C. C. A. 255, certiorari denied (1911) 32 S. Ct. 840, 225 U. S. 710, 56 L. Ed. 1267.

2. "Words importing masculine gender."-Upon an application by a woman to be admitted to practice before the Court of Claims under a rule that "no counsel will be permitted to practice in the court unless he is a man of good moral character," it was held that, while the masculine gender, which is generally used in statutes, frequently embraces the feminine, it would not be so construed so as to admit the applicant. The court stated: "If a masculine word receives any such latitude of construction, it is when it is applied to those cases where law and cus

Cited without specific application in Railroad Tax Cases (C. C. Cal. 1882) 13 F. 724 (concurring opinion), writ of error dismissed County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1885) 6 S. Ct. 317, 116 U. S. 138, 29 L. Ed. 589.

4. Affirmation as satisfying requirement of "oath."-In early cases decided prior to the provision in this section that "a requirement of an 'oath' shall be deemed complied with by making affirmation in judicial form" it was held that affirmation instead of oath would only be permitted when the court was satisfied that the witness belonged to a society which professed to be conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath. Bank of Columbia v.

upon the same ground of right or responsibility; the general rule being that words are to be construed according to their usual meaning. Certainly it is not obligatory on courts to construe them other

wise, unless that is made obligatory by legislation. There is no such legislation affecting this court or its rules, and certainly when the rules were made the word 'man' was used in its usual and literal meaning, and, so used, expressed all that the court then intended." Mrs. Lockwood's Case (1873) 9 Ct. Cl. 346.

Under District of Columbia Rent Law Oct. 22, 1919, it was held that a married woman who was the owner of rented property might exercise all the remedies which were secured to owners under the act notwithstanding that the masculino gender was used in the relevant provisions of the statute. This section was cited as authority for the holding. Barbagollo v. Fishbien (App. D. C. 1923) 286 F. 780.

3. "Person."-"Person" is defined in a number of cases scattered throughout this work under the specific statute to which it relates. The general index is a guide to those cases.

No. 883; King v. Fearson (C. C. Dist. Col. 1829) Fed. Cas. No. 7,790.

Affirmation instead of oath was permitted where the witness had applied for admission to full participation in the mem

bership of the society of Quakers, and

usually met with them for worship. King v. Fearson (C. C. Dist. Col. 1829) Fed. Cas. No. 7,790.

But affirmation by a juror not a Quaker, and not attached to any particular reMcInligious sect, was not permitted. tire's Case (C. C. Dist. Col. 1803) Fed. Cas. No. 8,824.

And a juror was not allowed to make affirmation in lieu of oath, on the ground that he was a Methodist, where it was not contrary to the principles of that religious society to take an oath. Bryan's Case (C. C. Dist. Col. 1804) Fed. Cas. No. 2,063.

5. Oath of Chinaman.-In a suit in Admiralty the oath of a Chinaman, taken on the Bible, in the usual way, was held sufficient, where, on examination, it appeared that he felt solemnly bound by it. The Merrimac (D. C. N. Y. 1867) Fed. Cas. No. 9,474.

1. Transportation.

2. Manner of propulsion.

3. Barges, canal boats, etc.

4. Scows.

5. Rafts.

6. Floating elevator.

7. Pump boat.

8. Dredges, etc.

9. Pile drivers.

10. Wharfboats, landing floats, etc.

11. Dry docks.

12. Dismantled vessels.

13. Racing shells.

14. Sunken vessel.

15. Yachts.

16. Towboat.

17. Uncompleted structure.

1. "Transportation."-"The word 'transportation' is not expressly or impliedly limited to the carriage of passengers or merchandise for hire. A pleasure yacht or an ice boat is a vessel within the meaning of the section, equally with a merchantman or an ocean liner; although the ice boat be designed solely to keep navigation open, and the pleasure yacht may carry neither passenger nor merchandise for hire." The International (Pa. 1898) 89 F. 484, 32 C. C. A. 258.

Under the statutory definition, a vessel may be defined to be a navigable structure, capable of being used for transportation, whether intended to be or actually used for that purpose. Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat (D. C. Ky. 1909) 169 F. 895, 900.

2. Manner of propulsion.-A vessel is none the less one on account of the manner of her propulsion, whether by oars, sails, or steam. The Devonshire (C. C. Or. 1882) 13 F. 39, 41.

3. Barges, canal boats, etc.-Barges, canal boats, etc., used in transportation, though having no masts or sails or motive power of their own, are vessels within admiralty jurisdiction. The Dick-Keys (C. C. Ohio, 1863) Fed. Cas. No. 3,898; The Kate Tremaine (D. C. N. Y. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 7,622; The Wilmington (D. C. Md. 1880) 48 F. 566; Disbrow v. The Walsh Brothers (D. C. N. Y. 1888) 36 F. 607.

A navigable structure, intended for the transportation of a permanent cargo, that has to be towed in order to navigate, is a vessel. Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat (D. C. Ky. 1909) 169 F. 895, 900.

