INCOMPETENT PERSON-Continued.
grantor, and the probability that one in the possession of
his faculties would make a transfer of his property in a
given case. Hemphill v. Holford, 293.
2. Where, in such a case, the relation between the grantor
and grantee is very largely in the nature of guardian and
ward, and in view of the grantor's condition it becomes the
grantee's duty to properly care for him and his property,
it is the duty of the grantee to show entirely clean hands
in the transaction. Id.
3. Delay by children in instituting proceedings to test the
mental competency of an aged father to execute a deed
until after his death is not such laches as will bar their right
to file a bill to set aside the deed after his death. Id.
See EVIDENCE (26-34).
INDETERMINATE SENTENCES-See CRIMINAL LAW (2).
INJUNCTION-See TAXES (6).
INSANITY-See INCOMPETENT PERSON.
INSURANCE-See FIRE INSURANCE.
JUDGMENT CREDITORS' BILL-See EQUITY PLEADING (3).
After the parties have announced themselves satisfied with the
jury, and they are sworn, neither party can peremptorily
challenge a juror, against the objection of the opposite party.
Ayres v. Hubbard, 155.
See CHARGE TO JURY; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4); PRACTICE IN
CIRCUIT COURT (3, 5, 6, 8, 10-12).
JUSTICES' COURTS—See APPEAL; ATTACHMENT (3-7); CERTIORARI.
The term "laches" involves the idea of negligence,-a neglect or
failure to do what ought to be done under the circumstances
to protect the rights of the parties to whom it is imputed, or
involving injury to the opposite party through such neglect
to assert rights within a reasonable time. Ripley v. Seligman,
180.
See INCOMPETENT PERSON (3); LAPSE OF TIME.
An executory land contract has no tendency to show any legal
title in the vendee, or in any person claiming under him;
and, if it conveys no legal possessory interest in or upon the
land, it does not give the vendee a legal right to its posses-
sion. Gamble v. Ross, 315.
See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (3, 4); MORTGAGE (7).
1. A lessee, who has not been disturbed in the enjoyment of the
rights granted under his lease, cannot, in an action by the
lessor to recover the rent reserved, question the right of the
lessor to make the grant. Cunning v. Boom Co., 237.
2. Where the grantor in a trust-deed, authorizing the trustee to
lease, mortgage, or sell the premises conveyed in order to
pay the debts of the grantor, is allowed by the trustee, with
the assent of the creditors, to remain in possession under an
arrangement to pay rent to the trustee, or to carry on the
business in his own name, as it had been done, the trustee
and the creditors are estopped from setting up any claim
against one to whom the grantor has leased a portion of said
premises. Id.
3. A lease of a portion of a dock, which had been leased for
storage purposes to a prior lessee, who accepts and uses
another portion of the dock, will not amount to an eviction
of the first lessee, who will be held to have assented to the
change. Id.
4. In a suit to recover rent, it was admitted that a fixed rental
was agreed upon, payable monthly, but the parties differed
as to the term of the lease, the lessor testifying that it was
for one year, and the lessee that no definite time was agreed
upon. The lessee further testified that he told the lessor that
he could not tell how long he would keep the house, as he
did not know himself, but, if it suited him, and nothing
occurred, he would probably stay in that locality three or
four years, as he wished his children to attend a school near
by. And it is held that the lessee was, upon his own show-
ing, a tenant at will, paying rent monthly, and that he could
not vacate the premises without a month's notice, as provided
by 3 How. Stat. § 5774. Holmes v. Wood, 435.
5. A defence of non-tenantability is not made out where the lessor
had no notice that the house was claimed to be untenantable,
LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued.
and the tenant assigned other reasons for leaving the premises
in his notice of removal, and, while testifying to the presence
of bad odors, arising from the alleged want of repairs, did
not testify that he left the house on that account. Id.
1. Lapse of time, though not a sufficient prohibition to consti-
tute a statutory bar, may, if circumstances warrant, so operate
by way of evidence as to create a presumption that the
parties have waived or abandoned their rights; and in this
connection the fact that during the delay one of the parties
died should have its proper bearing. Ripley v. Seligman,
2. Lapse of time alone is not sufficient to bar equitable relief.
Id.
LIFE-SUPPORT-See PARENT AND CHILD (3).
LOGS AND LOGGING-See BILL FOR ACCOUNTING.
1. An answer to a petition for mandamus, which denies the
allegations of fact upon which the application is based, is
decisive on a hearing upon petition and answer. Grondin v.
