These FY99 savings were necessary to minimize budgetary requirements in the FY00 budget request.

Mr. WELDON. Why would the Air Force penalize itself with increased cost within its own future years defense plan?

General MARTIN. Higher priority requirements required funding to fit within a constrained fiscal year 2000 budget. The SBIRS High program delay provided FY00 budget resources for these higher priorities but did result in cost increased to the program in later years.

Mr. WELDON. How does the Air Force intend to support the engineering team and prevent a production break in the SBIRS High sensor suite?

General MARTIN. A SBIRS High Joint Estimate Team (JET) is assessing the restructed SBIRS High program to determine a most probable cost estimate for the restructure. The JET assessment will include recommendations to minimize costs which would include minimizing production breaks.

Mr. WELDON. How does the Air Force intend to address the $100 million shortfall for the scaled back SBIRS High Program?

General MARTIN. The Air Force has submitted a fully offset budget amendment to the Department of Defense based on our current budget estimate. This budget amendment was forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget on April 14, 1999, and will correct the FY00 budget shortfall. The Joint Estimate Team (JET) will finalize a most probable cost estimate for the restructured SBIRS High program. The JET estimate will be used to update the budget amendment in FY01 and out as necessary.

Mr. WELDON. Was BMDO involved in the decision making process? At what level? General MARTIN. The BMDO Director was briefed on the Air Force's approach before the slowdown of the SBIRS High program was contractually implemented. The BMDO Director did not have any objections to the Department's approach.

Mr. WELDON. When did the Air Force know the demonstration programs were over cost and behind schedule?

General-MARTIN. The first cost growth on the Flight Demonstration System (FDS) occurred in the November 1996, timeframe. The Low Altitude Demonstration System (LADS), awarded subsequent to FDS, began showing cost overrun in the June 1997, timeframe. The February 1999, decision to terminate both programs resulted from an assessment of both programs which showed they had reached a point of diminishing return given their newest cost overrun predictions of mid-January 1999. This most recent estimate revealed that FDS required more funding than that appropriated for FY99 and both programs would run out of funds in early February 1999.

Mr. WELDON. When did the Air Force have the data providing the proofs of principle necessary to proceed with SBIRS Low without the demonstrations? General MARTIN. The cost growths on both demonstration programs that were first reported to the Air Force in January 1999, forced a reevaluation of the program that determined that the point of diminishing returns had been reached.

The efforts of the Flight Demonstration System and Low Altitude Demonstration System, prior to their termination, had resulted in significant risk reduction progress particularly in the areas of sensor production and integration. Also, onorbit phenomenology data is now available from the Midcourse Space Experiment, launched in FY96, and the Miniature Sensor Technology Initiative, launched in FY97. By coupling the above information with an expanded Program Definition/Risk Reduction phase, the government believes proof of principle and risks will be well understood at EMD start (Summer, 2002). Further, a Defense Science Board Independent Review Committee is reviewing this strategy to ensure risks are adequately reduced.

Mr. WELDON. What requirements were not being met that limited the operational legacy of the demonstration systems? Why is the Air Force confident of that assessment without having completed program definition?

General MARTIN. The demonstrations did not meet a variety of requirements expected for the operational SBIRS low satellite. For example, they would not be able to meet duty cycle (on-time) nor be able to provide real-time downlink and on-board processing sufficient to meet the expected SBIRS Low requirements. The SBIRS Low demonstration satellites, due to these technical limitations, could not be operationalized.

Mr. WELDON. Why is the restructured program lower risk than proceeding with the demonstrations?

General MARTIN. Because the funding required to support the overruns of the two demonstrations would remove funding necessary to perform requirements definition and initial design of the operational SBIRS Low system. Further, the schedule delays of the two demonstrations were encroaching on the Milestone II decision

point. Further delays would increase the risks to a SBIRS Low first launch in fiscal year 2006.

Mr. WELDON. What is the Air Force assessment of the risk for a first launch in fiscal year 2006?

General MARTIN. Medium Risk. The risk will increase as the Program Demonstration and Risk Reduction (PDRR) contract date slips. The FY06 first launch represents a shorter duration between preliminary design review and launch for the SBIRS Low system than the less complex SBIRS High geosynchronous system.

Mr. WELDON. Why did the Air Force delay informing Congress of its decisions? Genral MARTIN. From the time the Air Force was notified of the FDS and LADS cost overruns in January until it made its recommendations to OSD and then advised the appropriate Congressional Members and their staffs in early February was less than one month. During that process, an intense review of funding, schedule, and programmatic implications was conducted to determine the appropriate program restructure recommendations.

