the defendant railroad companies be compelled to join in a through routing from Kalamazoo to Charlevoix via Bay View, but shall Bay View and Petoskey be established as interchange points between said defendants without restriction or limitation. Defendant, Grand Rapids and Indiana Railway Company, is willing that Bay View be established as an interchange point for passenger traffic from Kalamazoo to Charlevoix, but defendant, Pere Marquette, is unwilling that such order be made. unless the order be made broad enough to permit free and unrestricted interchange at Bay View. This the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railway Company is unwilling to concede.

Subdivision "b" Section 4 of Act 300 of the Public Acts of 1909, the same being Section 48 of the laws relating to railroads, revision of 1913, provides as follows:

"All railroads incorporated under the general railroad law of this State, as between themselves, and all electric railroads, as between themselves, shall establish through routes and just and reasonable rates applicable thereto, except as hereinafter provided."

Subdivision "e" of Section 22 of the same Act, the same being Compiler's Section 91 of the Laws relating to Railroads, revision of 1913, provides in part as follows:

"The Commission may after hearing on a complaint, establish through routes and joint rates as the maximum to be charged and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated when the common carriers complained of have refused or neglected to voluntarily establish such other routes and joint rates: Provided, No reasonably satisfactory through route and joint rate exists."

It will thus be seen that it is made the statutory duty of railroads to establish through routes and joint rates for the convenience of the traveling public, and it is further made the duty of the Commission, when the carriers have failed to perform such duty, to establish such other routes and joint rates, but the power of the Commission is expressly limited to those cases where no reasonably satisfactory through route and joint rate exists. It is stated on page 5 of defendant, Pere Marquette's brief that

"It appears from the testimony in this case that there is a through rate and through route from points on the lines of the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railway Company to Charlevoix via Grand Rapids and that tickets can be purchased providing for the interchange of such traffic at Grand Rapids."

We have not before us a transcript of the testimony taken on the hearing, but we assume from the foregoing statement that a through route now exists between Kalamazoo and Charlevoix with interchange at Grand Rapids. If this route is reasonably satisfactory then, under the Michigan statute, your Commission would have no authority to order another and distinct through route between these points. The case of

the Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 216 U. S. 538, is cited in this connection by counsel for defendants. The facts before the Interstate Commerce Commission in that matter were materially different from those here under consideration. In that case, the Northern Pacific and its connecting lines afforded means of transpor tation between the eastern points mentioned and Tacoma and Seattle on the west. The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission in compelling a joint route between the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific simply tended to divert traffic from a road already offering reasonably satisfactory means of transportation and would compel that road to divert passenger traffic from its own line for the purpose of satisfying a mere desire or preference upon the part of the traveling public, and the Supreme Court found and expressly stated as a matter of fact that the services afforded by the Northern Pacific was equally as good as that furnished by the Union Pacific via Portland, and found further that "a majority of the Commission plainly could not and would not have made the declaration in their order that there was no such other route, but for the view of the law upon which this court must pass." In other words, the Commission took the ground that the primary consideration was the satisfying of the traveling public and that it was for the traveler to determine as to whether the through route already established was reasonably satisfactory. From an analysis of the Northern Pacific case, it is apparent that in determining whether an established route is reasonably satisfactory all of the facts must be considered rather than the preference of individual travelers. For example, in the instant matter in determining whether the route from Kalamazoo to Charlevoix with interchange at Grand Rapids, the connection between trains, the time of transfer, etc., should be considered. The train may leave Kalamazoo arriving in Grand Rapids at ten A. M. The next train leaving Grand Rapids for Charlevoix via Pere Marquette may be 5 P. M., and again a passenger leaving Kalamazoo at night would naturally desire sleeping car accommodations. If the interchange is at Grand Rapids, he must transfer at that point and it is possible that no Pere Marquette train is leaving Grand Rapids after the arrival of such passenger from Kalamazoo. On the other hand, if the transfer is to be made at Petoskey or Bay View, such passenger could leave Grand Rapids at 9:15, get into his berth and without change arrive at Bay View at 6:18 the next morning, and from there take his train a short distance over the Pere Marquette to Charlevoix. I do not attempt to say what the actual condition with respect to connection at Grand Rapids is, but these and other matters are to be considered by the Commission in determining whether a reasonably satisfactory route now exists. If the Commission should determine that the route from Kalamazoo to Charlevoix via Grand Rapids is not reasonably satisfactory, it certainly would have the right to order a through route via Petoskey or Bay View. It appears further from the answers filed that the arrangement existing prior to 1908 with respect to interchange at Bay View was discontinued for the reason, as before stated, that the Grand Rapids and Indiana refused to make Bay View an interchange point for passengers to and from Mackinaw City, the Pere Marquette contending that a through route from Mackinaw City to Grand Rapids and points east and south should be established with Bay View as an interchange point permitting the Pere Marquette to

