team will be equipped to perform detection, monitoring, sampling, and decontamination. By the end of 1999, the FBI plans to have 4-person teams in the remainder of the field offices, trained to the HAZMAT technician level, but with very little equipment. Eight of the larger FBI teams will be in states that also have the National Guard RAID teams.

There are also highly specialized military assets to deal with the full range of WMD. These include the Army's Technical Escort Unit, with three detachments stationed across the United States; the U.S. Marine Corps' Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force stationed at Camp Lejune, North Carolina; the Army's 52 Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, stationed across the United States; military laboratories, such as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; and other assets, such as the Mobile Analytical Response System from the Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center. These units have been positioned at large events such as the Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, economic summits, and presidential inaugurations in case of a terrorist attack.

There are 89 Air National Guard civil engineering units spread throughout the 50 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia that the state governors or federal officials can access to help in a WMD event. These civil engineering units-Prime Base Engineering Emergency Forces, known as "Prime BEEF" units-have the wartime mission of supporting sustained air operations during a WMD attack and mitigating the consequences of an attack. The Air Guard also has 78 Prime BEEF fire fighting units that are trained in handling hazardous materials and 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal units that are capable of handling WMD devices. There are plans to increase the number of Disposal units to 44 in the next 5 years. According to Air Guard officials, these skilled units could be of great use to local incident commanders in a WMD attack on civilian targets, if their equipment and training were upgraded. This would allow these units to be available to the states, not only in a WMD event, but also in a major HAZMAT emergency.

The military services, both active and reserve, have units that could be used in a WMD emergency. For example, the U.S. Army Reserve has 63 percent of the chemical units in the U.S. Army, including 100 chemical reconnaissance/decontamination elements stationed across the United States that can perform basic detection and identification of chemical agents as well as decontamination operations. The U.S. Army Reserve also has two chemical companies that are specifically designed for nuclear, chemical, and biological reconnaissance and contains the only biological detection company in the Army today that is ready to deploy. Under the authority of Army Regulation 500-60, a Reserve commander can respond to an emergency in the local area when there is imminent danger of loss of life or critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the local authorities could request assistance from the local Reserve commander in a WMD emergency without an official deployment of the military.

CONCERNS ABOUT RAID TEAMS' ABILITY
TO FULLY MEET THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

Our discussions with local, state, and federal officials and our analysis of the information regarding the RAID teams surfaced a number of concerns that the teams may not be able to meet their mission and responsibilities. The most significant and frequently mentioned is the time it

would take the RAID team to respond to an incident. Other concerns centered on recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues.

The goal for the RAID team, either in part or as a whole, is to be able to deploy to a WMD incident within 4 hours of notice. All local, state, and federal officials we met with expressed concern that this time frame would get the team there too late to be useful. They stated that, for the incident commander to benefit from the information they could produce, the RAID team would be needed at the scene within the first 1 to 2 hours. After that time, the local/state HAZMAT teams could have the basic detection and identification information that would allow them to begin to handle the situation. Then, the incident commander would either be in control of the situation and not need additional assessment input from the RAID team or so completely overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation that the FBI and FEMA already would have been notified, and in coordination with the state, federal assets already would be on their way to the

scene.

The RAID teams will have dedicated vehicles to transport them and their equipment to the incident. The teams will also have access to Army National Guard helicopters and small, fixedwing aircraft that could carry some team members with hand-held equipment. The remainder of the team and equipment would then follow in the vehicles. To transport the entire team to a distant location within the state or region, with all its equipment and vehicles, would require military airlift, like C-130 aircraft. However, there are no plans to dedicate ground crews, flight crews, or aircraft for on-call, immediate response to a RAID team deployment. If Air National Guard or Air Force aircraft were required to transport the RAID teams, authorization would have to be obtained from the U.S. Transportation Command.

The lack of dedicated airlift for the RAID teams adds to the concern about the delayed arrival. Some federal assets, including the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response Unit, have immediate access to aircraft and flight crews. The EPA and Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators have the ability to contract for civilian aircraft to get their assets, as well as contractor assets, to a scene quickly.

As a result of a 1993 restructuring, combat support and combat service support functions were concentrated in the Army Reserve and combat functions in the Army National Guard. Therefore, except for the RAID teams, there are few promotion opportunities for chemical and medical specialists in the rest of the Army Guard. Some officials expressed concern that the Guard would not be able to maintain a "pipeline" of highly trained individuals to fill vacancies on the RAID teams, making it necessary for the teams to operate at less than full capability when vacancies occur. For example, it may be difficult to find the highly trained personnel with the necessary education and skills required to operate the sophisticated equipment planned for the RAID teams, such as the mass spectrometer. According to DOD, there are ample units in the Guard and Reserve from which to draw qualified candidates for the RAID teams and that can provide opportunities for team members who want to leave for promotions.

