After several years of dramatic decline, the Air Force's FY92 budget request for $86.8 billion in total obligational authority (31.1% of the total DoD request) provides a modest real growth over FY91 of 0.8%. The biennial budget also requests $91.7 billion for FY93, a 1.7% real growth over FY92. These modest increases reflect the need to capitalize upon long-planned investments in order to modernize and retain capabilities in essential mission areas. In subsequent years, Air Force plans respond to continuing downward projections in defense budgets.

To develop the FY92/93 budget, every program was scrutinized from top to bottom for relevance. We analyzed each mission area systematically to re-examine our most important requirements and rethink investment strategies. The results exploit America's aerospace technological edge to ensure maximum combat capabilities for the long term. At the same time, we have ruthlessly pursued efficiency to get the most combat power out of tax payers' dollars.

The Air Force has deliberately chosen to sacrifice size while continuing modernization and preserving readiness-to provide a smaller, but balanced, ready, and sustainable warfighting force. The dramatic reductions are illustrated in Figure 2. The Air Force is reducing active and civilian end-strength and increasing reliance on the Air Reserve Component to the maximum extent possible. We are also substantially cutting our bomber, ICBM, and fighter force structure. To sustain the combat effectiveness of this smaller force and position ourselves for the long-term challenge, we will continue to pursue the most vital modernization programs.

Deterrence of nuclear attack is the cornerstone of U.S. national security. The Soviet Union remains the only nation capable of destroying the United States, and for the foreseeable future the Soviets will retain the capability to deliver thousands of nuclear warheads against our nation. The TRIAD concept remains fundamental. Each leg of the TRIAD possesses unique and complementary characteristics which synergistically provide a retaliatory capability that no adversary could hope to successfully overcome. Air Force objectives in sustaining strategic deterrence are to maintain military sufficiency, flexibility, and stability in the post-START force. We continue scaled-back plans to modernize the two legs of the

Force Structure

The Bomber Force

The USAF's commitment to maintaining a viable long-range bomber force is rooted in the historical experience of long-range bomber development and operations, the bomber's indispensable role in supporting nuclear deterrence, and the unique versatility that makes it a particularly effective weapon for conventional operations and the projection of U.S. power.

The rapid changes to the global security environment have added unprecedented uncertainty to our security planning, increasing the importance of flexibility and adaptability. As we have seen in Operation Desert Storm, when the theater commander needed increased firepower, he called for additional heavy bombers. Understanding the versatility of heavy bombers-in both nuclear and conventional operations-is the key to understanding their utility. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring the long-term viability of the bomber force.

In the nuclear arena, the bomber enhances the stability of the nuclear balance. Its high survivability promises any aggressor that an attack will be met with devastating retaliation, while its relatively slow speed compared to ballistic missiles means that the bomber does not pose a credible first strike threat. Because it can be generated, dispersed, launched under positive control, and then recalled or redirected, the bomber also provides our nation's leaders with a highly flexible means of sending a variety of unmistakable messages to an adversary-messages that can help defuse and stabilize crises.

The United States currently fields two major types of heavy bombers-penetrating bombers and stand-off cruise missile carriers. A balanced combination of penetrating bombers and cruise missile carriers enhances deterrence by complicating the enemy defensive problem and adding targeting flexibility. Cruise missiles have proven to be a valuable complement to the penetrating bomber force; they extend the lives of older bombers no longer capable of penetrating effectively, add mass to the bomber attack by saturating defenses, and are excellent weapons against many fixed targets. The manned penetrating bomber is an extremely efficient, flexible, and effective system. The key to the penetrating bomber's warfighting versatility and efficient weapons delivery is the presence of a crew in the cockpit capable of reacting to situations and making decisions.

Moving to a pure cruise missile force would eliminate the advantages provided by penetrating bombers and introduce new vulnerabilities. Using long-range radars, airborne radar platforms, tankers, and fighters, Soviet air defenses could focus on detecting, tracking, and engaging non-stealthy

cruise missile carriers before they could launch their missiles. Such an approach would not work against a stealthy penetrating bomber. The USAF's highest priority is the acquisition of 75 B-2 bombers, the only stealth aircraft planned for fielding in the 1990s.

The advantages provided by stealth have been proven under fire. Figure 3 shows why such a small percentage of our combat aircraft—the F117 force-was able to cover such a large proportion of the target base in Desert Storm operations. Stealthy aircraft can penetrate defenses without the range of support assets required by non-stealth airframes-stealth provides more combat capability from a smaller number of assets with less risk to personnel. Stealth also aids in accurate delivery of munitions in combat the accuracy of stealthy aircraft is not degraded by survivability tactics. And such systems allow us to recapture the element of surprise.

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PRECISION AND STEALTH

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The B-2 will offer stealthier operations than the F-117 and greater payload/range capability than the B-52 or B-1B-the aircraft will provide extraordinary versatility in supporting nuclear deterrence and enhancing our conventional warfighting capabilities. And that is the kind of flexibility we need in our future smaller force structure.

Based on the need to balance reductions across all accounts and stabilize annual B-2 funding within a constrained resource environment, the budget limits annual B-2 investment (procurement and RDT&E) to approximately $5 billion. This budget funds four aircraft in FY92 and seven aircraft in FY93.

With the B-2 as the backbone of our bomber force, we will continue to upgrade the B-1B fleet and elements of the B-52 force. A defensive avionics recovery plan has been developed for the B-1B. And over the next few months, we will complete follow-on operational test and evaluation for conventional bombing certification of that aircraft. Budgetary pressures require us to accelerate retirement of the B-52G cruise missile carriers, although two squadrons of dedicated conventional B-52Gs will be retained. The B-52H force will transition to a pure cruise missile force, armed with both the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the stealthy Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). Approximately half of the B-52H force will be upgraded to also support conventional operations, thus increasing their versatility to meet the demands of this uncertain world environment.

ICBMs

ICBMs make unique contributions to the TRIAD. They are valued for their promptness, reliability, accuracy, low operating cost, connectivity, and availability-while their near 100% alert rate allows the other two legs of the TRIAD to operate at more economical tempos.

Soviet advancements in ICBM accuracy and increased MIRVing led to increasing concern over the survivability of our silo-based ICBM force and the potential for crisis instability. Adding mobility was deemed to be the best method of addressing these problems, which in turn led to the development of the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison (PRG) program, where Peacekeeper missiles would be mounted on trains, and the Small ICBM (SICBM) program, where single warhead missiles would be mounted on Hard Mobile Launchers (HMLs).

Our adjusted ICBM modernization plans reflect the new realities of the post-Cold War era. Mobility comes at a high cost to procure and operate. And potential future arms control talks beyond START are increasingly focusing on reducing or eliminating heavily MIRVed landbased systems such as Peacekeeper and the Soviet SS-18.

These factors have led to a re-evaluation of our missile modernization plans. We intend to validate the PRG basing mode, but will pause