Economics of the Environment: Theory and PolicySpringer Science & Business Media, 2008 M01 3 - 333 pages The labor of nature is paid, not because she does much, but because she does little. In proportion as she becomes niggardly in her gifts, she exacts a greater price for her work. Where she is munificently bene- cent, she always works gratis. 1 David Ricardo This book interprets nature and the environment as a scarce resource. Whereas in the past people lived in a paradise of environmental superabundance, at present environmental goods and services are no longer in ample supply. The environment fulfills many functions for the economy: it serves as a public-c- sumption good, as a provider of natural resources, and as receptacle of waste. These different functions compete with each other. Releasing more pollutants into the environment reduces environmental quality, and a better environmental quality implies that the environment’s use as a receptacle of waste has to be restrained. Consequently, environmental disruption and environmental use are by nature allocation problems. This is the basic message of this book. |
Contents
Chapter 1 | 3 |
List of Figures and Tables | 9 |
Fig 112 | 11 |
Material Flows Between the Environment and | 12 |
Fig 171 | 17 |
Environmental Effects of Government Decisions | 18 |
XIII | 27 |
Fig 31 Emission and production functions | 28 |
12 | 140 |
13 | 147 |
Fig 84 Combining standards and an emission tax | 149 |
Chapter 9 | 153 |
Fig 92 Optimal waste reduction with two cost functions | 156 |
The Political Economy of Environmental Scarcity | 163 |
Environmental Endowment Competitiveness and Trade | 173 |
Fig 111 Trade effects of environmental policy | 177 |
Fig 35 Transformation space with negative externalities | 34 |
Fig 41 Determination of the emission tax | 47 |
Tables | 52 |
Fig 51 Aggregation of willingness to pay | 60 |
Chapter 5 | 61 |
Fig 53a Abatement costs in selected sectors | 67 |
Fig 54 Pareto optimum of environmental allocation | 75 |
Thesis of Market Failure | 77 |
Fig 56 Lindahl equilibrium | 82 |
Mechanisms of Social Choice | 84 |
Ethical Aspects of Environmental Evaluation | 91 |
Part III | 99 |
Fig 61 Coase solution with transaction costs | 102 |
Chapter 7 | 108 |
Fig 72 Structure of general equilibrium model | 113 |
Pollution Intensities Factor Intensities and Allocation | 118 |
Fig 74 Allocation effects in a twofactor model | 119 |
8 | 126 |
Fig 81 Effect of an instruction to reduce emissions | 134 |
Environmental Policy Imperfect Competition and Trade | 179 |
Transfrontier Pollution | 194 |
Global Environmental Media | 208 |
Controlling the Free Rider | 216 |
16 | 223 |
Regional Aspects of Environmental Allocation | 229 |
LongTerm Aspects of Environmental Quality | 250 |
Chapter 3 | 253 |
Control Theory | 262 |
A1 Optimality conditions | 264 |
Growth and Environmental Degradation | 268 |
Risk and Environmental Allocation | 285 |
About the Author | 299 |
301 | |
324 | |
328 | |
330 | |
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Common terms and phrases
abatement technology analysis approach assimilative capacity Assume capital chapter Coase theorem constraints consumption costs of abatement costs of environmental curve damage function defined demand denotes determined diffusion economic growth effect emission tax emission trading environment environmental allocation environmental media environmental policy environmental problem environmental quality environmental systems European Union evaluation factor factor of production firm given home country implies incentive income increase indifference curve individual preferences inputs instance institutional arrangement interpreted interregional Kyoto Protocol level of pollution Lindahl equilibrium marginal abatement costs marginal costs marginal damage maximization negative norms opportunity costs optimal output pollutants ambient pollution licenses pollution rights pollution-intensive commodity property rights quality target quantity of emissions reduce region relative price resource ronmental scarcity shadow price shifts side payments social solution specific tion trade transaction costs transformation space transfrontier pollution unit of pollution utility variable willingness to pay µg/m³
Popular passages
Page 301 - Arrow, KJ and AC Fisher (1974), 'Environmental preservation, uncertainty and irreversibility', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88, 312-19.