APPLIED SOCIOLOGY (OR SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY)

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

The University of Chicago

German economists find it convenient to distinguish between general (theoretical) and special (practical) economics. There is an important and significant difference between the divisions of social technology here proposed and the divisions commonly used in practical economics and economic politics. In the latter the divisions are based on the specialization of labor and branches of industry or commerce; as the economics of banking, insurance, railroads, agriculture. In practical sociology, because it deals directly with humanity, the divisions should be based on natural groups of persons, as families, communities, classes. It is convenient in sociology to follow the hint of economists and cultivate general and practical sociology. Social technology starts from the analysis of social groupings and interests furnished by general sociology, and it is modified at every step by advance in knowledge in all the fields of science. At a given moment, however, all available knowledge must be utilized for achievement; there is no final "solution" of social problems. The physician must each day do the best he can in his science and art of healing, well aware that tomorrow a laboratory bulletin may place him under moral obligation to adopt entirely different means. Herbert Spencer showed that science is just common knowledge carried to the highest possible degree of completeness and accuracy. Whenever an intelligent citizen adopts a principle of personal conduct he takes into account all the interests and consequences he can remember or discover.

He may abstract any one of them for thorough examination, but if he consciously omits any one in his life plan, he is that far immoral, and knows it. We can illustrate the scope of social technology by what constantly happens in a chance group of farmers or in the deliberate discussions of a village improvement

society when the "general welfare" is under consideration. The range of topics is as wide as the urban newspaper. The farmer suggests one set of phenomena, the storekeeper another, the doctor another, the county editor many things, and the visiting commercial traveler touches all. They may call in a lawyer to formulate local regulations or a bill for a law, but their plans look more to future achievements than to salted precedents. They know that they must agree on a policy because they must live together, and must find a practicable method of realizing the covenanted end. Thus they are social technologists. Certainly with wider and clearer vision and fuller knowledge their policy would be more adequate; and it is here that applied social science can help them.

Each "socius" has in his nature all the needs of all men, without exception, but feels them as wants in varying degrees. Each "socius" must use all the institutions of society and all the forms of knowledge. He goes to specialists, as lawyers, teachers, physicians, for expert professional service; but he must possess enough "world ideas" to live in association with his neighbors. Every man and woman of social position above the lowest is compelled to form some kind of a judgment, favorable or adverse, in regard to scores of ameliorative and reform movements started by specialists or fanatics. By appeals in circulars, newspapers, letters, and interviews citizens are made to say "yes" or "no" to these multifarious calls. A refusal is a judgment and a decision involving responsibility. It is evident that answers to requests ought to be as intelligent as possible, whether we help or decline to help with time, money, influence, labor. An intelligent judgment is possible only after a survey of the entire field, and this survey cannot be made by any one person; it is a product of well co-ordinated rational labor.

The "practical" man who despises theory is the most obstinate theorist; he is sure of his experience, but he is sometimes slow to learn of the world's experience; he may lose years in trying an experiment which has often been tried by others.

All forms of science culminate in applied sociology. It is only when they co-operate that they are fully rational.

Sir H. S. Maine (Village Communities, p. 230) said: "It is

not the business of the scientific historical inquirer to assert good or evil of any particular institution. He deals with its existence and development, not with its expediency." But this aspect of science satisfies only one of the many needs of humanity, the desire for knowledge. Social technology does deal with "expediency," if by that we mean the actual adaptation of institutions to human welfare. In this wide sense a course of conduct is ethically "good" when it actually tends to promote all forms of welfare for the entire community under consideration; and "expediency," rationally interpreted, becomes the supreme test of conduct. Where the "scientific historical inquirer" leaves off, the practical sociologist begins; but he does not leave the solid ground laid in scientific inquiry; he judges by consequences.

A. Wagner declares that the social sciences differ from the sciences of nature in the scope of their tasks. All the sciences in common seek to establish (1) the facts and (2) the tendencies of the phenomena studied, and (3) to explain these facts in a causal series. But the sciences of society go farther and inquire (1) What is the value of the facts for human society? (2) What ought to be? and (3) How can the end be progressively realized? In the purely theoretical sciences the task is to learn in order to know; in the social sciences we learn in order to control means and ends; but in both cases knowledge is the object of the scientific discipline.