Coal barges, which are mere open boxes, floated downstream, and usually sold for lumber at the end of the voyage, are not ships or vessels in the maritime sense of the term. Jones v. Coal Barges (C. C. Pa. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 7,458; Wood v. Two Barges (C. C. La. 1891) 46 F. 204.

Under this section providing that the word "vessel" includes every description

of water craft or other artificial contriv ance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water, barges used for the transportation of coal on an inland river were held to be "vessels," within R. S. 4141 (see Title 46, Shipping, § 17), providing for the registration thereof. Arnold v. Eastin (1903) 116 Ky. 686, 76 S. W. 855.

A barge or lighter employed in transporting stone used in the construction of a breakwater is a "vessel." Com. v. Breakwater Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 10, 100 N. E. 1034.

A claim against a barge for wharfage is cognizable in admiralty. Ex parte Easton (N. Y. 1877) 95 U. S. 68, 74, 24 L. Ed. 373.

4. Scows.-Scows are vessels. Ellis V. U. S. (Mass. 1907) 27 S. Ct. 600, 206 U. S. 246, 51 L. Ed. 1047, 11 Ann. Cas. 589.

Scows, though having no propelling power of their own, are vessels. The General Cass (D. C. Mich. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 5,307; Endner v. Greco (D. C. N. Y. 1880) 3 F. 411.

The section includes a scow, 110 feet long and 34 feet wide, without motive power of its own, employed in carrying mud from a harbor to the dumping ground. In re Eastern Dredging Co. (D. C. Mass. 1905) 138 F. 942, 943.

In view of this section defining "vessel," and section 713 of Title 46 Shipping, defining "seaman," the case for death, by falling off the gangplank of a night watchman on a derrick lighter or scow, floating in New York Bay, though moored to the bulkhead, and being used there in construction work, was held one in admiralty, excluding recourse to Workmen's Compensation Law. Norman v. Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. (1922) 193 N. Y. S. 195, 200 App. Div. 360.

5. Rafts.-A raft made of cross-ties, used as a convenient mode of bringing them to market, manned by a pilot, crew, and cook, who lived and had shelter thereon during the voyage, which lasted many days, and propelled by the tides and by poles and large oars, is a vessel, within this section, so as to give jurisdiction to admiralty of a libel in rem against it for a collision on navigable waters. Seabrook v. Raft of Railroad CrossTies (D. C. S. C. 1889) 40 F. 596.

A steam tug towing a raft of logs must carry the lights required by law, though such raft may not be strictly a vessel, as defined by this section. The Annie S. Cooper (D. C. La. 1891) 48 F. 703, 704.

6. Floating elevator.-A former canal boat, on which had been built an elevating apparatus for hoisting grain, for transferring grain from one vessel to another, though without motive power of its own or capacity for cargo other than its eleva

tor, is nevertheless a vessel, a subject of maritime lien. The Hezekiah Baldwin (D. C. N. Y. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 6,449.

7. Pump boat-A pump boat, which is a floating structure equipped with engine, boiler, pumps, pipes, and capstans, used for pumping out coal barges, capable of being moved on the water by ropes attached to its capstans or by being towed, is a vessel within this section, and subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat (D. C. Ky. 1909) 169 F. 895.

8. Dredges, etc.-Floating dredges are vessels. Ellis v. U. S. (Mass. 1907) 27 S. Ct. 600, 206 U. S. 246, 51 L. Ed. 1047, 11 Ann. Cas. 589.

A steam dredge, without motive power

of its own, but capable of being towed from place to place, is a vessel, within the definitions given by this section. Saylor v. Taylor (Va. 1896) 77 F. 476, 477, 23 C. C. A. 343; McRae v. Bowers Dredging Co. (C. C. Wash. 1898) 86 F. 344, 347; The Pioneer (D. C. N. Y. 1886) 30 F. 206; Aitcheson v. The Endless Chain Dredge (D. C. Va. 1889) 40 F. 253, 254; The Atlantic (D. C. S. C. 1893) 53 F. 607, 608.

A steam dredge and the scows used in connection with it are each a vessel within this section. The International (C. C. A. Pa. 1898) 89 F. 484, affirming (D. C. 1897) 83 F. 840; The Alabama (C. C. Ala. 1884) 22 F. 449; The Alabama (D. C. 1884) 19 F. 544; The Starbuck (D. C. Pa. 1894) 61 F. 502.

A hydraulic steam dredge, operating afloat, by sucking up material from the bottom and discharging it through adjustable pipes on adjacent land is a ship or vessel, within the admiralty jurisdiction. Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Co. v. Federal Contracting Co. (D. C. N. Y. 1906) 148 F. 290, 294, affirmed (1907) 153 F. 870, 83 C. C. A. 52. See In re Hydraulic Steam Dredge No. 1 (Ill. 1897) 80 F. 545, 25 C. C. A. 628.

But a marine pump, used to suck mud from the bottom or from scows and force it on the adjacent land, resting, while at work, on piles driven into the ground, and weighted with heavy ballast to keep it in place though capable of being towed from place to place, has none of the characteristics of a vessel. The Big Jim (D. C. Pa. 1894) 61 F. 503.

