FM 34-52 APPENDIX D PROTECTED PERSONS RIGHTS VERSUS SECURITY NEEDS The articles in this Appendix are extracted from the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949. The GC attempts to balance the necessity of the proper treatment of protected persons with the needs of security by the Detaining or Occupying Power. The GC applies to the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in par. ticular, on race, nationality, religion, or political opinion. It is the design of the Convention to alleviate the sufferings caused by war (Article 13). At the outbreak of a conflict, many protected persons become displaced persons. They move within their own country to areas where hostilities are not a threat or a power is able to protect them. They may become refugees, fleeing into neighboring countries seeking a safe haven. The GC provides that protected persons who desire to leave at the outset of, or during a conflict, should be allowed to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interest of the State (Article 35). However, in light of possible threats to the security of the State receiving the refugees or a Detaining Power, the Geneva Convention does recognize a State's right to take appropriate action to insure security. The most typical security measure taken in such cases is the establishment of some manner of screening camps where the people may be identified and screened. During the process, useful intelligence may be obtained from legitimate displaced persons or refugees, and from potential threats, such as covert agents, who may be identified and interrogated. In most cases, interrogators or linguists will conduct the screening operations while working closely with CI personnel to identify those protected persons of CI interest. Other military intelligence personnel may be required to participate in this screening process because of the large numbers of refugees and/or the lack of other qualified personnel. Internment of a protected person occurs when the Detaining Power determines that confinement or assignment of residences to certain protected persons is absolutely necessary to the security of the Detaining Power (Articles 41 and 42). A civilian internee is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a civilian who is interned during an armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the Detaining Power. GENEVA CONVENTION PROVISIONSCONCERNING PROTECTED PERSONS It is critical that the GC provisions concerning protected persons be strictly adhered to in the quest to identify legitimate threats and gain needed intelligence. Specifically: (a) Article 5 provides that if a Party to the conflict is satisfied that an individual protected person is suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual shall not be entitled to claim rights or privileges under the convention, if the exercise of that right would be prejudicial to that State. However, such individuals must be humanely treated during internment and the pendency of any investigation and/or prosecution. A limitation of rights or privileges may include the withholding of the right to communicate with members of their family or representatives of their government. Such restrictions would be appropriate in a case involving spying, (b) Article 29 places the responsibility for the treatment accorded protected persons upon the Party in whose hands they are found. This is in addition to any personal responsibility incurred by an agent of that Party. This is an affirmative duty upon commanders to insure their subordinates are not mistreating protected persons or their property. The command and the government will ultimately be held responsible for any mistreatment. (c) Article 31 prohibits physical or moral coercion against protected persons to obtain information from them or from third parties. Prohibited coercion may be obvious, such as physically abusing the subject of the screening or interrogation. It may also be more subtle, such as threats to turn the individual over to hostile forces; subjecting the individual to humiliating or degrading treatment, implying harm to the individual or his FM 34-52 property, or implying a deprivation of rights guaranteed by international law because of a failure to cooperate; threatening to separate parents from their children; or forcing a protected person to perform guide services. (d) Article 32 prohibits corporal punishment, torture or taking any measure of such character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in your control. This prohibition not only applies to actions taken by the Detaining Party against the protected persons, but also any adverse action that others may take. (e) Article 33 prohibits collective punishments, penalties, reprisals, or pillaging of protected persons and their property. The principle behind this provision is that protected persons should only be held liable for offenses they personally commit. This prohibition includes all measures of intimidation or terrorism. (f) Article 41 allows the Power, in whose hands the protected persons are found, to intern or force assigned residence to protected persons, if the other measures of control permitted by the convention are inadequate. Some persons may demand internment (for example, protected persons who may be threatened by others). Internment must be provided when the situation renders this step necessary (Article 42). (g) If interned or forced into assigned residences, protected persons have the right to have any such determination reconsidered and reviewed on a periodic basis (Article 43). (h) In connection with the above, Article 44 prohibits the Detaining Power from automatically interning or forcing an assigned residence against refugees who are nationals of an Enemy State, exclusively on the basis