Mr. WELDON. What were the results of the recent independent assessment of the ABL program?

General MARTIN. The independent assessment of the ABL program was provided to congress on 17 Mat 99. Overall, the Air Force concurs with the observations and findings of the Independent Assessment Team (IAT). The IAT concluded the ABL could "represent a truly revolutionary weapon in the nation's arsenal" and the remaining questions relate to "system issues which can only be answered by a complete High Energy Laser (HEL) system flying. . . .

In addition, the IAT report made recommendations to bolster the program. The recently restructed ABL restructured ABL program is already aligned with many of the IAT report recommendations:

a. The Air Force has stood up a Directed Energy Countermeasures Assessment Team (DECAT) that will serve as an independent countermeasure "red team" for the program.

b. North Oscurra Peak, NM compensation and tracking tests will verify ability to compensate for atmospheric disturbances and deliver laser energy.

c. Added CONUS and overseas date collection campaigns using a star scintillometer will help characterize atmospheric turbulence. Also, the program has added contractor risk reduction activities and expanded the test program.

In summary, we feel that the IAT report served as a healthy review of the program and the end result will be a stronger, less risky program. Those few IAT recommendations that are not already in the program are being evaluated through the working groups, Integrating Integrated Product Team (IPT), and Overarching IPT

process.

Mr. WELDON. How would the Air Force assess the ABL program risk now? One Air Force assessment recently stated that the program delay resulted in a stronger program. What impact would additional delay and testing have on the program?

General MARTIN. Overall, the risk of the program is moderate our major challenge is the integration of optics, laser, and Battle Management C4I (BMC41) segments onto the 747 aircraft. The FY99 $25M Congressional cut forced a program restructure and the Air Force used this opportunity to add significant risk reduction activities and expand the test program. As a result of this restructure, the program slipped one year but is stronger and less risky.

An additional delay to the program would result in proportionate delays to the major program milestones such as Initial Operational Capability (3 aircraft fielded currently in FY07) and Full Operational Capability (7 aircraft fielded in FY09), as well as program cost increases. At this point, the Air Force believes that additional delays to the program would suffer from diminishing returns-the benefits derived from the additional risk reduction and testing that the slips would allow, would not be worth the cost growth and delay of much needed TMD capability to the warfighter.

Mr. WELDON. How mature is the operational concept for ABL, given its current stage of development?

General MARTIN. The interim ABL Concept of Operations (CONOPS), published by Air Combat Command on 31 Jun 98, is very mature for a program early in Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR). The ABL Independent Assessment Team concluded the "current operational concept is sufficiently developed to guide the development and testing of the PDRR hardware and software." In addition, in a 9 Feb 99, letter from AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to Lt. Gen. Martin (SAF/ AQ), the ABL team was identified as having made excellent progress in the CONOPS development. The SAB team's conclusion was that the program is on track with respect to the CONOPS. The CONOPS is an evolutionary document that will be updated over several cycles in consonance with the ABL Operational Require

ments Document (ORD) and the development and fielding of the ABL. The final version of the CONOPS will support the program's production decision in FY06.

Mr. WELDON. How robust is the planned intercept testing prior to entry into EMD?

General MARTIN. The ABL PDRR test philosophy is very robust. It is designed to build high confidence through incremental integration and testing. The planned lethal intercept tests (first intercept scheduled for Sep 3) are the culmination of a very long and thought out test program which includes: progressive Battle Management C41, beam control/fire control (optics), laser, and weapon system ground and flight testing. Targets for the PDRR flight test build-up include static and dynamic target boards, domestic missile targets (21 Lances and Terrier/Black Brants), and Foreign Material Assets missiles (3 SCUD-B's). Instrumented target boards should provide in depth quantitative data concerning ABL's ability to put the appropriate level and quality of laser energy on target. The seventeen month flight test program will be conducted at White Sands Missile Range, NM; Edwards AFB, CA; and the Western Range at Vanderberg AFB, CA. The goal of the lethal intercept tests against the SCUD-B's will be to demonstrate the end-to-end capability of an integrated PDRR weapon system against a threat-represntative theater ballistic missile.