9. Pile drivers.-A pile driver, consisting of a floating platform carrying a derrick, engine, and pile-driving apparatus, having a stern wheel, by which it could propel itself, and a rudder and steering wheel, but in its existing condition not fitted for purposes of transportation, is not such a vessel as to be the subject of admiralty jurisdiction. Pile Driver E. O. A. (D. C. Mich. 1894) 69 F. 1005.

A flatboat, with a pile driver and its engine erected thereon, mainly used in constructing bulkheads, for the erection of

channel lights, but also employed in transporting materials used in the work, being towed by a tug for that purpose, is to be classed as a vessel, subject to maritime jurisdiction. Southern Log Cart & Supply Co. v. Lawrence (Ala. 1898) 86 F. 907, 30 C. C. A. 480, affirming Lawrence v. Flatboat (D. C. 1897) 84 F. 200.

10. Wharfboats, landing floats, etc.-A wharfboat, owned by carrier, secured to shore by cables and used as office, warehouse, and wharf, having water and electric light connections and telephone system, is not a "vessel," to come within rule Evansof limited liability for damages. ville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co. (Ind. 1926) 46 S. Ct. 379.

A float, supporting a floor and a house, used to store oars and sails of small boats landing at it, and as a means of egress from there to the wharf at which it was moved, and thence to the shore, being stationary, and never employed in transportation upon the water, cannot be held to be a ship or vessel. Woodruff v. One Covered Scow (D. C. N. Y. 1887) 30 F. 269.

A floating structure, designed to be moored alongside a wharf, so that carts could be driven over it with refuse to be dumped into boats lying alongside, which was mainly stationary, though capable of being towed from one wharf to another, is not a vessel within the meaning of the maritime law. Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform (D. C. N. Y. 1889) 38 F. 158.

11. Dry docks.-A floating dry dock, being a fixed structure, not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a vessel. Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co. (La. 1887) 119 U. S. 625, 7 S. Ct. 336, 337, 30 L. Ed. 501; Snyder v. A Floating Dry-Dock (D. C. N. J. 1884) 22 F. 685; Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co. (D. C. N. J. 1915) 219 F. 763.

12. Dismantled vessels.-A steamboat stripped of her boiler, engine, and paddle wheels, and fitted up and used as a saloon and hotel, is not, while being towed to another place, to be there used in a similar way, engaged in commerce or navigation, so as to be liable in rem in admiralty for services rendered to it. The Hendrick Hudson (D. C. N. Y. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 6,355.

A dismantled steamboat, moored on a navigable river, and undergoing alterations and repairs to fit her for use as a wharfboat, such use being in aid of commerce and navigation, is liable in rem to a charge for salvage. The Old Natches (D. C. Miss. 1881) 9 F. 476.

An old steam boat, from which the boilers, wheel, engines, and machinery had been removed, and which had been changed into a pleasure barge for the transportation of excursion parties, having no independent means of propulsion, but intended to be towed by a towboat, is a

vessel, and subject to a maritime lien. The City of Pittsburgh (D. C. Pa. 1891) 45 F. 699.

13. Racing shells.-Racing shells are not "vessels." Thayer v. U. S. (1912) 2 Ct. Cust. App. 526.

14. Sunken vessel.-Where it appeared that a vessel, engaged in the coastwise trade, struck a rock and sunk, and after several unsuccessful attempts to raise her, was abandoned by her owners to the underwriters, who sold her, and the purchaser succeeded in raising her about a year and a half after she had sunk, the court held that she was still a vessel and subject to admiralty jurisdiction. The George W. Elder (Or. 1913) 206 F. 268, 124 C. C. A. 332.

15. Yachts.-The section includes sailing yachts. U. S. v. Holmes (C. C. Ohio, 1900) 104 F. 884, 886.

16. Towboat.-A stern wheel steamer licensed for the coasting trade, formerly a ferryboat, used to propel from place to

place on navigable waters a floating house, in which was given, while moved to the shore, an exhibition or circus show, is a vessel engaged in commerce and navigation. The W. F. Brown (D. C. La. 1891) 46 F. 290.

17. Uncompleted structure.-"Vessel" describes a structure so far completed as to be capable of being used as a means of transportation on water. R. R. Ricou & Sons Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. (C. C. A. Fla. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 103.

Cited without specific application.-The Conqueror (N. Y. 1897) 17 S. Ct. 510, 513, 166 U. S. 110, 41 L. Ed. 937; The F. & P. M. No. 2 (D. C. Wis. 1888) 33 F. 511; The Conqueror (D. C. N. Y. 1892) 49 F. 99; U. S. v. One Gasoline Launch (Wash. 1904) 133 F. 42, 43, 66 C. C. A. 148 (dissenting opinion); Eastern S. 8. Corporation v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Mass. 1919) 256 F. 497, 168 C. C. A. 3; George Leary Const. Co. v. Matson (C. C. A. Va. 1921) 272 F. 461; Gonzales v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. (D. C. N. Y. 1924) 3 F. (2d) 168.