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Action creates what pleasure uses up. This would divide progress into three stages: a pain economy, a pleasure economy, and a creative economy. Each stage has its own mode of thought, and its own social institutions. To visualize the elements of these stages, I have put them in the following table:

Character of the Stage of Progress Form of Struggle Form of Control

Social Bonds 1. A pain economy

Race struggle Ancestral control Blood bonds 2. A pleasure economy

Class struggle Wealth control Interest bonds 3. A creative economy

Self direction Character control Social beliefs
Kind of

Type of
Type of Thought Thought Limitations Philosophy

Morality I. Theological

Substance Anthropomorphic Traditional 2. Rational


Utilitarian 3. Pragmatic


Telic We may forgive much in a thinker who frequently returns from his wanderings with trophies like this.


Financial History of Ohio. By E. L. BOGART. Urbana, Ill.

University of Illinois Press, 1912. $1.80.

In this volume, Professor Bogart has made an important contribution to the literature on public finance in the United States. The work is based largely on Ohio legislative and executive documents and thus presents to the student a very useful array of material from original sources hitherto unused except in a very brief history of taxation of Ohio, by Judge Nelson W. Evans. The work covers the entire period of Ohio's history as a territory and as a state up until the close of 1911. It is unfortunate that the work closes without presenting the results of the recent constitutional convention and the provisions of the new constitution which form a very important part of recent taxation history in Ohio.

The volume is about equally divided into two parts, the first dealing with the history of financial legislation and administration and the second treating the history of taxation in Ohio. Such a division has involved many repetitions which might possibly have been avoided by some other arrangement of material. For example, much of the material on the economic development of Ohio given in the first chapter could have been placed more appropriately in the chapters on railroads and banking.

The most important chapters in the first division are those on the budget and budgetary practice. The tables of receipts and expenditures on pp. 118-21 covering the entire history of Ohio will be of great value to the student of local taxation. The chapters on the history of taxation of railways and banks are of interest and full of suggestion. Professor Bogart seems to agree with Judge N. W. Evans that "the law for the taxation of banks is as near perfect as can be made.”

The student of taxation will find the most important material in the chapter on the general property tax. This chapter is an excellent and suggestive account of the working of the general property tax in Ohio. The evolution of the tax is described in detail and an account given of the attempts during the last twenty or thirty years to enforce such taxation acts as have been passed in conformity to the principle of uniformity. Professor Bogart concludes his study by saying: "Whatever the future may hold in store, the student of taxation in Ohio cannot conclude this general survey of taxation without having his conviction of the inequity of the general property tax deepened.” This conclusion presents an interesting contrast to the statements contained in a paper read at the Des Moines conference of the National Tax Association by the chairman of the Ohio Tax Commission, who declared that the general property tax, although not scientific was nevertheless just, had always worked well, and was now satisfactory to the people of Ohio. Professor Bogart further concludes that "the general property tax has begun to disintegrate and we may confidently expect to see developed an improved system.” The vote of the people of Ohio two years ago on the question of changing the constitution so as to provide for the classification of property for taxation seems to bear out this statement, for the proposition would have carried if the majority of those voting at the special election had been considered a sufficient majority, but the law required a majority of those voting at the previous gubernatorial election.

Professor Bogart had a great deal of faith in the work of the constitutional convention for he says (p. 250): “When it (the convention] meets, there is little doubt but that the provisions of the constitution relating to taxation and finance will be carefully revised and that the rule of uniformity in taxation will be changed.” Unfortunately the constitution was not revised in this particular, and so afraid were the friends of the old order that the people might use the new initiative and referendum to change the rule of uniformity that they placed in the section providing for the initiative and referendum a clause prohibiting the people from initiating any law which would change the present system.

Among the reforms in taxation in Ohio noted by Professor Bogart

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are: the use of the general property tax in obtaining revenue for the local jurisdictions alone, thus bringing about the practical separation of state and local revenues; the appointment of a permanent tax commission; the more frequent valuation of real property; and the listing of property at its full value. Another reform alluded to by Professor Bogart has been abolished by the recent vote on the new constitutional amendments, namely, the exemption of state and municipal bonds from taxation. The new constitution once more provides for their listing and taxation.



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Social Value. A Study in Economic Theory, Critical and Construc

tive. By B. M. ANDERSON, JR., Ph.D., Instructor in Political Economy in Columbia University. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. Pp. xviii+204. $1.00 net.

This is the one indispensable book for those who are teaching courses in both theoretical economics and theoretical sociology. One is indeed tempted to say that it is an indispensable book for both sociologists and economists who wish an outlook upon each other's respective fields, for it bases economic theory squarely upon the intermental life of men in society, that is, upon sociology. From the standpoint of the sociologist, therefore, it is not too much to say that Dr. Anderson's work in economic theory is epoch-making. To be sure, a great number of economic writers have been of recent years gradually coming to the sociological point of view, but, so far as the reviewer knows, this is the first work which avowedly bases economic theory upon the soundest and most recent developments in sociological theory. The author, unlike many writers in economics, shows extensive mastery of the recent literature in sociology and psychology.