Logan, 247.
2. A township board cannot question the election or qualifica-
tion of justices of the peace, who have acted and been recog-
nized as such for more than one year, in mandamus pro-
ceedings prosecuted to compel the board to allow such
justices to act as members thereof. Id.
3. An averment in a petition for mandamus not expressly
denied, but admitted to be true in part, in the answer, will
be taken as true. Jones v. Board of Education, 371.
MARKET-PRICE-See SALE (1).
Pending a suit by a wife for divorce, she remarried, and, after
securing a decree, lived and cohabited with the second hus-
band as his wife, under the belief that another marriage
ceremony was not necessary, induced by his statement that
he had been so advised by good counsel, and his agreement,
which was kept, to make his will in her favor, and deliver
it to her for safe-keeping. And it is held that the formal
marriage ceremony may be treated as evidence, with what
subsequently occurred, of the nature of the relation which
the parties assumed and occupied, and that the facts establish
a valid marriage. Williams v. Kilburn, 279.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-See DAMAGES.
MENTAL COMPETENCY-See INCOMPETENT PERSON.
MILL-RACE-See HIGHWAYS (1, 2).
MISTAKE-See EVIDENCE (1); STATUTES.
1. An attorney for a mortgagee, who is charged with actively
participating with his client in the fraudulent foreclosure of
the mortgage, whereby all of the mortgagor's property was
absorbed to the injury of creditors, is a proper, though not
a necessary, party to a bill filed by a judgment creditor for
an accounting and the payment of his judgment. Sweet v.
Converse, 1.
2. Where a judgment creditors' bill alleges that the mortgagor
and a receiver appointed in the foreclosure suit fraudulently
conspired together to enable the mortgagee to get possession
of all of the mortgagor's assets for a nominal consideration,
and that the conspiracy was successful, it is not necessary to
aver that as a consequence there were no assets with which
to pay complainant's judgment, or that the conduct of the
defendants operated as a fraud upon other creditors, or that
the intent was to defraud them. Id.
3. Where a mortgagee of a corporation, its president, and the
receiver appointed in the foreclosure suit conspire to, and do,
conceal the mortgagor's property from bidders at the fore-
closure sale, neither the conveyance by the receiver, nor the
confirmation of the sale by the court, secured by a fraud
upon it, can protect such property as against existing credit-
ors. Id.
4. Where by the decree of the Supreme Court one of several
mortgages is allowed to stand as a valid security for the
amount which the Court find the mortgagor has been bene-
fited, but the time for payment and the rate of interest are
changed, and the mortgagee enjoined from foreclosing until
he has discharged the other mortgages, which are declared
void, and surrendered the accompanying notes, the only
method of foreclosing the lien created by the decree is by a
proceeding in chancery, in which a compliance with the terms
of the decree must be alleged and proved. Strong v. Tom-
linson, 112.
5. A foreclosure by advertisement by an assignee of a mortgage,
the assignment of which was executed in another state, and
not so certified as to entitle it to be recorded in this State,
although recorded therein, is void. Dohm v. Haskin, 145.
6. Equity will not permit one tenant in common, in the posses-
sion of property, for the use of which he is bound to account
to his co-owner, to foreclose by separate advertisements three
mortgages which he holds upon his co-tenant's interest, all
of which are past due. Id.
7. Where the vendee in a land contract assigned it to third
parties as collateral security for the performance of a con-
tract with them, and to secure them for money advanced to
pay the balance of the purchase price of the land, and in the
assignment authorized the vendor to convey the land to the
assignees, the papers will be construed together, and the deed
treated as a mortgage. Gamble v. Ross, 315.
8. The mere fact that, prior to the performance of said con-
ditions, the assignees allowed the vendee to lumber the land
so conveyed to them with other lands owned by them will
not be a waiver of their rights under the deed, contract, and
assignment. Id.
9. Where in replevin by the vendee from the assignees, of
lumber manufactured from logs taken from their lands and
from the lands conveyed to them, the assignees claim to have
made advances upon the logs cut from the latter lands, and
to have received an order from the vendee turning over to
them the lumber manufactured from said logs, which claims
are denied by the vendee, who claims to have acted in his
own right, it is for the jury to pass upon such disputed
questions of fact. Id.
10. In case such issue is found in favor of the vendee, and it
is further found that he lumbered the latter lands on his
own account, being in possession of the same, all with the
knowledge and consent of the assignees, the jury might be
justified in finding that their lien under their mortgage was
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