STATEMENT OF MARK GEBICKE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ANN BORSETH, SENIOR EVALUATOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND ROBERT PELLETIER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. GEBICKE. That's correct. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're very pleased to be here this morning to talk about the National Guard RAID teams. We've worked very closely with this subcommittee along with Mr. Skelton and we've enjoyed that relationship providing a number of products over the last over the last 3 years on the Federal structure and the programs that are available to combat terrorism.

And we've seen a consistent theme emerge over just about all the products that we've done, and that theme is that the number and cost of programs that have been initiated to combat terrorism has grown tremendously. And this has presented a very difficult management and coordination challenge in order to avoid duplication, fragmentation, and gaps.

And my message here today is going to be somewhat similar to the theme that we've given you over the past dealing with theand that theme deals with the RAID teams obviously and the report that the subcommittee just released today and that is that there's a need for a more focussed and coordinated U.S. response to weapons of mass destruction. We need an approach that capitalizes on the existing capability, minimizes the duplication, and at the same time focuses our funding on the highest priorities.

Now, exactly what are the RAID teams? DOD is currently establishing RAID teams to assist local and State responders. They're really going to do three things. They're going to help assess the situation when an incident does occur, advise the local and State authorities when necessary, and then facilitate requests for additional resources from the State and Federal military assets.

This fiscal year, 10 RAID teams are to be established. They're going to be in States that also coincide with FEMA regions. Each RAID team will consist of 22 full-time members. They'll be on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and each team will have dedicated equipment, ground transportation. They will not, however, have dedicated air transportation.

As you mentioned in your opening remarks, when we went to the Federal, State, and local officials to ask about how the RAID teams have begun to and will eventually fit into the scheme that currently exists for responding to a weapon of mass destruction, we found varying views, differing views.

At the Federal level, principally the players are the Army, the FBI, and FEMA, the principal players. The Army takes the position that the National Guard RAID teams are a very necessary element of a Federal response and a State response picture and believe that there are no obstacles that can't be overcome; and I'm sure the witnesses after I and our panel finishes will confirm that.

The FBI and FEMA, on the other hand, express quite a different view. They question the need for the teams. They are of the opinion that we have an adequate Federal response capability and that possibly this capability might be duplicative of what already exists. They're concerned about how the Federal Government-excuse me, the National Guard RAID teams would be able to integrate themselves in the local and the State response that has already been established.

And I need to mention this too that every place we went, all those officials that we spoke to were highly complimentary of the National Guard in their more traditional role and that is coming to an event where we need assistance and providing personnel, equipment, supplies, and transportation in the event of a catastrophe.

So that's really not at issue here, and what we're really talking about is whether or not the FBI, FEMA, and other officials that we've talked to believe that we need that initial capability of detection and identification that has to take place very early in an incident. And I'll talk more about that in just a second.

Now, at the State level, we also have varying views. It depends on where you go. One State is getting ready to accept and implement a RAID team. It was very complimentary, felt that the RAID team in their particular State was being integrated adequately and it would provide them with additional, more robust capability.

They anticipated using the RAID team to help them in general hazardous material incidents and to be the primary asset that would be available to the State, should there be an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction.

We need to clarify that when we have an incident the very first people that respond typically are your police department and then probably followed very closely by your fire department and your emergency medical personnel.

Most of the HAZMAT teams that are available throughout the country have basic training in dealing specifically with chemical agents and more specifically with toxic industrial chemicals because whenever they encounter an accident on a highway, they just don't know what confronts them so they have to have some basic training to assure that they take adequate control of the situation. Some officials told us that they believed the RAID teams could be useful in locations that have little or no HAZMAT capability, that this could be very helpful in those instances. We also talked with local officials and also the International Association of Fire Chiefs and we talked specifically about that first element that's very critical, the detection and identification of chemical agents and there again emphasized that it's really the first responders that need to have that real robust capability. They are the people that are going to be first on the scene and have to make a very, very quick assessment, usually within the first hour, certainly no more than the first 2 hours of when they're confronted with.

The second question that you asked us to address was whether or not there were other capabilities that exist at either the Federal or the State or the local level and we did identify over 600 HAZMAT teams located throughout the United States that can respond and do respond to incidents.