Mr. WELDON. How does ABL fit into the BMDO "family of systems" concept? General MARTIN. ABL makes vital contributions to the BMDO "family of systems" (FOS) as the only boost phase interceptor. The theater missile defense (TMD) architecture has three layers or tiers: attack operations, boost phase intercept, midcourse, and terminal phase. ABL is the only boost phase system. Destroying enemy missiles in the boost phase is extremely important for several reasons:

a. Deterrence: It presents an enemy with the possibility that missile debris, including the warhead, may fall back on their territory-in this way, ABL serves as a viable deterrent to use of weapons of mass destruction.

b. Enhance FOS effectiveness: It reduces the number of missiles that midcourse and terminal defense systems must engage, allowing these systems to focus on fewer targets-extends range of the hit-to-kill systems-and eases interceptor inventory requirements.

c. Defeats terminal system countermeasures: It kills missiles before any early release of submunitions (ERS), as ERS is a very significant challenge for hit-to-kill defense systems.

In addition to its role as boost-phase "shooter," ABL will also possess significant sensing capability that will improve performance of other TMD layers by: providing quick and accurate missile launch point estimates which cue attack operations assets; pass trajectory data and impact point predictions on "leakers" to midcourse and terminal systems to narrow their sensor search patterns and extend their range; and. Predicting accurate and timely impact points to enhance passive defense in the target areas.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. Given the possibility that several of these rogue states could acquire not just one but several nuclear missiles, the first missile going 50 miles up, exploding over the target to an electromagnetic pulse; other missiles are kept shielded and fired an hour, half hour, whatever adequate time necessary so that their mechanisms are not fried, but fired in a follow-on attack. Is that scenario being considered as you develop this system, it certainly causes me to believe that that is something that could happen and something we should be preparing for? Many of our even fairly simple systems would be fried in such a scenario, and I am talking about simple weapon systems. And so I was wondering if something as sophisticated as this could be hardened?

General LYLES. The ability for the NMD system to survive and perform its mission would not be affected by the described scenario. The NMD system is being designed to withstand the effects of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) caused by the detonation of nuclear weapons at high altitude. The NMD hardening requirements are based on a spectrum of projected threats that clearly covers this one, and the system is being designed with margin so that excursions from the projected threats are handled as well.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. Aerostats, as an anti-cruise missile sensor platforms, impose severe constraints in radar payload weight and prime power, as well as cost; none of which can be overcome by conventional technologies. What alternative technologies are

being evaluated or demonstrated as risk reduction measures to prove technical feasibility and affordability of an aerostat-based radar surveillance system?

General LYLES. In 1998, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) Technology Directorate began addressing the integration of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) technologies, including those technologies needed for cruise missile defense. BMDO, in cooperation with the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and the Services, has taken the lead in coordinating work in supporting technologies necessary to fill the gaps of an integrated, milti-service, TAMD capability.

The BMDO Technology Master Plan (TMP) addresses both the technology needs and acquisition challenges of theater air and missile defense. Many aspects of the technologies specifically relating to the cruise missile defense (CMD) mission are highly classified; however, the BMDO TMP addresses several technology initiatives that will lead to radar systems with significantly reduced weight, prime power requirements, and that can be produced at much lower costs to the Department. BMDO is constantly reviewing new technologies to fill TMD needs. In addition, the Army's Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensors (JLENS) program is developing technologies specific to the application of aerostats as a sensor platform for the CMD mission.

General MARTIN. The aerostat-based cruise missile defense system (Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) is being developed as part of an integrated theater missile defense architecture. No one system will be able to counter the future threat. Based on this premise, the DOD is pursuing a joint systems of systems approach to counter the future cruise missile threat. Because JLENS is an Army-managed program, the bulk of the following information was provided by the Army's Aerostat Program Office. If you desire more detail on the alternative technologies being developed, the Air Force would be happy to arrange a classified briefing.

The standard 71-meter aerostat (being used in the cruise missile defense program) can lift approximately 4400 pounds to 15,000 feet above sea level. A majority of the radar processing (signal and data processors), communications and power generation equipment is located on the ground, allowing most of the airborne payload to be dedicated to the radar array and receiver/exciter. Lofting an array in excess of 4400 pounds provides a radar payload fully capable of meeting the near- and farterm cruise missile defense requirements.

The JLENS program plans to make maximum use of existing technologies and those next generation technologies in development as part of other DOD programs. As Raytheon Systems Company (Bedford, MA) is the prime contractor for JLENS, a significant amount of the technology being transferred to JLENS has been or is being developed as part of other DOD contracts to Raytheon. This approach will ensure the development cost of the JLENS system are consistent architecture. The following major technology transfers are currently planned:

Tether. A scaled up version of the current 60kVA tether currently in use on the counter drug aerostats will provide adequate power for the radar being developed under the JLENS program. Prior to the JLENS source selection, the tether contractor designed, built, and tested a 500 foot section of a 60kVA tether. This new tether supplies all necessary power with an 8-10 percent power reserve. The tether development is considered low risk.