The scope of practical sociology is indicated in this description of the objects of the study: "Those modifications of society which are brought about by the social will, equipped with adequate knowledge, using appropriate means, and striving toward an intelligently conceived goal" (E. A. Ross).

Social technology must start with an analysis of desirable ends of concerted volition analyzed by psychology, revealed in history, widely presented in art and literature, and justified by social philosophy. Human purpose directed to desirable ends is an objective fact, like a star or a crystal. Granted that not all social changes are due to concerted human volition, and that many changes can be traced to external nature and unthinking custom, Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie, 3. Aufl., 1. Band, 2. K., S. 144-45.

still men do co-operate consciously to improve their condition and they sometimes succeed. The ends are in human nature and they come out in deeds, laws, institutions, works.

These desires and volitions are themselves causal factors;' they act upon the materials and forces of nature, using them to accomplish desired ends. Knowledge, science, is the instrument of achievement.

Practical sociology attempts to comprehend in an intellectual system the complex of conditions in which the accepted ends of human life may best be realized. This "theory," or intellectual control, is necessary to furnish the most effective and economical method of actual achievement.

While the material objects of desire are beyond counting and infinitely varied, the ends or interests themselves may be analyzed and classified. (1) There are the desires on whose satisfaction depend the physical integrity and power of the individual and the perpetuation of human life, as the appetites of hunger, thirst, sex. (2) There are the desires whose satisfaction in control of nature is necessary to all other satisfactions and whose activities are the special field of economics. These are means to other ends, but come to be almost idealized as ultimate in wealth, commerce, industry. (3) There are the higher desires which have been evolved in civilized man and are the springs of interest and achievement in science, art, companionship, morality, government, religion, and the social institutions which are created for their furtherance. (4) There are the agencies of order, security, and liberty which are idealized as political ends, but are really only means to social ends. The system of means and measures for the satisfaction of these desires may be studied in various ways. The complex whole must be viewed in various aspects, without forgetting that society is one and its interests not divided into independent parts. As soon as we attempt to invent and apply a "technique" we must find a different set of tools for each achievement. Analysis

IL. F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology, rendered a great service in making this clear.

This has been done many times, as by Plato and Aristotle, by ethical writers and psychologists; more definitely of late by A. W. Small, General Sociology, and by E. A. Ross, Foundations of Sociology.

is imposed on us by the limitation of our focal field. The division here offered is merely a convenience, a tentative device, which may easily be rejected for a better. We may in turn inquire how the ends of welfare (desires, interests) may best be promoted in the family, the rural community, the urban community, the commonwealth, the nation, the world of international law and civilization, humanity. This study may be followed or accompanied by an investigation of the regulative principles found in the best methods of dealing with particular groups of human beings having many traits in common: the depressed, the abnormal, the anti-social. We may also isolate for study the interests of the wage-earners and the "social politics" which have grown out of attempts to improve their conditions.

We select for illustration of the procedure of practical sociology what might be done by a large group of men and women of light and leading for their commonwealth. The very name "commonwealth" shows that we are not making an appeal to credulity but to common-sense; for the word is proof that Aristotle's definition still has vital meaning: the state is a people living a common life to a noble end. We can easily imagine a conference of persons representing science, business, art, religion, government, recreation, uniting to make a working program for the welfare of the whole people. It is not necessary that they should be formally elected; their decisions would have no more authority than the wisdom they embody. Such a conference would agree that all the elements of welfare should be considered; that no group of persons should be neglected; that health, wealth, and culture for all citizens should be taken into account. Then they would adopt some natural division of labor. The physicians and engineers would be regarded as responsible for leadership in matters of public health, and they would formulate the demands of modern sanitary science. The teachers would be requested to standardize the work of the schools. The artists would agree upon the requirements of the people in relation to the works of beauty. Those who cared specially for the destitute, and had studied their needs, would draw up one part of the program and justify it. Those who had given long thought to the wage-earners would set up a standard