The chart over here to my right and your left indicates the various categories of the response elements that are available to a locality. At the very top you see what's readily available to the State in terms of the RAID teams once implemented, the State HAZMAT teams and the Air National Guard units, and then the lighter shaded to the right of the chart would indicate the Reserve military units, the active military units, and then the darker shaded to the bottom and to the left would indicate the Federal civilian and military activities that would be available.

So when you look at that you paint a very, very complicated picture of a number of different units that can respond, and we can talk in more detail about that later if you'd like.

The third issue that I wanted to mention here this morning that came up frequently in our discussions about the implementation of the RAID teams again had to do with the timeliness of the arrival of the RAID teams. Officials indicated the need for the team to arrive in that first hour to particularly be of help in the detection and identification of a chemical. They feel that the HAZMAT teams have that capability and with the RAID teams not arriving until probably the 4th hour, that assistance in that particular mode of dealing with the incident would not be of much value.

They also raised concerns about the team's ability to both retain and also to train their individuals, particularly those individuals that are in relatively specialized occupations.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the fact that we've got, as you've characterized it, murky views from the State and local and Federal agencies about the RAID teams and how useful they could be and how they'd fit into the Federal response and the State response mode, we felt that greater clarification was needed before we proceeded.

The fact that there appears to be some similar organizations that have functions very close to what the RAID team would bring to an incident lead us to believe that there might be unnecessary duplication among the responders and finally the concern about the timeliness of the response of the RAID teams coupled with issues of potential retention problems and also training problems leads us to believe that the RAID teams might have difficulty executing their responsibilities diligently.

And as you mentioned, we made several recommendations in our report for consideration. We felt it would probably be a good idea at this point in time to pause, to see how the implementation goes in these first few RAID teams to see if these issues that have been raised at the State and local and Federal Government are indeed issues that need to be resolved or whether or not we can move forward if we feel that the RAID teams are certainly necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I'll stop right there. It's a brief summary of our report. We'll be glad to respond to any questions that you may have.

[NOTE.-The GAO report entitled, "Combating Terrorism, Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear," GAO/NSIAD-99-110, is retained in subcommittee files, and may be obtained from GAO by calling (202) 512-6000.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gebicke follows:]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss our report,' which this subcommittee is releasing today, on the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams. The Department of Defense (DOD) is creating the teams to assist local and state authorities in assessing situations surrounding weapons of mass destruction emergencies (WMD), advise these authorities regarding appropriate actions, and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of additional state and federal military assets. As you know, over the past 3 years we have studied and reported on a number of issues concerning federal agencies' programs and activities to combat terrorism for this Subcommittee and Representative Ike Skelton. For example, we reported in September 1997 that many federal agencies had duplicative or overlapping capabilities and missions in combating acts of terrorism, including incidents involving WMD. We have also reported that the many and increasing number of participants and programs in the evolving counter-terrorism area across the federal government pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps.

After a brief summary, my testimony will address three issues in more detail. First, I will describe the role of the RAID teams in response plans as understood by local, state, and federal officials. Second, I will discuss other response assets that can perform similar functions to the RAID teams. Finally, I will discuss the RAID teams' responsibilities and how they plan to meet these responsibilities.

SUMMARY

While DOD has defined the specific mission for the RAID teams, the plans for these relatively new teams and their implementation continue to evolve. We found that there are differing views among federal and state officials on the role and use of the RAID teams and how they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to WMD incidents. Among the principal federal agencies involved, Army officials believe the teams can be valuable assets to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the federal response plan. They also believe that the teams will be a critical and integral part of the state and local response to such weapons. In contrast, officials with the two agencies responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist incidents-the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-do not see a role for the RAID teams in the federal response. They question the need for the RAID teams because of the federal structure already available to respond to WMD incidents. Instead, they see the National Guard, whether in state or federal status, responding with personnel and equipment as it does for natural disasters and other emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Officials in some states without a RAID team question the teams' utility primarily because of their response time; however, officials from a state with a RAID team are very enthusiastic about the concept and are making plans to use their team.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

For purposes of this testimony, weapons of mass destruction are defined as biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).