piano boxes; there was a piece of land there and they went back there. It might have belonged to their father and belonged to them but they were certainly in a bad fix because these were not places where they could make a living.

Continuing with chart IV, if the strong downward trend from 191630 is projected into the post-war period, on the assumption that the depression interrupted this trend but that the heavy losses since 1940 have made up for the slackened migration during the 1930's, a postwar farm-population level of approximately 26,700,000 persons is indicated. On the other hand, the post-war level of farm population suggested by the over-all trend during the entire period 1916-44 is 28,800,000. This longer-time-trend level, however, is considerably weighted by the depression decade of the 1930's. Because the outmovement from farms during the war years has represented in large part a telescoping within a few years of the migration repressed during the preceding decade, it is likely that the post-war farm-population level will be substantially under the 1940 level.

Whether the actual farm-population level in the post-war period will be 26,000,000, 27,000,000, or 28,000,000 will largely depend on how far toward full employment our economy is operating. Should the farm population rise to 28,000,000 or more, agriculture's reabsorptive capacity would probably leave a considerable number of farm residents in the unemployed or greatly underemployed categories. On the other hand, if full industrial employment can be guaranteed, probably relatively few will desire to return to farms.

In recent surveys made of defense workers in the Portland, Oreg., shipyards 51.9 percent of the immigrant workers stated their intentions to stay in the area after the war; 30.6 percent said they would stay if they could obtain jobs; the other 21.3 percent did not qualify their intentions to stay. An additional 21.9 percent were undecided and only 21.6 percent indicated definite intentions to leave. By and large a higher percentage of the older than the younger workers_expressed their intentions to stay. A larger percentage of women than men expressed their intentions to stay, and a larger percentage of office than field workers said they would stay.

Even after the last war return migration to farms fell far short of bringing the farm population back to its pre-war level. If there had later not been a collapse in general business conditions the farm population would probably never have regained its wartime loss because the general trend in net population movements is away from, not to, farms.

I think the following concluding statements will serve to interpret the information I have presented:

(1) The volume of migration which agriculture can readily absorb following the war, even under favorable economic conditions, will be a volume approximately equal to the number of those who will withdraw, after the war, from the present agricultural working force.

(2) If there is full industrial employment few of those now employed in industry will choose to return to farms.

(3) Under any other conditions than extreme economic depression there will continue to be many boys and girls born and reared on farms who, as in the past, will move cityward. This is a normal trend.

(4) If we do suffer a depression the movement of population from farms will slow down and there may be a back-to-the-land movement.

(5) Any stimulation of civilians to move from industrial centers to farms will not only encourage an unnatural trend but invite agricultural maladjustment and agricultural underemployment. Farm born and reared boys returning from military service will probably more than suffice to replace all those withdrawing from the farmlabor force following the war.

(6) If economic conditions following the war are such as to warrant a movement of some presently industrially employed civilians to farms, the best possible planning will be necessary to guarantee, in as far as possible, that they settle in the best locations and receive the maximum technical agricultural guidance.

Because a high level of industrial employment appears to be the only sure means of forestalling an economically unhealthy post-war movement of population to the land and because such a movement would inevitably result in serious agricultural maladjustment the Bureau of Agricultural Economics has been attempting to do some constructive thinking concerning post-war demand for farm products. Dr. Bushrod Allin will present a statement on that subject.

Senator HAWKES. How many excess employees have gone to the Portland area that are in that calculation?

Mr. TAYLOR. I don't know.

Senator HAWKES. It was estimated 150,000 when I was out there. Does that mean anything to you, 150,000?

Mr. TAYLOR. It wouldn't sound abnormal to me at all.

Senator TAFT. Are these figures just taken among men who do come as migrant workers?

Mr. TAYLOR. This happens to be a survey done in the Kaiser shipyards.

Senator TAFT. I wondered if that included workers who were always living there.

Mr. TAYLOR. I think the tabulation would have told me that, but I don't have that tabulation with me.

Senator HAWKES. Will you read that again, 60 percent?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sixty percent of all workers expressed an intention of remaining in the areas if jobs were available.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator TAFT. The only thing that impresses me, the more jobs that are provided in the United States the more people come off the farms to create a need for more jobs.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, it seems to me the interesting fact is that right at the time when agriculture can least take care of more people is the very time when they come. And I do think that because agriculture is strung out all over the United States it isn't obvious like the city slum and that we can very easily develop a bad situation in agriculture without being conscious of it. It only shows up when you take a long look at it such as we have tried to do here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Taylor.

Mr. RUSSELL. May I ask Dr. Taylor just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. I gather from your statement that you think that percentagewise growth will probably take up less employment following the war than it took up prior to the war.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. Yes, I think so; and that has been a pretty steady trend in our economy ever since the frontier, our movement to the West, stopped.

Mr. RUSSELL. So that in supplying jobs or a greater number of jobs industry can look for no help from agriculture on that score?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; agriculture only takes care of more people when it really becomes the dumping ground. It doesn't really take care of them well when those times come; as we know from the depression. The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions? Thank you very much.

Mr. Allin.

STATEMENT OF BUSHROD ALLIN, BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL

ECONOMICS

Mr. ALLIN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, because of the very great uncertainty as to the future course of events, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics is thinking about post-war agriculture on the basis of specific assumptions concerning national income, employment, price levels, foreign trade, and other aspects of our economy which determine the level of agricultural prosperity. Our analysis of the meaning of these assumptions in terms of probable demand for farm products is helpful in clarifying our thinking about possible post-war employment opportunities in agriculture. With our assumptions defined, it is possible for anyone to apply his own judgment as to whether they are optimistic or pessimistic, and to modify our conclusions drawn from the analysis in either direction he may choose.

If we assume that after full transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy, the national income can be maintained at about $140,000,000,000 annually, which represents substantially full employment at the 1943 general price level, domestic and foreign demand for farm products at about parity prices would be sufficient to absorb a total output not greatly different from our 1943 production. The gross income to agriculture would be about $17,000,000,000 as compared with $20,000,000,000 in 1943, when average farm prices were 117 percent of parity.

The year 1943 was a war year, and farm prices then were abnormally high; hence, we assumed that in the post-war period they will be somewhat lower, even if the general price level should be substantially the same as in 1943. Under these assumptions per capita domestic consumption for all the major agricultural products would be not only higher but substantially higher than it was, for example, in 1935-39 or in 1941-years in which labor was not fully employed and the national income was considerably lower than $140,000,000,000. Table 10 contains these estimates.

The fact that consumers are disposed to purchase larger quantities of agricultural products in general, and substantially larger quantities of particular commodities, when labor is fully employed and business activity and national income are high, is a matter of great significance to agriculture. It demonstrates, as nothing else can, the farmer's interest in maintaining full employment and a high level of industrial activity and national income. For it means that he can sell not only a larger volume of agricultural products, but can sell this larger volume at more favorable prices than it is possible for him to do when business activity and the national income are depressed or are below the full employment level.

TABLE 10.-Estimated per capita consumption of major agricultural commodities under conditions of full employment for 1950, with historical comparisons

To complete our estimate of the possible total post-war demand for farm products, it was also necessary to make some assumptions with respect to imports and exports. In the 2 decades between the two World Wars our agricultural imports represented about 50 percent of all imports, and changes in our total imports followed closely changes in our national income. On the basis of past relationships, we may expect total annual imports of agricultural products after this war of about 22 billion dollars, if our national income is maintained at $140,000,000,000. These imports, of course, would include in large