite number and variety of new combinations and situations in history. But though individuals have always been the bearers of events, they themselves can only be understood in relation to the whole. Historical generalization is possible only by means of comparison. The historian of necessity constantly compares types. The type expresses, not the concrete content, but the general form assumed by that; and this form is an integral and organic part of historical knowledge. The presuppositions of all historical construction are: the limited number and variety of elements with which generalization is concerned, and the finite range of combinations among them. Both these presuppositions are actually present. The historian is able to grasp the individual occurrence only by reducing it to a few known forms or types. Mere historical perception of reality without concepts is blind. The historical sciences, therefore, stand in constant need of the concepts developed by the systematic social sciences. Every branch of historical science demands for its correlate a general, theoretical, and systematic science of the same genus. The historical social sciences supply the content, the systematic ones the form of human experience. Franz Eulenburg, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XXXV, 299-365. P. W.

Neuorientierung in der Sozialpolitik?—The working-class struggle for emancipation, by making use of the state for the attainment of its ends, has created not the means of liberation but the fetters that bind it to the existing order. The state had been appealed to as a counterweight against private enterprise. In consequence of the economic functions allotted to it, it is today perhaps the greatest of all capitalistic entrepreneurs. In the hope of saving large masses of workers from the blows and the insecurity of a free capitalistic labor market, the organization and activities of the state have been extended, with the result that these working masses, "emancipated from capitalism," are less free today and less able to determine their own lot than any proletarian masses in free private enterprise. We can no longer speculate on the dialectic self-elimination of capitalism or its displacement by other formations, but can only look forward to a strengthening and extension alongside of it of such other forms; none of these being democratic or socialistic, but all necessarily bureaucratic in structure: the state, the trade union, the co-operative society. It is the task of the future to select and develop that form of organization which liberates the largest measure of spiritual vitality, demands the maximum of individual self-determination, and involves the minimum of dead forms of authority.-Alfred Weber, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, January, 1913. P. W.

La dernière évolution de la théorie de l'évolution. The position of De Vries in botany that species arise not by a slow process of natural selection of the fittest, but by the sudden appearance of entirely new forms due to mysterious and independently operative causes, receives confirmation in the fields of zoology, philosophy, and sociology. Bergson's conception of "creative evolution" represents a direct denial of the theory of Darwin and Spencer, and a return to the independent creation of Linne and Cuvier. Under the auspices of this movement of thought syndicalism has grown up. A merit of the new doctrine is its recognition of the normal and necessary function of revolution in the life process. Its fundamental fallacy is its view of periodic revolutions as the result of sudden causes intervening at the point of shock and unconnected with the antecedent evolutionary process. Just as the