carry such passengers from Bay View to Grand Rapids. I do not believe this position tenable. The Grand Rapids and Indiana takes this passenger at Mackinaw City. It affords a reasonably satisfactory route to Grand Rapids. It should not be compelled to transfer its passenger who desires transportation to Grand Rapids, or points south and east, even though that point be on the line of the Pere Marquette south or east of Grand Rapids to another road. In other words, it, as long as the transportation facilities are reasonably satisfactory, should be allowed to carry such passenger on its own line as far as possible. On the other hand, if such passenger desires transportation from Mackinaw City to Charlevoix, it should transfer such passenger to the Pere Marquette line at either Bay View or Petoskey, and the same would probably be true of passengers desiring transportation to other points south of Charlevoix and north of Grand Rapids, unless such points are so near a junction point of the Grand Rapids and Indiana line that the passenger could be carried to that junction point and then transferred without inconvenience and over a route that the Commission would determine reasonably satisfactory. In other words, in considering routing, the road of origin if reasonable transportation is furnished should be entitled to the preference, that is to the long haul. For example, the Pere Marquette takes a passenger upon its train at Detroit for transportation to Mackinaw City; it will be necessary for such passenger to transfer to either the Michigan Central at Lansing or the Grand Rapids and Indiana at Grand Rapids, Petoskey or Bay View. The Pere Marquette road should not be compelled to transfer such passenger at Lansing or Grand Rapids, if its own line is a reasonably satisfactory line of travel but should be permitted to carry such passenger to Petoskey or Bay View and there interchange with the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railway Company, thus permitting itself the long haul. For the reasons herein stated, it is apparent that the petition filed by the Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Company and the Northern Steamship Company, as interveners, making Bay View and Petoskey interchange points without restriction, should not be granted, but we are impressed with the idea that Bay View and Petoskey should be interchange points for passengers traveling from Kalamazoo to Charlevoix, if the route now established via Grand Rapids is not reasonably satisfactory, and should also be made interchange points for Grand Rapids and Indiana passengers traveling from Mackinaw City to Charlevoix and certain points south thereof and north of Grand Rapids.

In the last analysis the determination as to whether a reasonably satisfactory route exists is to be determined from all the facts found by the Commission, bearing in mind that other things being equal, the road of origin is entitled to the long haul. It might also be well to bear in mind that, as appears from the files, the Pere Marquette has no track or station facilities at Bay View, and unless the same can be arranged by consent, it might not be within the province of the Commission to order interchange at that point. Such interchange, however, could be made at Petoskey, this being a point touched by both roads.

Trusting that the foregoing makes clear my position with respect to the subject matter submitted, I am,

Cr-y-O

Files submitted are returned herewith.

Very respectfully,

GRANT FELLOWS,
Attorney General.

CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. Under Section 14, any person who acts on behalf of a corporation donating to a wet or dry committee in a local option contest is guilty of a violation of the act.

July 6, 1914.

Mr. Charles H. Hayden, Prosecuting Attorney, Lansing, Michigan:

Dear Sir-I have before me your letter of recent date in which you ask for my opinion relative to the construction of Section 14 of Act 109 of the Public Acts of 1913, commonly referred to as the corrupt practices act. Said section reads as follows:

"No officer, director, stockholder, attorney, agent or any other person, acting for any corporation or joint stock company, whether incorporated under the laws of this or any other State or any foreign country, except corporations formed for political purposes, shall pay, give or lend, or authorize to be paid, given or lent, any money belonging to such corporation to any candidate or to any political committee for the payment of any election expenses whatever."