Fire Control Radar: The JLENS fire control radar is partially based on the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) radar. The transmit/receive modules will come directly from the THAAD production line. A new housing will be developed to integrate this radar onto the aerostat. The baseline signal and data processing software will come from an existing fire control radar program. This software will be modified to account for flight performance differences on an aerostat platform. The JLENS adaptation of the fire control radar has been evaluated as low risk. Surveillance Radar: The technology used for the JLENS surveillance radar is also being transferred from other DOD programs. These programs have completed extensive testing of the applicable technology and demonstrated its performance. There will be a configuration change to adapt the technology to the aerostat; however, the antenna components are identical. The other program signal and data processing software will be used as the baseline. Once again this software will be modified to account for flight performance differences on an aerostat platform. The JLENS adaptation of the surveillance radar has been evaluated as higher risk than the fire control radar, but still achievable with proven technology,

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. REYES. Over the past several years, the Department of Defense has told Congress time and time again that PAC-3 could not be converted to meet the MEADS requirement. You are now telling me that you are restructuring the program and plan to use the PAC-3 missile as the basis for the MEADS system. Please explain this discrepancy.

General LYLES. It is true that the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system could not be converted to meet the MEADS requirement. The MEADS requirements differ significantly from that of PATRIOT in several areas, specifically: transportability, mobility, BMC4I (netted and distributed architecture), battery defended area with 360-degree protection, and the ability to prosecute advanced threats. However, incorporating the PAC-3 interceptor into the restructured MEADS system should provide a system that satisfies the majority of those requirements. A recent examination of updated threat information showed that the MEADS architecture with the PAC-3 interceptor satisfies the majority of the near term threat requirements. This approach is consistent with our technology leveraging strategy and we believe that it will provide a cost-effective, low risk solution.

Mr. REYES. How much will this restructured system cost to develop? How much will this restructured system cost to deploy? How much would the previously planned system cost to develop? How much would the previously planned system cost to deploy?

General LYLES. Dr. Hamre directed that the U.S. Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) develop a detailed estimate for the original full MEADS development. They estimated this complete development at $5.7B USD, with the U.S. share estimated at $3.3B (including U.S. unique costs). An initial estimate using the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile reduces that cost to $4.2B with the U.S. share estimated at $2.4B (including U.S. unique costs). Neither of these estimates include credit for technology leveraging, one of the primary objectives of the Risk Reduction Effort (RRE), and I am confident that the cost can be further reduced based on the results from the Risk Reduction Effort.

Deployment costs for the original full system configuration were estimated at approximately $12B. This is primarily procurement cost for 8 battalions of equipment. A major contribution to this cost is the missile itself and the Department has undertaken several initiatives to reduce this cost. Using the PAC-3 missile, I expect a reduced deployment cost due to economies associated with higher production quantities from both U.S. and allied procurement.

Mr. REYES. It appears that there is funding for MEADS for the next three years, but no funding for 2003-2005. Isn't this the same problem that you faced with the MEADS system in the past-the failure of the Department of Defense to commit funding in the outyears? What is the difference now?

General LYLES. The original full MEADS program was very ambitious and expensive given available funding for Ballistic Missile Defense programs. Now the Department has identified a lower cost MEADS approach relying on the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor. We have discussed this idea with our German and Italian allies and they have agreed to pursue a lower cost PAC-3 based system. In addition, the United States worked with Germany and Italy to realign the cost share and reduce the U.S. contribution for future phases. These principles will be embodied in a revised Statement of Intent to which the Department can commit. Funding for the 2003-2005 timeframe is being addressed in the Department's preparation for the FY01 President's Budget.

Mr. REYES. The MEADS requirement has been verified again and again by the Secretary of Defense, the warfighting CINCs and by others throughout the Department of Defense. Is the Department of Defense committed to deploying a system that meets this requirement?

General LYLES. Yes, the Department is committed to developing and deploying a system that satisfies the MEADS requirement. Despite competing priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense resources, the Department, recognizing the need for maneuver force protection and the value of international cooperation, added $150M to the MEADS program for a three-year effort beginning in FY00 to develop critical technologies (e.g., mobile 360-degree fire control radar and lightweight mobile launcher) that support the MEADS requirement. This allows us to explore less costly program options by taking advantage of existing missile development programs, such as the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 interceptor. This approach provides increased resources for higher priority BMD efforts and enables us to continue armaments cooperation in this important mission area. Finally, Secretary Cohen stated in a recent letter to his German and Italian counterparts that the U.S. is committed to developing a MEADS capability.