According to local and federal HAZMAT team leaders, it may be difficult for the RAID team members to maintain their proficiency after they receive their training. For example, the teams will have a mobile lab with very sophisticated, technical identification equipment. Many local

HAZMAT team leaders stated that they would not have some of this equipment in their inventory, particularly the mass spectrometer, because it requires highly trained personnel to use and maintain it effectively. The federal HAZMAT team leaders stated that, while some of them have a mass spectrometer, it takes almost daily use to maintain competency and accuracy, which the RAID team may not get. All of the HAZMAT team leaders expressed concern that the RAID team members would lose their HAZMAT expertise if they did not have opportunities to continually practice their skills in more than just a simulated environment. All of the leaders stated that this on the job training is also critical to effective team operation. The stressful situation of an actual HAZMAT emergency cannot be replicated in a classroom or exercise and team members need to know that everyone on the team can operate in that environment. The Pennsylvania Guard officer responsible for developing that state's RAID team stated that the Guard was concerned about this and realized the need to create these on-the-job opportunities, not only to maintain proficiency but to keep the team members from leaving to work on local HAZMAT teams. He added that the Guard was working with local HAZMAT teams so that the RAID team could participate in local training exercises and, at some later point, perhaps respond with the local teams on actual HAZMAT emergencies. According to DOD, there are a significant number of exercises conducted by federal, state, and local authorities that provide ample opportunities for the RAID teams to exercise their skills.

All of the HAZMAT team leaders discussed the need to have sufficient team members cross trained in each position to be able to field a complete team when an emergency arises. This process also alleviates the concern of having the entire team on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, which could cause significant hardships for the RAID team members as they try to maintain normal lives. The RAID team survey function is the only part of the team that has multiple individuals performing the same job. All other members of the RAID team who could not respond to a deployment call would create a loss of capability for the team. Also, the RAID team will have only one set of equipment for both training and deployment, which could make it difficult to both train on the equipment and be operationally ready to deploy.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, I would like to summarize our three major findings and reiterate the recommendation in our report. First, the fact that local, state, and federal officials responsible for implementing emergency response plans have differing views regarding the role for the RAID teams suggests that further clarification of their expected role and use is needed. Second, the fact that the RAID teams have capabilities similar to other local, state, and federal emergency response teams suggests that these teams might unnecessarily duplicate existing capabilities. Finally, concerns about whether they could arrive on the scene in a timely manner as well as other concerns related to recruiting, retention, and training raise questions about whether they could, in fact, effectively execute their responsibilities and missions. In view of these questions, we believe that a pause is warranted to more fully evaluate the need for these teams and more fully explore how they would fit into the total WMD response framework. Accordingly, we are recommending that the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism-in conjunction with the FBI, FEMA, and DOD-determine whether the teams are, in fact, needed before proceeding to expand the program in more states.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to answer any questions at this time.

CONTACT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Mr. Mark Gebicke at (202) 512-5140. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Robert Pelletier and Ann Borseth.

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10

Mr. SHAYS. First let me recognize the presence of Mr. Tierney. Nice to have you here, and it's my intention to call on Lee Terry and have him go first and then with the permission of Congressman Tierney, we'll go to Ike Skelton and then we'll go to you. You have the floor.

Mr. TERRY. Thank you. I appreciate hearing your remarks again, and I really do feel this is one of the few hearings where I really think we're on the same page. I want to bring out a little bit of your testimony here, some of the points that you raised and discuss them in the context really of what I stated in my opening remark and, that is, who should be in control and who should be helping whom?

We in the Federal Government have this system of we're supposed to be the ones that control and local governments are subordinate to States and States to us, but I think in an emergency response situation, it has to be the reverse.

You mentioned the word timeliness probably three or four times in your remarks, and I think that's the core of the issue here. In any type of emergency, whether it's detecting an emergency before it happens or the disaster and the cleanup that's necessary afterwards, it's our local police officers and our fire department and in a lot of these experiences it's the fire truck that gets there before the cops do. And then the EMS behind it.

They're there for a certain amount of time. They've got at least an uncontrollable situation, as much control as possible and then come the RAID teams and FEMA and everybody else just to confuse the picture and, like I said in my opening statement, everyone may have or possess benevolent means or desires but it just adds to a confusing situation. So let's talk about the timeliness for a second and let's highlight that.

Your chart over here is great, and it shows all the entities and right there in the middle is the first responders, the HAZMAT, the fire, and the police. Now, one of the studies that we do yearly on the city level with our fire department is response times.

Has there been a study that shows what the response times can be for these RAID units when a situation occurs and whatever the cities are in their territory?

Mr. GEBICKE. They're using a standard of 4 hours. Now, obviously that would be could be less if the incident happened to occur closer to the proximity where the RAID team is situated. If the incident is in another part of the State, it could take longer, feasibly. But 4 hours is the assumption that we have on arrival of the RAID team at an incident.

Mr. TERRY. Again with the assumption of 4 hours, let's say that response time is an average time in any type of a region; but I do agree with you I think probably in a lot of these areas it could be a lot longer than 4 hours. But have they shown any cost benefit analysis of showing up 4 hours after the fact? And by the way, I also want to highlight the first group that comes in in 4 hours may be the minimal crew and others will follow once that first crew has made an assessment.

So we heard from the city council person in Oklahoma City that it was as long as 15 hours, and I think that's probably very probable. But anyway, has there been a cost benefit of seeing that if