It appears from your statement that a detailed account has been filed in accordance with the statute by the committee of the party that opposed the adoption of local option in Ingham County at the recent election. Said accounts shows that a certain brewing company formerly doing business in the City of Lansing contributed the sum of $500.00 to the campaign fund and that other brewing companies organized under the laws of this State or of other states contributed amounts ranging from $50.00 to $500.00. The question is presented as to whether or not Section 14, quoted above, applies under the circumstances as stated by you.

It has heretofore been the holding of this Department that a committee organized for the purpose of conducting a campaign upon the question of the adoption of local option must be deemed to be a "political committee" within the meaning of the statute. If this construction be correct, it seems apparent that Section 14 of Act 109, above quoted, was flagrantly violated during the local option contest in Ingham County. It will be noted that said section imposes no penalty on the corporation that makes a donation, but is aimed rather at individuals who are thus held responsible for the corporate action. As drawn the section is broad enough in its terms to include all of the persons who may be responsible for the illegal contribution. In each case, that may arise the ascertaining of the parties who are actually at fault becomes a question of fact. In some instances there may be difficulty in determining what officials of the corporation have participated in the transaction and have rendered themselves liable to a criminal prosecution under Section 14. It would seem, however, that those persons who are required to take action in order to authorize the payment of money as well as those persons by whom the money must be actually paid out on behalf of the corporation are scarcely in a position to deny any connection with the transaction. Undoubtedly in most cases at least, the identity of the person who paid over the money to the political committee can be definitely established

and it would seem probable that, from such starting point, the connection of the other individuals criminally responsible might be established. Respectfully yours, GRANT FELLOWS, Attorney General.

Ca-v-O

SCHOOL LAW. A meeting of the board of education called by the president or secretary is not a "regular adjourned meeting."

The board of education in a graded district comprising a village and adjoining territory may employ a superintendent of schools.

July 6, 1914.

Mrs. T. S. Barber, Secretary, Board of Education, Saranac, Michigan.

Dear Madame-I have before me your letter of the 2nd instant in which you request the opinion of this Department upon several matters. Your first inquiry deals with the compensation to which the director of the school district is entitled for taking census. Under the terms of the statute, this is a matter that rests entirely within the determination of the Board of Education. If, therefore, it was the agreement and understanding that you as director should receive the sum of $50.00 per year which should cover the cost of taking the census, then you would not be entitled to extra compensation for doing the work or causing it to be done. As I understand the matter the real point in dispute in this connection is not as to the law but as to the fact as to whether or not the agreement for the payment of the annual compensation mentioned was intended to include the services of the director in taking the census. Upon the disputed question of fact, we can not, of course, undertake to pass. The records of the proceedings of the Board should show what the exact agreement in this respect was. If the records are in fact silent, I would suggest that the Board of Education take action at this time in order that it may be definitely cleared up.

Your second question has reference to adjourned regular meetings of the Board of Education. The precise point is as to whether a regular meeting may be adjourned "subject to the call of the secretary or chairman." Generally speaking, a Board of Education may adopt rules for its own guidance. The generally accepted idea of a "regularly adjourned meeting" is that the time thereof shall be fixed by the Board at their regular session and not left to the discretion of an individual member. It seems to me that a meeting called by the Secretary or chairman is to all intents and purposes a special meeting and can not be deemed to be a regular adjourned session of the Board. Being deemed a special meeting it is subject to the statutory provision regulating same and consequently twenty-four hours' written notice must be given thereof. Verbal invitation would not be sufficient. If, however, all the members of the board were present at the meeting any irregularity in the calling thereof would be cured.

You further state that your school district comprises the Village of Saranac and also a portion of the township adjoining the village. It seems that the contention has been raised that the statutory provision relative to the employment of a superintendent, found in Section 3 of