of their nationality, who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government. The purpose of this article is to insure that refugees, who may only technically remain enemy aliens, are not, on that basis alone, automatically subject to control measures, notwithstanding the fact that they are not protected by their government. An example of this would be interning Iraqi refugees based solely on their status as Iraqis. This prohibition, however, does not in any way deny the right of a State to intern such persons or subject them to legitimate controls when there is an additional basis for taking such action in the interest of security of the State. (1) Article 45 prohibits the transfer of protected persons into the custody of a Power not a signatory to the convention. The transferring Power must insure that protected persons transferred from their custody will be treated in accordance with the conventions. In the event that the transferring Power discovers that the protected persons are not being treated in accordance with the convention, they shall request that the protected persons be returned to their custody. FM 34-52 APPENDIX E In addition to reports previously covered, there are other reports prepared or used by interrogators in tactical and strategic units. DIAM 58-13 is the authority for format and preparation of intelligence information reports (IIRs), biographic reports, and knowledgeability briefs (KBS). Local SOPs guide the interrogator in preparing other reports. Message Text Format (MTF) Editor is software used by the military services, National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). MTF Editor • Creates, formats, edits, stores, prints, and transmits United States Message Text Formatting (USMTF) messages. • Is designed to run on Z-150, AN/UYK-83, Z-248, IBM PC compatibles, and other standard and nonstandard systems. • Requires minimum 320K random access memory (RAM), microsoft (MS) or personal computer (PC) disk operating system (DOS) version 2.1 or higher, and 5.25-inch disk drive. • Is "user friendly," as it employs many of the same commands available in commercial word proces sors. The SALUTE report format contains relevant information necessary to alert higher commands of an incident or relevant information obtained. It answers all basic interrogatives: Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why. Figures of sample reports, formats, and tags used by interrogators are listed below: • Figure E-1, Spot report voice message template. • Figure E-6, Biographic report. TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT The TIR (Figure E-3) serves as written summary of initial or subsequent interrogations. The term "tactical interrogation report" was adopted under NATO STANAG 2033. The TIR Eliminates information duplication of effort in later EPW interrogations. • Disseminates information to the intelligence officers of the immediate command, those of other appropriate commands, and interrogators who will conduct further interrogations. • Serves as an intelligence value assessment of EPWs, documents, and equipment carried by him at time of capture. • Consists of Part I, Intelligence Potential of EPW, and Part II, information obtained. In the heading, the EPW will be classified according to one of four categories explained in Chapter 4 under document exploitation. The first section of the report contains the source's name and category, interrogation serial number, date, report number, interrogator's name and unit, maps and language used, and interpreter's name (if one is used). The second section, Part I, contains the EPW's personal particulars, career, assessment of intelligence value, capture data from the captive tag, and documents and equipment found on the EPW. The third section, Part II, lists information obtained from the EPW during the interrogation regarding missions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, training, logistics, combat effectiveness, electronic technical data, and miscellaneous data. FM 34-52 BIOGRAPHIC DATA ENTRIES The following data prosigns are used in blographic reporting. If available, biographic information will fit in the summary of the IIR; the text entry will be NONE. Should the reportable information exceed the limitations of the summary, entries will be made in the text. When making entries, ensure that the numbers and prosigns shown here are those used in the biographic report, if you have no data for a particular item, skip it and list the next item for which you have a data entry. Items skipped are not listed on the report. The paragraph classification follows the biographic prosign. Do not use colons to separate the prosign and data entries. Minimum essential data (MED) prosigns are asterisked. SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT The rationale behind the summary interrogation report, shown at Figure E-8, is to preclude duplication of effort. In DESERT STORM, as EPWs were being evacuated up the chain, the gaining interrogator would ask questions only to be told the same questions had already been asked by somebody else at a previous location. This is embarrassing, and does not foster rapport building, because the gaining interrogator had no previous EPW screening or interrogation reports. It was assumed this was the first time the EPW was questioned. If the previous echelon received EPW information pertaining only to their immediate tactical situation, with no reports being forwarded, it would have been to the gaining interrogators advantage to be apprised of what transpired at the lower echelon; hence the summary interrogation report. This report is simple in design and purpose, but reveals EPW information that gives the gaining interrogator insight as to what was developed at the previous echelon. |