The work as a whole is a scholarly piece of psychological and sociological analysis. It would seem to leave but little for the individualistic value theorists in economics to stand upon. The implications of the essay are, however, far wider than the purely economic field, for incidentally the book treats of legal, political, and ethical values as well as of economic value, and it demonstrates quite conclusively that all of these values are products, not simply of individual feeling, as the individualists would have us believe, but of the whole intermental life of men in society. Dr. Anderson's essay, therefore, not only offers a sound sociological foundation for the science of economics but, by implication, also for ethics, jurisprudence, and politics in so far as those sciences deal with values.

The book is therefore of great use to the sociological theorist as well as to the economic theorist. The sociologist will in addition be particularly interested to see how Dr. Anderson develops, from his own standpoint, the criticisms which advanced sociological thinkers have been making of economics during the past dozen years. There is scarcely a sane criticism of economic theory offered by leading sociological thinkers which Dr. Anderson does not repeat and with telling effect, because the criticism is developed by him as an independent economic thinker in his own search after a sound theory of economic value.

The argument of the book is also based upon the soundest and most recent developments in psychological theory. The point of view is functional throughout. Feeling is recognized only as one element in value and that a purely individualistic one. Value must be understood not so much in terms of feelings as in terms of function and the function of value is to motivate the activities of individuals of society. Values which motivate the activities of masses of individuals or of groups are, therefore, the product of the intermental life of individuals. The motivation of the economic activities of society is something superindividual and that something is social economic value. While there is no such thing as social utility, there is, therefore, such a thing as social values in the economic sphere as well as in the legal and ethical sphere.

In the opinion of the reviewer, it is to be regretted that Dr. Anderson did not dispense entirely with the use of such terms as "social mind” and "social organism." They are not at all necessary to his argument and they are continually misunderstood by workers outside the sociological realm as something mystical. The psychological theory of society is by no means the same as the organic theory and the retention of such terms in psychological interpretations of our social life tends perhaps to confuse some. Since Dr. Anderson's argument is entirely in psychological terms, it would seem to have been unnecessary to have retained any terms which suggest the organic analogy.


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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS Rousseau et socialisme.--There are coexisting in the writings of Rousseau at various moments two opposing tendencies; one is a great confidence in the law of tomorrow, which will be the work of a state in conformity with the general will and rebuilt by the social contract; the other is a great defiance of the law of yesterday, which is the work of an interested minority of privileged characters. These same opposing tendencies are found in the minds of socialists today; it is significant that to explain the application of the Hegelian dialectics to the development of property Engels draws his examples from Rousseau's Discours. The chief difference between Rousseau and the socialists is that the main factor in socialistic thinking and action is the member of the industrial group, while Rousseau's thinking is done in terms of the small farmer and peasant. Rousseau hated machinery and the whole industrial revolution, and city life was absolutely distasteful to him.-C. Bouglé, Revue de metaphysique et de morale, May, 1912.

M. S. H. Les idées politiques de Rousseau.--The political ideas of Rousseau are generally misunderstood and interpreted as a sort of atomism and return to nature. Rousseau very clearly brings out that it is not a return to a primitive state, constructed ficti. tiously, but a state of society in which the inequalities of conventions and of morals are adapted to the inequalities of nature. It is true that Rousseau admits that man is lost in the world of social values, which he treats as artificial, although genetically necessary. But he attempts also to justify these social values on the ground that in the social obligations of man, and nowhere else, are realized his liberty and equality. This amounts to an Aristotelian conclusion, and was stated clearly by Burlamaqui, one of the disciples of Rousseau, when he said that "the civil state is of all states the most perfect and the truly natural state of man.” Rousseau, however, was more concerned with detecting the faults of the civil state in the form in which it presented itself to him in his day and for that reason the critical aspect of his political philosophy has been unduly overstated.-Bernard Bosanquet, Revue de metaphysique et de morale, May, 1912.

M. S. H. Rudolf von Ihering und die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft.-In view of the controversy concerning penal law, and its influence on legislation, and in view of Ihering's influence on German jurisprudence, a critical analysis of his philosophy is timely. To synthetize Ihering's philosophic system of jurisprudence it is necessary to treat of (1) the jurist's place in the development of jurisprudence, (2) the essence of subjective law, (3) the limits to the efficacy of legal restraint, (4) the methodology of the science, (5) the positivistic character of Ihering's system, (6) its influence on the philosophy of law, (7) an analysis of Ihering's chief works, Der Geist des römischen Rechts, and Der Zweck im Recht, (8) a criticism of his teleological principle, and (9) his relation to the new sociological school regarding penal jurisprudence. Thering is a follower of the historical school but transcends that method by the adoption of the historical rationalistic method. His standpoint is the staatssocialistische, for he attempts to reconcile and unite individualism and collectivism. His philosophy shows the influence especially of Hegel and Marx.-Dr. E. Hurwicz, Abhandlungen des kriminalistischen Seminars an der Universität Berlin, N. F., 6. Band, 4. Heft, 1911.

Y, S. Der Nationalismus und seine Wurzeln.-The roots of a dominant nationalistic consciousness are found in the formation of the modern state with its social and economic organization. Before the nationalistic spirit could arise, it was necessary for political, economic, and social life to assume their modern forms; it was necessary, further, that individuality should be discovered in a man by his fellow-men as the condition of the recognition of individuality in the state. Nationalism is originally


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